

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

25 August 1978

*Dear Rich,*

*So be it  
MS*

The Archbishop Of Uganda

Thank you for your letter of 15 August and for meeting Archbishop Wani.

We are grateful for your offer to address a letter to Archbishop Wani placing on record any points worth making. We should, however, prefer to let matters rest. There is a risk that if we were to write to Archbishop Wani, suggesting improvements we would wish to see in Uganda, Amin would interpret this as a first step towards the resumption of relations, making renewed efforts to draw us into a dialogue. He would be likely to yield little of substance and could well indulge in mischief-making at our expense. Moreover, we have to consider the position of Archbishop Wani and the members of his Church. In all probability he was a reluctant emissary for Amin and may be anxious not to be further involved. If he were, we cannot rule out the possibility that he and the Church in Uganda would be made the scapegoat for any subsequent lack of progress in the restoration of our relations with Uganda. As it is, the Bishops have discharged their commission and can so report to Amin.

*Yours ever,*  
*Stephen*  
(J S Wall)

N Sanders Esq  
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

15 August 1978

The Archbishop of Uganda

As you suggested in your letter of 11 August, I met the Archbishop of Uganda and two of his colleagues this morning. They had little to add to the text of the letter of 4 August to the Prime Minister which we have already copied to you, except to say that they had been specifically authorised by President Amin to visit No. 10, and to express on behalf of the Church of Uganda the hope that relations would be re-established. They also said that President Amin had told them that he would be very willing to send a delegation to this country to discuss relations between us.

I undertook to pass their views on, but said that I could offer no comment on them, let alone any sort of reply.

It would be perfectly possible to leave the exchange there, but I will of course be glad to put on record in a letter to Archbishop Wani any points which seem to you to be worthwhile making. Could you please advise?

N. J. SANDERS

J. S. Wall, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



NOTE FOR THE RECORD

Archbishop Wani and two other bishops called on me on 15 August 1978.

I invited them to add anything they wished to their letter to the Prime Minister of 4 August. In reply they said that there was nothing of substance which they would wish to add, but they wanted to make it clear that they were acting with the express authority of President Amin, not only in writing to the Prime Minister but also in visiting No. 10.

They said on behalf of the Church that they would want to emphasise the wish of the ordinary people of Uganda that relations with this country should be re-established and the old cultural ties resumed. They fully appreciated the reasons which had led H.M.G. to sever relations, but felt them to be outweighed by more compelling reasons.

They said that President Amin had told them that he would be very glad to send an official delegation from Uganda for talks here if there was any prospect of an improvement in relations, and to meet a British delegation in Uganda subsequently.

I said that I would pass the message itself and their comments on it, but that as they would understand I was unable to offer anything in the way of comment or reply, and that the question of the resumption of relations necessarily depended on the human rights situation in Uganda.

At their request, some photographs were taken at the front door.

15 August 1978



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

11 August 1978

L11

Dear Arch,

The Archbishop of Uganda

Thank you for your letter of 7 August with which you enclosed a copy of a letter sent to the Prime Minister by Archbishop Wani of Uganda, asking for a meeting to convey a message from President Amin proposing a restoration of diplomatic relations with Britain.

The Prime Minister mentioned to Dr Owen in April that he had no interest whatever in warming up relations with General Amin. Dr Owen has recently concluded that it would be premature at this stage to take any initiative of a bilateral kind which could be interpreted by Amin and others as a first step towards the resumption of relations.

The Anglican church in Uganda has suffered considerable persecution at Amin's hands. It remains a focus for humane standards and as such merits our sympathy and support. We do not want to take any action which might put its members at risk at home. But Archbishop Wani has made clear that he is in this instance acting under instructions as an emissary of Amin for a political purpose. In these circumstances Dr Owen recommends against the Prime Minister or any other Minister receiving the Archbishop. However, Dr Owen thinks it would be wrong to rebuff the Archbishop since this would not only disappoint many Ugandan Christians, but also make good propaganda for Amin. Dr Owen suggests that Archbishop Wani should be received by a Private Secretary at No. 10. This would show that the Prime Minister had responded out of courtesy to the Archbishop but need not involve any discussion of substance. The Private Secretary could simply take note of whatever Archbishop Wani had to say and at the most explain that any move towards re-establishing relations would depend on the human rights situation in Uganda.

/ \* I enclose a draft reply to Archbishop Wani which reflects Dr Owen's advice.

*Jan Owen*  
*Stephen*  
J S Wall

N Sanders Esq  
10 Downing Street

\* See note for file 15/8  
for new address for Arch. Wani

Rutherford College,  
University of Kent,  
CANTERBURY, Kent.

4th August, 1978.

R5

The Right Honourable  
The Prime Minister  
10 Downing Street,  
LONDON, S.W.1.

Dear Prime Minister,

I and my fellow bishops of the Church of Uganda, before we left Kampala for the Lambeth Conference, had an opportunity to say farewell to our President, His Excellency Field Marshal Dr. Idi Amin Dada. On that occasion he expressed a desire to see our diplomatic relations with your country restored; and he requested us that while we are here we should seek an opportunity to convey this wish to you and your Government.

He especially requested us to inform you that on his part he has declared 1978 to be a year of reconciliation, peace and love. It was in this spirit that he requested restoration of relations between our two countries.

We also endorse his request very earnestly and sincerely as citizens of Uganda and as leaders of the Church of Uganda. We long to work together again and to re-establish cultural ties with the British with whom we had a Treaty relationship and very friendly co-operation for so long. We therefore wish to plead for the restoration of this relationship for good of us all.

If you would be kind enough to meet our Archbishop to convey personally this message to you, we would be very grateful.

Yours sincerely,

  
S. G. WANI  
Archbishop

for the Bishops of  
the Church of Uganda

Statement of William C. Harrop

Acting Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs

Before the Subcommittee on Africa, the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade and the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the House International Relations Committee, February 2, 1978

Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for inviting me to discuss with you the question of U.S. policy toward Uganda. I would like first to review very briefly the principal elements of our relationship with Uganda, and then I would be happy to respond to your questions.

At the outset, let me establish one point about which I believe there can be no doubt or dispute: the United States Government deplores the record of massive violations of fundamental human rights in Uganda. This record of violations has been documented by such respected organizations as the International Commission of Jurists. We must and will continue to make clear our opposition to and abhorrence of such flagrant disregard of fundamental human rights and denial of basic human dignity. I believe that this view reflects the sentiment of the Congress as well as the basic values and orientation of the American people. While we may occasionally differ as to the form in which our shared attitude is best expressed, I presume that there need be no

860 020/1

Debate over the fact or the sincerity of our basic premise that human rights conditions in Uganda are a source of deep concern to the United States.

U.S. relations with Uganda have been both limited and cool ever since 1973. In that year a number of problems led successively to the termination of our Peace Corps and AID programs and ultimately to the closing of the American Embassy in Kampala and the withdrawal of all U.S. personnel. Factors which prompted our official withdrawal included persistent internal security problems in the country, increasing operating difficulties for American programs and personnel, and repeated public threats against Embassy officials and other Americans in the country by high Ugandan officials. The abrupt expulsion of the U.S. Marine Security Guard responsible for the protection of the Embassy led to the final decision to withdraw our remaining personnel and close the Embassy in November of that year. Since that time, American interests in Uganda have been represented by the Federal Republic of Germany.

Under present circumstances, we have no reason to consider the reestablishment of a U.S. presence in Kampala, nor would we do so unless our overall relationship with Uganda were to improve considerably. A prerequisite for this would be a fundamental improvement in human rights conditions in Uganda.

The Ugandan Government has continued to maintain a small Embassy in Washington, currently headed by a Second Secretary as Charge d'Affaires. In keeping with the nature of our relations, the Department maintains working level contacts with the Embassy as necessary to conduct official business. No higher level of representation would be necessary or appropriate at present.

When we withdrew our Embassy from Kampala in 1973, based on the same concerns over unsettled conditions and threats against Americans that affected our official programs and personnel, we also advised private American residents of Uganda to depart. This guidance remains in effect and has been periodically reiterated to those concerned. In addition, we have issued travel advisories cautioning American travelers against visiting Uganda -- whether for business, pleasure or any other purpose. Nevertheless, we have no authority to prevent Americans from traveling to Uganda or to require Americans resident in Uganda to leave, and somewhat over 200 Americans still reside there. (Approximately a third of these are missionaries; just under a third are professional and technical personnel working under a variety of international and private auspices; the remainder include students, visitors, some dependents of Ugandans and others). The continued presence of these Americans in Uganda and our concern and

responsibility for them is a factor which we must take into account in all our decision-making regarding Uganda.

We continue to deny bilateral U.S. assistance to Uganda, in accordance both with executive branch policy and with recent legislation. Moreover, U.S. representatives to international development banks are under instructions to oppose and vote against loans to Uganda.

Although private commercial trade with Uganda has continued, Uganda does not currently benefit from U.S. programs promoting trade and investments. Neither Eximbank nor OPIC have been active in Uganda since 1973, and Uganda's exports have not been made eligible for general tariff preferences ("GSP").

Further, we do not and will not license exports to Uganda of items on the munitions list; we believe such exports would be manifestly incompatible with our human rights concerns and interests. We also review other exports to Uganda from the human rights perspective, and in cooperation with the Department of Commerce deny exports which would in our estimation contribute directly to continued human rights violations. This would include, for example, the sale of helicopters or other such equipment to the Ugandan security establishment.

In response to the discovery last fall that Ugandan police personnel were in this country undergoing commercial helicopter training (without the Department's advance knowledge), we instituted a new procedure under which visa applications by officially-connected Ugandans and other representatives of Uganda must be referred to the Department for review. This procedure enables us to prevent travel by Ugandans to the United States such as that of the helicopter personnel which would be incompatible with our human rights interests. (On these same grounds, we also made extraordinary efforts to bring about the early termination of the helicopter training program, efforts which were at least partially successful.)

Overall, then, our bilateral relations with Uganda are highly restricted, most specifically with respect to matters touching fundamental human rights. Within the international community we have also expressed our concerns over Uganda's human rights situation. We strongly supported efforts at the United Nations Human Rights Commission meeting in March of 1977 to bring about a full examination and discussion of Uganda's human rights problems, in the hope that such attention would lead to amelioration of conditions within Uganda. Similarly, we welcomed the introduction of a resolution on this subject by the Nordic states in the UN General Assembly's



Third Committee in December, and the informal agreement which resulted from this discussion that the issue will be given serious consideration at the upcoming 1978 session of the Human Rights Commission. We have made clear throughout our hope that the Ugandan Government would cooperate with such efforts; we continue to hope that this will be the case.

Finally, it is our policy to provide humanitarian assistance to refugees from Uganda, both through contributions to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and through special assistance (such as in the education field) where particular needs are identified.

As you know, a number of proposals have been made for additional U.S. actions with respect to Uganda. These proposals include barring U.S. trade with Uganda, closing down the Ugandan Embassy in Washington and placing travel restrictions on Uganda's representatives to the UN, and prohibiting Ugandan aircraft from landing on U.S. territory. Frankly, it is the Administration's view that these proposals go farther than is advisable at the present time.

With respect to a trade boycott, we believe that the imposition of a unilateral export and/or import embargo on Uganda would be neither advisable nor likely to be effective.  
The U.S. is committed to the principles of free trade, as

incorporated in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

Whenever these principles are set aside, their overall authority as protection for our worldwide trade interests is undermined and others are encouraged to take similar actions.

This is potentially harmful not only to the U.S. but to the world economy generally. Additionally, in the absence of any significant international participation or support -- which is highly unlikely under present circumstances -- we believe that such a boycott in the case of Uganda would not be effective. U.S. imports from Uganda consist almost

exclusively of coffee, and given the present high price of coffee in world markets Uganda could readily find other outlets for its coffee now sold to the U.S. As to U.S. exports to Uganda, which have been very modest in value in recent years, Uganda could very easily find alternative sources for these products.

Nor do we favor breaking relations with Uganda and closing the Ugandan Embassy in Washington or otherwise placing special restrictions on the Ugandan diplomats in this country. We do not view the maintenance of diplomatic relations with another government as implying approval of that government's policies. Except in the most unusual circumstances, we do not favor severing the communications link provided by diplomatic representation. This is why, when we closed our Embassy and withdrew our personnel from

Kampala in 1973, we did not characterize this step as a break in relations and did not require the Ugandans to close their Embassy in Washington. The continued presence of a small Ugandan Embassy here has provided a useful direct communications link, especially in emergency situations such as the February 1977 events when the Ugandan Government temporarily barred Americans from leaving Uganda.

As to imposing travel restrictions on Ugandan personnel accredited to the United Nations, basic U.S. practice has been to restrict the travel of foreign personnel in this country only in instances where those governments have placed similar restrictions on American diplomats. This is not the case with Uganda. Such restrictions would also go against the spirit of our obligations as host country for the United Nations. We are aware of allegations that Ugandan personnel in Washington and New York are engaging in improper activities directed against Ugandan exiles in the United States. We have no concrete evidence that this is the case, but if specific problems of this sort were identified, we have more direct methods of rectifying this type of situation than through the imposition of generalized (and difficult to enforce) travel restrictions.

Finally, as to landing rights of Ugandan aircraft in the United States, we do not believe that the purposes for which Ugandan aircraft have landed in this country raise

general problems from the human rights or foreign policy perspectives. However, these flights are subject to standard customs and immigration inspection procedures, and we would of course consider appropriate remedial action should it be determined that these flights are being used for purposes inconsistent with U.S. law or policy.

To summarize, our policy toward Uganda is one of consciously distancing the United States from human rights violations in that country, denying Uganda U.S. products and facilities which would in our view directly contribute to continued human rights violations, and encouraging more concerted international attention to this situation. We believe that this is the most active, realistic and effective approach available to us under present circumstances.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would now welcome your questions.

GR 383

CONFIDENTIAL

*File + po.*

FLASH

CYPHER CAT A

*DR 17/6*

FM FCO 161131Z

CONFIDENTIAL

TO FLASH JEDDA TELNO 383 OF 16 JUNE

INFO PARIS

UGANDAN INTERESTS SECTION IN LONDON

1. WE HAVE TODAY INFORMED THE SAUDI AMBASSADOR IN LONDON THAT THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT SHOULD CEASE TO PROTECT UGANDAN INTERESTS IN THIS COUNTRY AND HAVE REQUESTED THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE UGANDAN INTERESTS SECTION. THIS ACTION HAS BEEN ANNOUNCED TO THE PRESS PLEASE TAKE PARALLEL ACTION WITH THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT SPEAKING ON THE FOLLOWING LINES.

2. THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT WILL BE AWARE THAT HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT HAVE WITHDRAWN THE BRITISH INTERESTS SECTION FROM THE FRENCH EMBASSY IN KAMPALA. WE HAVE DONE THIS BECAUSE THE UGANDAN GOVERNMENT INSISTED THAT THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT SHOULD CEASE TO ACT AS OUR PROTECTING POWER IN UGANDA AND SUGGESTED THAT THE FRENCH EMBASSY HAD CONDONED ESPIONAGE BY THE BRITISH INTERESTS SECTION. THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR IN KAMPALA HAS INFORMED THE UGANDAN GOVERNMENT THAT HM GOVERNMENT HAVE EVERY CONFIDENCE IN THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT AS OUR PROTECTING POWER AND THAT WE ARE IN NO DOUBT THAT THEY HAVE ACTED CORRECTLY IN DISCHARGING THEIR DUTIES. HM GOVERNMENT ARE NOT THEREFORE PREPARED TO SEEK AN ALTERNATIVE PROTECTING POWER AND WERE LEFT WITH NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO WITHDRAW THE BRITISH INTERESTS SECTION.

CONFIDENTIAL

3. HM GOVERNMENT MUST NOW ASK THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT TO CEASE  
LOOKING AFTER UGANDAN INTERESTS IN THIS COUNTRY AND REQUEST THE  
WITHDRAWAL OF THE UGANDAN INTERESTS SECTION. THIS IS NOT TO BE  
REGARDED AS AN ACT OF RETALIATION. IT IS SIMPLY THAT WE  
HAVE WITHDRAWN THE BRITISH INTERESTS SECTION IN KAMPALA BECAUSE  
THERE IS NO FURTHER FUNCTION THEY USEFULLY PERFORM THERE.  
AS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE UGANDAN INTERESTS SECTION IN LONDON  
WAS HERE ON A RECIPROCAL BASIS IT THEREFORE FOLLOWS THAT THEY  
SHOULD NOW ALSO LEAVE. MEMBERS OF THE UGANDAN INTERESTS SECTION  
WILL OF COURSE BE PERMITTED A REASONABLE PERIOD - SAY UP TO  
ONE WEEK - TO SETTLE THEIR AFFAIRS. DURING THIS PERIOD  
THEY MAY CONTINUE TO ENJOY THE PROTECTION OF THE SAUDI EMBASSY.

OWEN

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION  
EAD  
MED  
WED  
P & CD  
CONS DEPT

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

- 2 -

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Enter pa  
RTN  
15/6

GR 370

FLASH

CYPHER CAT A

FM F C O 142044Z

CONFIDENTIAL

TO FLASH PARIS TELEGRAM NUMBER 407 OF 14 JUNE  
INFO FLASH KAMPALA IMMEDIATE NAIROBI

MY TELNO. 403: BRITISH INTERESTS SECTION IN KAMPALA.

1. IN THE LIGHT OF YOUR DISCUSSION WITH THE QUAI I HAVE NOW DECIDED THAT, ASSUMING THE UGANDANS PERSIST IN THEIR DEMAND THAT THE FRENCH CEASE TO ACT AS OUR PROTECTING POWER, THE BIS WILL BE WITHDRAWN IMMEDIATELY FROM KAMPALA.
2. I SHALL BE GRATEFUL THEREFORE IF M. RENARD COULD BE ASKED TO INFORM THE UGANDANS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE THAT HM GOVERNMENT HAVE EVERY CONFIDENCE IN THE FRENCH AS THEIR PROTECTING POWER IN UGANDA AND ARE IN NO DOUBT THAT THE FRENCH HAVE AT ALL TIMES ACTED CORRECTLY IN DISCHARGE OF THEIR DUTIES. HM GOVERNMENT ARE THEREFORE NOT (NOT) PREPARED TO SEEK AN ALTERNATIVE PROTECTING POWER. IF THE UGANDANS INSIST THEY SHOULD BE TOLD THAT , THE BRITISH INTERESTS SECTION WILL BE WITHDRAWN WITH IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
3. FOR FRENCH INFORMATION WE PROPOSE TO TAKE RECIPROCAL ACTION IN LONDON, IE ASK THE SAUDIS TO CEASE LOOKING AFTER UGANDAN INTERESTS HERE AND REQUEST THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE UGANDAN INTERESTS SECTION. IN ORDER, HOWEVER, TO AVOID PROVOKING THE UGANDANS INTO ACTION AGAINST THE BIS IN KAMPALA (SUCH AS PREVENTION OF THEIR DEPARTURE) WE PROPOSE TO HOLD OUR HAND ON THIS UNTIL THEY ARE SAFELY OUT OF THE COUNTRY.

14. FOR BIS

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

4. FOR BIS KAMPALA. YOU SHOULD MAKE ARRANGEMENTS TO LEAVE IMMEDIATELY REPEAT IMMEDIATELY (BY FIRST AVAILABLE AIRCRAFT) AFTER THE UGANDANS HAVE BEEN INFORMED OF OUR DECISION THAT YOU BE WITHDRAWN. YOU SHOULD GO TO THE NEAREST AVAILABLE COUNTRY AND FLY ON TO LONDON AS FEASIBLE.

5. M. RENARD IS RECEIVING INSTRUCTIONS DIRECT FROM THE QUAI TO FACILITATE YOUR DEPARTURE BY ALL MEANS POSSIBLE. PLEASE CONVEY TO HIM MY GRATITUDE FOR HIS EXCELLENT CO-OPERATION IN THESE DIFFICULT TIMES.

OWEN

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

EAD

CONSULAR D

CONS FM UNIT

PCD

NAWS D

NYD

CCD

ASD

WED

SECURITY D

FINANCE D

POD

APD

PSD

OADS

CABINET OFFICE

[COPIES SENT TO  
NO 10 DOWNING ST]

CONFIDENTIAL



RESTRICTED

Ende rps  
RJA  
15/6

120

CYPHER CAT A

FM PARIS 141641Z

RESTRICTED

TO PRIORITY KINSHASA TELNO 001 OF 14 JUNE  
INFO ROUTINE FCO WASHINGTON NAIROBI KAMPALA

KINSHASA TELNO 1 TO PARIS: MOBUTU AND UGANDA

1. AFTER HIS MEETING OVER LUNCH WITH PRESIDENT GISCARD ON 10 JUNE, PRESIDENT MOBUTU WAS ASKED (ACCORDING TO AFP,) "IF HE COULD NOT INTERVENE WITH MARSHALL AMIN DADA TO ASK HIM TO BE MORE CONCILIATORY TOWARDS FOREIGN NATIONALS. THE ZAIRIAN HEAD OF STATE REPLIED THAT HE HAD ALREADY DONE THIS WITH SOME SUCCESS ON TWO OCCASSIONS: LAST YEAR (SIC) IN SUPPORT OF DR (SIC) HILLS CONDEMNED TO DEATH BY A UGANDAN COURT, AND MORE RECENTLY OVER AMERICAN CITIZENS".

2. WE HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO DISCOVER ANY REFERENCE TO A UGANDAN VISIT BY MOBUTU OR POSSIBLE FUTURE MEDIATION. HE MADE NO REFERENCE TO EITHER POINT IN THE INTERVIEWS WHICH HE GAVE TO LE MONDE AND LE FIGARO.

HENDERSON

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

DEPTL DISTN

EAD

CONS D

CONS EM UNIT

NEWS D

CC D

WE D

RESTRICTED

CONFIDENTIAL

*Entrepa RSN 14/6*

GR150

IMMEDIATE

CYPHER CAT A.

FM F C O 131922Z

CONFIDENTIAL

TO IMMEDIATE KAMPALA TELNO 142 OF 13 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS PRIORITY NAIROBI

1. WE HAVE TOLD FRNCH GOVERNMENT THAT SUBJECT TO THEIR VIEWS AND IF THE UGANDANS PERSIST IN DEMANDING THAT THEY SHOULD CEASE TO LOOK AFTER OUR INTERESTS, WE INTEND TO WITHDRAW THE BIS RATHER THAN ASK ANOTHER GOVERNMENT TO TAKE OVER THIS RESPONSIBILITY. THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT WILL BE CONSULTING M. RENARD ON HOW BEST TO PRESENT THIS TO UGANDANS, BUT MEANWHILE YOU SHOULD, IN CONSULTATION WITH M. RENARD, MAKE ALL POSSIBLE DISPOSITIONS, IN STRICT SECRECY, FOR YOURSELVES AND FAMILIES TO LEAVE UGANDA RAPIDLY. THIS IS ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE GENERAL BAN ON BRITISH CITIZENS LEAVING THE COUNTRY WILL NOT APPLY TO YOU AND WELBORN, IN VIEW OF YOUR DIPLOMATIC STATUS. SUBJECT TO YOUR VIEWS, WE THINK IT WOULD BE BEST FOR YOU TO PLAN TO LEAVE BY AIR.
2. IN THE LIGHT OF FRENCH VIEWS, WE WILL SEND FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS.
3. WE WILL ADVISE YOU URGENTLY ABOUT DISPOSITION OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE PROPERTY.

OWEN

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

EAD  
CONS D  
CONS EMERG UNIT  
P & C D  
NEWS D  
NTD  
CCD  
ASD  
WED  
SECURITY D  
FINANCE D  
POD  
PPD  
PSD  
OADs  
CABINET OFFICE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Conte & P.  
RJR  
14/6

NR 360

IMMEDIATE

CYPHER CAT A

FM FCO 131921Z

CONFIDENTIAL

TO IMMEDIATE PARIS TELNO 403 OF 13 JUNE  
INFO PRIORITY NAIROBI

KAMPALA TELNO 143 AND TELECON EWANS/GORDON LENNOX; UGANDA

1. P U S INFORMED FRENCH AMBASSADOR THIS AFTERNOON OF MY DECISION THAT WE SHOULD NOT (NOT) ASK ANOTHER GOVERNMENT TO TAKE OVER FROM THE FRENCH THEIR RESPONSIBILITY FOR LOOKING AFTER BRITISH INTERESTS IN UGANDA, INSTEAD, IF THE UGANDANS MAINTAIN THEIR DEMAND AND SUBJECT TO FRENCH VIEWS, WE WOULD WITHDRAW THE BRITISH INTERESTS SECTION
2. THE P U S TOLD M. BEAUMARCHAIS THAT I WISHED THE UGANDANS TO BE INFORMED THAT WE WOULD TAKE RECIPROCAL ACTION IN LONDON; IE ASK THE SAUDIS TO CEASE LOOKING AFTER UGANDAN INTERESTS HERE AND REQUEST THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE UGANDAN INTERESTS SECTION. WE WERE IN SOME DOUBT, HOWEVER, ABOUT THE ADVISABILITY OF PUTTING THIS TO THE UGANDANS INITIALLY, SINCE IT MIGHT PROVOKE THEM TO PREVENT THE DEPARTURE OF THE B I S. WE WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR M. RENARD'S VIEWS ON THIS. IT MIGHT BE PREFERABLE TO WITHDRAW THE B I S AND ONLY TAKE RECIPROCAL ACTION AFTER THEIR DEPARTURE.
3. PLEASE TELL THE QUAI THAT SINCE THE P U S TALKED TO THE AMBASSADOR, I HAVE CONCLUDED THAT THE LATTER COURSE WOULD BE PREFERABLE, ASSUMING UGANDAN INSISTENCE THAT THE FRENCH SHOULD NO LONGER LOOK AFTER OUR INTERESTS. WE HOPE IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR THE FRENCH EMBASSY TO ARRANGE FOR THE B I S AND FAMILIES TO BE MOVED OUT UNDER FRENCH PROTECTION AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE. SEE MY SEPARATE TELEGRAM TO KAMPALA.
4. P U S ALSO TOLD THE AMBASSADOR THAT MINISTERS WOULD LIKE THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT TO BE AWARE THAT PRESIDENT AMIN'S RECENT ACTIONS, AND INDEED THE WHOLE PROBLEM OF UGANDA AND HUMAN RIGHTS THERE, SHOULD BE THE CONCERN OF THE WHOLE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY. IT SHOULD BE MADE CLEAR TO AMIN THAT IN TAKING ACTION AGAINST BRITISH

CONFIDENTIAL

/ REPRESENTATION

CONFIDENTIAL

REPRESENTATION AND HARASSING OUR COMMUNITY, HE CALLS INTO QUESTION NOT JUST HIS RELATIONS WITH BRITAIN, BUT ALSO HIS RELATIONS WITH FRANCE AND OTHER COMMUNITY COUNTRIES. THE AMBASSADOR WAS TOLD THAT THE SECRETARY OF STATE INTENDED TO RAISE UGANDA WITH HIS COLLEAGUES AT THE RESTRICTED SESSION OF THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COUNCIL ON 21 JUNE.

5. P U S FINALLY RE-EMPHASISED MINISTERS' APPRECIATION OF THE FRENCH EFFORTS ON OUR BEHALF IN UGANDA, PARTICULARLY THOSE OF M. RENARD.

OWEN

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

EAD  
CONS D  
CONS EMERG UNIT  
P & C D  
NEWS D  
NTD  
CCD  
ASD  
WED  
SECURITY D  
FINANCE D  
POD  
PPD  
PSD  
OADs  
CABINET OFFICE

CONFIDENTIAL

FLASH

CYPHER CAT A

Cable  
RST  
13/6

FM KAMPALA 111000Z

CONFIDENTIAL

TO FLASH FCO TELNO 141 OF 11 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS AND NAIROBI ROUTINE KINSHASA WASHINGTON.

MY TEL NO 137 CHGM.

THIS MORNING FRENCH AMBASSADOR SENT TO FOREIGN MINISTER TEXT OF  
QUAIS COMMUNIQUE OF 10 JUNE ABOUT UGANDAN REQUEST TO FRENCH  
GOVERNMENT TO END ITS RESPONSIBILITIES FOR BRITISH INTERESTS IN  
UGANDA.

2. LATER ORIS TELEPHONED M RENARD TO EXPRESS HIS CONCERN AT  
CONTINUING ESCALATION AND TO SUGGEST THAT BETWEEN THEM THEY SHOULD  
COOL SITUATION. M RENARD SAID THAT HE WAITED UGANDAN EVIDENCE OF  
EMBASSY INVOLVEMENT IN SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES, TO WHICH ORIS REPLIED  
HE HOPED TO PROVIDE IT ON MONDAY 13 JUNE. M RENARD EXPLAINED THAT  
QUAI HAS BEEN IN TOUCH WITH YOU, BUT HE DID NOT EXPECT TO RECEIVE  
YOUR DECISION FOR A FEW DAYS, CERTAINLY NOT BY MONDAY. M RENARD  
COULD NOT FORECAST OUTCOME OF YOUR DELIBERATIONS.

3. IT IS TOO EARLY TO INTERPRET THIS DEVELOPMENT AS FIRST UGANDA  
STEP TOWARDS DEESCALATION.

GLASBY

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

## DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

EAD

CONS DEPT

CONS EM UNIT

NEWS DEPT

CCD

WED

[COPIES SENT TO NO. 10 DOWNING STREET AND CABINET OFFICE]

[RECEIVED VIA FRENCH EMBASSY]

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

10 June 1977

*Pine*

*R 10/6*

*Dear Patrick,*

Uganda

You will wish to have a report on recent developments in Uganda and what action we are taking to meet them.

On 8 June, Radio Uganda announced that no British subject would be allowed to leave the country and that their plight would be determined when President Amin returned from the CHGM. We know that this has been put into effect because two UK citizens have been prevented from leaving the country (although another, on UN documentation, was allowed to leave). On 9 June, Radio Uganda announced that President Amin had "returned home" to discover that a British subject had been arrested in his absence for spying and said that he would be tried by a military tribunal and executed if found guilty. Radio Uganda went on to say that Amin had received "concrete evidence" that some Britons were using the French Embassy's facilities "for anti-Uganda subversive activities". President Amin had said that the French should cease to look after British subjects in Uganda with immediate effect. The French Embassy subsequently received an official Note confirming the latter statement,

Radio Uganda announced this morning that the name of the arrested British "spy" was Cullen (phonetic - as monitored by the BBC). This name does not appear in the lists of the British community held by us. It is possible that the name is Collins. It is much more likely, however, from all the evidence available, that the person concerned is in fact Mr Robert Scanlon, a Ugandan citizen of UK origin, who renounced his UK citizenship at the end of 1975. We have had a report from the Head of the British Interests Section (BIS) in Kampala that Scanlon was arrested by the State Research Bureau on the afternoon of 9 June, ie after the Radio Uganda announcement. It is just possible that this arrest was additional to the one announced on the radio but it seems more likely that the announcement was in anticipation of the actual arrest. A further Radio Uganda report just received this afternoon states that Britons may not travel by car in groups of more than three and will be put in gaol if they do.

The French adopted a robust attitude towards the Ugandan demand that they cease to look after British interests in Uganda. The French Ambassador saw the Ugandan Foreign Minister this morning and handed over a Note denying that the French were permitting espionage by the BIS, insisting that the French had acted in all

/respects

Patrick Wright Esq.,  
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL



respects correctly and had protected the British community as agreed with the Ugandans, and insisting that the French should have the right to continue to protect British interests. The Ambassador added that, even in the light of President Amin's request, he still regarded the British Interests Section staff as members of his Mission and in this respect enjoyed his protection and diplomatic immunity. The Ugandan Foreign Minister did not oppose this view but pressed for the re-attachment of the BIS to another Embassy in Kampala. The French Ambassador also asked for consular access to the arrested British subject (on the assumption that this was other than Mr Scanlon) and said that when granted he would send a member of the BIS to visit him.

The French have, however, now told us that they feel they have no choice but to comply with the Ugandan demand. We consider that this is a perfectly reasonable attitude: international law is quite clear that the agreement of the host country is necessary for a protection arrangement of this kind.

Despite this development, we have asked the French whether they can see their way to making informal enquiries about Mr Scanlon in view of his British origins, his family in Kampala, who are still UK citizens, and his relatives in this country. We do not yet know whether the French will be able to act in this way for us but our own interests section are in touch with the family and doing what they can for them.

We now have to consider what alternative arrangements we should make for the protection of our interests in Uganda. The options are (a) to ask another Western European power to act for us (in practice only the Italians are available and they are likely to be considerably less effective, than the French even if they were willing); (b) to approach a non-European power, perhaps Saudi Arabia; or (c) to conclude that there is no purpose to be served by representation in Uganda at this juncture and to withdraw our staff. If we wished to act firmly on the issue, we could also reciprocate against the Ugandan Interests Section in the Saudi Arabian Embassy here.

Dr Owen wishes to give these options careful consideration and will advise the Prime Minister as soon as possible after the weekend. In the meantime, the French have assured us that their communications remain available to us if we need to contact the British Interests Section in Kampala; and we are sure the French will continue to give their hospitality to our two staff until we can make alternative arrangements.

*Jans ever,  
Stephen*

(J. S. Wall)

FLASH

CONFIDENTIAL

HER CAT A

Uganda  
Part 2  
16/6

FM KAMPALA 091615Z

CONFIDENTIAL

TO FLASH FCO TEL NO 131 OF 9 JUNE AND TO IMMEDIATE  
PARIS WASHINGTON NAIROBI AND KINSHASA.

MY TELEGRAM NO 130 TO FCO.

THIS EVENINGS 1700 HOURS RADIO UGANDA NEWS ANNOUNCED THAT:

- A) AMIN HAD RETURNED FROM THE RWANDAN/TANZANIAN/UGANDAN BORDERS WHERE HE HAD HAD USEFUL TALKS WITH REVOLUTIONARY LEADERS FROM TANZANIA AND ZAMBIA. THE COMMONWEALTH WAS NOT AS IMPORTANT AS OAU, UNITED NATIONS, NON ALIGNED ORGANISATION AND WAS FULL OF IMPERIALIST MINDED MEMBERS.
- B) A BRITON HAD BEEN ARRESTED FOR SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES, HAVING BEEN DENOUNCED TO UGANDAN AUTHORITIES BY A BELGIAN. PRISONER WAS BEING HELD IN A REMOTE PART OF UGANDA, WOULD BE TRIED BY A MILITARY TRIBUNAL AND EXECUTED BY FIRING SQUAD IF FOUND GUILTY.
- C) ANYONE BUYING BRITISH PROPERTY IN UGANDA DID SO AT THEIR OWN RISK.
- D) FRENCH/UGANDAN RELATIONS WERE GOOD AND FORMER SHOULD NOT BE INVOLVED IN BRITISH AFFAIRS. THEREFORE FRENCH EMBASSY SHOULD CEASE TO BE RESPONSIBLE FOR BRITISH INTERESTS AND HMG SHOULD FIND A REPLACEMENT, UNDER WHICH WELBORN AND MYSELF COULD REMAIN IN UGANDA.

2. THE ANNOUNCEMENT THEREFORE CONSTITUTES THE NEXT ESCALATORY STEP. IT ADMITS THAT AMIN IS BACK IN UGANDA, WITHOUT CONCEDED THAT HE HAS NEVER ATTENDED CHQM. THE CRITICISM OF COMMONWEALTH IS NO DOUBT INTENDED TO EXPLAIN THIS.

/3. PREDICTABLY

CONFIDENTIAL



3. PREDICTABLY THE ARREST OF A UKC HERALDS THE EARLY STAGES OF ANOTHER HILLS AFFAIR. PRISONER COULD BE ELIAS OR QUOTE PAUL UNQUOTE, I KNOW OF NO OTHER POSSIBILITIES.

4. THE ORDER TO SWITCH PROTECTING POWERS IN EFFECT AIMS TO NEGATE UGANDAN GOVERNMENT AGREEMENT TO ESTABLISHMENT OF BRITISH INTERESTS SECTION UNDER FRENCH PROTECTION.

YOU WILL NO DOUBT WISH TO CONSULT QUAI AND SPEAK TO SAUDI AMBASSADOR ON THIS, BUT IN MEANTIME H.E. IS REPLYING TO FOREIGN MINISTER MAKING FOLLOWING POINTS:

A) ASKING FOR DETAILS OF SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES BY UKCS IN WHICH ALLEGEDLY FRENCH FACILITIES HAVE BEEN USED.

B) DETAILS OF ARRESTED BRITON, REASONS ETC..

C) INFORMING FOREIGN MINISTER THAT, PENDING RECEIPT OF INSTRUCTIONS, HE CANNOT REGARD HIMSELF AS BEING UNILATERALLY DISCHARGED OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES FOR BRITISH AFFAIRS.

GLASBY

[RECEIVED VIA FRENCH EMBASSY]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

EAD  
CONS D  
CONS EM UNIT  
NEWS D  
CCD  
WED

COPIES TO:

~~PS/NO. 10~~ 10 DOWNING STREET  
DIO CABINET OFFICE

CONFIDENTIAL

Enter + pa.

RJN

10/6

CYPHER CAT A

FLASH

FM KAMPALA 091515Z

CONFIDENTIAL.

TO FLASH FCO TELNO 130 OF 9 JUNE

AND TO IMMEDIATE PARIS, WASHINGTON, NAIROBI, KINSHASA.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF NOTE TO FRENCH AMBASSADOR OF TODAY'S DATE  
DELIVERED THIS EVENING.

QUOTE

BEGINS. I AM DIRECTED BY HIS EXCELLENCY THE LIFE PRESIDENT TO  
INFORM YOU THAT HIS EXCELLENCY HAS RECEIVED INFORMATION AND  
CONCRETE EVIDENCE FROM THE SECURITY FORCES TO THE EFFECT THAT SOME  
BRITISH NATIONALS ARE USING FACILITIES GIVEN BY THE FRENCH EMBASSY  
FOR SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES AGAINST UGANDA.

HIS EXCELLENCY HAS FURTHER ASKED ME TO INFORM YOU THAT THE GOVERNMENT  
AND THE PEOPLE OF FRANCE, UNDER THE WISE LEADERSHIP OF HIS EXCELLENCY  
PRESIDENT VALERY GISCARD D'ESTAING OF FRANCE, ENJOY EXCELLENT  
RELATIONS WITH THE GOVERNMENT AND THE PEOPLE OF UGANDA, AND ALSO THE  
FRENCH GOVERNMENT HAS VERY GOOD RELATIONS WITH MANY AFRICAN COUNTRIES  
AS WELL AS THE ARAB WORLD.

IN VIEW OF THESE EXCELLENT RELATIONS, HIS EXCELLENCY THE LIFE  
PRESIDENT DOES NOT WISH THE BRITISH NATIONALS OR THE BRITISH  
GOVERNMENT TO INVOLVE FRANCE IN MATTERS CONCERNING BRITAIN AND  
UGANDA.

FOR THIS REASON, HIS EXCELLENCY THE LIFE PRESIDENT HAS ASKED ME  
TO INFORM YOU, AND THROUGH YOU, THE GOVERNMENT OF FRANCE, THAT  
THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT SHOULD CEASE TO LOOK AFTER THE INTERESTS OF  
BRITAIN IN UGANDA. HIS EXCELLENCY'S DECISION DOES NOT MEAN THAT  
THE TWO BRITONS NOW WORKING IN YOUR EMBASSY AND LOOKING AFTER THE  
BRITISH INTERESTS SHOULD LEAVE UGANDA. THESE TWO BRITONS, HIS

/EXCELLENCY STATED

CONFIDENTIAL

EXCELLENCY STATED, MAY REMAIN IN UGANDA BUT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT SHOULD APPOINT ANOTHER EMBASSY TO LOOK AFTER HER INTERESTS IN UGANDA.

PLEASE ACCEPT YOUR EXCELLENCY THE ASSURANCES OF MY HIGHEST CONSIDERATION.

J.E. EKOCHU

PRINCIPAL PRIVATE SECRETARY TO THE PRESIDENT

ENDS

UNQUOTE

2. FURTHER FLASH TELEGRAM FOLLOWS.

GLASBY

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

EAD

CONSULAR D

CONS RM UNIT

WED

CCD

CABINET OFFICE

COPIES TO

DIO

CABINET OFFICE

[COPIES SENT TO  
NO 10 DOWNING ST]

2

CONFIDENTIAL

FLASH  
CYPHER CAT A

FM PARIS 091625Z

*Gule ops*  
*RSN*  
*10/6*

CONFIDENTIAL

TO FLASH FCO TELNO 581 OF 9 JUNE

TELECON HUNT - WALDEN: BRITISH COMMUNITY IN UGANDA.

1. MINISTER TELEPHONED GEORGY, DIRECTEUR D'AFRIQUE, AT THE QUAI D'ORSAY TO ASK HIM FOR HIS PRELIMINARY TO RENARD'S TELEPHONE MESSAGE ABOUT FRENCH PROTECTION OF THE BRITISH COMMUNITY. GEORGY TOLD MINISTER THAT THEY WERE INSTRUCTING M RENARD TO MAKE A DEMARCHE TO THE UGANDA GOVERNMENT SAYING THAT THEY REJECTED THE SUGGESTION IN A REUTERS REPORT THAT THE EMBASSY WERE PERMITTING ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES BY THE BRITISH INTERESTS SECTION TO GO ON AGAINST THE UGANDA GOVERNMENT. M RENARD WOULD ALSO BE INSTRUCTED TO INSIST THAT THE FRENCH EMBASSY HAD ACTED IN ALL RESPECTS CORRECTLY AND HAD FULFILLED A NORMAL ROLE IN PROTECTING THE INTERESTS OF THE FRENCH COMMUNITY AND, AS AGREED WITH THE UGANDAN AUTHORITIES, THE BRITISH COMMUNITY FOR WHICH THEY WERE RESPONSIBLE. THE FRENCH WERE GOING TO INSIST THAT THEY SHOULD HAVE THE RIGHT TO CONTINUE TO REPRESENT OUR INTERESTS. THEY WOULD OF COURSE HAVE TO SEE HOW THE UGANDAN AUTHORITIES REACTED TO THIS.

2. GEORGY ADDED THAT THEIR POLICY WAS TO TRY AND ADOPT AS NEUTRAL A ROLE AS POSSIBLE IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES AND HOPED THAT THEY WOULD BE ABLE TO BE IN A POSITION TO ACT AS A MEDIATOR. THAT WAS WHY THEY WERE PREPARED TO AGREE TO THE LANDING OF AMIN'S AIRCRAFT IN FRANCE.

3. HE SAID THAT THEY WOULD KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH US ON FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS.  
HENDERSON

*Allundana at CPMM - See Uganda*  
*Feb 77*

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION  
EAD  
CONSULAR D  
CONSEMI UNIT  
NEWS D  
CCD  
WED

COPIES TO  
DFO  
CABINET OFFICE  
PS/NO 10 DOWNING ST

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Enter 2/24  
RS  
9/6

GRS 150

IMMEDIATE

CYPHER CAT A

FM PARIS 090915Z

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY FCO 090930Z

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 576 OF 9 JUNE 1977 AND TO IMMEDIATE KAMPALA,  
PRIORITY NAIROBI AND WASHINGTON.

OUR TELNO 574: BRITISH COMMUNITY IN UGANDA

1. WE HAVE SPOKEN AGAIN THIS MORNING TO THE QUAI D'ORSAY. THEY HAVE CONFIRMED THAT THEY HAVE SENT A TELEGRAM TO KAMPALA AGREEING WITH M RENARD'S ADVICE THAT MODERATION IS NEEDED AND THAT IT WOULD BE BEST NOT TO TAKE ANY ACTION FOR THE MOMENT. THE QUAI EXPRESSED SOME DOUBTS ABOUT SEEKING CLARIFICATION OF THE ANNOUNCEMENT IF THERE HAD BEEN NO FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS BY FRIDAY. THEY THOUGHT THAT IN THE PRESENT SITUATION THERE MIGHT BE SOMETHING TO BE SAID FOR CONTINUING TO LIE LOW AND NOT PROMPTING THE UGANDANS INTO TAKING A MORE EXTREME POSITION. IN ANY EVENT, THE QUAI THOUGHT THAT AN ENQUIRY ABOUT THE LENGTH OF THE RESTRICTION MIGHT SIMPLY RESULT IN A NIL RETURN. SINCE THERE MAY BE FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN THE COURSE OF THE NEXT TWO DAYS, THEY AGREED THAT WE SHOULD LOOK AT THIS QUESTION AGAIN TOMORROW.

2. WE HAVE ALSO EXPLAINED TO THE QUAI OUR DENIAL OF THE ALLEGED INCIDENT INVOLVING A BRITISH MILITARY AIRCRAFT.

HENDERSON

[REPETITION TO KAMPALA REFERRED FOR DEPARTMENTAL  
DECISION REPEATED AS REQUESTED TO OTHER POSTS  
[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

DEPTL DISTN

EAD

CONS D

CONSEM UNIT

WE D

CC D

CABINET OFFICE

CONFIDENTIAL

Cutter 8/2  
FSA  
9/6

CONFIDENTIAL

GR 130  
FLASH  
CYPHER CAT A

FM F C O 081915Z

CONFIDENTIAL

TO FLASH PARIS TELNO 392 OF 8 JUNE.

INFO FLASH: KAMPALA. PRIORITY NAIROBI AND WASHINGTON.

KAMPALA TELNO 127: BRITISH COMMUNITY IN UGANDA

1. WE AGREE THAT IT IS IMPORTANT TO AVOID OVER-REACTING AND TO KEEP THE TEMPERATURE AS LOW AS POSSIBLE. WE HOPE THEREFORE THAT THE QUAI WILL AGREE THAT M. RENARD SHOULD NOT MAKE ANY APPROACH TO THE UGANDAN AUTHORITIES AT THIS STAGE, BUT THAT IF THERE HAVE BEEN NO DEVELOPMENTS BY FRIDAY HE MIGHT THEN SEEK CLARIFICATION OF THE ANNOUNCEMENT FROM THE UGANDAN M F A. HE MIGHT SIMPLY ASK HOW LONG RESTRICTION WAS LIKELY TO LAST.
2. WE HAVE DENIED ON THE RECORD THAT ANY BRITISH MILITARY AIRCRAFT WAS INVOLVED IN THE INCIDENT DESCRIBED. THERE HAVE BEEN NO BRITISH MILITARY AIRCRAFT AT ALL IN EAST AFRICA IN THE LAST 24 HOURS.

OWEN

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION  
EAD  
CONS D  
CONS EM UNIT  
NEWS D  
CCD  
WED

COPIES TO  
DIO CABINET OFFICE  
PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

---

CONFIDENTIAL

file  
CONFIDENTIAL

3 June 1977


Uganda Defector

Thank you for your letter of 2 June which we have shown the Prime Minister, together with John Kerr's minute of 1 June to Sir Antony Duff.

The Prime Minister has considered Dr. Owen's advice, but has concluded that we should not take any action to persuade the 'Sunday Times' to postpone the publication of this story on 5 June. The Prime Minister has commented that the timing of the story might in fact suit us quite well.

P. R. H. WRIGHT

E.A.J. Fergusson, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



CONFIDENTIAL

MAF

MESSAGE NO 5

FROM NO 10 TO CHEQUERS

TO PRIME MINISTER FROM NIGEL WICKS

THURSDAY 2 JUNE 1977

PRIME MINISTER

WE HAVE RECEIVED THE LETTER BELOW FROM THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE IN WHICH DR OWEN SEEKS YOUR VIEW ON WHETHER HE SHOULD APPROACH MR HAROLD EVANS, EDITOR OF THE SUNDAY TIMES, TO TRY TO PERSUADE HIM TO WITHHOLD PUBLICATION OF THE STORY OF MR KYEMBA, FORMER MINISTER OF HEALTH IN UGANDA, WHICH IS DUE TO BE PUBLISHED NEXT SUNDAY, JUST BEFORE THE COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING.

THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE SUGGEST THAT WE MIGHT DELAY TAKING A DECISION ON THIS UNTIL WE HAVE HEARD ANY NIGERIAN REACTIONS TO THE TELEGRAM WHICH YOU HAVE JUST CLEARED. BUT I DOUBT WHETHER WE ARE LIKELY TO GET ANYTHING FROM THEM UNTIL SATURDAY AND THAT WOULD PROBABLY BE TOO LATE TO DELAY PUBLICATION OF THE SUNDAY TIMES STORY.

TOM MCCAFFREY'S VIEW IS:

- (1) THERE IS NOTHING THAT THE BRITISH PEOPLE CAN BE TOLD ABOUT AMIN WHICH WILL MAKE THEM THINK ANY WORSE OF HIM.
- (2) PUBLICATION OF THE STORY MAY PROVIDE HIM WITH AN EXCUSE NOT TO COME.
- (3) THERE MIGHT BE TROUBLE WITH THE NIGERIANS, BUT TOM IS NOT IN A POSITION TO ASSESS THAT

IN HIS VIEW THE ARGUMENTS ARE FAIRLY EVENLY BALANCED, BUT HE COMES DOWN ON THE SIDE OF NOT REPEAT NOT MAKING AN APPROACH TO MR EVANS. IF AN APPROACH WAS TO BE MADE, HE THINKS THAT IT MIGHT BE BETTER IF THE APPROACH WAS MADE PERHAPS EITHER BY YOU OR ON YOUR BEHALF EG BY MYSELF. HE ALSO THINKS THAT PROVIDED MR EVANS WAS GIVEN GOOD REASONS FOR DELAYING PUBLICATION A WEEK, HE MIGHT ACT RESPONSIBLY AND DO SO.

DO YOU WANT DR OWEN TO TALK TO MR HAROLD EVANS?



LETTER FROM THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

UGANDA DEFECTOR

CONFIDENTIAL

JOHN KERR SENT YOU A COPY OF HIS MINUTE OF 1 JUNE ABOUT THE DEFECTION OF MR KYEMBA, FORMER MINISTER OF HEALTH IN UGANDA, AND THE SUNDAY TIMES' INTENTION TO PUBLISH HIS STORY.

THE TIMING OF THE SUNDAY TIMES STORY COULD SCARCELY BE MORE UNFORTUNATE AND IT WILL, NO DOUBT, BE GENERALLY BELIEVED THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAVE ENCOURAGED PUBLICATION OF THE UGANDA HORRORS JUST AT THIS TIME IN ORDER TO JUSTIFY THEIR DENIAL OF ENTRY. THIS IS LIKELY TO BE PARTICULARLY TRUE OF THE NIGERIANS ABOUT WHICH YOU HAVE JUST RECEIVED A LETTER FROM STEPHEN WALL. THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY SUSPECTS THAT THE SUNDAY TIMES WILL BE MOST RELUCTANT TO WITHHOLD PUBLICATION OF A MAJOR SCOOP OF THIS KIND AND THE FINAL DEADLINE FOR PRINTING IS NOW NOT FAR AWAY, IF THE FIRST INSTALMENT IS INDEED TO BE PUBLISHED THIS SUNDAY, 5 JUNE.

ALL THE SAME, DR OWEN BELIEVES THAT IT WOULD BE HELPFUL, IN THE CONTEXT OF THE OPENING OF THE COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING, IF THE SUNDAY TIMES COULD BE PERSUADED TO AGREE TO A WEEK'S POSTPONEMENT OF PUBLICATION. IF THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD LIKE HIM TO DO SO HE WOULD BE PREPARED TO SUGGEST THIS TO MR HAROLD EVANS, WHOM HE KNOWS WELL. THE SOONER THAT HE CAN TAKE ACTION THE BETTER, THOUGH IF THIS WERE NOT POSSIBLE UNTIL TOMORROW AND THE PRIME MINISTER HAD AGREED TO SEND A MESSAGE TO GENERAL OBASANJO WE MIGHT BENEFIT FROM MORE CLEARER INFORMATION ABOUT LIKELY NIGERIAN REACTIONS.

SIGNED E A J FERGUSSON

CONFIDENTIAL

NOW TAKE IN LETTER THAT JEAN TYPED STRAIGHT ONTO MACHINE OK

OK VANESSA IS THAT ALL FOR NOW K  
YES BREATHE EASY C U LATER BI K  
BI

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

2 June 1977

*Dear Sir,*

Uganda Defector

*Below.*

John Kerr sent you a copy of his minute of 1 June about the defection of Mr Kyemba, former Minister of Health in Uganda, and the Sunday Times' intention to publish his story.

The timing of the Sunday Times' story could scarcely be more unfortunate and it will, no doubt, be generally believed that the Government have encouraged publication of the Uganda horrors just at this time in order to justify their denial of entry. This is likely to be particularly true of the Nigerians about which you have just received a letter from Stephen Wall. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary suspects that the Sunday Times will be most reluctant to withhold publication of a major scoop of this kind and the final deadline for printing is now not far away, if the first instalment is indeed to be published this Sunday, 5 June. All the same, Dr Owen believes that it would be helpful, in the context of the opening of the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting, if the Sunday Times could be persuaded to agree to a week's postponement of publication. If the Prime Minister would like him to do so he would be prepared to suggest this to Mr Harold Evans, whom he knows well. The sooner that he can take action the better, though if this were not possible until tomorrow and the Prime Minister had agreed to send a message to General Obasanjo we might benefit from more clearer information about likely Nigerian reactions.

*Yours ever,*

*E.A.J.*

(E.A.J. Fergusson)

Patrick Wright Esq.,  
10 Downing Street,  
London SW1.

CONFIDENTIAL

Sir A Duff

UGANDA

1. Just before he left for Chequers this afternoon the PUS had a telephone call from Mr Frank Giles of the Sunday Times, who said he had with him in his office Mr Kyemba, who until yesterday had been Minister of Health in Uganda. In that capacity he had gone to Geneva for a WHO meeting, but he had decided to defect, and had come to the Sunday Times with an offer to sell them his story. The newspaper had given him a large sum of money, and proposed to send him to a cottage in the country, accompanied by a member of their staff who would assist him in producing a fairly long report.
2. According to Mr Giles, Mr Kyemba is in a position to reveal a good deal about the Amin regime; for instance he has said that he knows the true story of how Mrs Bloch and Archbishop Luwum had died. Not surprisingly Mr Giles expects the revelations to produce something of a furore: the first instalment would be published on 5 June.
3. Mr Giles said he was telling the PUS this with Mr Kyemba's agreement, and indeed at his express wish. He had indicated that he had already been in touch with the Home Office about his defection, but in what terms Mr Giles was not clear. Mr Kyemba had mentioned that he had had a Ugandan bodyguard while he was in Geneva, and that this man had followed him to London, but had been turned back by the Immigration authorities at Heathrow: Mr Giles seemed to think that this indicated that the Home Office had known beforehand of Mr Kyemba's proposed defection.
4. Mr Giles said that it seemed to him that for the next 2 or 3 weeks at least Mr Kyemba should have Special Branch protection, and he asked whether the PUS thought this could be arranged officially. The PUS said he would think about it; his first reaction was that the newspaper might wish to arrange protection from one of the commercial security companies but he would contact Mr Giles again tomorrow when he had had an opportunity to consider the point.
5. The PUS would be grateful for your advice on what he should say to Mr Giles about protection, and whether he should comment on the proposed timing of the Sunday Times story.

*J O Kerr*

J O Kerr  
PS/PUS

1 June 1977

/Copied to:

CONFIDENTIAL

Copied to:

PS  
PS/Mr Rowlands  
Mr Mansfield  
News Department  
EAD  
PUSD

P R H Wright Esq, No 10  
R T Armstrong Esq CB, Home Office

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER CAT A

FM KAIROBI 160900Z AUG

CONFIDENTIAL

1/100/1000

See x

RJH

16/8

TO PRIORITY FCO TELNO 2154 OF 16 AUGUST 1976  
AND TO PRIORITY KAMPALA  
INFO PRIORITY PARIS.

YOUR TELNO 223 TO KAMPALA : CLEGG

1. ARTHUR, WHO IS EMPLOYED BY AIRWORK, IS NOW BACK IN PERTH AND, ACCORDING TO UNDP REP HERE, WILL NOT BE RETURNING TO UGANDA. WE SEE NO OBJECTION THEREFORE TO QUOTING ARTHUR BY NAME AS OUR SOURCE OF INFORMATION ON CLEGG'S ARREST BUT WOULD PREFER THAT FRENCH AMBASSADOR SHOULD NOT REPEAT NOT MENTION HAMILTON AND OTHER AIRWORK EMPLOYEES STILL AT SOROTI WHOSE ENTITLEMENT TO UN PROTECTION IS QUESTIONABLE.

X 2. KENYAN AUTHORITIES HAVE NO INFORMATION ON KIMANI'S FATE OR WHEREABOUTS. IT IS DOUBTFUL WHETHER THEY WILL PRESS UGANDANS FOR INFORMATION ABOUT HIM SINCE THEY HAVE TOLD US THAT THEY BELIEVE THAT HE AND CLEGG WERE INVOLVED IN CURRENCY SMUGGLING.

3. ALTHOUGH WITH KNOWLEDGE OF SITUATION IN UGANDA PEOPLE HERE ARE SPECULATING THAT CLEGG HAS PROBABLY BEEN KILLED, WE HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO DISCOVER ANYONE WHO HAS ANY RELIABLE INFORMATION ON WHAT HAS HAPPENED TO HIM.

FINGLAND

[REPETITION TO KAMPALA REFERRED FOR DEPARTMENTAL  
DECISION, REPEATED AS REQUESTED TO OTHER POSTS]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

EAD	UN DEPT
CONS DEPT	MVD
CONS EM UNIT	EID (E)
NENAD	GIPD
WED	CABINET OFFICE
PUSD	
NEWS DEPT	
OADS	

[COPIES SENT TO NO. 10 DOWNING STREET]

CONFIDENTIAL

Uganda Pt 2  
Gulerpa.

RS1  
16/8

CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE

GR 390

CYPHER CAT A

FM NAIROBI 131218Z AUG

CONFIDENTIAL

TO IMMEDIATE FOO TELNO 2149 OF 13 AUGUST 1976.  
MY TELNO 2137 OF 12 AUGUST.

KENYA/UGANDA RELATIONS.

1. BRUCE MCKENZIE RANG ME THIS MORNING TO SAY THAT, HAVING BEEN ASKED BY HIS UGANDA MANAGING DIRECTOR TO BE IN HIS OFFICE FOR A TIMED TELEPHONE CALL, HE RECEIVED CALL FROM AMIN PERSONALLY. GIST OF AMIN'S REMARKS WAS THAT HE WAS ANXIOUS TO RESTORE HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH PRESIDENT KENYATTA WITH WHICH MCKENZIE HAD BEEN INSTRUMENTAL IN HELPING IN THE PAST. AMIN WISHED A MESSAGE TO BE PASSED TO THE PRESIDENT THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO RESTORE SOME COMMUNICATION OR LINE OF CONTACT WITH HMG. AMIN ADDED THAT HE REALISED THAT THERE HAD BEEN MANY MISTAKES MADE IN THE PAST AND HE WAS NOW ANXIOUS TO IMPROVE HIS RELATIONS AND REDUCE THE INFLUENCE OF THE "SOCIALIST BLOC" ON UGANDA.
2. MCKENZIE SAID THAT HE WAS ON THE WAY TO MOMBASA TODAY AND WOULD CONVEY THIS MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT KENYATTA. HE WOULD IN DUE COURSE CONVEY A MESSAGE BACK THROUGH HIS BUSINESS CONTACT TO AMIN THAT MESSAGE HAD BEEN DELIVERED. I SUGGESTED THAT HE CONFINE ANY SUCH REPLY TO SAYING THAT MESSAGE HAD BEEN CONVEYED TO THE PRESIDENT.
3. MCKENZIE FELT THAT PRESIDENT KENYATTA WOULD BE UNLIKELY TO WISH TO GET INVOLVED AS A MIDDLE-MAN AND THAT HIS ADVISERS WOULD NOT WISH HIM TO DO SO. MCKENZIE THOUGHT THAT THE PRESIDENT MIGHT THEREFORE INSTRUCT HIM SIMPLY TO TELL AMIN THAT THE MESSAGE HAD BEEN PASSED ON TO US.

CONFIDENTIAL

/4. I

CONFIDENTIAL

4. I THINK IT IS CORRECT THAT KENYANS WILL NOT WISH TO BECOME INVOLVED IN TRYING TO ASSIST AMIN TO IMPROVE HIS RELATIONS WITH BRITAIN. YOU WILL RECALL THAT KARIITHI CLEARLY DID NOT WISH US TO GET INVOLVED IN ACTING AS MIDDLEMEN BETWEEN UGANDA AND KENYA ( SEE MY TELNO 1876 OF 16 JULY). IT WOULD ALSO SEEM INADVISABLE TO ENCOURAGE AMIN TO BELIEVE THAT KENYA AND UK ARE ACTING IN CLOSE LIAISON ON UGANDA RELATIONS.

5. I WILL REPORT FURTHER WHEN I HEAR OF PRESIDENT KENYATTA'S REACTIONS. I LEAVE IT TO YOU TO DECIDE WHETHER TO REPEAT THIS TELEGRAM TO KAMPALA THROUGH FRENCH CHANNELS. I SHALL INFORM WYPER WHO IS HERE.

FINGLAND

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

EAD  
CONS D  
CONS EM UNIT  
NENAD  
PUSD  
NEWS D  
OADS  
UND  
MVD  
WED  
EID (E)  
GIPD  
CABINET OFFICE

GR 213

PRIORITY

CYPHER/CAT A

FM KAMPALA 110745Z

CONFIDENTIAL

To see

RSM

4/8

CONFIDENTIAL

TO PRIORITY FCO TELNO.399 OF 11 AUGUST  
INFO NAIROBI.

MY TELNO.392 : ANGLO/UGANDAN RELATIONS.

1. YOU WILL BY NOW HAVE SEEN THE TEXT OF PRESIDENT AMIN'S STATEMENT TO BBC INTERVIEWERS AT ENTEBBE AIRPORT YESTERDAY THAT HE WOULD RE-ESTABLISH RELATIONS WITH FMG WITHOUT CONDITIONS AND THAT PRESIDENT KENYATTA WOULD POSSIBLY ACT AS A MEDIATOR TO THIS END. THE PRESIDENT TURNED THE INTERVIEW INTO A USEFUL PROPAGANDA EXERCISE JUDGING FROM EARLY MEDIA REPORTS HERE.

2. WE ARE INCLINED TO TREAT AMIN'S COMMENTS WITH CAUTION ALTHOUGH PRIMA FACIE IT REAFFIRMS OUR EARLIER VIEW THAT THE CHANCES OF A UGANDAN REACTION AGAINST THE UK COMMUNITY AS A WHOLE AND OF OUR BEING ASKED TO PROVIDE UKC LISTS HAVE RECEDED FOR THE TIME BEING. THIS PLACATORY MOOD COULD OF COURSE CHANGE WITH ADVERSE RESULTS. IN THIS CONNECTION IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO KNOW PRESIDENT KENYATTA'S REACTION TO ANY REQUEST TO MEDIATE HE MIGHT HAVE RECEIVED FROM AMIN.

3. WE HAD NO PRIOR KNOWLEDGE OF THE BBC INTERVIEW (FRENCH AMBASSADOR IS THEREFORE IN A POTENTIALLY EMBARRASSING POSITION) AND IT WOULD ALSO BE HELPFUL TO KNOW BACKGROUND E.G WHETHER IT TOOK PLACE AT AMIN'S OR BBC'S REQUEST.

GLASBY

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

EAD

CONSULAR D

CONS EM UNIT

NEPAD

PUSD

NEWS D

OADS

UND

MVD

EID (E)

GIRD

CABINET OFFICE

WED

[COPIES SENT TO  
NO 10 DOWNING ST]

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

PRIORITY

OR 250

Uganda 11/8  
Guter & pa.

11/8

RSN

CYPHER CAT A

FM LAGOS 101001Z

CONFIDENTIAL

TO PRIORITY FCO TELNO 669 OF 10 AUGUST.

MY TELNO 664: BRITISH/UGANDAN RELATIONS

1. THE FMG IS TOUCHY ABOUT UGANDA SINCE BRIG GARBA'S ATTEMPT AT MEDIATION ON HIS SURPRISE VISIT TO EAST AFRICA IN MID-JULY. THIS DID NOT ACHIEVE MUCH AND WAS SUPERSEDED BY THE APPARENTLY MORE SUCCESSFUL MISSION BY THE OAU SECRETARY-GENERAL. GARBA'S OWN UNDOUBTED VANITY IS INVOLVED. THIS IS A PARTIAL EXPLANATION OF THE RATHER DIDACTIC TONE OF HIS PERSONAL MESSAGE.
2. THE MESSAGE CAN ALSO BE SEEN AS A MANIFESTATION OF NIGERIA'S NEW-LOOK FOREIGN POLICY. THE NIGERIANS ARE VERY CONSCIOUS OF THEIR SELF-ASSUMED ROLE AS LEADERS OF BLACK AFRICA AND THEY FEEL OBLIGED TO QUESTION STATEMENTS ON AFRICAN QUESTIONS, ESPECIALLY FROM WESTERN GOVERNMENTS. THEY EVEN WENT TO THE EXTENT IN JANUARY OF PUBLISHING AND REPLYING PUBLICLY TO PRESIDENT FORD'S CIRCULAR LETTER TO AFRICAN HEADS OF STATE BEFORE THE OAU EXTRA-ORDINARY SUMMIT MEETING ON ANGOLA.
3. THE MESSAGE ALSO REFLECTS A FEELING WHICH WAS EXPRESSED TO ONE OF MY STAFF IN THE MEA YESTERDAY THAT WE STILL WIELD INFLUENCE IF NOT WITH AMIN THEN WITH ARTICULATE ELEMENTS IN UGANDA.

/4. ON THE WHOLE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

4. ON THE WHOLE I RECOMMEND THAT WE LET THE MATTER DROP AND DO NOT REPLY TO GARBA'S LETTER. THE MINISTER OF STATE'S DISCUSSIONS WITH GARBA WILL DOUBTLESS COVER EAST AFRICAN QUESTIONS BY WHICH TIME, WE HOPE, RELATIONS BETWEEN UGANDA AND KENYA WILL HAVE FURTHER IMPROVED.

WILLIAMS.

/COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET/

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

EAD  
CONSULAR D  
CONS EM UNIT  
MENAD  
PUSD  
NEWS D  
OADS  
UND  
MVD  
EID (E)  
FIPD  
WEO  
CCD  
CABINET OFFICE

PRIORITY  
CYPHER/CAT A  
FM KAMPALA 10735Z

RESTRICTED

*Centex pa*  
*RSN*  
*4/9*

(RESTRICTED)  
NO PRIORITY FCO TELNO.397 OF 10 AUG.  
MY TEL.NO.381: CLEGG/TULLY

ADRESSE ( VIA LE DEPARTEMENT ) A AMBAFRANCE LONDRES NO 164.  
COMMUNIQUE A DIPLOMATIE PARIS NO 1100.

A/S : RELATIONS ANGLO-UGANDAISES.

DEBUT DE CITATION

DESPITE FURTHER REPRESENTATIONS BY FRENCH AMBASSADOR OUGANDAN GVT  
HAVE STILL NOT CONFIRMED THAT EITHER CLEGG OR TULLY HAVE BEEN  
ARRESTED OR THAT HE LETTER HAS BEEN RELEASED (NAROB1 TEL.NO.2048  
TOCO). IN VIEW OF YOUR INSTRUCTIONS THAT WE SHOULD NO VOLUNTEER  
FURTHER CONTACT WITH UGANDAN AUTHORITIES YOUR UNNUMBERED TL OF  
EQ 31 JULY), OUR FRENCH COLLEAGUE ARE HAVING TO MAKE ENQUIRIES INTO  
SUCH CASES AS CLEGG/TULLYSS. COULD YOU NO AGREE THAT WE MIGHT  
NOW ASIST IN SUC TASKS AT FRENCH AMBASADOR'S DISCRETION, DESPITE  
FACT THAT DIS STILLAWAITS FORMAL APPROVAL

GLABY ''

FIN DE CIATION

\*\*\*\*\*

RENARD

[PASSED TO PARIS]  
[RECEIVED VIA FRENCH EMBASSY]  
[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTN  
EAD  
CONS D  
CONS EM UNIT  
MENAD  
OADS  
WED  
GIPD  
NEWS D  
CABINET OFFICE

RESTRICTED

CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE

CYPHER/CAT A

GPS 490

FM F C O 272130Z

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 280500Z

TO IMMEDIATE DAR ES SALAAM TELNO 184 OF 27 JULY  
INFO IMMEDIATE NAIROBI.

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE. *Encl + p:*

SERIAL NO. *T 2 AAC 176.*

YOUR TELNOS 232 AND 233: UGANDA/KENYA RELATIONS.

1. PLEASE DELIVER FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRIME MINISTER TO  
PRESIDENT NYERERE.  
BEGINS.

DEAR MR PRESIDENT, I WAS CONCERNED TO READ MR STRONG'S REPORT OF  
THE MEETING WHICH YOUR FOREIGN MINISTER HAD WITH A NUMBER OF  
HEADS OF MISSION IN DAR-ES-SALAAM ON 20 JULY, IN WHICH SOME  
DISQUIET WAS EXPRESSED ABOUT ALLEGED BRITISH INVOLVEMENT IN  
THE DISPUTE BETWEEN KENYA AND UGANDA.

I WOULD BE UNHAPPY IF YOU WERE TO BE MISLED INTO THINKING THAT  
WE WERE DOING ANYTHING TO WORSEN THIS CONFLICT OR UPSET THE  
STABILITY OF EAST AFRICA. AS YOU KNOW, WE HAVE DONE MUCH IN THE  
PAST TO FOSTER CO-OPERATION AND UNITY WITHIN EAST AFRICA  
AND WE HAVE A REAL CONCERN FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE IN THE  
REGION. I AM SURE YOU DO NOT NEED MY ASSURANCE THAT WE WILL DO  
NOTHING WHICH MIGHT PREJUDICE IT.

WE HAVE NO AGREEMENT WITH KENYA OR ANY OTHER COUNTRY WHICH  
COMMITTS US IN ANY WAY TO INTERVENTION IN THIS AFFAIR AND WE HAVE  
NO BRITISH TROOPS OR WARSHIPS IN OR NEAR EAST AFRICA. YOU WILL  
KNOW, HOWEVER, THAT THE KENYAN ARMED FORCES HAVE TRADITIONALLY  
PURCHASED THEIR ARMS FROM BRITAIN. THEY HAVE A RIGHT TO PREPARE  
TO DEFEND THEMSELVES IN THE FACE OF THE TYPE OF THREAT WITH  
WHICH YOU YOURSELF HAVE BEEN FAMILIAR, AND IT IS A NORMAL AND  
LEGITIMATE THING FOR US TO FULFIL THEIR ORDERS (JUST AS, INDEED,  
WE HAVE BEEN HAPPY TO FULFIL YOUR OWN RECENT ORDER FOR A FORCE  
OF SCORPION TANKS). THIS IS THE SUM AND LIMIT OF OUR INVOLVEMENT.

THERE IS A FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF WHICH I SHOULD INFORM YOU.  
YOU WILL KNOW OF THE ACUTE PROBLEMS WE HAVE HAD WITH PRESIDENT  
AMIN DURING THE LAST FEW WEEKS. WE HAVE HAD A BRITISH CITIZEN  
BRUTALLY DONE TO DEATH AND BLATANT LIES TOLD ABOUT HER DISAPPEARANCE.  
WE HAVE HAD TWO OF OUR DIPLOMATS EXPELLED FROM UGANDA ON TRUMPED-  
UP GROUNDS. WHEN I WAS IN KAMPALA A YEAR AGO I RECEIVED ASSURANCES

/FROM PRESIDENT AMIN

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM PRESIDENT AMIN THAT HE WISHED TO HAVE GOOD RELATIONS WITH US AND THAT HE WOULD SETTLE WITH OUR HIGH COMMISSIONER IN A QUIET MANNER ANY PROBLEMS AFFECTING BRITISH CITIZENS. THESE RECENT EVENTS AND, ABOVE ALL, THE CONTINUING EVIDENCE OF HIS UNPREDICTABILITY HAVE SHOWN THAT WE CANNOT RELY ON HIS ASSURANCES. PARLIAMENTARY AND PUBLIC INDIGNATION HERE HAS BEEN INTENSE AND WE HAVE BEEN FORCED TO CONCLUDE THAT WE CANNOT MAINTAIN A NORMAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT OF UGANDA AND THAT OUR HIGH COMMISSION IN UGANDA CAN NO LONGER PERFORM ITS PROPER FUNCTIONS. WE SHALL, ACCORDINGLY, ON 28 JULY BE ANNOUNCING THAT WE ARE BREAKING RELATIONS WITH UGANDA.

I WISH TO ASSURE YOU THAT, SO FAR AS WE ARE CONCERNED, THIS IS PURELY A BILATERAL AFFAIR: I THOUGHT, HOWEVER, THAT I SHOULD LET YOU KNOW WHAT WE INTEND. I MUST ASK YOU TO TREAT THIS AS FOR YOUR OWN VERY PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION.

I REMEMBER WITH GREAT PLEASURE OUR DISCUSSIONS DURING THE STATE VISIT LAST YEAR AND I SHALL LOOK FORWARD TO EXCHANGING VIEWS WITH YOU ABOUT AFRICAN PROBLEMS FROM TIME TO TIME.  
WITH WARM REGARDS.

JAMES CALLAGHAN.

ENDS.

CROSLAND

/COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET/

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

EAD  
POD  
PPD  
PSD  
CONS D  
CONS EN UNIT  
SECURITY D  
FINANCE D  
ASD  
COD  
P & CD  
WED  
CCD  
DEFENCE D  
NEWS D  
GIPD  
N AM D  
EID (E)  
OADS  
RES D (AM SECT)  
(WE SECT)  
CAD  
CABINET OFFICE

GR 260

FLASH

CYPHER CAT A

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 271013Z JUL

CONFIDENTIAL

TO FLASH KAMPALA TELNO 198 OF 27 JULY 1976  
AND TO IMMEDIATE PARIS, NAIROBI.

MY IPT.

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF NOTE. BEGINS.

USUAL BEGINNING ..... AND HAS THE HONOUR, UPON INSTRUCTIONS, TO INFORM THE MINISTRY THAT HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT HAS DECIDED, BECAUSE OF THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF MAINTAINING A NORMAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT IN UGANDA, TO BREAK OFF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THAT GOVERNMENT. THE BRITISH HIGH COMMISSIONER, MR JAMES HENNESSY, IS THEREFORE BEING WITHDRAWN AS FROM TODAY.

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC HAS EXPRESSED ITS WILLINGNESS TO PROTECT BRITISH INTEREST IN UGANDA, AND IT IS PROPOSED TO ATTACH TO THE FRENCH EMBASSY A BRITISH INTERESTS SECTION COMPRISING TWO OFFICIALS, MR A I GLASBY, FIRST SECRETARY, AND MR R B WYPER, THIRD SECRETARY.

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THIS DECISION TO BREAK OFF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS, IT IS REQUESTED THAT THE UGANDAN HIGH COMMISSION IN LONDON SHOULD CEASE TO FUNCTION AS FROM TODAY AND THAT MR FREDERICK ISINGOMA, UGANDAN HIGH COMMISSIONER IN LONDON, BE WITHDRAWN. HE AND MEMBERS OF THE STAFF OF THE UGANDAN HIGH COMMISSION WILL BE PERMITTED, HOWEVER, REASONABLE TIME IN WHICH TO WIND UP THEIR PERSONAL AFFAIRS BEFORE DEPARTURE.

CONFIDENTIAL

/IT WILL BE

CONFIDENTIAL

IT WILL BE OPEN TO THE GOVERNMENT OF UGANDA, IF IT SO WISHES, TO MAKE CORRESPONDING ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE PROTECTION OF ITS INTERESTS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM THROUGH A FRIENDLY GOVERNMENT AND TO ATTACH STAFF TO THAT GOVERNMENT'S EMBASSY OR HIGH COMMISSION FOR THAT PURPOSE.

USUAL ENDING.      ENDS.

CROSLAND

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

EAD	RESEARCH DEPT (AM SECT)
POD	(WE SECT)
PPD	CABINET OFFICE
PSD	
CONS DEPT	
CONS EM UNIT	
SECURITY DEPT	
FINANCE DEPT	
ASD	
COD	
P & CD	
WED	
CCD	
DEFENCE DEPT	
NEWS DEPT	
GIPD	
N AM D	
EID (E)	
OADS	
CAD	
UND	

CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 770

IMMEDIATE

CYPHER/CAT A AND BY BAG

FM FCO 271045Z

CONFIDENTIAL

TO IMMEDIATE /PRIORITY CERTAIN MISSIONS AND DEPENDENT TERRITORIES  
TELNO GUIDANCE 149 OF 27 JULY 1976

ANGLO/UGANDAN RELATIONS

1. I PROPOSE TO ANNOUNCE IN THE COMMONS AT ABOUT 1330Z ON 28 JULY (TEXT IN VERBATIM SERIES) THAT WE HAVE DECIDED THAT WE CAN NO LONGER REMAIN IN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH UGANDA. WE WILL ON THAT DAY SO INFORM THE UGANDAN AUTHORITIES IN KAMPALA AND IN LONDON. AS WE WILL ALSO INFORM THE UGANDANS, OUR INTERESTS IN KAMPALA WILL BE PROTECTED BY THE FRENCH, AND WE PROPOSE TO ESTABLISH A SMALL BRITISH INTERESTS SECTION WITHIN THE FRENCH EMBASSY THERE. WE WILL TELL THE UGANDANS THAT THEIR HIGH COMMISSION HERE MUST CEASE TO FUNCTION, BUT THAT THEY WILL SIMILARLY BE FREE TO CHOOSE ANOTHER COUNTRY TO ACT AS PROTECTING POWER.

2. LINE TO TAKE.

MORE DETAILED GUIDANCE HAS BEEN GIVEN TO COMMONWEALTH, EEC AND CERTAIN AFRICAN POSTS. OTHER POSTS SHOULD NOT INITIATE DISCUSSION ON THIS SUBJECT, BUT MAY, IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS, DRAW ON THIS TELEGRAM. YOU SHOULD TAKE CARE TO EXPLAIN OUR DECISION BY REFERENCE TO THE GENERAL REASONS GIVEN BELOW, RATHER THAN THE CASE OF MRS BLOCH,

BACKGROUND

3. THE DECISION TO BREAK RELATIONS HAS BEEN A DIFFICULT ONE. IT IS THE FIRST TIME WE HAVE INITIATED A BREAK SINCE 1946, WHEN WE BROKE RELATIONS WITH ALBANIA. IT IS ALSO THE FIRST TIME THAT WE HAVE BROKEN RELATIONS WITH A COMMONWEALTH COUNTRY, ALTHOUGH OTHERS HAVE DONE IT TO US. THE IMMEDIATE CAUSE HAS BEEN THE CASE OF MRS DORA BLOCH (MY GUIDANCE TELNO 136 NOT TO ALL), THE SUBSEQUENT UNWARRANTED EXPULSION OF OUR ACTING HIGH COMMISSIONER AND ANOTHER MEMBER OF OUR HIGH COMMISSION IN KAMPALA, AND THE RENEWED EVIDENCE AT THIS TIME OF THE GENERAL IRRATIONALITY AND UNPREDICTABILITY OF AMIN'S

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

GOVERNMENT. WE HAVE COME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO HAVE A NORMAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT OF UGANDA AND THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE HIGH COMMISSION TO FULFIL ITS PROPER FUNCTIONS.

4. THE DECISION IS, HOWEVER, ALSO A CULMINATION OF EVENTS IN UGANDA SINCE PRESIDENT AMIN CAME TO POWER. FOLLOWING HIS DECLARATION OF ECONOMIC WAR IN 1972, UGANDA HAS TAKEN A SERIES OF ACTIONS HOSTILE TO OUR INTERESTS, INCLUDING THE EXPULSION OF THE ASIANS, THE EXPROPRIATION OF BRITISH COMPANIES AND TEA PLANTATIONS IN 1972, TWO THREATS TO EXPEL THE ENTIRE BRITISH COMMUNITY, THE REDUCTION TO FIVE OF THE NUMBERS OF THE HIGH COMMISSION'S UK-BASED STAFF IN 1974, AND THE ATTEMPTED BLACKMAIL OVER MR DENIS HILLS IN 1975. WE HAVE GIVEN THE UGANDANS EVERY CHANCE IN THE PAST TWELVE MONTHS TO SHOW GENUINE WILLINGNESS TO FULFIL THEIR INTENTION OF TURNING OVER A NEW LEAF AFTER MR CALLAGHAN'S VISIT THERE, BUT THE OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS BETWEEN US HAVE NOT CHANGED AND THE BLOCH CASE AND THE RECENT DEPORTATIONS ARE A CLEAR BREACH OF PRESIDENT AMIN'S UNDERTAKING TO MR CALLAGHAN THAT THE BRITONS IN UGANDA COULD LIVE IN SAFETY. PARLIAMENTARY AND PUBLIC INDIGNATION OVER THESE EVENTS HAS BEEN INTENSE.

5. OUR COMMUNITY IN UGANDA HAS BEEN OUR FIRST CONCERN THROUGHOUT. IN MAY OF THIS YEAR, IT NUMBERED ABOUT 550. WE HAVE BEEN ADVISING THEM SINCE THE BLOCH AFFAIR TO CONSIDER URGENTLY WHETHER THEY SHOULD LEAVE, POINTING OUT THAT THEY COULD NOT COUNT ON THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF THE HIGH COMMISSION IN KAMPALA. THERE WILL BE A HARD CORE OF BRITONS LEFT, MOST OF THEM MISSIONARIES WHO HAVE SERVED UGANDA SELFLESSLY FOR MANY YEARS. THE FRENCH EMBASSY AND OUR RESIDUAL STAFF WILL DO THEIR BEST TO PROTECT THEM.

6. SO FAR AS WE ARE CONCERNED, THIS IS PURELY A BILATERAL AFFAIR AND HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH CURRENT KENYA/UGANDA RELATIONS. THERE IS NO INTENTION IN OUR ACTION OF SLIGHTING AFRICA OR THE COMMONWEALTH. IT DOES NOT INDICATE ANY CHANGE IN OUR ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE ISRAELI RAID ON ENTEBBE. WE SHALL CONTINUE TO CO-OPERATE IN AFRICA AND OUR AID PROGRAMMES WILL REMAIN UNCHANGED. WE DO NOT INTEND TO URGE OUR COMMUNITY PARTNERS TO ALTER THEIR POLICIES TOWARDS UGANDA UNDER EITHER THE LOME CONVENTION OF THE EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENT FUND.

7. YOU SHOULD DISCOURAGE SPECULATION ON THE EFFECTS OF THIS DECISION ON THE COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING IN LONDON

CONFIDENTIAL

IN JUNE 1977. THE COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY GENERAL HAS INFORMED HEADS OF GOVERNMENT ABOUT THE MEETING AND IT IS CUSTOMARY FOR THE PRIME MINISTER OF THE HOST GOVERNMENT TO SEND A LETTER OF WELCOME TO HEADS OF GOVERNMENT SOME TWO TO THREE MONTHS BEFORE THE MEETING. MUCH MAY HAVE HAPPENED BEFORE ANY ACTION ON OUR PART IS REQUIRED.

CROSLAND

BY TELEGRAPH:

ANKARA	NEW YORK(UKMIS)	MOGADISHU	FREETOWN
BONN	NEW YORK (BIS)	ISLAMABAD	LAGOS
BRUSSELS	WASHINGTON	OTTAWA	DAR-ES-SALAAM
BRUSSELS(UKREP,EEC)	BAGHDAD	CANBERRA	NAIROBI
BRUSSELS(UKDEL,NATO)	JEDDA	WELLINGTON	LUSAKA
COPENHAGEN	KUWAIT	NEW DELHI	LILONGWE
THE HAGUE	TEL AVIV	DACCA	GABORONE
LUXEMBOURG	CAIRO	COLOMBO	MASERU
PARIS	KHARTOUM	KUALA LUMPUR	PORT LOUIS
ROME	TRIPOLI	SINGAPORE	MBABANE
GENEVA (UKMIS)	ADDIS ABABA	ACCRA	KINGSTON
DUBLIN	KINSHASA	BANJUL	
	[ALL IMMEDIATE]		
ATHENS	MEXICO CITY	DAMASCUS	PEKING
LISBON	BRASILIA	ALGIERS	TOKYO
OSLO	RIO DE JANEIRO(CG)	RABAT	BANDAR SERI BEGAWAI
BELGRADE	HAVANA	TUNIS	VALLETTA
HELSINKI	AMMAN	ABIDJAN	NICOSIA
HOLY SEE	BAHRAIN	DAKAR	PORT OF SPAIN
MADRID	DOHA	MONROVIA	GEORGETOWN
STOCKHOLM	DUBAI	YAOUNDE	BRIDGETOWN
VIENNA	ABU DHABI	PRETORIA	NASSAU
MOSCOW	MUSCAT	JOHANNESBURG(CG)	HONG KONG
BUENOS AIRES	TEHRAN	MAPUTO	GIBRALTAR(PERSONAL)
	[ALL PRIORITY]		

AND SAVING TO CERTAIN OTHER POSTS

FCO/WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

GIPD

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

GUIDANCE

ODM

d



Americans' joint info.  
fco.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

27 July 1976

~~Prime Minister~~

p:

Amey can't with the message & A?

See Patrick,

R  
27/7

Tanzanian Allegations of British "interference" in the  
Kenya/Uganda Dispute

In his telegrams nos 232 and 233 (copies attached for ease of reference), our Acting High Commissioner in Dar-es-Salaam has reported allegations by the Tanzanian Foreign Minister that we and the Americans were "interfering" in the current dispute between Kenya and Uganda. Mr Strong spoke well in reply and we do not think there would be any point in pursuing the matter with Kaduma, who is an ill-disposed and obstinate man. We do, however, consider that there would be advantage in trying to put the record straight with President Nyerere.

A further advantage in communicating soon with Nyerere derives from our decision to announce a break in relations with Uganda next Wednesday. He would in normal circumstances well understand our action - indeed he blames us strongly for our original support for Amin and believes we should have broken with him long ago - but he may at this time see it as a further action on our part in support of Kenya. We think it would be worthwhile trying to disabuse him of such a misconception. The most effective and appropriate way would be by means of a Prime Ministerial message.

[A] I accordingly attach, for the Prime Minister's consideration, a draft telegram incorporating such a message from him to Nyerere.

For eva.  
M. J.

(R. N. Dales)

Patrick Wright Esq.,  
10 Downing Street



CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

26 July 1976

Prime Minister

Are you content with this?

Via Sattek,

Uganda

You will remember that the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary told the Prime Minister on 13 July that he intended to break off diplomatic relations with Uganda, after a few weeks' delay to allow time for the British community to be advised to leave and for them to do so.

Mr. Crosland has now reviewed the situation to take into account in particular the much increased tension between Kenya and Uganda. This undoubtedly increases the risk of harassment of British subjects following the announcement of a break in relations. The announcement of a break could be a spark which enflames the Kenya/Uganda dispute and the Ugandans might be glad to have us to blame. We might be accused by some African and Arab countries of acting in collusion with Kenya and Israel against Uganda, especially as we are known to be sending additional arms to Kenya. On the other hand, the High Commission in Kampala cannot do much to help British subjects in trouble if they stay. Paradoxically, the continued presence of the High Commission perhaps increases the risk to British subjects in Uganda, since it implies continued responsibility for British subjects in Uganda and hence <sup>our</sup> continued vulnerability to blackmail by Amin. The Kenyans have no Mission in Uganda. In a period of heightened tension with Kenya our Mission could be used by Amin to force us to put pressure on Kenya. There is, moreover, no guarantee that a week or two's delay might help matters. If anything, the prospects are of a worse situation in the coming weeks. Amin's request for OAU and UN fact-finding missions gives us at least a few days breathing space; he is less likely to arrest Europeans while fact-finding missions are planned or in Uganda.

/Mr. Crosland

P. R. H. Wright Esq.,  
No. 10 Downing Street,  
LONDON S.W. 1

CONFIDENTIAL

2



Mr. Crosland has accordingly decided that the balance of risk argues in favour of an early break. The evidence we have suggests that most British subjects who are prepared to heed our advice have now left Uganda. Subject, therefore, to a last minute review of the situation tomorrow morning he will, unless the Prime Minister disagrees, take the opportunity of Question Time on Wednesday, 28 July, to announce a break in relations. The High Commission in Kampala has been preparing for a break and will close their secure means of communication tomorrow at noon our time. A decision to delay the breach in relations would thus have to be conveyed to Kampala before that time. The remaining staff will then leave Kampala with the exception of the Acting High Commissioner and two others. The Acting High Commissioner will on Wednesday, close to the time of the Parliamentary announcement, inform the Ugandans of the decision to break relations. He will, we hope, be accompanied by the French Ambassador. The other two members of staff will then staff the British interests section of the French Embassy. We have asked the French to look after our interests because neither of the other two Commonwealth countries represented in Kampala, Ghana and India, are suitable and because of the other two European candidates, the Germans already look after the American interests and Italy was not thought suitable in present circumstances.

Mr. Crosland is keen to reduce the risks to British subjects following an announcement as far as he can. We are exploring the possibility of Dr. Waldheim being able to exploit the request for a fact-finding mission in a way which might stabilise the situation or at least buy more time. In his announcement to the House on Wednesday, Mr. Crosland proposes to be more moderate in his language than he had previously intended and to emphasise the fact that the French Embassy would be looking after British interests following the breach in relations.

*Yours ever*

*R. N. Dales*

(R. N. Dales)

CONFIDENTIAL

GPS 620

FLASH  
CYPHER CAT A

FM FCO 261830Z

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY KAMPALA AND NAIROBI (270500Z)

DESKBY PARIS (270800Z)

TO FLASH UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO 563 OF 26 JULY

INFO IMMEDIATE KAMPALA PARIS NAIROBI WASHINGTON

RELATIONS WITH UGANDA

1. I DECIDED A FORTNIGHT AGO THAT IT HAD BECOME IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN A PRODUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PRESENT UGANDAN GOVERNMENT. WE THEREFORE SET ABOUT ARRANGING AN ORDERLY DISENGAGEMENT WHICH WOULD TERMINATE IN THE BREAKING OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS AFTER A PERIOD WHICH WOULD HAVE GIVEN TIME FOR THOSE MEMBERS OF THE BRITISH COMMUNITY WHO WISHED TO DO SO TO LEAVE. IT WAS MY INTENTION TO ANNOUNCE THIS DECISION AS BEING THE OUTCOME OF THE REVIEW OF OUR RELATIONS WHICH, AT THE TIME OF THE DISAPPEARANCE OF MRS BLOCH, WE ANNOUNCED THAT WE WERE CONDUCTING WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF MR HENNESSY. THE FRENCH HAVE UNDERTAKEN TO ACT AS PROTECTING POWER.
2. THIS DECISION SHOULD NOT HOWEVER BE SEEN AS BEING BASED ON THE CASE OF MRS BLOCH. THE FACT IS THAT WE HAVE HAD RECURRING CRISES WITH PRESIDENT AMIN, EACH OF WHICH HAS CAUSED US SEVERE EMBARRASSMENT SINCE THE HILLS AFFAIR LAST YEAR WE HAVE MADE A DETERMINED ATTEMPT TO GET ON TERMS WITH HIM AND WE BELIEVED THAT WE HAD TO SOME EXTENT SUCCEEDED. WE HAVE NOW ONE MORE EXAMPLE OF HIS IRRATIONALITY AND INTRACTABILITY AND ARE BACK TO SQUARE ONE. I HAVE DECIDED THAT THE TIME HAS COME TO STOP TRYING.
3. I HAD HOPED THAT, BY GIVING IT A COUPLE OF WEEKS, WE WOULD

CONFIDENTIAL

/ HAVE ALLOWED

CONFIDENTIAL

HAVE ALLOWED THE TENSION TO SUBSIDE AND WOULD BE ABLE TO MAKE OUR MOVE IN A CALMER ATMOSPHERE. WITH THIS IN MIND WE AIMED AT A BREAK ON 28 JULY.

4. BECAUSE OF THE TENSION BETWEEN KENYA AND UGANDA, THE SITUATION IS NOT NOW AS CALM AS I WOULD HAVE WISHED IT TO BE. HOWEVER, OUR WARNINGS TO THE BRITISH COMMUNITY HAVE BEEN VERY THOROUGHLY DISSEMINATED AND MANY OF THEM HAVE LEFT. THOSE REMAINING

-A HARD CORE OF 2-300 "SEASONED CAMPAIGNERS"

-ARE I LEARN NOW EXPECTING US TO BREAK RELATIONS. IF I DELAY ANY FURTHER THE RISK IS THAT OUR WARNINGS WILL NOT BE BELIEVED AND THE COMMUNITY WILL BEGIN DRIFTING BACK AGAIN. (IT WILL ALSO BE DIFFICULT FOR THE FRENCH TO KEEP THEIR OFFER OPEN INDEFINITELY). MOREOVER, THE LONGER WE DELAY NOW, THE LONGER WE LEAVE IN PLACE A CONVENIENT HOSTAGE TO FORTUNE FOR AMIN TO USE IN THE SHAPE OF THE REMAINING MEMBERS OF THE HIGH COMMISSION.

5. AFTER MOST CAREFUL THOUGHT TODAY AND SUBJECT ONLY TO FINAL REVIEW FIRST THING TOMORROW MORNING, I HAVE DECIDED THAT THE BALANCE OF RISKS MUST LIE IN FAVOUR OF BREAKING NOW. I SHALL THEREFORE INSTRUCT THE ACTING HIGH COMMISSIONER TO CONVEY THIS TO THE UGANDAN GOVERNMENT ON WEDNESDAY AFTERNOON, 28 JULY, HIMSELF LEAVING THE COUNTRY IMMEDIATELY THEREAFTER. THE REST OF HIS STAFF WILL HAVE LEFT THAT MORNING, EXCEPT FOR TWO OFFICIALS WHO WILL COME UNDER THE PROTECTION OF THE FRENCH EMBASSY AS THE BRITISH INTERESTS SECTION.

6. I RECOGNISE THAT AS IMPLIED ABOVE THERE IS A RISK OF VIOLENT REACTION BY AMIN - AS THERE WOULD OF COURSE BE AT ANY TIME. I AM ANXIOUS TO LIMIT THIS AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE AND IN THIS CONTEXT IT WOULD CLEARLY BE HELPFUL IF AMIN, FOR THE FIRST DAY OR TWO AFTER HE LEARNS OF OUR DECISION, WERE TO BE STILL EXPECTING THE UN HELP FOR WHICH HE HAS ASKED. I SHOULD THEREFORE BE MOST GRATEFUL IF THE SECRETARY GENERAL WOULD MAKE AS SYMPATHETIC A RESPONSE TO THE UGANDAN REQUEST AS HE CAN AND THAT IT SHOULD REACH AMIN BEFORE HE LEARNS OF OUR DECISION. I AM NOT (NOT) ASKING THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO FALL IN WITH THE UGANDAN REQUEST.



CONFIDENTIAL

IT IS NOT FOR ME TO ADVISE ON THAT. BUT I AM ASKING THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL SHOULD TELL AMIN THAT HE IS CONSIDERING THE REQUEST URGENTLY, THAT HE HOPES HE CAN HELP, ETC. PLEASE DO WHAT YOU CAN TO THIS END URGENTLY AND LET ME HAVE A REPORT BEFORE 0700Z TOMORROW 27 JULY.

CROSLAND

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

EAD  
POD  
PPD  
PSD  
CONSULAR D  
CONSULAR EMERG UNIT  
SECURITY D  
FINANCE D  
ASD  
COD  
P & C D  
WED  
CCD  
DEFENCE D  
NEWS D  
GIPD  
N AM D  
EID (E)  
OADs  
RESEARCH D (AM SECT)  
                    (WE SECT)  
CAD  
CABINET OFFICE



CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 160

IMMEDIATE

CYPHER CAT -A-

FM TEL AVIV 250940Z JUL

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 260800Z

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 250 OF 25/07/76

RPTD IMMEDIATE INFO: NAIROBI AND KAMPALA.

UGANDA

MR PERES ( MINISTER OF DEFENCE ) TOLD ME LAST NIGHT THAT SINCE ENTERBE PRESIDENT AMIN HAD AGAIN BEEN IN TELEPHONIC CONTACT WITH COLONEL BAR LEV ( THE FORMER HEAD OF THE ISRAEL MILITARY MISSION IN UGANDA ) . HE HAD TALKED TO HIM YESTERDAY ABOUT HIS DISILLUSION WITH THE ARABS AND HAD ASKED FOR AN ISRAELI OFFICER TO TRAIN HIS MEN IN THE CONTEXT OF HIS TROUBLES WITH KENYA.

2. LATER IN THE EVENING MR PERES WAS INFORMED THAT AMIN HAD AGAIN TELEPHONED BAR LEV, THIS TIME TO ASK THAT ISRAEL SHOULD PROVIDE SOMEONE TO MEDIATE BETWEEN HIM AND KENYA. IF THIS WERE NOT DONE WITHIN FIVE DAYS AMIN WOULD HAVE NO ALTERNATIVE TO TAKING DRASTIC ACTION AGAINST KENYA.

3. MR PERES SAID THAT THESE CONVERSATIONS HAD BEEN TYPICALLY ILLOGICAL AND INCOHERENT. COLONEL BAR LEV HAD DONE NO MORE THAN LISTEN AND SAY THAT HE WOULD REPORT WHAT AMIN HAD SAID TO THE ISRAEL GOVERNMENT.

ELLIOTT

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

EAD	NEWS D	GIPD
CONS D	OADS	FINANCE D
CONS EM UNIT	UND	WED
NENAD	MVD	CABINET OFFICE
PUSD	EID (E)	

CONFIDENTIAL



Pr. OK.  
M.J.

London SW1A 2AH

15 July 1976

Pine Knobs

Kosau

cc. ~~Mr. McNally~~  
Mr. McCaffrey.

Dear Patrick,

Mr Crosland explained that there were two options. The first was to denounce Amin and break off diplomatic relations immediately. This was the option which superficially had the greater attraction. It would certainly go down well with Parliament, the press and public opinion. It would free us from further blackmail. However, he was advised by those who knew Uganda and President Amin that such a course would run the risk of provoking reprisals against the British community in Uganda. Such harrassment of the community could easily result in loss of life, if not from the actions of Amin himself then from those of his unruly soldiery. Consequently he had decided to adopt the alternative option of avoiding precipitate action with the objective of achieving an orderly disengagement from Uganda. When we thought that those of the community who could be persuaded to leave had had enough time so to do we would quietly withdraw our High Commission. The timing here would be imprecise but it would have to be a matter of weeks.

The British community already knew the score, but we would be taking more specific steps to advise them to leave. We were conveying this message both to the headquarters of firms and missionary societies with people in Uganda and, so far as was possible, directly to members of the British community in Uganda. Because of the way the British community was spread out in Uganda, a forced evacuation would present extremely difficult problems. On the other hand, there was a good chance that over a few weeks those who would be prepared to leave would have a chance to go in good order. There was already a trickle out of Uganda.

Mr Crosland said he accepted that the chosen option ran risks but these were much less than would be the case if he had announced an immediate break in relations. Moreover President Amin could at any moment take action which would force us to abandon an orderly withdrawal and go into a forced evacuation.

/Contingency

CONFIDENTIAL



Contingency plans were ready for this but he hoped that it would not be necessary to activate them. He was acutely conscious of the political cost of his chosen course of action but he was convinced that it was the right one.

In answer to a question Mr Crosland explained that neither he nor officials had seriously considered a third possible course which was to do nothing at all, hoping that things would blow over and that we would be able to establish good relations. This was not the first time we had been through this kind of situation with Uganda under Amin and enough was enough. We needed to move out of the situation where we were vulnerable to the taking of hostages, which is what the British community were under the present Ugandan regime, because of our obligation and theoretical ability to protect them.

Mr Crosland was asked how he expected the editors to react to the information he had given them. How would it appear for example if newspapers began to imply that the government's policy was one of orderly withdrawal? The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that to reveal the strategy would be to imperil it. He agreed with the suggestion (from Harold Evans of the Sunday Times) that the most helpful line would be for newspapers to recommend the chosen policy and to criticise him for not pursuing it!

*True as,*  
*M-L*

(R. N. Dales)

EDITORS - 6 pm 14 July

✓ Roy Wright	Daily Express	
✓ Peter Grover	Daily Mail	(Deputy Editor)
✓ Michael Taylor	Daily Mirror	(Deputy Editor)
✓ Colin Welsh	Daily Telegraph	(Deputy Editor)
✓ Andrew Knight	Economist	
✓ M H Fisher	Financial Times	
✓ David MacKie	Guardian	(Deputy Editor)
<del>✓ John Cole or</del>		(Deputy Editor)
✓ Donald Trelford	Observer	
✓ Larry Lamb	Sun	
✓ William Rees-Mogg	Times	
✓ Harold Evans	Sunday Times	
✓ John Thompson	Sunday Telegraph	

IMMEDIATE

CYPHER/CAT A

FM F C O 151445Z

*Finer Minski*  
*W. M. Rosen*

CONFIDENTIAL

TO IMMEDIATE PARIS TELEGRAM NO. 368 OF 15 JULY 1976  
AND TO KAMPALA  
INFO NAIROBI AND WASHINGTON.

*P*  
*15/7*

YOUR TELNO 686: ANGLO-UGANDAN RELATIONS.

1. I HAVE NOW DECIDED THAT, UNLESS EVENTS FORCE MY HAND, I SHALL NOT IMMEDIATELY WITHDRAW OUR MISSION OR SEVER DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS. TO DO SO WOULD RISK PRODUCING A REACTION FROM AMIN WHICH MIGHT PUT THE BRITISH COMMUNITY IN SERIOUS DANGER.
2. I HAVE, HOWEVER, DECIDED THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN A PRODUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP WITH PRESIDENT AMIN. I PROPOSE THEREFORE TO ATTEMPT TO ARRANGE AN ORDERLY DISENGAGEMENT, WHICH WOULD TERMINATE IN THE BREAKING OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS AFTER A PERIOD WHICH WOULD HAVE GIVEN TIME FOR THOSE MEMBERS OF THE COMMUNITY WHO WISH TO DO SO TO LEAVE. THE BREAK WILL BE PRESENTED AS THE OUTCOME OF THE REVIEW OF OUR RELATIONS WHICH WE HAVE ANNOUNCED THAT WE ARE CONDUCTING WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF MR HENNESSY. MY VIEW ON TIMING IS THAT IF ALL GOES WELL WE MAKE THE BREAK IN ABOUT TWO WEEKS' TIME, PERHAPS AT THE VERY BEGINNING OF NEXT MONTH.
3. PLEASE INFORM THE FRENCH IN THE STRICTEST CONFIDENCE AND SAY THAT WE ARE NOW GRATEFULLY TAKING UP THEIR AGREEMENT TO ACT AS PROTECTING POWER. YOU SHOULD EXPLAIN THAT, AS THEY WILL KNOW, WE HAVE HAD RECURRENT CRISES WITH PRESIDENT AMIN, EACH OF WHICH HAS CAUSED US SEVERE EMBARRASSMENT. SINCE THE HILLS CASE LAST YEAR WE HAVE MADE A DETERMINED ATTEMPT TO GET ON TERMS WITH HIM AND BELIEVED THAT WE HAD TO SOME EXTENT SUCCEEDED. WE HAVE NOW ONE MORE EXAMPLE OF HIS IRRATIONALITY AND INTRACTABILITY, AND WE ARE BACK TO SQUARE ONE. WE HAVE DECIDED THAT THE TIME HAS COME TO STOP TRYING.

/4. YOU SHOULD

4. YOU SHOULD GO ON TO SAY THAT WE ARE HOPING THAT BY GIVING IT A COUPLE OF WEEKS, WE WILL ALLOW THE PRESENT TENSION TO SUBSIDE AND BE ABLE TO MAKE OUR MOVE IN A CALMER ATMOSPHERE. MEANWHILE, WE SHALL CONTINUE TO ADVISE THE BRITISH COMMUNITY TO CONSIDER SERIOUSLY WHETHER THEY SHOULD REMAIN IN UGANDA AND WE ARE HOPING THAT WITHIN A WEEK OR TWO SOME AT LEAST OF THOSE WHO ARE NOT IRREVOCABLY WEDDED TO THE COUNTRY WILL HAVE BEEN ABLE TO MAKE THEIR DISPOSITIONS TO DEPART.

5. YOU MAY ASSURE THE FRENCH THAT WE INTEND TO ATTACH TWO OF OUR STAFF TO THE FRENCH EMBASSY TO ASSIST WITH OUR WORK. WE WILL CONSULT THEM ON THE VARIOUS DETAILS OF THEIR TAKE-OVER WHEN WE HAVE THEIR RESPONSE TO YOUR APPROACH.

6. WE RECOGNISE THAT THERE MAY BE A REACTION FROM AMIN AND THAT HE MAY MAKE DIFFICULTIES EITHER IF HE LEARNS OF OUR PREPARATIONS, OR WHEN WE INFORM HIM OF THE BREAK. THESE ARE RISKS WE HAVE TO TAKE. WHEN THE TIME COMES WE WOULD ASK THAT THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR BE AUTHORISED TO JOIN OUR ACTING HIGH COMMISSIONER IN PRESENTING OUR DECISION TO THE UGANDAN MFA. WE WOULD ALSO EXPLAIN IT MORE FULLY TO THE UGANDAN HIGH COMMISSIONER HERE WHO IS A REASONABLE AND WELL DISPOSED MAN. A CONSTRAINT ON THE UGANDANS WILL BE THAT THEY WILL NEED TO MAKE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE CONDUCT OF THEIR APPRECIABLE OFFICIAL BUSINESS IN LONDON AND IT WOULD THEREFORE NOT BE WISE FOR THEM TO OBJECT STRONGLY TO WHAT WE FOR OUR PART PROPOSE.

7. KAMPALA SHOULD NOW REINFORCE THEIR ADVICE TO THE BRITISH COMMUNITY (MY TELNO 140). THEY SHOULD SAY THAT IN THE LIGHT OF RECENT EXPERIENCE, THE COMMUNITY SHOULD REALISE THAT A SITUATION MIGHT ARISE AT ANY TIME IN WHICH THE HIGH COMMISSION MIGHT HAVE TO LEAVE OR OTHERWISE BE IN NO POSITION TO BE ABLE TO HELP THEM. BRITISH SUBJECTS SHOULD THEREFORE URGENTLY CONSIDER LEAVING. THE FCO WILL SPEAK SIMILARLY, FROM TODAY, TO HEAD OFFICES OF FIRMS AND MISSION SOCIETIES. THE HIGH COMMISSION SHOULD MAKE EVERY

/EFFORT TO



CONFIDENTIAL.

EFFORT TO GET THIS MESSAGE ROUND THE COMMUNITY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE INCLUDING USING THE TELEPHONE WHERE NECESSARY.

8. IF (IF) OSAS OFFICERS ENQUIRE THEY MAY BE REMINDED THAT COMPENSATION TERMS EXIST IF THEY BREAK THEIR CONTRACTS WITH THE UGANDAN GOVERNMENT.

9. HENNESSY WILL NOW STAY HERE TO ASSIST IN PLANNING THIS OPERATION. WE WILL TELEGRAPH SHORTLY ABOUT STAFF MOVEMENTS AND STAFF FOR THE BRITISH INTERESTS SECTION.  
CROSLAND

[COPIES SENT TO NO.10 DOWNING STREET]

F I L E S

EAD  
CONS D  
PCD  
LEGAL ADVISERS  
POD  
PS  
PS/MR. ROWLANDS  
PS/LORD GORONWY-ROBERTS  
PS/PUS  
SIR A. DUFF  
MR. ASPIN  
MR. KEEBLE  
MR. HAWLEY

APS 120  
IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER CAT A

FM KAMPALA 141530Z JULY

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBYBY FCO 141630Z

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TEL NO 304 OF 14 JULY 1976.

INFO IMMEDIATE NAIROBI UKREP BRUSSELS PARIS

PRIORITY WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

YOUR TEL NO 140: EXPULSION.

1. LUBEGA RANG ME LATE THIS AFTERNOON TO SAY THAT AMIN HAD SPOKEN TO ISINGOMA BY TELEPHONE AND INSTRUCTED HIM TO FORMALLY REQUEST MY WITHDRAWAL. LUBEGA'S UNDERSTANDING WAS THAT YOU HAD INDICATED TO ISINGOMA THAT I SHOULD NOT BE ASKED TO LEAVE BEFORE FRIDAY. AMIN NOW AGREES THIS IS ACCEPTABLE. I THEREFORE PROPOSE TO TRAVEL ON THE EAA FRIDAY EVENING FLIGHT (EC918) TO NAIROBI, CONNECTING WITH THE OVERNIGHT BRITISH AIRWAYS FLIGHT FOR LONDON. DETAILS WILL BE TELEGRAPHED LATER.

HORROCKS

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTN

EAD

CONS D

CONS EM UNIT

NENAD

PTCD

PUS D

POD (WELFARE)

NEWS D

ODS

QIP D

CABINET OFFICE

CONFIDENTIAL



- OPS 160  
FLASH  
CYPHER/CAT A

CONFIDENTIAL

FM F.C.O. 141330Z

CONFIDENTIAL

TO FLASH KAMPALA TELNO 147 OF 14 JULY  
INFO IMMEDIATE NAIROBI, UKMIS NEW YORK, PRIORITY PARIS WASHINGTON.

UGANDA EVACUATION

1. TODAY'S EVENING NEWS, UNDER HEADLINE QUOTE R.A.F. ON PED ALERT UNQUOTE CARRIES STORY THAT FOUR R.A.F. V.C.10S ARE STANDING BY TO EVACUATE BRITISH COMMUNITY FROM UGANDA.
2. THIS STORY IS COMPLETE FABRICATION. R.A.F. SPOKESMAN IN FACT TOLD EVENING NEWS THAT THERE WERE NO REPEAT NO R.A.F. AIRCRAFT ON STANDBY.
3. WE HAVE SPOKEN TO ISINGOMA WHO HAS UNDERTAKEN TO TELEPHONE KAMPALA AND ENSURE THAT THERE IS NO MISUNDERSTANDING THERE. YOU SHOULD TAKE ANY OPPORTUNITY OPEN TO YOU TO DO LIKEWISE.
4. SPOKESMAN TODAY CONFIRMED R.A.F. DENIAL AND ADDED THAT WE HAD NO IMMEDIATE PLANS FOR AN AIRLIFT. ASKED ABOUT THE ADVICE BEING GIVEN TO THE BRITISH COMMUNITY, HE SAID THAT YOU WERE IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH THEM AS WE WERE WITH THEIR EMPLOYERS. THE COMMUNITY WERE FULLY AWARE OF WHAT WAS HAPPENING. HE ADDED UNATTRIBUTABLY THAT THEY WERE QUITE ABLE TO MAKE UP THEIR OWN MINDS.

CROSLAND

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

EAD

CONS DEPT

CONS EM UNIT

NENAD

PUSD

NEWS DEPT

OADS

UND

MVD

EID (E)

GIPD

CABINET OFFICE

POG

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

CONFIDENTIAL

200

CONFIDENTIAL

FLASH  
CYPHER/CAT A

FM WASHINGTON 131820Z

CONFIDENTIAL

TO F L A S H FCO TEL NO 2410 OF 13 JULY

INFO F L A S H UKMIS NEW YORK.

UKMIS TEL NO 1098 TO FCO.

SECURITY COUNCIL: HIJACKING.

1. I WOULD SUPPORT THIS RECOMMENDATION. YOU WILL RECALL THAT, WHEN KISSINGER FIRST DISCUSSED THE RESPECTIVE U.K. AND U.S. REACTIONS WITH YOU ON 7 JULY, HE APPEALED FOR OUR SUPPORT IN DEFEATING ANY CONDEMNATORY RESOLUTION AGAINST THE ISRAELI ACTION - AND CONTRASTED THIS REQUEST WITH HIS ACCEPTANCE OF OUR ABSTENTION ON THE P.L.O. RESOLUTION AT THE BEGINNING OF THE YEAR.

2. WHEN I SAW KISSINGER AT THE WEEKEND, HE ASKED WHAT OUR APPROACH WOULD BE. I SAID I THOUGHT THE EPISODE OVER MRS BLOCH WOULD NOW INCLINE US TO ALIGN OURSELVES WITH THE AMERICAN POSITION MORE CLOSELY THAN MIGHT OTHERWISE HAVE BEEN THE CASE.

RAMSBOTHAM

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTN

UN D

E A D

CONS D

CONSE M UNIT

NENAD

PJS D

NEWS D

O A D S

M V D

E I D (E)

Q I P D

CABINET OFFICE

CONFIDENTIAL

FLASH

CIPHER/CAT A

FM UKHIS NEW YORK 131700Z

CONFIDENTIAL.

TO FLASH FCO TELNO 1098 OF 13 JULY  
INFO FLASH WASHINGTON.

SECURITY COUNCIL: HIJACKING.

1. I UNDERSTAND THAT YOU WOULD FIND IT HELPFUL TO HAVE A SUMMARY OF MY RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE VARIOUS VOTING SITUATIONS WE MAY REACH IN THE COUNCIL, AND THE ARGUMENTS, AS SEEN FROM HERE, FOR THOSE RECOMMENDATIONS.

2. WE MAY GET INTO VOTING AS EARLY AS AROUND 5 O'CLOCK OUR TIME THIS EVENING, BUT THIS IS STILL NOT CERTAIN AND VOTING COULD BE DELAYED UNTIL TOMORROW OR EVEN LATER.

3. THE AMERICANS AND OURSELVES AGREE THAT THE PRESENT LIKELY VOTING LINE UP, ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT NEITHER OUR OWN NOR THE AFRICAN DRAFTS ARE AMENDED, IS AS FOLLOWS:

ANGLO/US DRAFT.

IN FAVOUR: FRANCE, ITALY, JAPAN, SWEDEN, UK, US  
ABSTAIN: PANAMA  
OPPOSED: OTHERS

AFRICAN DRAFT.

IN FAVOUR: DENIN, CHINA, GUYANA, LIBYA, PAKISTAN, ROUMANIA,  
USSR, TANZANIA  
ABSTAIN: JAPAN, PANAMA, SWEDEN  
OPPOSED: UK, US AND, LESS CERTAINLY, FRANCE AND ITALY.

4. THE TANZANIANS SPENT MUCH OF YESTERDAY TRYING TO ACHIEVE A FURTHER SOFTENING OF THE AFRICAN DRAFT, NOTABLY BY ADDING TO IT A CONDEMNATION OF HIJACKING IN GENERAL. BUT THE LIBYANS REFUSED TO ACCEPT THIS. SO THE AFRICANS DO NOT LOOK AS THOUGH THEY WILL GET THEIR NINTH VOTE. OUR OWN DRAFT SHOULD GET 6. .

CONFIDENTIAL

5. I THINK THAT TANZANIA WOULD PROBABLY PREFER NOT TO PUT THE AFRICAN DRAFT TO THE VOTE AND SEE IT FAIL FOR LACK OF NINE POSITIVE VOTES. BUT LIBYA (WITH SOVIET ENCOURAGEMENT) MIGHT RATHER PRESS THE MATTER TO A VOTE, WHATEVER THE LIKELY RESULT.

6. I DO NOT THINK IT WOULD BE A BAD OUTCOME TO THE DEBATE IF THERE WERE TO BE NO VOTE ON EITHER DRAFT. BUT GOVERNOR SCRANTON HAS TOLD US THIS MORNING THAT HIS STRONG PREFERENCE WOULD BE TO ASK FOR A VOTE ON OUR RESOLUTION. MY INCLINATION IS TO GO ALONG WITH HIM. IF YOU PREFER NOT TO DO SO, GIVEN THE SITUATION IN KAMPALA, I THINK IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO TELL THE STATE DEPARTMENT WHY URGENTLY.

7. IF THE AFRICANS DO PRESS THEIR DRAFT TO A VOTE, I STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT WE SHOULD VOTE AGAINST IT IN COMPANY WITH THE UNITED STATES. IT IS NOT FOR ME TO ASSESS THE LIKELY REACTION IN UGANDA, NOR IN ISRAEL (TEL AVIV TELNO 229). BUT I BELIEVE THAT A BRITISH ABSTENTION WHICH LEFT THE AMERICANS VOTING ALONE AGAINST THE AFRICAN DRAFT WOULD BE BADLY RECEIVED IN THE UNITED STATES. THEY WOULD, IN MY VIEW, JUSTIFIABLY REPROACH US FOR BEING QUITTERS HALF-WAY DOWN THE LINE. THE PRESENT AFRICAN DRAFT IS JUST ABOUT AS OBJECTIONABLE AS THE FIRST ONE, CONDEMNING AS IT DOES ISRAEL'S FLAGRANT VIOLATION OF UGANDA'S SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND DEMANDING COMPENSATION FROM ISRAEL. I THINK THAT A BRITISH ABSTENTION WOULD BE SEEN BY MANY AT THE UNITED NATIONS AS EVIDENCE THAT AMIN'S BLATANT BLACKMAIL PAID. THE AFRICANS WOULD NOT BE SURPRISED BY A BRITISH NEGATIVE VOTE. FEW OF THE AFRICANS LIKE AMIN'S METHODS. AND KENYA'S OPPOSITION TO UGANDA HAS STRENGTHENED OUR TACTICAL POSITION HERE. A NEGATIVE VOTE AGAINST 8 IN FAVOUR WOULD NOT OF COURSE, CONSTITUTE A VETO: THE AFRICAN DRAFT WOULD HAVE FAILED FOR A LACK OF THE NECESSARY 9 VOTES. BUT WE WOULD HAVE MADE OUR POSITION QUITE CLEAR.

8. IF THE AFRICANS DO AMEND THEIR DRAFT FURTHER TO OBTAIN JAPAN'S OR PANAMA'S VOTE (E.G. BY ADDING A CONDEMNATION OF HIGHJACKING IN GENERAL), THEN I WOULD LIKE TO CONSIDER THE MATTER FURTHER,

2.  
CONFIDENTIAL

THOUGH.

# CONFIDENTIAL

THOUGH MY OWN INCLINATION WOULD STILL BE TO VOTE AGAINST ANY  
RESOLUTION WHICH INCLUDED A SPECIFIC CONDEMNATION OF THE  
ISRAELI ACTION.

RICHARD

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTN

UN D

EAD

CONS D

CONSEM UNIT

NENAD

PUSD

NEUSD

OADS

MVD

EID (E)

GIAD

CABINET OFFICE

CONFIDENTIAL

5

QPS 600  
IMMEDIATE  
CYPHER CAT A  
FM KAMPALA 131450Z JULY

Prime Minister

CONFIDENTIAL

R  
13/7

TDESKBY FCO 131600Z  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO TEL NO 300 OF 13 JULY 1976  
AND TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK  
INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS BONN TEL AVIV UKMIS GENEVA NAIROBI AND  
WASHINGTON

MY TELN 298: HIJACKING

1. IN HIS 70 MINUTE ADDRESS, AFTER THANKING ALL COMMUNIST COUNTRIES FOR SUPPORTING THE UGANDAN COURSE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL AMIN THEN GAVE A STEP BY STEP ACCOUNT OF THE HIJACKING AND DETAILED EXPLANATIONS DESIGNED TO SHOW THAT ALL HIS ACTIONS HAD BEEN AIMED AT SECURING THE RELEASE OF ALL THE HOSTAGES AND THE AMELIORATION, MEANTIME, OF THEIR CONDITIONS. HE PRODUCED TWO TAPE CASSETTES WHICH HE SAID CONTAINED ALL THE COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE HIJACKERS. THESE TALLIED WITH FRENCH STATEMENTS IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL THEREBY DISPROVING THE ISRAELI, US AND THE BRITISH ACCOUNTS. HE DENIED AGAIN FOREKNOWLEDGE OF THE HIJACKING AND COLLABORATION WITH THE HIJACKERS. ALL THE HOSPITALITY EXTENDED AND EXPENSE BORN BY UGANDA TOWARDS THE HOSTAGES WAS NOW BEING ABUSED BY THE BRITISH AND THE BBC.
2. AMIN THEN REFERRED TO A TELEX HE HAD RECEIVED FROM THE PFLP ASSERTING THAT ALTHOUGH THERE WOULD BE NO HIJACKINGS IN UGANDA ALL THOSE NOW SPEAKING ON BEHALF OF THE ISRAELIS (SUCH AS THE BRITISH) WOULD PAY VERY DEARLY.
3. REFERRING TO MRS BLOCH, AMIN ATTEMPTED TO CAST SUSPICION ON THE INTEREST OF THE BRITISH IN HER. SHE WAS AN ISRAELI - HE HAD SEEN HER PASSPORT - BUT THE BRITISH WERE NOW ACTING FOR THE ISRAELIS. BRITAIN'S ACTION WAS MOTIVATED BY HER ANGER OVER THE 1972 ASIAN EXPULSIONS.
4. AMIN WENT ON TO CRITICISE THE BBC REPORTING ON ANGOLA. ANGOLA WAS NOT IN THE POCKETS OF THE USSR AND CUBA SEMI COLON NOR WAS AMIN IN THE POCKETS OF LIBYA AND THE PALESTINIANS. HE WOULD NEVER BE AGAINST SOVIETS, CUBA, CHINA AND OTHER COMMUNIST COUNTRIES. HE REFERRED TO REMARKS IN PARLIAMENT ABOUT THE 500 BRITISH NATIONALS RESIDENT IN UGANDA BEING ENCOURAGED TO LEAVE, ASSERTING THAT HE WAS NOT AGAINST THE BRITISH AND MAKING

# CONFIDENTIAL

PARTICULAR MENTION OF THE MISSIONARIES. BRITISH PROPAGANDA, HAD BEEN DISPROVED BY FRENCH STATEMENTS IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. HE WOULD HENCEFORTH STRENGTHEN HIS RELATIONS WITH THE FRENCH.

5. THE ACTING BRITISH HIGH COMMISSIONER HAD HAD COMPLETE KNOWLEDGE OF THE ISRAELI INVASION AND HAD DRIVEN TO ENTEBBE WHILST THE FIGHTING WAS GOING ON.

6. RELATIONS WITH KENYA WERE EXCELLENT AND PRESENT DIFFICULTIES, EG A HUNDRED OIL TANKERS HELD UP ON ROUTE FOR UGANDA, RESULTED FROM BRITISH AND US PRESSURE ON KENYA. "WHEN THINGS CHANGE IN KENYA THE BRITISH WILL REGRET IT". THE BRITISH WERE THE RING LEADERS WHO WERE CREATING ALL THE PROBLEMS OVER KENYA. THE SECOND SECRETARY OF THE BRITISH HIGH COMMISSION HAD BEEN SENT AWAY FROM UGANDA BECAUSE OF STATEMENTS HE HAD MADE. THESE INDICATED HIS APPROVAL OF THE KILLING OF THE PALESTINIANS AND THE UGANDAN SOLDIERS.

7. IN HIS CLOSING REMARKS AMIN SAID HE WOULD NOT BE TAKING A DECISION REGARDING THE BRITISH UNTIL THE SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING WAS OVER. WHEN THE DECISION WAS TAKEN IT WOULD BE FINAL. REFERRING TO ALLEGED BBC REPORTS THAT THE UK HAD THREATENED TO BREAK OFF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS HE SAID THIS WOULD CAUSE NO PROBLEMS SINCE THE UK PROVIDED NO AID.

8. TWO MORE BRITISH NATIONALS WOULD BE DEPORTED TODAY BUT THERE WOULD BE NO PRIOR DISCLOSURE OF THEIR NAMES. AS LONG AS THE BRITISH MADE PROPAGANDA AGAINST UGANDA THEY WOULD EARN HIS RESENTMENT. FINALLY HE REPEATED THAT THE QUOTE OLD LADY UNQUOTE HAD BEEN HANDED OVER TO REJOIN THE OTHER HOSTAGES ON SATURDAY EVENING. SECURITY OFFICERS HAD BEEN PRESENT AND HIS MINISTER HAD REPORTED THAT ALL HOSTAGES HAD BEEN RETURNED TO ENTEBBE AIRPORT AS DIRECTED.

HORROCKS

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRN

EAD

CONS. D

CONS. EM UNIT

NENA D

PVSD

NEWS D

OADS

UND

MVD

EID (E)

CLPD

CABINET OFFICE

GR250 IMMEDIATE  
CYBER CAT A

CONFIDENTIAL

FM KAMPALA 131500Z JULY

CONFIDENTIAL

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TEL NO 299 OF 13 JULY 1976

AND TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

INFO PARIS BONN TEL AVIV UKMIS GENEVA NAIROBI AND WASHINGTON

MIPT: HIJACKING

1. LUBEGA WAS WIDE OF THE MARK IN HIS ASSESSMENT OF THE LINE AMIN MIGHT TAKE IN HIS ADDRESS THIS AFTERNOON.
2. AMIN'S SPEECH, BUILD AROUND THE HIJACKING DRAMA FROM THE TIME OF ARRIVAL OF THE AIRCRAFT AT ENTEBBE UNTIL THE ISRAELI RAID, QUICKLY LEAD UP TO A DENUNCIATION OF THE UK. BY LEVELLING ALL MANNER OF ACCUSATIONS (SOME OLD) AGAINST US HE OBVIOUSLY HOPED EFFECTIVELY TO DRAW ATTENTION AWAY FROM THE FACTS OF MRS BLOCH'S DISAPPEARANCE.
3. AMIN' ATTACK ON US WAS INTENSIFIED BY HIS FURY AT THE BRITISH MEDIA PARTICULARLY THE BBC AND LUBEGA'S ASSESSMENT OF HIS SENSITIVITY ON THIS POINT WAS ACCURATE.
4. AMIN HAS GIVEN NO HINT OF THE NATURE OF THE DECISION HE MIGHT TAKE AFFECTING THE UK FOLLOWING THE SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE BUT HE MADE NO THREATS AGAINST THE COMMUNITY INDICATING INSTEAD THAT HE HAD NOTHING AGAINST THEM. HIS LAST SUBSTANTIAL THREAT OF DRASTIC ACTION AGAINST US WAS IN DECEMBER 1972. THE UPSHOT ON THAT OCCASION WAS THE EXPROPRIATION OF MOST LARGE BRITISH FIRMS AND TEA ESTATES. OUR REMAINING ECONOMIC INTERESTS, HOWEVER, ARE NOT LARGE ENOUGH TO MERIT A REPETITION OF THIS EXERCISE. THIS SUGGESTS THAT HE MAY HAVE SOMETHING DIFFERENT IN MIND. MY OWN EXPULSION OR OTHER ACTION AGAINST THIS MISSION WOULD NOT BE INCONSISTENT WITH THE TENOR OF HIS ATTACK.

HORROCKS

[COPIES SENT TO NO.10 DOWNING  
STREET]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

EAD	OADS
CONS D	UND
CONS EM UNIT	MVD
NENAD	EID (E)
PUSD	GIPD
NEWS D	CABINET OFFICE

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

12 July 1976

Dear Sir

UGANDA

As you know, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary called on the Prime Minister at about 1730 this evening following his discussions in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office about policy towards Uganda.

After a report on the latest developments, including President Amin's press conference this morning, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that he was convinced that a policy of keeping cool was the right one rather than escalating the situation. The sole issue was what action President Amin would take towards the remaining British residents in Uganda, and although others had argued that we should take a tougher line, e.g. by breaking diplomatic relations immediately, he did not find these arguments convincing.

Mr. Crosland agreed that it was necessary to have contingency plans in case President Amin stepped up his threats against the British community, including a rupture of diplomatic relations, instructions to British citizens to leave Uganda, economic sanctions and the possibility of a personal telephone call from the Prime Minister to President Amin.

In the longer term, Mr. Crosland thought that we must try to disengage from Uganda. In terms of the total British community, we had already done this to some extent and the number of British residents in Uganda had declined over the past four years from about 7,000 to 500. There had not however been much disengagement in terms of business interests. He had therefore concluded that we should play it cool in the short term, trying to disengage in the longer term. Only then would it be right to think in terms of closing the High Commission in Kampala.

cc Master Set  
Foreign Policy,  
June 76

/On the question

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

On the question of a telephone call by the Prime Minister (which had been discussed earlier today in Brussels) Mr. Crosland said that he was sure this would be a mistake. If the purpose was to talk about Mrs. Bloch, it would achieve nothing. If it was designed to cool the situation by drawing on the Prime Minister's personal relationship with President Amin there was a danger, either that a friendly conversation would be followed within a month or so by President Amin's discovery that we had started to disengage and consequent hostile reactions on his part; or that he would invite the Prime Minister to visit Uganda or suggest a visit by himself to London; or that we would give the impression of crawling to President Amin for no particular purpose.

The Prime Minister said that he accepted Mr. Crosland's advice that the idea of a telephone call should be kept in reserve. He had, however, envisaged that the call would have two purposes, one of which would have been to obtain a formal assurance that British citizens would not be harassed. Mr. Crosland said that there might come a time when the Prime Minister's influence would be needed for this purpose, but only when British citizens were being harassed. He did not think that our goodwill should be dissipated now. He had thought of sending Mr. Hennessey back to Uganda tomorrow, but had concluded that he should remain here for another five or six days. In response to a question, Mr. Crosland said that he did not think we should meanwhile try to obtain assurances through the Acting High Commissioner in Kampala.

The Prime Minister questioned whether instructions could be given to the British community to leave, and asked whether a plan existed for evacuating them. He recalled that about 250 British citizens had been collected in about 24 hours during his visit to Kampala two years ago. Mr. Crosland said that there was a very elaborate evacuation plan in existence, based on a Lebanese-type situation in Uganda. Mr. Hennessey had told him that there was a simpler plan, based on the use of two Boeing 707s, and he had been asked to check on this and let Mr. Crosland have a written report.

In the course of a discussion on domestic politics, Mr. Crosland recalled that, after the Dennis Hills episode, the Government's policy of disengagement from Uganda had been deliberately reversed. He had no intention of repeating that reversal. Neither his own Ministers nor the Shadow Foreign Secretary had been particularly struck by the strength of opinion in the House of Commons.

/In the course

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 3 -

In the course of a discussion about a further Parliamentary Statement, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that he would like to keep open the possibility of a further statement within a day or two. The Prime Minister said that a statement would certainly be needed if Mrs. Bloch's body had indeed been found, as reported in the press, and he thought that any statement should cover both the need for Mrs. Bloch's murderers to be brought to justice and the question of assurances of non-harassment for British citizens.

Reverting to the question of a break in diplomatic relations, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that in the present atmosphere he thought that a break would be highly provocative and could result in the arrest and torture of British subjects. He could not guarantee that his conclusion was right, but he had thought very carefully before reaching this conclusion, and would continue to watch the situation closely. The Prime Minister said that he accepted Mr. Crosland's judgement, but asked him to keep the question under daily review. It might be necessary to move, in the face of public opinion.

Ans. Mr.

Paiching

E.A.J. Fergusson, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

tw

MESSAGE FROM PATRICK WRIGHT FOR FCO: 13.30, 12 July 1976

"The Prime Minister has spoken to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary about Mr. Rowlands statement on Uganda this afternoon. Both of them think that it should contain a passage in forthright terms making it clear that we hold the Ugandan Government responsible for bringing to justice those responsible for Mrs. Bloch's death, and that the passage should come directly after the reference to Mrs. Bloch's death.

Could they also please flash the full text of the statement to UKREP Brussels, to await the arrival of Patrick and party."

This message was given to both Richard Dales and a lady in Mr. Young's Office (Mr. Rowlands private secretary) at 13.35.

FR 100  
FLASH

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT A

*Ent. + p.*

FM FCO 122145Z

*R*  
*13/7*

CONFIDENTIAL

TO FLASH KAMPALA TELNO 140 OF 12 JULY

INFO FLASH NAIROBI IMMEDIATE UKREP BRUSSELS, PARIS, WASHINGTON,  
AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

YOUR TELNO 293: BRITISH COMMUNITY.

1. YOU SHOULD AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE BEGIN TO WARN THE COMMUNITY  
OF THE MESSAGES PASSED TO YOU TONIGHT. YOU SHOULD SAY THAT THEY  
MUST MAKE THEIR OWN DECISIONS, BUT THAT THEY SHOULD SERIOUSLY  
CONSIDER WHETHER TO REMAIN IN UGANDA FOR THE TIME BEING. YOU WILL  
PRESUMABLY WISH TO EMPHASISE THE NEED FOR DISCRETION.

CROSLAND

[COPIES SENT TO NO.10 DOWNING STREET]

NNNN

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION:

EAD

CONSULAR DEPT

POD

PPD

NEWS D

GIPD

CONFIDENTIAL

OPS 240

EN CLAIR

IMMEDIATE

UKHIS NEW YORK 122235Z

UNCLASSIFIED

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TEL NO 1095 OF 12 JULY 1976

INFO IMMEDIATE UKREP BRUSSELS (FOR PRIME MINISTERS AND SECRETARY OF STATES PARTY) KAMPALA MODUK

MIPT: BRITISH COMMUNITY IN UGANDA

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MY SECOND STATEMENT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON 12 JULY, ON THE BRITISH COMMUNITY IN UGANDA:

QUOTE

I HAVE ASKED FOR THE FLOOR, ON INSTRUCTIONS, TO REPORT TO THE COUNCIL SOME DISTURBING DEVELOPMENTS WHICH HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN UGANDA SINCE THIS DEBATE BEGAN. THE SECOND SECRETARY IN OUR HIGH COMMISSION IN KAMPALA, WHO SAW MRS BLOCH IN HOSPITAL, HAS BEEN EXPELLED WITH HIS WIFE ON A DEADLINE OF MIDNIGHT TOMORROW. OUR HIGH COMMISSION HAVE ALSO BEEN TOLD THAT TWO MEMBERS OF THE BRITISH COMMUNITY ARE ALSO TO BE EXPELLED TOMORROW. AND SERIOUS THREATS HAVE BEEN MADE AGAINST THE BRITISH COMMUNITY IN GENERAL. THE SMALL BRITISH COMMUNITY IN UGANDA HAS SHOWN ITS DEDICATION TO THAT COUNTRY BY THEIR LONG SERVICE THERE: THE HIGHEST SINGLE OCCUPATION NOW BEING THOSE INVOLVED IN MISSIONARY WORK. A PARTICULARLY SINISTER ASPECT OF THESE THREATS IS THAT ACTION IS TO BE TAKEN AFTER THE SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE. MAY I ADD THAT WE ARE FULLY CONVINCED THAT OUR HIGH COMMISSION HAVE PERFORMED THEIR DIPLOMATIC DUTIES IN A PROPER MANNER AND THAT THEIR REPORTING ON RECENT EVENTS HAS BEEN ACCURATE THROUGHOUT. IT IS FORTUNATE THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL IS SITTING ON THIS ISSUE AT THIS MOMENT. IT GIVES ME THE OPPORTUNITY OF BRINGING THESE FACTS TO THE ATTENTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AS A WHOLE.

UNQUOTE.

RICHARD

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

EAD

UND

NEWS D

GIRD

POD

ASD

CONSULAR D

CABINET OFFICE

[COPIES SENT TO NCIO  
DOWNING STREET]

TO UKREP BRUSSELS

GRS 2000

EN CLAIR

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 122030Z

UNCLASSIFIED

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TEL NO 10900F 12 JULY  
INFO IMMEDIATE UKREP BRUSSELS (FOR PRIME MINISTER'S AND SECRETARY  
OF STATE'S PARTY) KAMPALA ROUTINE WASHINGTON PARIS  
INFO SAVING ROME STOCKHOLM NAIROBI UKMIS GENEVA BONN TOKYO  
DAR ES SALAAM BUCHAREST PANAMA.  
SECURITY COUNCIL: UGANDA HIJACKING

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MY STATEMENT AT THIS MORNING'S MEETING  
OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL:

THIS MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAS BEEN CALLED TO CONSIDER  
THE EVENTS WHICH TOOK PLACE AT ENTebbe INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT ON THE  
NIGHT OF 3-4 JULY AND IN PARTICULAR THE ACTION UNDERTAKEN BY THE  
GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL TO SECURE THE RELEASE OF A NUMBER OF ISRAELI  
HOSTAGES HELD THERE. AS WE ALL KNOW, HOWEVER, EVENTS DID NOT START  
THERE, BUT RATHER WITH THE HIJACKING ON 27 JUNE OF AN AIR FRANCE  
JETLINER ON A FLIGHT FROM ATHENS TO PARIS. AT THE OUTSET THEREFORE,  
I MUST PUT ON RECORD IN THE STRONGEST POSSIBLE TERMS MY GOVERNMENT'S  
UTTER CONDEMNATION OF THIS ACT OF AIR PIRACY AND THE SUBSEQUENT  
HOLDING HOSTAGE FOR SEVERAL DAYS OF OVER 250 INNOCENT PASSENGERS  
AND CREW AT ENTebbe AIRPORT. IT IS INTOLERABLE TO MY GOVERNMENT  
THAT, IN THE YEAR 1976, THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY SHOULD STILL  
BE HELD TO THIS KIND OF RANSOM BY LATTER-DAY HIGHWAYMEN. WE  
BELIEVE THAT IT IS THE DUTY OF THE ENTIRE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY  
TO MAKE CLEAR THEIR CONDEMNATION AND ABHORRENCE OF SUCH EVIL ACTIONS  
WHICH PUT AT RISK THE LIVES OF THE INNOCENT, AND, INDEED, STRIKE  
AT THE FABRIC OF THE COMMUNITY OF NATIONS. WE DEEPLY DEPLORE THE  
LOSS OF HUMAN LIFE AT ENTebbe AIRPORT WHICH RESULTED FROM THIS  
ACTION. AT THE SAME TIME, WE ARE EXTREMELY PLEASED THAT THE LIVES  
OF SO MANY OF THE INNOCENT HOSTAGES WERE SAVED AND THAT THE HIJACKING  
ATTEMPT ITSELF FINALLY ENDED IN THE FAILURE IT SO RICHLY DESERVED.

MR PRESIDENT, LAST FRIDAY THE UGANDAN FOREIGN MINISTER, IN  
REPLYING TO THE DISTINGUISHED REPRESENTATIVE OF ISRAEL, MADE  
SOME EXTRAORDINARY AND UNFOUNDED ALLEGATIONS ABOUT THE CASE OF  
MRS DGRA BLOCH, A BRITISH CITIZEN WITH DUAL ISRAELI NATIONALITY.  
THE TRUE FACTS ARE AS FOLLOWS.

WHEN WE FIRST HAD NEWS OF THE HIJACKING OF THE AIR FRANCE PLANE  
ON 27 JUNE, WE ENQUIRED IF ANY OF THE ISRAELI NATIONALS AMONG THE  
PASSENGERS ABOARD HAD BRITISH NATIONALITY. BOTH AIR FRANCE AND THE  
ISRAELI AUTHORITIES LATER INFORMED US THAT THERE WERE NONE STILL

*Gale Boon*

Full Distribution ✓
Selective Distribution:—
Agriculture
Econ/Finance
Ext Trade/Dev Countries
Pol Inst & Legal Affs
Industry/Trade And Env.
SA/Int & R Policy

FOUO



ABOARD. ON SUNDAY, 4 JULY, WE LEARNT THAT AMONG THE HOSTAGES RELEASED ON 2 JULY WAS MRS BLOCH, WHO HAD BEEN ADMITTED TO MULAGO GENERAL HOSPITAL. THE BRITISH ACTING HIGH COMMISSIONER IN KAMPALA WAS IMMEDIATELY INSTRUCTED TO ASSIST MRS BLOCH IN LEAVING UGANDA.

A MEMBER OF THE HIGH COMMISSION STAFF VISIT MRS BLOCH ON THE EVENING OF 4 JULY IN THE HOSPITAL. IN OTHER WORDS, LONG AFTER THE ISRAELI AIRCRAFT HAD LEFT ENTEBBE AIRPORT. IT IS SIMPLY NOT TRUE TO ASSERT, AS THE UGANDAN FOREIGN MINISTER DID BEFORE THIS COUNCIL ON FRIDAY, THAT MRS BLOCH HAD LEFT HOSPITAL ON THE EVENING OF 3 JULY AND HAD BEEN RETURNED TO ENTEBBE AIRPORT SO AS NOT TO JEOPARDISE THE LIVES OF THE OTHER HOSTAGES. THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT SHE WAS STILL THERE AFTER THE ISRAELI ACTION. THIS IS ALSO CONFIRMED BY THE FACT THAT SHE WAS ALSO SEEN IN HOSPITAL BY A MEMBER OF THE FRENCH EMBASSY.

MR GOVERNMENT IS ENTIRELY SATISFIED THAT THE UGANDANS HAD CUSTODY OF MRS BLOCH AT THE TIME OF THE ISRAELI RAID AND THEREAFTER.

ON 9 JULY, OUR HIGH COMMISSIONER IN UGANDA WAS ABLE TO SEE PRESIDENT AMIN. HE TOLD THE PRESIDENT THAT MY GOVERNMENT FOUND IT IMPOSSIBLE TO ACCEPT THE UGANDAN GOVERNMENT'S STATEMENTS, THAT THERE WAS GREAT CONCERN IN BRITAIN ABOUT HER FATE, AND THAT HE HOPED AN IMMEDIATE ENQUIRY WOULD BE CONDUCTED INTO HER DISAPPEARANCE.

HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT'S POSITION IS FULLY SET OUT IN A STATEMENT MADE TODAY IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS BY THE MINISTER OF STATE IN THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE. I WOULD LIKE TO QUOTE DIRECTLY FROM IT.

QUOTE ON THE 7TH OF JULY I TOLD THE HOUSE THAT WE WERE SENDING OUR HIGH COMMISSIONER BACK TO KAMPALA TO DISCUSS MRS BLOCH'S DISAPPEARANCE URGENTLY AND FULLY WITH THE UGANDAN GOVERNMENT. MR HENNESSY SAW PRESIDENT AMIN ON THE 9TH OF JULY. ON THE 10TH OF JULY THE UGANDAN GOVERNMENT SENT MR HENNESSY A NOTE WHICH CONTINUED TO DENY KNOWLEDGE OF THE WHEREABOUTS OF MRS BLOCH AND REPEATED THAT ISRAEL SHOULDERED THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR HER AS FOR ALL OTHER HOSTAGES. AS WE SAID AT THE TIME, THIS IS TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE IN THAT MRS BLOCH WAS SEEN BY A MEMBER OF THE HIGH COMMISSION STAFF IN HOSPITAL WELL AFTER THE ISRAEL OPERATION AT ENTEBBE AIRPORT WAS OVER. WE ARE JUST NOT SATISFIED WITH THE RESULTS OF ANY ENQUIRIES THE UGANDANS MAY HAVE MADE.

OUR HIGH COMMISSIONER IN KAMPALA ARRIVED HOME THIS MORNING. I HAVE HAD A REPORT PERSONALLY FROM HIM. AS A RESULT I DEEPLY REGRET TO HAVE TO INFORM THE HOUSE THAT THERE SEEMS LITTLE DOUBT THAT MRS BLOCH WAS TAKEN FROM HER ROOM IN MULAGO HOSPITAL AT ABOUT 9.30 P.M. (LOCAL TIME) ON THE 4TH OF JULY AND THAT SHE IS NO LONGER ALIVE. WE EXTEND OUR DEEPEST SYMPATHY TO ALL HER FAMILY. IN WHATEVER CIRCUMSTANCES MRS BLOCH'S DEATH TOOK PLACE, THE UGANDAN GOVERNMENT MUST BRING THOSE RESPONSIBLE TO JUSTICE UNQUOTE

FROM WHAT I HAVE ALREADY SAID IT WILL BE CLEAR THAT I CANNOT TELL THE COUNCIL WITH ANY CERTAINTY WHAT PRECISELY HAPPENED TO MRS BLOCH. THE STRONG PROBABILITIES ARE THAT SHE IS DEAD. THERE IS ONLY ONE



GOVERNMENT THAT CAN KNOW WHAT HAPPENED AND IF THEY DO NOT KNOW  
ALREADY THEY ARE THE ONLY GOVERNMENT THAT HAS THE MEANS OF FINDING  
OUT, NAMELY THE GOVERNMENT OF UGANDA. WE NOW LOOK TO THEM TO DO SO.

WE HAVE LISTENED WITH GREAT ATTENTION AND INTEREST TO THE ACCOUNTS  
GIVEN EARLIER IN THIS DEBATE BY THE REPRESENTATIVES OF UGANDA AND  
ISRAEL OF THE EVENTS WHICH TOOK PLACE FROM THE TIME OF THE HIJACKING  
ON 27 JUNE TO THE ACTION UNDERTAKEN BY ISRAEL ON 3 JULY. NO-ONE IN  
THIS COUNCIL CAN HAVE FAILED TO NOTICE THE REMARKABLY DIFFERENT  
INTERPRETATION GIVEN BY THE TWO REPRESENTATIVES. WHAT SURELY  
EMERGES VERY CLEARLY FROM ALL OF THIS IS THE NEED TO AVOID A  
REPETITION OF A SITUATION IN WHICH NOTWITHSTANDING THE PREOCCUP-  
ATION WHICH MANY OF US HAVE WITH THE OBLIGATION OF EVERY STATE TO  
RESPECT THE SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF ALL STATES, A  
GOVERNMENT IS DRIVEN TO TAKE UNILATERAL ACTION WITHIN THE TERRITORY  
OF ANOTHER STATE IN ORDER TO ASSURE THE SAFETY OF ITS CITIZENS. IN  
THE VIEW OF MY DELEGATION IT IS ON THIS ASPECT OF THE PROBLEM THAT  
THE SECURITY COUNCIL SHOULD CONCENTRATE ITS ATTENTION NOW, LOOKING  
TOWARDS THE AVOIDANCE OF SUCH EVENTS IN THE FUTURE RATHER THAN  
SEEKING TO PASS JUDGEMENT ON WHAT TOOK PLACE AT ENTebbe.

THIS PROBLEM OF HIJACKING IS AN INTERNATIONAL PROBLEM WHICH FACES  
US ALL EQUALLY. ALREADY IN THE BRIEF TIME THAT HAS ELAPSED SINCE  
THE EVENTS WHICH WE ARE CONSIDERING,  
A FURTHER HIJACKING INCIDENT HAS TAKEN  
PLACE, THIS TIME INVOLVING A LIBYAN AIRCRAFT, WHICH HAPPILY DID NOT  
RESULT IN ANY CASUALTIES. EQUALLY IMPORTANT, IT IS A PROBLEM WHICH  
CAN ONLY BE SATISFACTORILY DEALT WITH BY A CONCERTED EFFORT BY THE  
WHOLE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. I SHOULD SAY THAT IN MY COUNTRY  
IT WOULD SEEM INCREDIBLE IF THE SECURITY COUNCIL SHOULD ADDRESS  
ITSELF TO WHAT HAPPENED AT ENTebbe WITHOUT AT THE SAME TIME  
CONSIDERING WHAT SHOULD BE DONE ABOUT HIJACKING. IT WOULD NOT ONLY BE  
INCREDIBLE, MR PRESIDENT, IT WOULD BE DISHONEST. WE CANNOT EXAMINE  
HALF THE CASE. WE HAVE TO DEAL WITH THE WHOLE OF IT.

ALREADY A CERTAIN NUMBER OF STEPS HAVE BEEN TAKEN IN THIS  
DIRECTION. MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL WILL RECALL THE DECISION WHICH WE  
ADOPTED BY CONSENSUS ON 20 JUNE 1972. OTHER INTERNATIONAL ACTION HAS  
ALSO BEEN TAKEN IN THE FORM OF THE HAGUE CONVENTION FOR THE  
SUPPRESSION OF UNLAWFUL SEIZURE OF AIRCRAFT, WHICH WAS ADOPTED IN  
DECEMBER 1970, THE MONTREAL CONVENTION FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF  
UNLAWFUL ACTS AGAINST THE SAFETY OF CIVIL AVIATION WHICH WAS  
ADOPTED IN SEPTEMBER 1971, AND ALSO THE STANDARDS AND PRACTICES  
GOVERNING AIRPORT SECURITY AND AIRCRAFT SAFETY APPROVED BY THE  
INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANISATION. WHAT IS NEEDED NOW, IT  
SEEMS TO US IS, FIRST, TO MAKE THE EXISTING INTERNATIONAL ACTION  
WHICH HAS ALREADY BEEN TAKEN AS EFFECTIVE AS POSSIBLE AND TO  
ENSURE THE MAXIMUM COMPLIANCE WITH IT BY ALL MEMBERS OF THE  
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. SECONDLY, WE SHOULD CONSIDER WHETHER THERE  
IS ANY FURTHER ACTION WHICH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY - AND  
SPECIFICALLY THE UNITED NATIONS - CAN TAKE TO SUPPLEMENT THESE  
MEASURES SO AS TO PREVENT FURTHER ACTS OF HIJACKING AND TO PUNISH  
THOSE RESPONSIBLE.

LET US TRY AND USE THE EVENTS OF RECENT WEEKS AS A CATALYST  
INTERNATIONAL ACTION IN THIS FIELD TO MAKE IT AS CERTAIN AS WE CAN  
THAT FUTURE ACTS OF HIJACKING WILL NOT SUCCEED. ONLY IN THIS WAY WILL  
WE BE ABLE TO MAKE A REAL CONTRIBUTION TO THE SOLUTION OF A PROBLEM  
WHICH CONFRONTS US ALL, AND TO FULFIL THE PRIMARY AIM OF THIS  
COUNCIL IN HELPING TO MAINTAIN INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY.

THE SECURITY COUNCIL MUST NOW GIVE THOUGHT TO THE TERMS OF A  
RESOLUTION WHICH COMPREHENDS THE VARIOUS FACTORS WHICH HAVE BEEN  
STRESSED BY DIFFERENT SPEAKERS HERE: AND IT MUST DO SO IN NO  
PARTISAN, OR ONE-SIDED, FASHION BUT IN A DELIBERATE AND CONSIDERED  
WAY. IF THE COUNCIL WERE TO IGNORE ONE OR OTHER OF THE PRINCIPAL  
STRANDS, IT COULD HARDLY EXPECT THE EXPRESSION OF ITS VIEWS TO BE  
ACCEPTABLE TO THE WORLD OUTSIDE, THE WORLD OF ORDINARY MEN, WOMEN  
AND CHILDREN, WHO MAY FIND THEMSELVES CAUGHT UP IN, AND INDEED THE  
VICTIMS OF, VIOLENCE, WHEREVER THEY MAY LIVE.

WE, TOGETHER WITH OUR COLLEAGUES IN THE DELEGATION OF THE UNITED  
STATES, HAVE THEREFORE SET OUT TO INCORPORATE THESE VARIOUS  
FACTORS IN A DRAFT RESOLUTION WHICH HAS NOW BEEN TABLED. WE HAVE  
TRIED TO BRING TOGETHER THE QUESTION OF HIJACKING AND OF THE  
NECESSITY OF ENSURING SAFETY OF AIR TRAVEL, WITH THE NECESSITY TO  
RESPECT SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY ON THE OTHER. OUR  
DRAFT STARTS BY NOTING THE LETTERS OF THE TWO PRINCIPAL PARTIES, AND  
BY RECALLING THE CONCERN OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY FOR SAFETY  
IN AIR TRAVEL AS EXEMPLIFIED BY THE HAGUE AND MONTREAL CONVENTIONS  
AND THE OBLIGATIONS WHICH THOSE CONVENTIONS IMPOSE UPON THE PARTIES  
TO THEM. I BELIEVE THAT THESE CONSIDERATIONS ARE COMMON GROUND  
BETWEEN US ALL.

WE THEN COME TO THE OPERATIVE PARAGRAPHS AND WE START AT THE  
BEGINNING, AS THE CHAIN OF EVENTS WHICH ENDED AT ENTEBBE STARTED,  
WITH HIJACKING. OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 1 CONDEMNES, AND THERE IS NO  
ONE HERE WHO DOES NOT CONDEMN, THE HIJACKING. OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 2  
DEALS SPECIFICALLY WITH EVENTS IN UGANDA. IT DEPLORES THE LOSS  
OF LIFE WHICH FOLLOWED THAT HIJACKING. WITH OPERATIVES PARAGRAPHS  
3 AND 4 WE MOVE FROM MATTERS OF FACT TO THE TWO PRINCIPLES AROUND  
WHICH THE DEBATE HERE HAS BEEN CONCENTRATING: ON THE ONE HAND,  
SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, ON THE OTHER HAND THE SAFETY  
OF INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION. OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 3 REAFFIRMS THE  
NEED TO RESPECT SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY IN ACCORDANCE  
WITH THE CHARTER AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 4 LOOKS  
TO THE FUTURE AND SEEKS TO ENGAGE THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY ONCE  
AGAIN IN FINDING FURTHER MEANS OF ASSURING THE SAFETY OF THOSE WHO  
TRAVEL BY AIR.

TO SUM UP, THIS DRAFT SEEKS TO RECOMMEND, WITH A SENSE OF  
BALANCE AND OF JUSTICE, AN OUTCOME TO THIS DEBATE WHICH WOULD  
COMMAND A WIDE MEASURE OF SUPPORT FROM THIS COUNCIL.

THIS IS BOUND TO BE A DIFFICULT DEBATE. IT INVOLVES QUESTIONS  
WHICH AFFECT US ALL. ON THE ONE HAND IS THE PRINCIPLE OF TERRITORIAL  
INTEGRITY. ON THE OTHER IS THE EQUALLY VALID CONSIDERATION THAT  
STATES EXIST FOR THE PROTECTION OF THEIR PEOPLE, AND THEY HAVE THE  
RIGHT, PERHAPS THE DUTY, TO EXERCISE THAT RIGHT. IN JUDGING THE  
EVENTS AT ENTEBBE, THESE TWO PRINCIPLES HAVE TO BE RECONCILED. THEY  
CAN ONLY BE RECONCILED BY AN APPROACH ALONG THE LINES OF THE  
RESOLUTION TABLED BY THE UNITED STATES AND OURSELVES.

THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IS DEEPLY DIVIDED ON THIS ISSUE. IT IS  
SURELY THE FUNCTION OF THIS COUNCIL ABOVE ALL, TO TRY AND BRIDGE  
THESE DIVISIONS, NOT TO DEEPEN THEM.

I THEREFORE COMMEND THIS DRAFT RESOLUTION TO THE COUNCIL IN THE  
HOPE THAT ONCE THE EXCESSIVE RHETORIC HAS SUBSIDED, WISDOM AND THE  
RULE OF LAW MAY YET PREVAIL.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO ROME, STOCKHOLM, NAIROBI, UKMIS GENEVA,  
BONN, TOKYO, DAR ES SALAAM, BUCHAREST, PANAMA.

RICHARD

NNNN

Mrs. Bloch

contact:  
233 4969  
Mr. Wiggen

Our High Commissioner in Kampala has now received a further written communication from the Ugandan Government following on his representation yesterday to President Amin. The statement repeats that the Ugandan Government has no knowledge of Mrs. Bloch's whereabouts and that Israel shoulders the responsibility for her. It is, however, incontrovertible that many hours after the raid Mrs. Bloch was seen by a member of the High Commission in Kampala in Mulago Hospital, where she was apparently under guard. She was also seen by an independent witness on a separate occasion. Moreover, in his meeting on 9 July with our High Commissioner, President Amin confirmed that while in hospital Mrs. Bloch had developed ulcers of the leg, during her treatment for the digestive disorder, which had necessitated her admission in the first place. Nonetheless, he had ordered her return to join the other hostages. He admitted, however, that he could not ensure that all his orders were always carried out.

President Amin, therefore, did not deny the possibility that the Ugandans had custody of Mrs. Bloch at the time of the Israeli raid and thereafter. In the view of the British Government responsibility for her safety rests squarely with them.

This totally unacceptable reply from the Ugandan Government adds to the gravity of our fears for Mrs. Bloch's life. We are at once recalling our High Commissioner from Kampala to make his personal report to the Foreign Office Ministers.

\* Foreign cultural attaché. 10.10.72

Our High Commissioner in Kampala has now received a further written communication from the Ugandan Government following on his representation yesterday to President Amin. The statement repeats that the Ugandan Government has no knowledge of Mrs. Bloch's whereabouts and that Israel shoulders the responsibility for her. It is, however, incontrovertible that many hours after the raid Mrs. Bloch was seen by a member of the High Commission in Kampala in Mulago Hospital, where she was apparently under guard. She was also seen by an independent witness on a separate occasion. Moreover, in his meeting on 9 July with our High Commissioner, President Amin confirmed that while in hospital Mrs. Bloch had developed ulcers of the leg, during her treatment for the digestive disorder, which had necessitated her admission in the first place. Nonetheless, he had ordered her return to join the other hostages. He admitted, however, that he could not ensure that all his orders were always carried out.

President Amin, therefore, did not deny the possibility that the Ugandans had custody of Mrs. Bloch at the time of the Israeli raid and thereafter. In the view of the British Government responsibility for her safety rests squarely with them.

This totally unacceptable reply from the Ugandan Government adds to the gravity of our fears for Mrs. Bloch's life. We are at once recalling our High Commissioner from Kampala to make his personal report to the Foreign Office Ministers.



2. EARLY THIS MORNING I SPOKE TO EKOCHU (WHO WAS PRESENT AT OUR MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT YESTERDAY) AND DREW HIS ATTENTION TO THE INACCURACIES IN THE UGANDA NEWSCAST. I ASKED HIM IF HE COULD OFFER ANY EXPLANATION. HE COULD NOT- AND WAS CLEARLY AT A LOSS TO KNOW WHAT TO SAY. HE REFERRED ME TO LUBEGA, NOW HEAD OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. I THEN ASKED HIM IF THE STATEMENT THAT I AM DUE TO GET FROM THE PRESIDENT TODAY WAS LIKELY TO CLARIFY MATTERS. AGAIN HE COULD NOT SAY,. BUT IT WAS CLEAR THAT HE DID NOT EXPECT THE STATEMENT TO GO BEYOND JUMA ORIS'S STATEMENT IN NEW YORK.

3. I HAD SPOKEN TO LUBEGA FIRST THING THIS MORNING TO ASK HIM TO ARRANGE URGENTLY FOR ME TO SEE THE PRESIDENT AGAIN TODAY. I TELEPHONED HIM AGAIN AFTER SPEAKING TO EKOCHU AND SAID I MUST HAVE AN EARLY EXPLANATION FROM THE GOVERNMENT -- FAILING WHICH I WOULD HAVE NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO MAKE PUBLIC THE TRUE FACTS REGARDING MY MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT YESTERDAY AND WHAT WAS SAID AT THAT MEETING. PEOPLE COULD THEN DRAW THEIR OWN CONCLUSIONS. LUBEGA, WAS AT A LOSS TO KNOW WHAT TO SAY. HOWEVER, HE REPEATED THAT HE HOPED TO BE TOUCH WITH THE PRESIDENT WITHIN THE NEXT HOUR AND WOULD LET ME KNOW THE RESULT OF HIS CONTACT SHORTLY.

4 IF I DO NOT SEE THE PRESIDENT SOON, AND IF THE STATEMENT THAT AMIN IS SUPPOSED TO BE SENDING ME ADDS NOTHING NEW, I FEEL THAT I SHOULD PUT THE RECORD STRAIGHT IN ANSWER TO <sup>ANY</sup> FURTHER ENQUIRIES WE MAY GET FROM THE MEDIA. BESIDES CLARIFYING THE SITUATION IT MAY HAVE THE EFFECT OF CAUSING THE PRESIDENT TO SEND FOR ME- TO SEEK AN EXPLANATION - AN OPPORTUNITY WHICH I WOULD WELCOME

HENNESSY

NNNNN

4TH AND 5TH LINE OF PARA ONE

MRS BLOCHS'S CASE IS CONCERNED. WHETHER THIS WAS DUE TO PRESSURE M AMIN BY THE DEFENCE COUNCIL TO ADHERE TO A PREVIOUSLY AGREED ETC

ADVANCE COPIES:

HIJACK (AIR FRANCE AIRCRAFT)

32

PRIVATE SECRETARY  
PS/MR HATTERSLEY  
PS/LORD GORONWY ROBERTS  
PS/MR ROWLANDS  
PS/MR LUARD  
PS/PUS  
MR SYKES  
~~MR THOMSON~~ *MR THOMSON*  
~~MR STATHAM~~  
MR BURROWS  
SIR A DUFF  
MR ASPIN  
MR WEIR  
MR KEEBLE  
MR HAWLEY  
HD/CONSULAR DEPT  
HD/NENAD  
HD/SECURITY DEPT  
HD/PUSD (2)  
HD/NEWS DEPT  
HD/MTD  
HD/WED

*Ha (ON)*  
.....

HD/EAD (2)  
RESIDENT CLERK

00 BONN  
00 PARIS  
00 UKMIS NEWYORK

00 UK MIS GENEVA  
00 NAIROBI  
00 WASHINGTON  
GR 330A

CYPHER CAT A

/FM KAMPALA 101000Z JULY

~~000~~

CONFIDENTIAL

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TEL NO 2801 OF 10 JULY  
INFO IMMEDIATE TO TEL AVIV BONN PARIS UKMIS NEW YORK  
UKMIS GENEVA NAIROBI WASHINGTON.  
MYTEL NO (279) MRS BLOCH.

1. A UGANDAN (WHO DID NOT WISH TO BE IDENTIFIED) CALLED  
AT THE HIGH COMMISSION YESTERDAY AND REPORTED THAT ON 5  
JULY HE HAD SEEN THE BODY OF AN OLD WHITE WOMAN WHICH HAD

~~PS NO 10 DOWNING STREET~~

PS HOME SECRETARY

PUS/SIR A PETERSON HOME OFFICE

SIR J HUNT CABINET OFFICE

DIO CABINET OFFICE (2)

~~S OF S FOR TRADE 1 VICTORIA ST~~

~~MR J R D GILDEA CA 3 DCT ADELPHI~~

~~MR ROY FARMERY CA 3 DCT 1 VICTORIA ST~~

IMMEDIATE



1. A UGANDAN (WHO DID NOT WISH TO BE IDENTIFIED) CALLED AT THE HIGH COMMISSION YESTERDAY AND REPORTED THAT ON 5 JULY HE HAD SEEN THE BODY OF AN OLD WHITE WOMAN WHICH HAD BEEN DUMPED (ACCORDING TO VILLAGERS) IN KIVUVU SUGAR ESTATE OFF THE KAMPALA/JINJA ROAD, 19 MILES FROM KAMPALA. THE FACE HAD BEEN BURNED, MAKING IDENTIFICATION DIFFICULT. SOLDIERS, HE SAID , CAME ON <sup>3</sup>7 JULY AND BURIED THE BODY. OTHER BODIES (UGANDAN) HAD <sup>3</sup>YEEEN DUMPED IN THE SAME AREA.
  2. THE SAME INFORMANT SAID HE HAD LEARNED FROM HIS BROTHER, WHO WORKS AT MULAGO HOSPITAL, THAT THE LATTER'S COLLEAGUES HAD TOLD HIS BROTHER THAT MRS BLOCH HAD BEEN SHOT AND DUMPED INTO THE BOOT OF A CAR BEARING A UVS REGISTRATION NUMBER (ONE OF THE SERIES USED BY THE STATE RESEARCH CENTRE AND OTHER INTELLIGENCE BODIES). HE ADDED THAT THE SAME SOURCES INDICATED THAT THE POLICEMAN ASSIGNED TO GUARD MRS BLOCH AT THE HOSPITAL HAD ALSO BEEN TAKEN AWAY AND SHOT.
  3. A MEMBER OF MY LOCAL STAFF HAS ALSO REPORTED THAT HE HEARD AT THE FUNERAL OF A RELATIVE THAT THE WOMAN'S BODY APPEARED TO HAVE A 'BAD' LEG. (MRS BLOCH IS REPORTED TO HAVE HAD LEG ULCERS)
  4. THIS KIND OF HEARSAY EVIDENCE DOES NOT PERHAPS TAKE US VERY FAR. AND IT COULD, OF COURSE, HAVE BEEN 'PLANTED'. BUT IT IS ONLY ONE OF A NUMBER OF SUCH STORIES ALL TENDING TO CONFIRM (IN THE LIGHT OF UGANDAN DENIALS OF ANY KNOWLEDGE OF MRS BLOCH'S WHEREABOUTS) MY FIRST REPORT THAT WE ARE DRIVEN TO THE CONCLUSION THAT SHE IS DEAD. (MYTEL NO 263 OF 8 JULY).
- HENNESSY

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

9 July 1976

Prime Minister

(with minute and M&A  
telegram)

*Dear Patrick,*

Mrs. Dora Bloch

The PUS talked briefly to the Prime Minister yesterday afternoon about future moves over the case of Mrs. Dora Bloch, the 74 year old UK/Israel national who has been missing in Uganda since Sunday evening, 4 July.

As you know, our High Commissioner has been sent back to Kampala to try to obtain a more satisfactory answer from the Ugandans about Mrs. Bloch's fate. The likelihood is that she is dead. The Ugandans have used a denial of whereabouts before in the case of missing persons who have subsequently never been traced. The Ugandan armed forces will be bitter and dangerous following their disgrace at Israel hands. They may have seized on the only available Jew on whom to extract revenge. It is quite possible that Amin and his senior colleagues were unaware at the time of what had happened to Mrs. Bloch. We had been about to write to you to recommend that the Prime Minister should send a message to Amin drawing on the personal relationship he established with Amin during his visit to Kampala last July and in particular Amin's assurances that we should contact him confidentially in any further case of difficulties affecting British subjects. This was on the assumption that Hennessy would be kept waiting by Amin indefinitely or would receive merely temporising answers. Hennessy has now had a long interview

/with

P. R. H. Wright Esq.,  
No. 10 Downing Street,  
LONDON S.W. 1

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

A

with Amin which he reports in Kampala tel. no. 273/ (attached). You will see that Amin has moved at least one step forwards in apparently agreeing to set up a Ministerial enquiry to look into Mrs. Bloch's disappearance. Amin asked Mr. Hennessy to postpone his return in order to await a Ugandan statement about Mrs. Bloch tomorrow. Clearly in these circumstances a message from the Prime Minister would not be appropriate.

We nevertheless fear that the contents of this statement may still be an unacceptable whitewash or the maintenance of the lie that Mrs. Bloch was returned to Entebbe airport to rejoin the other hostages. ~~In such circumstances~~ We need to consider our reaction to that possibility. There are strong feelings in Parliament and in the press and the Government will come under pressure to act. There are various courses open to us. The lowest response would be ~~not~~ to withdraw our High Commissioner. We do not consider that this would be adequate in the circumstances. The Government would certainly be urged to take stronger action. In addition, the remaining High Commission staff would be exposed and in a position of possible danger. We might also consider requiring the Ugandan High Commissioner in London to leave. However, we doubt whether this would satisfy either the gravity of the offence or British public opinion.

The next step up the ladder of possible reaction by the Government would be to follow the American precedent of not actually breaking diplomatic relations, but of withdrawing our whole mission from Uganda on the grounds that their task there had become impossible. There are, of course, severe risks in acting in this way. We still have nearly 500 British subjects in Uganda. They would be unprotected - and particularly vulnerable during the process of withdrawal. Even if we warned them that they should consider leaving (and we are consulting Mr. Hennessy urgently about this at the moment), many of the missionary workers and others in related jobs would be reluctant to leave what they regard as a vocation. However, we cannot always tailor our policies to suit the needs of the British community alone. They are fully aware of the risks of living in Uganda and that the ability of the High Commission to protect them is already strictly limited. In 1974 Amin twice threatened to expel the British community at short notice following hostile comments by the press.

/The

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

The situation is further complicated by the request made to us by the Kenyans to provide military equipment and perhaps more visible support against a possible invasion of Kenya by Uganda. (We have been consulting you separately about this.) There is no question where our interests lie. Quite apart from the important political factors, our investment in and trade with Kenya are many times greater than with Uganda. But Amin would certainly regard our support for Kenya as hostile to him. Our people would already be at risk because of this and any diplomatic retaliation by us over Mrs. Bloch would increase that risk.

These considerations apply a fortiori to the ultimate step of breaking diplomatic relations completely. Indeed, the public may not fully understand the difference between this and the "American" option above. This could cause public presentational problems. There is some cause for hope in what Amin said to Mr. Hennessy that we shall not be driven to these options. It would in any case be preferable to await Mr. Hennessy's return and his personal report early next week, (by which time we should have the UN Security Council debate on the Entebbe incident behind us). Meanwhile we are keeping in mind the need for possible consultations among our EEC partners in the margin of the European Council meeting on 12/13 July. It is partly for that reason that I thought you should be made aware now of our thinking.

*Yours w.  
R.N.*

(R. N. Dales)

270

CONFIDENTIAL

FLASH

CYPHER CAT A

FM FCO 091735Z

CONFIDENTIAL

TO FLASH TEL AVIV TELNO.145 OF 9 JULY,  
INFO IMMEDIATE KAMPALA, UKMIS NEW YORK.

KAMPALA TELNO.273/ TO FCO: MRS BLOCH.

1. PLEASE TELL THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT IN STRICTEST CONFIDENCE THAT PRESIDENT AMIN IN HIS TALK TODAY WITH THE BRITISH HIGH COMMISSIONER WAS UNABLE TO GIVE ANY SATISFACTORY EXPLANATION OF MRS BLOCH'S DISAPPEARANCE. ORDERS HAD BEEN GIVEN FOR HER TO REJOIN THE OTHER HOSTAGES AT ENTEBBE AIRPORT BUT THEY HAD APPARENTLY NOT BEEN CARRIED OUT. AMIN WAS MAKING ENQUIRIES INTO MRS BLOCH'S DISAPPEARANCE AND INTENDED TO SET UP SOME FORM OF COMMISSION OF ENQUIRY UNDER THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF A MINISTER. HE UNDERTOOK TO GIVE THE HIGH COMMISSIONER A WRITTEN STATEMENT TOMORROW.
2. SINCE AMIN HAS NOT BEEN WHOLLY UNRESPONSIVE TO OUR ENQUIRIES WE DO NOT WISH TO FORFEIT HIS COOPERATION BY MAKING PUBLIC WHAT HE HAS SO FAR TOLD US. WE ARE TELLING THE PRESS ONLY THAT MR HENNESSY HAD A LONG MEETING TODAY WITH AMIN AND THAT HE INTENDS TO CONTACT US FURTHER OVER THE WEEKEND. WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD IMPRESS UPON THE ISRAELIS THE NEED TO GO NO FURTHER THAN THIS WITH THE MEDIA.
3. WE ARE SENDING INSTRUCTIONS TO UKMIS NEW YORK BY FLASH TELEGRAM ABOUT THE HANDLING OF THE CASE OF MRS BLOCH IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE AND ALSO GUIDANCE AS TO THE LINE MR RICHARD SHOULD TAKE IN TALKING TO HERZOG. YOU SHOULD FOLLOW THE SAME LINE IN SPEAKING TO THE ISRAELIS.

[COPIES SENT TO NO.10 DOWNING ST]

CROSLAND

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION:

NENAD	SEC D
EAD	PUSD
CONS D	NEWS D
UND	MTD

CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

OR 125

CYPHER CAT A

FM KAMPALA 091530Z JULY

CONFIDENTIAL

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TEL NO 275 OF 9 JULY 1976.

INFO NAIROBI, UKMIS NEW YORK.

MY TEL 273. ANGLO /UGANDA RELATIONS.

1. IN THE COURSE OF OUR DISCUSSION THIS MORNING AMIN REPEATED SEVERAL TIMES THAT HE ONLY WANTED GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE UK. HE TOLD ME THAT I COULD TELL THE BRITISH COMMUNITY THAT THEY HAD NOTHING TO FEAR IN UGANDA AND WOULD ALWAYS BE WELCOME HERE. THE DISTURBANCES OF THE PAST FEW WEEKS WERE OVER AND THINGS HAD RETURNED TO NORMAL.

2. WHILE THIS IS REASSURING IT DOES NOT QUITE SQUARE WITH THE FACTS. THERE HAVE BEEN AN UNUSUAL NUMBER OF ARRESTS RECENTLY AND MUCH THUGGERY.

HENNESSY

[COPIES SENT TO NO.10 DOWNING ST]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION:

EAD

CONS D

CONS EM UNIT

NENAD

WED

PUSD

MTD

NEWS D

OADS

UND

MVD

CABINET OFFICE

COPIES TO:

MR J.R.D. GILDEA  
CA 3 DOT ADELPHI

MR R. FARMERY CA 3  
DOI 1 VICTORIA ST

CONFIDENTIAL

GRPS 400

CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE

CYPHER CAT A

(M KAMPALA 091345Z JULY

CONFIDENTIAL

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TEL NO 274 OF 9 JULY 1976.

INFO IMMEDIATE NAIROBI, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK.

MIPT.: UGANDA / KENYA RELATIONS.

1. TURNING TO THE PRESENT STRAINED STATE OF RELATIONS WITH KENYA, AMIN SAID IT WAS HIS EARNEST DESIRE TO COOL THINGS AND GET BACK TO A NORMAL RELATIONSHIP AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. HE HAD NO INTENTION OF ATTACKING KENYA AND HAD NOT MOVED ANY TROOPS TO THE BORDER AS THE PRESS HAD REPORTED. THE BATTALION AT TORORO HAD ALWAYS BEEN STATIONED THERE FOR NORMAL FRONTIER DUTIES. AS FAR AS HE KNEW THE KENYANS HAD SIMILARLY DEPLOYED TROOPS FOR NORMAL FRONTIER DUTIES. THERE HAD BEEN NO REINFORCEMENTS. BUT THE ROLE KENYA HAD PLAYED IN THE RECENT ISRAELI RAID HAD INCENSED HIS ARMY. (THIS IS CONFIRMED BY THE REPORTS WE HAVE HAD OF REPRISALS AGAINST KENYANS LIVING IN THIS COUNTRY). FRUSTRATED AT NOT BEING ABLE TO GET BACK AT THE ISRAELIS THEMSELVES SMALL BANDS OF ARMED SOLDIERS ARE ROAMING AROUND BEATING UP AND SOMETIMES KILLING INNOCENT KENYANS-NOW REFERRED TO AS ISRAELIS- WORKING IN UGANDA). THIS WAS MAKING THINGS DIFFICULT. AND NOW THE KENYANS WERE TRYING TO CUT OFF HIS OIL SUPPLIES: THEY HAS STOPPED THE STEAMER PLYING BETWEEN KENYA AND UGANDA ON LAKE VICTORIA AND TRAVEL BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES WAS HAZARDOUS

2. HE SAID HE HAD DONE HIS BEST TO GET KENYATTA TO AGREE TO DROP THE FEUD, BUT TO NO AVAIL. HOWEVER, BRITAIN STILL HAD INFLUENCE IN KENYA. COULD SHE NOT USE IT?. HE WOULD BE MOST GRATEFUL IF HMG COULD ASK THE KENYANS IF THEY WOULD NOT MEET HIM. IT NEED NOT BE ANYTHING PUBLIC- INDEED HE WOULD HOPE IT COULD BE KEPT QUIET. PERHAPS THE KENYAN VICE- PRESIDENT COULD MEET HIM QUIETLY SOMEWHERE NEAR THE BORDER. THERE WOULD BE A TALK, A PHOTOGRAPH AND THAT WAS ALL. THEREAFTER BOTH SIDES COULD GRADUALLY PERSUADE THEIR PEOPLES THAT IT WAS IN NO ONES INTERESTS TO GO ON WITH THIS SENSELESS QUARREL. THE TWO COUNTRIES WERE BOUND BY MANY TIES: HISTORICAL, ECONOMIC, POLITICAL AND BLOOD.

CONFIDENTIAL

3. IF KENYATTA WAS STILL AFRAID THAT THE STORY ABOUT THE 5 PALESTINIANS WOULD COME OUT HE COULD ASSURE HIM THAT HE WOULD USE HIS CONSIDERABLE INFLUENCE WITH THE PALESTINIANS TO DROP THE MATTER. HE THOUGHT HE SHOULD DO THIS ANYWAY. THE PALESTINIANS WERE NOW LOOKING AROUND FOR TARGETS AGAIN: THEY MIGHT BE WESTERN AIRCRAFT, WESTERN DIPLOMATS ETC. HE WOULD LIKE TO SEE THIS NIPPED IN THE BUD. HE HAD ALWAYS TOLD THE PALESTINIANS THAT THEIR ACTIVITIES MUST NOT BE ALLOWED TO EXTEND TO UGANDA. HE WOULD DO HIS BEST TO SEE THAT KENYA WAS PUT OUT OF BOUNDS TOO.

4. MY IMPRESSION IS THAT AMIN WAS- FOR MANY REASONS- QUITE GENUINE IN WANTING A RETURN TO THE STATUS QUO ANTE WITH KENYA. IF YOU SEE NO OBJECTION I WOULD BE GLAD OF THE OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS AMIN'S PROPOSAL FURTHER WITH MR FINGLAND, IF HE IS AGREEABLE, ON MY WAY BACK TO LONDON.

HENNESSY

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION  
EAD  
CONS DEPT  
CONS EM UNIT  
NENAD  
WED  
PUSD  
MTD  
NEWS DEPT  
OADS  
UN DEPT  
MVD  
CABINET OFFICE

COPIES TO:

MR J R D GILDEA  
CA 3  
DOT  
ADELPHI

MR R FARMERY  
DOT  
1 VICTORIA ST

[COPIES SENT TO NO. 10 DOWNING STREET]



CONFIDENTIAL

SR 600

FLASH

CYPHER CAT A

FM KAMPALA 091415Z JULY

CONFIDENTIAL

TO FLASH FCO TEL NO 273 OF 9 JULY 1976

AND TO IMMEDIATE TEL AVIV, BONN, PARIS, UKMIS NEW YORK,  
UKMIS GENEVA, NAIROBI AND WASHINGTON.

MY TEL 268: MRS. BLOCH.

1. THE PRESIDENT SAW ME IMMEDIATELY ON MY ARRIVAL AT STATE HOUSE. HE WAS ACCOMPANIED ONLY BY ONDOGA AND EKOCHU. THE PRESIDENTIAL PRESS UNIT WERE ALSO PRESENT BUT WITHDREW PRIOR TO THE DISCUSSIONS. AMIN APPEARED IN A SOBER AND SERIOUS MOOD AND, THOUGH OBVIOUSLY WORRIED BY HIS MANY CURRENT PROBLEMS SEEMED AS MUCH IN COMMAND AS EVER.

2. HE BEGAN BY ASKING ME TO EXPLAIN THE PURPOSE OF MY MISSION. I REPLIED THAT HMG HAD FOUND IT IMPOSSIBLE TO ACCEPT THE UGANDAN GOVERNMENT STATEMENT ABOUT MRS BLOCH. SHE HAD BEEN SEEN BY MY CONSUL AT MULAGO HOSPITAL LAST SUNDAY LONG AFTER THE ISRAELI COMMANDOS HAD COME AND GONE. SINCE THEN SHE HAD NOT BEEN SEEN ANYWHERE. OUR INFORMATION WAS THAT SHE HAD BEEN DRAGGED FROM HER BED AT THE HOSPITAL SCREAMING. THOUGH SHE HAD BEEN LIVING IN ISRAEL SHE WAS A BRITISH NATIONAL AND OUR RESPONSIBILITY. AND THE PRIME MINISTER HAD DECIDED I SHOULD COME OUT AND ENQUIRE INTO HER DISAPPEARANCE AND THEN REPORT TO HIM. THE PM, PARLIAMENT AND INDEED THE WHOLE BRITISH PEOPLE WERE CONCERNED ABOUT HER FATE. SHE APPEARED TO BE AN INNOCENT VICTIM OF THE ISRAELI RAID.

3. THE PRESIDENT THANKED ME AND SAID HE WAS GLAD I HAD COME BACK. HE HAD BEEN BADLY MISREPRESENTED IN THE BRITISH PRESS AND HE WOULD LIKE TO PUT THE RECORD STRAIGHT. FOR THE NEXT 45 MINUTES HE GAVE ME A BLOW BY BLOW ACCOUNT OF THE HIJACKING, THE SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE TERRORISTS AND THE ISRAELI COMMANDO RAID AND WHAT HAD FOLLOWED. HE MADE IT CLEAR ( AND I AM INCLINED TO SUSPECT HE WAS TELLING THE TRUTH) THAT HE HAD HAD NO PRIOR KNOWLEDGE OF THE HIJACKING OR THE FACT THAT THE TERRORISTS WOULD COME TO ENTEBEE.

CONFIDENTIAL

/ HE ALSO MADE

CONFIDENTIAL

ALSO MADE IT CLEAR THAT FROM THE MOMENT THE JACKED PLANE HAD LANDED HE PERSONALLY TOOK CHARGE OF THE PROCEEDINGS, HELPED ONLY BY MY FRENCH AND SOMALI COLLEAGUES. HE EXPLAINED HOW HE HAD GOT THE TERRORISTS.

1. TO AGREE TO SHIFT THE PLANE FROM THE NEW TO THE OLD TERMINAL.

(2) TO ALLOW THE HOSTAGES INTO THE TERMINAL;

(3) TO ALLOW HIM TO FEED THE HOSTAGES AND GIVE THEM WASHING FACILITIES;

(4) TO POSTPONE THE FIRST DEADLINE.

FOR NONE OF THIS HAD HE RECEIVED ANY THANKS IN BRITISH NEWSPAPERS WHICH HAD CONTINUED TO PRAISE THE ISRAELI ACTION; NOR HAD ANYONE EXPRESSED THEIR CONDONENCES ABOUT THE DEATHS OF THE MANY UGANDAN SOLDIERS. (I CORRECTED HIM ON THE LATTER POINT)

4. TURNING SPECIFICALLY TO THE CASE OF MRS BLOCH. AMIN SAID THAT IN PREPARATION FOR THE LATEST DEADLINE OF 1100 GMT, 4 JULY, HE HAD, ON HIS RETURN FROM THE OAU SUMMIT IN MAURITIUS INSTRUCTED THE MINISTER OF HEALTH TO ENSURE THAT HOSPITALISED PASSENGERS WERE RETURNED TO THE OLD AIRPORT TERMINAL BEFORE THAT TIME. MRS BLOCH, HE WENT ON, HAD NOT BEEN IN NEED OF EXTENSIVE TREATMENT IN HOSPITAL AND COULD HAVE BEEN DISCHARGED ON FRIDAY 2 JULY IN TIME TO JOIN THE HOSTAGES WHO WERE RELEASED. BUT SHE HAD BEEN KEPT BEYOND THAT TIME BECAUSE IT HAD COME TO LIGHT THAT SHE HAD DEVELOPED ULCERS ON HER LEG. SHE SHOULD NEVERTHELESS HAVE REJOINED THE OTHER HOSTAGES PRIOR TO THE DEADLINE.

5. WITH HIS MANY OTHER COMMITMENTS HE COULD NOT BE EXPECTED TO ENSURE THAT EVERY SINGLE ORDER HE GAVE WAS CARRIED OUT. THERE HAD SIMPLY BEEN TOO MUCH TO DO. BUT HE WAS MAKING ENQUIRIES INTO MRS BLOCH'S DISAPPEARANCE. AT THIS POINT I SUGGESTED THAT A COMMISSION OF ENQUIRY WITH AN INDEPENDANT CHAIRMAN MIGHT BE APPROPRIATE IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES. AMIN REPLIED THAT THE DEFENCE COUNCIL WAS STILL SENSITIVE ON THE ISRAELI ISSUE- FEELINGS HAD BEEN OUTRAGED BUT HE TOOK MY POINT AND WOULD SET UP A MINISTERIAL ENQUIRY AT ONCE HEADED BY THE MINISTER OF HEALTH AND INTERNAL AFFAIRS TO LOOK INTO ALL THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING MRS BLOCH DISPEARANCE. AMIN CONCLUDED BY ASKING ME IF I COULD POSTPONE MY RETURN TO LONDON TODAY IN ORDER TO AWAIT A UGANDAN WRITTEN STATEMENT ABOUT MRS BLOCH WHICH <sup>HE</sup> WOULD LET ME HAVE TOMORROW.

CONFIDENTIAL

6. UNLESS YOU HAVE ANY OBJECTION I PROPOSE TO HOLD OVER FOR THIS DOCUMENT.

7. AMIN THEN TURNED TO VARIOUS OTHER MATTERS.  
SEE M I F T , S.

HENNESSY

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

EAD  
CONS D  
CONS EM UNIT  
NENAD  
WED  
PUSD  
MTD  
NEWS D  
OADs  
UND  
MVD  
CABINET OFFICE

COPIES TO:

MR J R D GILDEA  
CA 3 DOT ADELPHI  
MR R FARMERY CA 3  
DOI 1 VICTORIA ST

ADVANCE COPIES:

HIJACK (AIR FRANCE AIRCRAFT)

(34)  
PRIVATE SECRETARY  
PS/MR HATTERSLEY  
PS/LORD GORONWY ROBERTS  
PS/MR ROWLANDS  
PS/MR LUARD  
PS/PUS  
MR SYKES  
MR THOMSON  
MR STATHAM  
MR BURROWS  
SIR A DUFF  
MR ASPIN  
MR WEIR  
MR KEEBLE  
MR HAWLEY  
HD/CONSULAR DEPT  
HD/NENAD  
HD/SECURITY DEPT  
HD/PUSD (2)  
HD/NEWS DEPT  
HD/MTD  
HD/WED

PS NO 10 ~~DOWNING~~ STREET  
PS HOME SECRETARY  
PUS/SIR A PETERSON HOME OFFICE  
SIR J HUNT CABINET OFFICE  
DIO CABINET OFFICE (2)  
S OF S FOR TRADE 1 VICTORIA ST  
MR J R D GILDEA CA 3 DOT ADELPHI  
MR ROY FARMERY CA 3 DOT 1 VICTORIA ST

**IMMEDIATE**

**ADVANCE COPY**

.....  
HD/EAD  
RESIDENT CLERK

FM KAMPALA 061900Z JULY  
CONFIDENTIAL

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TEL NO 247 OF 6 JULY 1976.  
INFO TEL AVIV, PARIS, BONN, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK.

MY TEL NO 246: MRS BLOCH.

1. UGANDA RADIO NEWS AT 1700GMT CARRIED THE FOLLOWING ITEM  
(PROBABLY CULLED FROM FOREIGN PRESS AGENCY REPORTS)

BEGINS:

ONE ISRAELI, 75 YEAR OLD WOMEN MRS DORA BLOCH REMAINED IN A  
UGANDA HOSPITAL WHERE SHE WAS TAKEN BEFORE THE RAID BECAUSE  
OF ILLNESS. ISRAEL HAS ASKED THE INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS AND  
AN UNIDENTIFIED THIRD COUNTRY TO TRY TO SECURE HER RELEASE.

ENDS.

2. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE ITEM WILL BE REPEATED IN TOMORROW'S  
LOCAL PRESS BUT WE HAVE IN ANY CASE ALREADY RECORDED IT ON TAPE.

CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE

CYPHER/CAT A

GRPS 300

FM FCO 061240Z

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 061400Z

TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS GENEVA TELNO 117 OF 6 JULY.

INFO IMMEDIATE TEL AVIV, KAMPALA, JERUSALEM, UKMIS NEW YORK.

HIJACK IN UGANDA : MRS BLOCH.

1. A DUAL UK/ISRAELI NATIONAL, MRS DORA BLOCH, (HOLDER OF BRITISH PASSPORT NO C739950) WAS ADMITTED TO MULAGO HOSPITAL, KAMPALA, ON 2 JULY, FOLLOWING HER RELEASE FROM THE AIR FRANCE PLANE AT ENTEBBE AIRPORT. ALTHOUGH HM CONSUL WAS ABLE TO SEE HER ON ONE OCCASION WE DO NOT KNOW HER PRESENT WHEREABOUTS AND HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO REGAIN ACCESS. WE HAVE MADE REPRESENTATIONS AT A HIGH LEVEL BOTH HERE AND IN KAMPALA WITH A VIEW TO OBTAINING HER RELEASE, BUT SO FAR WITHOUT RESULT.

2. THE ISRAELIS, WHO HAVE KEPT THE ICRC INFORMED THROUGHOUT, HAVE NOW (WITH OUR AGREEMENT) ASKED THE ICRC TO DO WHAT THEY CAN TO ASSIST IN THE SAFE RETURN OF MRS BLOCH. THE ISRAELIS HAVE SUGGESTED THE ICRC SHOULD SEND A REPRESENTATIVE TO KAMPALA.

3. THE UGANDAN REFUSAL TO RELEASE MRS BLOCH IS OBVIOUSLY POLITICAL MOTIVATED AND WE DOUBT WHETHER ANY ACTION BY THE RED CROSS WILL IN ITSELF PROVE SUCCESSFUL. HOWEVER, WE THINK WE SHOULD EXPLORE EVERY AVENUE AND WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD ASK THE ICRC URGENTLY TO DO EVERYTHING IN THEIR POWER TO OBTAIN THE RELEASE OF MRS BLOCH. YOU MAY TELL THEM IN CONFIDENCE OF THE REPRESENTATIONS WE HAVE MADE TO THE UGANDANS, BUT WE ARE CONCERNED NOT TO EXCITE PRESS INTEREST IN THIS CASE AND WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD IMPRESS UPON ICRC THE NEED FOR ABSOLUTE CONFIDENTIALITY.

CROSLAND

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET AND TO CABINET OFFICE]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

NENAD NEWS D  
EAD MTD  
UND  
CONSULAR D  
PUSD

COPIES TO:

MR GILDEA CA3 DOT ADELPHI  
MR FARMELY CA3 DOT VICTORIA ST

CONFIDENTIAL

ADVANCE COPIES:

IMMEDIATE

HEJACK (AIR FRANCE AIRCRAFT)

(32X)

PS/LATE SECRETARY  
PS/MR HATTERSLEY  
PS/LORD CORONBY ROBERTS  
PS/MR ROWLANDS  
PS/MR LUARD  
PS/PUS  
MR SYKES  
MR THOMSON  
~~MR STAMMAM~~  
~~MR BURROWS~~  
SIR A DUFF  
MR ASPIN  
MR WEIR  
MR KEEBLE  
MR HAWLEY  
HD/CONSULAR DEPT  
HD/NENAD  
HD/SECURITY DEPT  
HD/PUSD (2)  
HD/NEWS DEPT  
HD/MTD  
HD/WED

PS NO 10 DOWNING STREET  
PS HOME SECRETARY  
PUS/SIR A PETERSON HOME OFFICE  
SIR J HUNT CABINET OFFICE  
DIO CABINET OFFICE (2)  
S OF S FOR TRADE 1 VICTORIA ST  
MR J R D GILDEA CA 3 DOT ADELPHI  
MR ROY FARMERY CA 3 DOT 1 VICTORIA S

.....  
HD/EAD  
RESIDENT CLERK

PP UKMIS NEW YORK

PP JERUSALEM

GR 100

CYPHER CAT

FM KAMPALA 061330Z JULY

CONFIDENTIAL

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TEL NO 243 OF 6 JULY 1976

AND TO IMMEDIATE TEL AVIV PRIORITY PARIS WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW  
YORK AND JERUSALEM.

YOUR TEL NO 110 PARA 2: MRS BLOCH.

1. LUBEGA HAS INFORMED ME THAT A NOTE IS ON ITS WAY  
STATING THAT THE UGANDA GOVERNMENT HAS NO INFORMATION  
CONCERNING MRS BLOCH AND THAT ENQUIRIES SHOULD BE ADDRESSED  
TO THE ISRAELIS. THE PRECISE TEXT WILL BE TELEGRAPHED WHEN  
RECEIVED.

2. LUBEGA ALSO INFORMED ME THAT THE UGANDAN HIGH COMMISSIONER  
HAD TELEPHONED FROM LONDON AND HAD BEEN GIVEN A SIMILAR REPLY  
TO PASS ON TO YOU.

3. SUCH A DENIAL OF MRS BLOCH'S EXISTENCE BY THE UGANDANS

3. SUCH A DENIAL OF MRS BLOCH'S EXISTENCE BY THE UGANDANS  
LEAD ME TO SUSPECT THAT SHE HAS BEEN KILLED.

HORROCKS

NNNNN

GVM

PRIVATE SECRETARY  
PS/MR HATTERSLEY  
PS/LORD CORNWY ROBERTS  
PS/MR FOWLANDS  
PS/MR LUARD  
PS/PUS  
MR SYKES  
MR THOMSON  
MR STATHAM  
MR BURROWS  
SIR A DUFF  
MR ASPIN  
MR WEIR  
MR KEEBLE  
MR HAWLEY  
HD/CONSULAR DEPT  
HD/NENAD  
HD/SECURITY DEPT  
HD/PUSD (2)  
HD/NEWS DEPT  
HD/MTD  
HD/WED

PS NO 10 DOWNING STREET  
PS HOME SECRETARY  
PUS/SIR A PETERSON HOME OFFICE  
SIR J HUNT CABINET OFFICE  
DIO CABINET OFFICE (2)  
S OF S FOR TRADE 1 VICTORIA ST  
MR J R D GILDEA CA 3 DOT ADELPHI  
MR ROY FARMERY CA 3 DOT 1 VICTORIA

**IMMEDIATE**

**ADVANCE COPY**

.....

HD/EAD  
RESIDENT CLERK

FM KAMPALA 061415Z JULY

CONFIDENTIAL

TO IMMEDIATE ECO TEL NO 246 OF 4 JULY 1976.

INFO IMMEDIATE TO TEL AVIV, BONN, PARIS, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK.

MY TEL NO 243: MRS BLOCH.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF UGANDAN REPLY DATED 6 JULY:

BEGINS:

..... HAS THE HONOUR TO REFER TO ITS NOTE NO 74 5 JULY, 1976 CONCERNING A MRS DORA BLOCH, AN ISRAELI NATIONAL WITH A BRITISH PASSPORT.

THE MINISTRY HAD MADE THE NECESSARY ENQUIRY AND WISHES TO INFORM THE HIGH COMMISSION THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF UGANDA DOES NOT HAVE ANY KNOWLEDGE OF THE WHEREABOUTS OF THE PERSON UNDER REFERENCE. THE GOVERNMENT OF UGANDA HAD DONE ITS BEST TO SEE TO IT THAT THE LIVES OF ALL THE HOSTAGES HELD AT ENTEBBE AIRPORT WERE SPARED. HOWEVER, WHEN ISRAEL INVADDED ENTEBBE AIRPORT, SHE ASSUMED BY FORCE THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR ALL THE HOSTAGES. FROM THAT MOMENT THE GOVERNMENT OF UGANDA CEASED TO BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THEM. IT WOULD, THEREFORE, BE ADVISED THAT ANY QUESTIONS RELATED TO THE HOSTAGES SHOULD BE ADDRESSED TO THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL.



THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS ETC .....

2. I TOLD LUBEGA THAT THE REPLY WAS HIGHLY UNSATISFACTORY  
AND THAT WE WOULD BE COMMUNICATING FURTHER WITH THE UGANDA GOVERN-  
MENT.

HORROCKS

NNNN

Confidential Filing

UGANDA

Part 1:

March 1974

[illegible]

52  
PART 2 begins:-

Kampala to FCO (246) of 4/7/76

PART 1 ends:-

Kampala to FCO (117) of 25/3/76

*Algeria*

GRPS 100

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIORITY

CYPHER CAT A

FM KAMPALA 251200Z

CONFIDENTIAL

TO PRIORITY FCO TELNO 117 OF 25 TH MARCH.  
PERSONAL FOR EWANS.

*Pa.*

*Rw*  
*25/3*

YOUR TELNO 53 : PRESIDENT AMIN'S MESSAGE.

1. AMIN WOULD BE MOST UNLIKELY TO RISK A REBUFF BY ASKING ME WHETHER HE WAS GOING TO GET A REPLY TO HIS TELEGRAM TO THE PRIME MINISTER . AND IF HE DOES NOT RECEIVE AN ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THE INVITATION HE EXTENDED TO MR WILSON I THINK HE WILL TAKE IT RATHER BADLY . HE WOULD PROBABLY ASSUME (PERHAPS RIGHTLY) THAT HIS GREETINGS TO HER MAJESTY HAD ALSO BEEN IGNORED. THE NET EFFECT COULD BE TO SOUR THE ATMOSPHERE FOR MY DEPUTY WHEN I GO ON LEAVE, WHICH WOULD BE UNFORTUNATE.

HENNESSY

FILES

EAD

CCD

GIPD

NEWS DEPT

OADS

PS/MR ENNALS

PS/PUS

SIR A DUFF

MR ASPIN

COPIES TO:

MR P H R WRIGHT NO. 10 DOWNING STREET  
SIR J HUNT - CABINET OFFICE

CONFIDENTIAL

GPS80

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER CAT A

FROM F C O 241735Z

CONFIDENTIAL

TO ROUTINE KAMPALA TELNO 53 OF 24 MARCH

YOUR TELNO 108. PRESIDENT AMIN'S MESSAGE

1. AMIN'S MESSAGE IS IN REPLY TO THAT FROM THE PRIME MINISTER AND WE THINK IT BEST TO LEAVE MATTERS THERE AND NOT TO CONTINUE THE EXCHANGE. SHOULD AMIN ASK YOU ABOUT A RESPONSE TO HIS MESSAGE, YOU SHOULD SAY THAT YOU KNOW THAT ITS WARM TONE WAS GREATLY APPRECIATED.

2. WE HOPE TO BE ABLE TO GIVE YOU INSTRUCTIONS ON AMIN'S REQUESTS WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS.

CALLAGHAN

FILES  
EAD  
CCD  
GIRD  
NEWS D  
OADS  
PS/MR ENNALS  
PS/PUS  
SIR A DUFF  
MR ASPIN

COPIES TO  
SIR HUNT CABINET OFFICE

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10  
DOWNING STREET]

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

TO PRIORITY FCO TELNO 108 OF 18 TH MARCH.

MY TELNO 105 : P.M.'S RESIGNATION.

1. PRESIDENT AMIN'S TELEGRAM IN REPLY TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE WAS BROADCAST OVER UGANDA RADIO LAST NIGHT. I WAS HANDED A COPY THIS MORNING. COPY FOLLOWS IN NEXT BAG.

2. IT IS SEEN HERE AS BEING UNUSUALLY WARM AND FORTHCOMING, CONTAINING NONE OF THE GRATUITOUS ADVICE OR BAD JOKES THAT USED TO BE A FEATURE OF SUCH TELEGRAMS. AS SUCH IT SHOULD CAUSE MY SOVIET COLLEAGUE TO THINK EVEN HARDER THAN BEFORE.

3. THE LAST TWO PARAGRAPHS APPEAR TO CALL FOR A REPLY. I HOPE THAT THIS WILL BE POSSIBLE- AND THAT YOU WILL FEEL ABLE TO ADVISE A REFERENCE IN IT TO PARA 4 OF THE TELEGRAM. THE FIRST HALF OF THAT PARAGRAPH PROVIDES AN OPPORTUNITY TO SAY SOMETHING ABOUT THE PROGRESS WE ARE MAKING ON AMIN'S VARIOUS REQUESTS- ON WHICH HE WILL BE HOPING TO HEAR SOMETHING SOON SEMI COLON WHILE THE SECOND HALF COULD BE USED TO BACK THE CHAIRMAN'S CALL TO WORK FOR PEACE RATHER THAN WAR.

4. AS SO MUCH IS BEING SAID IN AFRICA NOW ABOUT THE NEED FOR AN ARMED STRUGGLE, WITH CUBAN SUPPORT FOR THE LIBERATION OF ZIMBABWE AND AZANIA IT WOULD DO NO HARM TO COMMEND THE OAU CHAIRMAN FOR HIS STAND PARTICULARLY IF ANYTHING USEFUL COULD BE SAID ABOUT PROGRESS IN THE SMITH / NKOMO TALKS, WHICH YOU WILL REMEMBER HAD AMIN'S STRONG SUPPORT EARLIER ON. AS AN ALTERNATIVE, IF IT WAS THOUGHT THAT THERE WAS SOME PROSPECT OF GETTING THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE RHODESIAN TALKS TO INVITE AN OAU FACT FINDING MISSION ALONG (AS THE FRENCH HAVE RECENTLY AGREED TO DO IN DJIBOUTI) THIS COULD HELP TO KEEP THE PRESSURE DOWN WHILE NEGOTIATIONS PROCEEDED. AND AMIN COULD BE EXPECTED TO GIVE THE MOVE HIS SUPPORT.

HENNESSY.

F I L E S

EAD            GIPD  
OADS          NEWS D  
PS  
PS/PUS  
SIR A. DUFF  
MR. ASPIN

COPIES TO:

MR. P. WRIGHT, NO. 10 DOWNING STREET.  
SIR J. HUNT, CABINET OFFICE.

CONFIDENTIAL

61007 ADMINISTER

① Original retained by Mr. Wilson  
② Copy on PRIME MINISTER MAIL

PLEASE PASS ON THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE:

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE HAROLD WILSON M.P.  
10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON  
-----

17TH MARCH 1976

406 DEAR MR. WILSON,

I AM VERY GRATEFUL FOR YOUR MESSAGE DELIVERED TO ME BY THE  
BRITISH HIGH COMMISSIONER IN KAMPALA INFORMING ME OFFICIALLY ABOUT  
YOUR DECISION TO RESIGN AS PRIME MINISTER OF GREAT BRITAIN STOP  
I WISH TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO EXPRESS TO YOU THE GREAT  
ADMIRATION COMMA APPRECIATION AND TRUST THAT I PERSONALLY COMMA THE  
GOVERNMENT AND THE ENTIRE PEOPLE OF UGANDA HAVE HAD IN YOU AS THE  
PRIME MINISTER OF GREAT BRITAIN STOP

WHEN YOU WERE ELECTED PRIME MINISTER COMMA THE RELATIONS BETWEEN  
GREAT BRITAIN AND UGANDA WERE NOT GOOD BUT BECAUSE OF YOUR ABLE AND  
WISE LEADERSHIP COMMA YOU WERE ABLE TO NORMALISE THE SITUATION BY  
SENDING YOUR BRILLIANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND C  
COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS COMMA MR. JAMES CALLAGHAN TO UGANDA TO FIND OUT  
THE TRUE FACTS ABOUT UGANDA AS WELL AS ABOUT MR. CECIL HILLS' CASE  
STOP MR. CALLAGHAN'S VISIT TO UGANDA AND HIS FRIENDLY APPROACH AND  
CLEAR UNDERSTANDING OF THE SITUATION RESULTED IN THE IMMEDIATE  
NORMALISATION OF THE RELATIONS BETWEEN UGANDA AND GREAT BRITAIN COMMA  
AND I WAS ALSO ABLE TO HAND OVER MR. CECIL HILLS TO MR. CALLAGHAN  
STOP FROM THAT TIME COMMA THE DOOR WAS OPENED AGAIN FOR CLOSE  
COOPERATION BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES AND THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE  
FRIENDLY TIES WHICH HAVE EXISTED BETWEEN THE PEOPLE OF UGANDA AND THE  
PEOPLE OF GREAT BRITAIN FOR MANY YEARS STOP

-----

I WISH TO CONGRATULATE YOU PERSONALLY FOR YOUR BRILLIANT LEADERSHIP AND GREAT WISDOM IN GUIDING YOUR COUNTRY THROUGH A VERY DIFFICULT PERIOD ECONOMICALLY AND POLITICALLY STOP YOU HAVE INDEED TRIED YOUR BEST TO SOLVE THE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS IN YOUR COUNTRY AS WELL AS THE SERIOUS PROBLEMS IN NORTHERN IRELAND STOP ALL PEACE LOVING PEOPLE IN THE WORLD WANT PEACE AND UNDERSTANDING TO PREVAIL IN NORTHERN IRELAND AS WELL AS OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD WHERE THERE IS HUMAN SUFFERING STOP

IT IS MY SINCERE HOPE THAT THE LABOUR PARTY WILL IN DUE COURSE ELECT YOUR SUCCESSOR WHO WILL THEN BE APPOINTED PRIME MINISTER TO LEAD GREAT BRITAIN STOP UGANDA WILL COOPERATE WITH YOUR SUCCESSOR WHETHER HE IS WELSH COMMA SCOTTISH COMMA IRISH OR ENGLISH STOP IT IS INDEED MY DESIRE TO CONSOLIDATE THE GOOD RELATIONS ALREADY EXISTING BETWEEN UGANDA AND BRITAIN AND TO FOSTER THE COOPERATION AMONG COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES AND SUPPORT STRICTLY THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AND ITS RESOLUTIONS STOP UGANDA COMMA AS A SOVEREIGN STATE COMMA WILL DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO COOPERATE WITH ALL PEACE LOVING COUNTRIES IN THE WORLD COMMA WE SHALL MAKE EVERY EFFORT AS A SOVEREIGN STATE COMMA AS A MEMBER OF OAU COMMA AS A MEMBER OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL FORUMS COMMA TO WORK FOR PEACE COMMA UNDERSTANDING AND COOPERATION IN THE WORLD IN ORDER TO ALLEVIATE HUMAN SUFFERING STOP

I AM INFORMED THAT IT IS YOUR INTENTION TO CONTINUE TO BE A MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT AND I AM SURE THAT YOUR EXPERIENCE COMMA WISDOM AND BRILLIANT IDEAS WILL ALWAYS BE OF IMMENSE VALUE AND GUIDANCE TO THE PARLIAMENT STOP

MAY I TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO WISH YOU AND YOUR FAMILY GOD'S BLESSINGS AND GOOD HEALTH SO THAT YOU MAY CONTINUE TO SERVE YOUR COUNTRY IN ONE WAY OR ANOTHER STOP I WISH ALSO TO EXTEND AN INVITATION TO YOU AND YOUR FAMILY TO VISIT UGANDA AT ANY TIME CONVENIENT TO YOU STOP THE PEOPLE OF UGANDA WILL BE EXTREMELY HAPPY TO RECEIVE YOU AND EXTEND TO YOU THEIR WARM TRADITIONAL HOSPITALITY STOP I ALSO HOPE THAT I SHALL BE ABLE TO MEET YOU DURING THE NEXT COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCE IN LONDON STOP

LASTLY COMMA ON BEHALF OF THE ENTIRE PEOPLE OF UGANDA COMMA THE GOVERNMENT AND ON MY OWN BEHALF COMMA I WISH TO CONVEY COMMA THROUGH YOU COMMA OUR SINCERE GREETINGS AND BEST WISHES TO HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN AND THE ENTIRE PEOPLE OF GREAT BRITAIN STOP

WITH HIGHEST REGARDS FULLSTOP =====

ALHAJJI FIELD MARSHAL DR. IDI AMIN DADA VC. DSO MC



CONFIDENTIAL

L A S H

CYPHER CAT A

GRPS 300A

FM FCO 161430Z

CONFIDENTIAL

TO FLASH KAMPALA TEL NO 50 OF 16 MARCH

PLEASE DELIVER AS SOON AS POSSIBLE THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO GENERAL AMIN:

1. DEAR MR PRESIDENT,

AS YOU WILL HAVE SEEN FROM THE ANNOUNCEMENT ISSUED THIS MORNING FROM 10 DOWNING STREET, I HAVE TODAY CONFIRMED TO THE QUEEN MY DECISION TAKEN LAST DECEMBER TO MAKE WAY FOR A SUCCESSOR, AND TO RESIGN AS PRIME MINISTER AS SOON AS THE PARLIAMENTARY PARTY HAS COMPLETED THE NECESSARY CONSTITUTIONAL PROCEDURES FOR ELECTING A NEW LEADER.

2. I SHALL OF COURSE REMAIN IN CHARGE OF THE GOVERNMENT UNTIL A NEW LEADER OF THE PARTY HAS BEEN ELECTED AND MY SUCCESSOR HAS BEEN APPOINTED. YOU WILL KNOW THE IMPORTANCE I HAVE ALWAYS ATTACHED TO THE COMMONWEALTH, AND I LOOK BACK WITH GREAT PLEASURE ON THOSE COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCES WHICH I HAVE CHAIRED MYSELF, AS WELL AS THE OTHERS WHICH I HAVE ATTENDED. I HAVE THEREFORE SOME PERSONAL REGRETS THAT MY DEPARTURE WILL MEAN THAT I MYSELF CANNOT BE IN THE CHAIR AT NEXT YEAR'S MEETING IN LONDON, WHEN I WOULD HAVE LIKED TO HAVE WELCOMED YOU PERSONALLY. IT IS NEVERTHELESS A SOURCE OF SATISFACTION TO ME THAT, AT THE END OF MY TIME AS PRIME MINISTER, THE COMMONWEALTH IS IN MY VIEW AS STRONG AS IT HAS EVER BEEN, AS WAS SHOWN SO CLEARLY AT OUR MEETING IN KINGSTON LAST YEAR.

3. I AM CONVINCED THAT THE CLOSE RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES WILL CONTINUE TO GROW AND PROSPER.

CALLAGHAN

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

F I L E S

CCD

EAD

COPIES TO:

MR P WRIGHT

NO 10 DOWNING STREET

CONFIDENTIAL

GPS 100

PRIORITY

LYPHER/CAT A AND BY B19

RESTRICTED

*Myardae*

*Encl with pp*

*tp*

FM F.C.O. 071616Z

RESTRICTED

TO PRIORITY KAMPALA TELNO 344 OF 7 DECEMBER  
INFO SAVING NAIROBI AND KINSHASA.

*Ph 7/12*

YOUR TELNOS 677 AND 678: MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER

1. PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING REPLY TO PRESIDENT AMIN FROM  
THE PRIME MINISTER.

BEGINS:

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. *T1234/75*

DEAR MR PRESIDENT,

THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE OF 30 NOVEMBER, WITH ITS APPRECIATIVE  
REFERENCE TO HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT'S PROPOSALS FOR DEVOLUTION  
WITHIN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND ITS KIND WORDS ABOUT MR CALLAGHAN.  
I STRONGLY SUPPORT HIS EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN THE IMPROVEMENT IN  
RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES AND WELCOME THE STEPS WHICH  
ARE BEING TAKEN TOWARDS THAT END.

HAROLD WILSON

ENDS:

CALLAGHAN

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

FILES

EAD

PS

MR ASPIN

RESTRICTED

Achim Kuba.



Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Amin's message is pretty important!

5 December 1975

But it is probably wise to respond to

good intentions. If you give to the draft, the

Duty Clerk can ask Fio to despatch on the weekend.

I can sketch,

President Amin's Message

P.H.W. 5/12

President Amin has sent the enclosed message to the Prime Minister congratulating him on HMG's devolution policies and passing congratulations to Mr Callaghan for his part in improving Anglo-Ugandan relations. President Amin has been a great supporter of Irish, Scottish and Welsh nationalism in the past, to the extent of promising support for the IRA and blaming the Scottish Nationalist Party for not being nationalist enough. The terms of the present message are in marked and pleasant contrast to his previous pensées on regional policy within the United Kingdom.

We hope that the Prime Minister will agree to send a short reply. Anglo-Ugandan relations have improved markedly since Mr Callaghan visited Kampala last July and President Amin has shown restraint over the publication of Mr Denis Hills' book, 'The White Pumpkin', as well as over some unfavourable BBC comment on Ugandan policy from Nairobi and generally in his conduct of African affairs since becoming Chairman of the OAU.

We are hoping to resume negotiations on compensation for British property expropriated in Uganda early in the New Year and President Amin has made it clear that he wishes to see real progress made at these resumed talks. He is, however, extremely volatile and might well take amiss a failure to reply to a note as warm as that which he has now sent. I attach a draft reply for the Prime Minister's consideration, which Mr Callaghan has approved.

Mr W  
16/12/75

(R. N. Dales)

P. R. H. Wright Esq.  
Private Secretary, No 10

File No. ....  
Department .....  
Drafted by .....  
(Block Capitals) .....  
Tel. Extn. ....

OUTWARD  
TELEGRAM

Security Classification
Precedence
DESKBY ..... 2

FOR  
COMMS. DEPT.  
USE

Despatched

(Date) .....

(Time) ..... Z

POSTBY .....

PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin) ..... Z (G.M.T.)

(Restrictive Prefix) .....

(Security Class.) ..... RESTRICTED

(Caveat/  
Privacy Marking) .....

(Codeword) .....

(Deskby) ..... Z

TO PRIORITY  
(precedence)

KAMPALA  
(post)

Tel. No. .... of .....

AND TO (precedence/post) .....

AND SAVING TO .....

REPEATED TO (for info) .....

SAVING TO (for info) ..... NAIROBI KINSHASA

Distribution:-

[TEXT]

YOUR TELNOS 677 and 678: MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER

1. Please deliver the following reply to President Amin  
from the Prime Minister

Begins

Dear Mr President,

Thank you for your message of 30 November, with its  
appreciative reference to Her Majesty's Government's  
proposals for devolution within the United Kingdom and  
its kind words about Mr Callaghan. I strongly support his  
efforts to maintain the improvement in relations between  
our two countries and welcome the steps which are being  
taken towards that end.

Harold Wilson

Copies to:-

FO E 016/01  
LHH 938/1  
O O FCO

GRS 255  
EN CLAIR  
FM KAMPALA 010700Z

UNCLASSIFIED

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 667 OF 1 ST DECEMBER .

ANGLO - UGANDAN RELATIONS .

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT AMIN TO THE  
PRIME MINISTERS . IT WAS BROADCAST ON UGANDA RADIO YESTERDAY.

BEGINS:-

" I WISH TO CONGRATULATE YOU MOST SINCERELY FOR THE VERY  
REALISTIC AND BRILLIANT POLICY ANNOUNCED BY YOUR GOVERNMENT  
THAT SCOTLAND AND WALES WILL IN FUTURE HAVE REGIONAL ASSEMBLIES  
OF THEIR OWN . THIS NEW POLICY APPEARS TO BE A CORRECT REFLECTION  
OF POPULAR FEELING THROUGHOUT THE UNITED KINGDOM AND I HAVE NO  
DOUBT THAT IT WILL GREATLY CONTRIBUTE TO GREATER CORDIAL  
UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE SCOTTISH , WELSH AND ENGLISH PEOPLES  
NOT ONLY WITHIN THE BRITISH ISLES , BUT THROUGHOUT THE WORLD. IN  
THAT WAY, SECESSION TENDENCIES WHICH OFTEN HAVE EVEN RAISED  
SECURITY PROBLEMS SHOULD NOT NOW HAVE ANY BASIS FOR PUBLIC  
SYMPATHY .

2. MAY I ALSO REQUEST YOU , MR PRIME MINISTER , TO PASS  
MY CONGRATULATIONS AND GOOD WISHES TO ALL YOUR FELLOW CITIZENS  
IN SCOTLAND , WALES AND ENGLAND UPON THIS MODERN POLICY WHICH I  
HOPE THEY WILL ALL SUPPORT WHOLEHEARTEDLY AS IT IS TO THEIR  
BEST MUTUAL INTEREST.

3. MAY I IN PARTICULAR REQUEST YOU TO PASS ON MY SPECIAL  
CONGRATULATIONS TO FOREIGN SECRETARY CALLAGHAN , WHO, WHEN HE

X-7

PS UGANDA  
PS/MURKIN  
PS/PVS  
Sri A. Duff  
Mr. Aspin  
14 EAD  
14. News D.  
PS/N. 10. D. S.

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T122 B/75

CONGRATULATIONS TO FOREIGN SECRETARY CALLAGHAN , WHO, WHEN HE  
MET ME EARLIER THIS YEAR PROMISED TO ENSURE THAT THE RELATIONS  
BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND UGANDA WOULD BE IMPROVED. I HAVE  
INDEED SINCE HIS VISIT TO UGANDA , NOTICED A GREAT IMPROVEMENT  
OF RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. FOR MY PART AND ON BEHALF  
OF UGANDA , I WISH TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO CONTINUE IMPROVING  
AND WIDENING THE GOOD RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES  
FOR THE MUTUAL BENEFIT OF OUR TWO PEOPLES AND WORLD PEACE .  
HIGHEST CONSIDERATION .  
EL HAJJI FIELD MARSHALL IDI AMIN DADA VC DSO MC  
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA AND CURRENT CHAIRMAN OF  
THE O A U " . ENDS.

4. SEE M I F T.

CCN PARA ... BRITISH ISLES .....

HENNESSY

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

GPS 60  
IMMEDIATE  
CYPHER CAT A  
FM KAMPALA 211400Z  
CONFIDENTIAL

Prime Minister *Handwritten signature*

*Handwritten initials*

*2/4*

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 664 OF 21 ST NOVEMBER REPEATED FOR  
INFORMATION TO NAIROBI KINSHASA UKMIS NEW YORK MOSCOW  
LAGOS PRETORIA AND ADDIS ABABA.

YOUR TELNO 329 (NOT TO ALL) : PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE/ANGOLA.

1. AMIN WAS DELIGHTED TO RECEIVE THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE  
THIS MORNING. HE TOLD ME THAT HE WAS STILL HOPING TO GET A  
PEACEKEEPING FORCE TOGETHER FOR ANGOLA- NAND NOTED WITH PLEASURE  
THAT THE AMERICANS HAD REFUSED TO ACCEPT THE M P L A  
DELEGATION TO THE INTERNATIONAL COFFEE TALKS IN LONDON  
YESTERDAY.

HENNESSY

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

FILES

EAD  
NEWS D  
CSAD  
PTCD  
SED  
CLAIMS D  
PPD  
POD  
DEF. D  
PS  
PS/MR ENNAL  
PS/PUS  
SIR A. DUFF  
MR ASPIN  
MR HAWLEY  
MR THOMSON  
MR WHITEHEAD

CONFIDENTIAL

GRPS 75  
IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER CAT A

FM KAMPALA 211333Z

CONFIDENTIAL

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 660 OF 21 ST NOVEMBER REPEATED FOR  
INFORMATION TO NAIROBI KINSHASA AND PRETORIA.

M I P T ( NOT TO PRETORIA ) : RHODESIA.

1. WHEN I ASKED AMIN WHETHER HE HAD MADE ANY PROGRESS WITH  
SITHOLE ABOUT UNITING THE VARIOUS FACTIONS OF THE RHODESIAN  
A N C HE SAID IT WAS HIS INTENTION TO TRY AND GET ALL THE  
LEADERS ( INCLUDING JOSHUA NKOMO ) TO KAMPALA WHERE HE WOULD  
URGE ON THEM THE NECESSITY NOT TO ALLOW AN ANGOLAN SITUATION  
TO DEVELOP . IF HE COULD GET THEM TO UNITE HE WOULD SUGGEST  
THAT THEY- AND IAN SMITH- GO TO LONDON FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL  
CONFERENCE .

HENNESSY

FILES

EAD

CSAD

SED

PROT & CON DEPT

NEWS DEPT

CLAIMS DEPT

PPD

POD

DEF DEPT

RHOD DEPT

FRD

CCD

PS

PS/MR ENNALS

PS/PUS

SIR A DUFF

MR ASPIN

MR HAWLEY

MR THOMSON

MR WHITEHEAD

[COPIES SENT TO NO. 10 DOWNING STREET]

CONFIDENTIAL



IMMEDIATE  
GRS 115

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER CAT A

FM KAMPALA 211320Z

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 211400Z

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 659 OF 21 ST NOVEMBER REPEATED  
FOR INFORMATION TO NAIROBI AND KINSHASA.

*Enc 4:*

*Ph 4*

YOUR TELNO 328 : ANGLO UGANDAN RELATIONS.

1. THE PRESIDENT RECEIVED ME AT THE COMMAND POST THIS MORNING , WITH ONLY EKOCHU PRESENT . DURING THE INITIAL EXCHANGES AND WHILE THE PRESS AND T V WERE STILL AROUND HE TOUCHED ON A NUMBER OF SUBJECTS INCLUDING RHODESIA AND THE COMMUNISTS (SEE M I F T).
2. WHEN THE JOURNALISTS HAD GONE I HANDED OVER THE P M 'S MESSAGE ABOUT ANGOLA AND WENT ON TO DISCUSS COMPENSATION , REPRESENTATION, MILITARY AFFAIRS AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE ( SEE MI F T).
3. AMIN WAS AT HIS MOST AFFABLE AND THE WHOLE MEETING WAS CONDUCTED IN AN EXTREMELY CORDIAL ATMOSPHERE - DESPITE THE NASTY TASTE THAT MUST HAVE BEEN LEFT BY THE PUBLICATION OF HILLS BOOK YESTERDAY.

HENNESSY

FILES. FRD.  
EAD. PS  
CSAD. PS/MAENNALS.  
SED. PS/PUS.  
PCD SIR A DUFF  
NEWS D. MR ASPIN.  
CLAIMS D. MR HAWLEY  
PPD. MR THOMSON.  
POD. MR WHITEHEAD.  
DEFENCE D.  
RHOD. D.

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 10

IMMEDIATE

EN CLAIR

FM KAMPALA 210832Z

UNCLASSIFIED

DESKBY 210915Z

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 658 OF 21 ST NOVEMBER .

YOUR TELNO 329.

MESSAGE DELIVERED.

HENNESSY

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

F I L E S

EAD

CSAD

NEWS D

PS

PS/MR ENNALS

PS/PUS

SIR A DUFF

MR ASPIN

*Encl am pp*

*tpa*

*R 2 1/11*

CYPHER CAT A

FM FCO 201310Z

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE

TO IMMEDIATE KAMPALA TELNO 329 OF 20 NOVEMBER, 1975. 7/15 B/75  
INFO PRIORITY NAIROBI, KINSHASA, UKMIS NEW YORK, MOSCOW, LAGOS,  
PRETORIA AND ADDIS ABABA.

YOUR TELNO 637 AND MY IPT (NOT TO ALL): PRESIDENT AMIN'S MESSAGE  
ABOUT ANGOLA.

1. THE PRIME MINISTER HAS APPROVED THE FOLLOWING REPLY TO PRESIDENT  
AMIN'S MESSAGE TO HIM OF 12 NOVEMBER. PLEASE TRANSMIT IT TO THE  
PRESIDENT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE INFORMING US BY IMMEDIATE TELEGRAM  
WHEN YOU HAVE DONE SO. WE WILL THEN ANNOUNCE THAT A REPLY HAS  
BEEN SENT.

MESSAGE BEGINS:

DEAR MR PRESIDENT

I WAS GRATEFUL TO RECEIVE YOUR MESSAGE OF 12 NOVEMBER IN WHICH,  
AS CHAIRMAN OF THE OAU, YOU WERE GOOD ENOUGH TO EXPRESS YOUR  
APPRECIATION OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S VIEWS ON ANGOLA AS  
EXPRESSED IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON 10 NOVEMBER. WE ARE, OF COURSE,  
DEEPLY CONCERNED OVER THE TRAGEDY OF THAT TROUBLED COUNTRY AND  
ANXIOUS THAT PEACE SHOULD BE SPEEDILY RESTORED.  
OUR POLICY HAS THROUGHOUT BEEN ONE OF IMPARTIALITY AS BETWEEN THE  
RIVAL GROUPS IN ANGOLA. WE THEREFORE FULLY SUPPORT THE INITIATIVES  
OF THE OAU UNDER YOUR CHAIRMANSHIP TO FIND A SOLUTION FOR THE  
BENEFIT OF THE PEOPLE OF ANGOLA AS A WHOLE. WE WARMLY WELCOME YOUR  
CONTINUING EFFORTS TO THAT END.

HAROLD WILSON

MESSAGE ENDS

CALLAGHAN

FILES	PS/MR ENNALS
EAD	PS/PUS
NEWS DEPT	SIR A DUFF
CSAD	MR ASPIN
P&CD	MR HAWLEY
SED	MR THOMSON
CLAIMS DEPT	MR WHITEHEAD
PPD	
POD	
DEF DEPT	
PS	

[COPIES SENT TO NO. 10 DOWNING STREET]

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE  
CYPHER CAT/A

FM FCO 201305Z

CONFIDENTIAL

TO IMMEDIATE KAMPALA TELEGRAM NUMBER 328 OF 20 NOV 75

INFO PRIORITY NAIROBI KINSHASA.

YOUR TELNO 642 : ANGLO-UGANDAN RELATIONS

1. WHEN SEEKING AN AUDIENCE WITH AMIN TO DELIVER THE PRIME MINISTER'S REPLY TO HIS MESSAGE OF 12 NOVEMBER (SEE MY IFT) YOU SHOULD SAY THAT YOU ARE NOW ABLE TO RESPOND TO THE POINTS ON ANGLO-UGANDAN RELATIONS WHICH HE RAISED WITH YOU ON 13 NOVEMBER.

2. WHEN YOU SEE HIM, YOU SHOULD SAY :-

A. COMPENSATION

THE LISTS OF CLAIMANTS SHOULD BE IN THE CONFIDENTIAL BAG REACHING YOU ON 25 NOVEMBER. WE SHALL BE READY TO RESUME COMPENSATION TALKS AS SOON THEREAFTER AS THE UGANDANS WISH. WE WOULD HOPE, HOWEVER, THAT BEFORE THEN THEY WOULD HAVE MADE A THOROUGH STUDY OF THESE LISTS SO THAT SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS CAN BE CARRIED FORWARD. AT YOUR DISCRETION, YOU MAY DRAW AS NECESSARY ON THE TWO SEPARATE TELEGRAMS ON COMPENSATION WHICH ARE BEING DESPATCHED SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THIS TELEGRAM.

B. REPRESENTATION

WE HAVE NOTED WITH APPRECIATION PRESIDENT AMIN'S STATESMANLIKE REACTION TO THE PUBLICATION OF "THE WHITE PUMPKIN" AND ARE GLAD TO KNOW THAT HE ACCEPTS THAT HMG BEAR NO RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE BOOK. THE PROGRESS TOWARDS NORMALISATION IN

/ANGLO-UGANDAN/

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

ANGLO-UGANDAN RELATIONS FOLLOWING MY VISIT IN JULY NOW SEEMS TO US SUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY RAISING OUR RESPECTIVE HEADS OF MISSION TO FULL HIGH COMMISSIONER STATUS. WE ACCORDINGLY PROPOSE AS SOON AS THE NECESSARY FORMALITIES HAVE BEEN COMPLETED HERE TO SEEK AGREEMENT FOR YOUR APPOINTMENT AS HIGH COMMISSIONER. MEANWHILE WE SUGGEST THAT THE UGANDANS MIGHT GIVE US A FORMAL REQUEST FOR AGREEMENT FOR ISINGOMA AS HIGH COMMISSIONER. WE ALSO SUGGEST THAT IN ACCORDANCE WITH NORMAL PRACTICE, AN ANNOUNCEMENT SHOULD BE MADE WHEN THE QUEEN'S AND THE PRESIDENT'S FORMAL APPROVAL HAVE BEEN GIVEN. WE ARE HAPPY THAT MR ISINGOMA IS TO REMAIN IN LONDON AND WE HAVE NO INTENTION OF MOVING YOU FROM KAMPALA AT THE PRESENT TIME.

C. MILITARY AFFAIRS

NOW THAT AMIN IS BACK ON TERMS WITH THE RUSSIANS WE HOPE THAT HE WILL NOT REVERT TO THE QUESTION OF TRAINING AT WARMINSTER. IF HE DOES, YOU SHOULD SUGGEST THAT IT WOULD NOT BE IN UGANDA'S INTERESTS TO ACCEPT TRAINING SIMULTANEOUSLY FROM TWO COUNTRIES WITH WIDELY DIFFERING MILITARY TRADITIONS AND METHODS. IN ANY CASE, WARMINSTER COURSES ARE FULLY BOOKED FOR THE NEXT YEAR. YOU MAY ALSO DRAW ON MY SEPARATE TELEGRAM ABOUT MILITARY SUPPLIES, TO THE EXTENT YOU JUDGE NECESSARY TO CONVINCE AMIN THAT WE ARE NOT WHOLLY OPPOSED TO MEETING HIM OVER HIS MILITARY NEEDS.

CALLAGHAN

FILES  
EAD  
CSAD  
SED  
P&CD  
NEWS DEPT  
CLAIMS DEPT  
PPD  
POD  
DEF DEPT  
PS  
PS/MR ENNALS  
PS/FUS  
SIR A DUFF

MR ASPIN  
MR HAWLEY  
MR THOMSON  
MR WHITEHEAD

[COPIES SENT TO NO. 10 DOWNING STREET]

CONFIDENTIAL

CE3



10 Downing Street  
Whitehall

15 November 1975

MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT AMIN

You sent me yesterday a letter enclosing a draft telegram which incorporated a reply for the Prime Minister to send to President Amin's recent message about Angola.

The Prime Minister has approved the draft, and it may therefore be sent to Kampala for onward transmission as soon as you are ready to send Mr. Hennessy instructions on the points raised by President Amin during his recent meeting with Mr. Hennessy.

P. R. H. WRIGHT

R.N. Dales, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PRHW carried  
at action 15.11.75



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

14 November 1975

*Prime Minister*

*Dear Sir,*  
*If you agree, I will ask the FCO to arrange for the message to go. They will wish also to send Mr. Hennessy instructions on the subject, esp. details.*

You sent me a copy of President Amin's message about Angola to the Prime Minister.

*PR*  
*14/11*

President Amin's interest in Angola stems from his Chairmanship of the OAU and to a lesser extent from the influence which his 'best friend', President Mobutu of Zaire, has doubtless been bringing to bear on him. The Defence Commission of the OAU has recently been discussing in Kampala the Angolan situation under Ugandan chairmanship. Representatives of all three Angolan parties have been present.

The object of the message is almost certainly to win support for Amin in his current row with the Soviet Union, nominally over Angola but probably also arising from differences with the Soviet Union over their supply of military equipment and training to Uganda. This view is reinforced by a Radio Uganda report that very similar messages were sent to Chairman Mao and President Ford. Copies were sent to all OAU Heads of State. We suspect either that Uganda is being asked to pay more for this equipment than she can afford or that the Russians have imposed restrictions on its supply and use. On 9 November President Amin threatened to break off relations with the Soviet Union and on 11 November he expelled the Soviet Ambassador. On the same day the Russians announced a 'temporary' break in relations with Uganda. The present state of play is confused. Although Amin has privately said that he intends that all the Russians should go, there can be no doubt that he badly needs the presence of at least some Soviet military training personnel. He has however already started to think of alternative sources of training for his officers and mentioned Warminster to our Acting High Commissioner, Jim Hennessy, who called on him today (Kampala telno. 642).

/Our

P.R.H. Wright, Esq.,  
10 Downing Street,  
London S.W.1.

CONFIDENTIAL



Our own relations with Amin remain in the state of "convalescence" reached following Mr. Callaghan's visit there in July. Official talks in September made some progress and we hope they will be resumed next month or in the New Year. Apart from one outburst at the United Nations, Amin has been restrained in his references to us. However with the Russians in bad odour we have become his friends again. It is apparent from Hennessy's telegram that even Mr. Hills' book "The White Pumpkin" which caused all the trouble last summer and is to be published virtually uncut on 20 November is, for the moment at least, not causing him any difficulty in his relations with us. Indeed he was very friendly towards Hennessy however embarrassing his attentions may prove to be.

Against this background we think it would do no harm to send a short but friendly reply particularly when to send no reply might prompt him to change his volatile mind about his reaction to "The White Pumpkin". Moreover the message is about Angola on which, for once, our views are closely in line with those Amin expresses formally as Chairman of the OAU. We have followed a consistent policy of non-intervention in Angola; we have little means of bringing influence to bear. However our stance of not recognising either of the claimant regimes accords closely with the OAU line. Mr. Ennals has publicly wished the OAU well in its attempts to bring the parties together.

... Mr. Callaghan therefore considers that we should send a courteous but short reply to President Amin's message and I attach a draft for the Prime Minister's consideration in the form of a draft telegram.

*Yours ever*

*R.N. Dales*

(R.N. Dales)

CONFIDENTIAL



File No. \_\_\_\_\_  
Department EAST AFRICAN  
d by \_\_\_\_\_  
(Check Capitals) M K EWANS  
Tel. Extn. 233 4549

OUTWARD  
TELEGRAM

Security Classification
CONFIDENTIAL
Precedence
IMMEDIATE
DESKBY _____ Z

FOR  
COMMS. DEPT.  
USE

Despatched

(Date) \_\_\_\_\_

(Time) \_\_\_\_\_ Z

POSTBY \_\_\_\_\_ Z

PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin) \_\_\_\_\_ Z(G.M.T.)

(Restrictive Prefix) \_\_\_\_\_

(Security Class.) CONFIDENTIAL

(Caveat/  
Privacy Marking) \_\_\_\_\_

(Codeword) \_\_\_\_\_

(Deskby) \_\_\_\_\_ Z

TO IMMEDIATE KAMPALA Tel. No. \_\_\_\_\_ of \_\_\_\_\_  
(precedence) (post)

AND TO (precedence/post) \_\_\_\_\_

AND SAVING TO \_\_\_\_\_

REPEATED TO (for info) PRIORITY NAIROBI KINSHASA UKMIS NEW YORK MOSCOW  
LAGOS PRETORIA ADDIS ABABA

SAVING TO (for info) \_\_\_\_\_

bution:-

[TEXT]

Your telegram No 637: President Amin's message.

1. The Prime Minister has approved the following reply to President Amin's message to him of 12 November. Please transmit it to the President as soon as possible informing us by immediate telegram when you have done so. ~~News We Department~~ will then announce that a reply has been sent.

Message begins:

Dear Mr President

I was grateful to receive your message of 12 November in which, as Chairman of the OAU, you were good enough to express your appreciation of the British Government's views on Angola as expressed in the House of Commons on 10 November.

/We are

s to:-

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

We are, of course, deeply concerned over the tragedy of that troubled country and anxious that peace should be speedily restored.

Our policy has throughout been one of impartiality as between the rival groups in Angola. We therefore fully support the initiatives of the OAU under your Chairmanship to find a solution for the benefit of the people of Angola as a whole. We warmly welcome ~~and support~~ your continuing efforts to that end.

HAROLD WILSON

Message ends.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

IMMEDIATE

ADVANCE COPIES

ADVANCE COPY

0 FCO

R R NAIROBI

R R KINSHASA

GRS 650

CYPHER CAT A

FM KAMPALA 131300Z

CONFIDENTIAL

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 642 OF 13 TH NOVEMBER REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO NAIROBI AND KINSHASA.

MY TELNO 639 : ANGLO/UGANDAN RELATIONS.

1. THE PRESIDENT RECEIVED ME AT STATE HOUSE ENTERBE SHORTLY BEFORE LUNCH TODAY. ISINGOMA AND EKOCHU WERE PRESENT.

2. HE WAS IN AN EXPANSIVE MOOD- BUOYED UP I THINK BY WHAT HE REGARDS AS HIS VICTORY OVER THE SOVIETS- AND BEGAN BY SAYING THAT HE HAD A NUMBER OF POINTS HE WANTED TO TALK ABOUT. THE FIRST WAS NOT THE MOST IMPORTANT BUT HE WOULD LIKE TO GET IT OUT OF THE WAY SINCE A STATEMENT WAS SHORTLY BEING ISSUED ABOUT IT- AND HE SHOWED ME, WITH A GRIN, A COPY OF THE WHITE PUMPKIN. (THE STATEMENT - COPY OF WHICH FOLLOWS IN TOMMORROWS BAG- WAS BROADCAST AT 1 PM LOCAL TIME ) .

3. THE BOOK HE SAID, SHOWED WHAT SORT OF A MAN HILLS WAS- PRE- OCCUPIED WITH SEX AND WRITING PRONOGRAPHIC MATERIAL FOR FINANCIAL GAIN. THE OPINIONS OF SUCH A MAN DID NOT COUNT- AND WERE BEST IGNORED. THEY SHOULD NOT IN ANY CASE DISTURB THE EXCELLENT RELATIONS BETWEEN UGANDA AND BRITAIN. IN THIS CONTEXT HE REFERRED TO YOUR DISCUSSIONS WITH HIM IN JULY AND YOUR STATEMENT IN THE HOUSE ON NOVEMBER 11 TH .

4. THE SECOND POINT HE WISHED ME TO REPORT WAS HIS DESIRE (PROMPTED PERHAPS BY CURRENT DIFFICULTIES WITH THE RUSSIANS) TO HAVE HIS OFFICERS TAINED AT WARMINSTER AGAIN. BRITISH TRAINING WAS MUCH BETTER THAN ANY OTHER , AS HE KNEW FROM PERSONAL EXPERIENCE . HE ALSO PROPOSED FROM NOW ON (PERHAPS MAKING A VENTURE OF NECESSITY) TO STOP BUYING ARMS IN FAVOUR OF TRACTORS.

PS Mr. Anals

PS to PUS  
Sir A. Duff

Mr. Aspin

HD LAD

HD News D

No. 10 Downing St.

Pine Minister

13/11

EXPERIENCE . HE ALSO PROPOSED FROM NOW ON (PERHAPS MAKING A VIRTUE OF NECESSITY) TO STOP BUYING ARMS IN FAVOUR OF TRACTORS. MUCH EQUIPMENT WAS NEEDED TO DEVELOP THE COUNTRY . HE WOULD LIKE TO GET IT FROM BRITAIN , IT WAS WHAT THE UGANDANS WERE USED TO . BUT HE WOULD NEED SOME CREDIT. .

5. BEFORE I COULD SAY WE WOULD HAVE TO CONSIDER SUCH REQUESTS IN THE CONTEXT OF MORE NORMAL RELATIONS HE LED STRAIGHT ON TO HIS THIRD POINT: THE ANGLO - UGANDAN TALKS.

6. IT WAS IMPORTANT HE SAID TO GET THESE MOVING AGAIN. HE WAS STILL WAITING TO HEAR FROM US ON THE COMPENSATION QUESTION. HE HAD HOPED TO HAVE THEM FINISHED BEFORE THE INDIANS , BUT NOW THE INDIANS HAD FINISHED FIRST. AFTER DECEMBER HE AND HIS MINISTERS WOULD BE OCCUPIED WITH MANY OTHER THINGS- INCLUDING A LARGE SCALE SALARIES REVIEW. IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO HAVE THE QUESTION OF COMPENSATION OUT OF THE WAY BEFORE THEN.

7. WHEN I REMINDED HIM THAT I HAD ALREADY TOLD THE FOREIGN MINISTER WE HOPED TO HAVE OUR VIEWS READY BY THE END OF THIS MONTH HE SAID THAT HE HOPED THE TALKS COULD THEN BEGIN AGAIN STRAIGHT AWAY.

8. ISINSOMA , EKOCHU AND OSEKU ALL URGED THIS SAME POINT ON ME LAST NIGHT. WE SHOULD , THEY SAID, TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE PRESENT FAVOURABLE CLIMATE OF OPINION AND NOT LET THE OPPORTUNITY SLIP.- IF EVER THERE WAS A TIME TO STRIKE , THEY SAID, NOW WAS THAT MOMENT HAVING REJECTED THE EAST THE PRESIDENT WAS FEELING THE NEED FOR FRIENDS : AND HE WAS LOOKING TO US FOR A SIGN.

9. AMIN'S LAST POINT WAS THAT AS WE NOW ENJOYED EXCELLENT RELATIONS HE WOULD LIKE TO UP-GRADE THE LEVEL OF OUR REPRESENTATION TO THAT OF FULL HIGH COMMISSIONER . HE HAD SPOKEN TO YOU IN JULY AND YOU HAD SAID IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO TAKE IT SLOWLY - TO WAIT UNTIL A LITTLE NEARER THE END OF THE YEAR. THE TIME WAS NOW RIPE. HE WOULD KEEP MR ISINSOMA IN LONDON AND HE HOPED MY GOVERNMENT WOULD KEEP ME HERE. I MADE NO COMMENT.

10. BEFORE DRAWING OUR TALKS TO A CLOSE THE PRESIDENT EXPANDED AT SOME LENGTH ON THE CONTRAST BETWEEN THE SOVIET WAY OF DOING THINGS AND THE WAY IN WHICH WE IN BRITAIN CONDUCTED OUR AFFAIRS. " THEY DON'T KNOW HOW TO THINK", HE SAID. " WHATEVER YOU SAY TO THEM THEY HAVE TO REFER TO MOSCOW BEFORE THEY GIVE YOU AN ANSWER".

PRIORITY

GRS300

EN CLAIR

FM KAMPALA 121100Z

UNCLASSIFIED

TO PRIORITY FCO TELNO 637 OF 12 TH NOVEMBER.

PS TO PM

Encl + pa

Separate copy received via Uganda  
High Commission on 12 November and c  
to FCO, with oral request for advice  
a reply.

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF TELEGRAM WHICH MINISTER OF STATE  
TOLD ME HAD BEEN SENT TO PRIME MINISTER THIS MORNING AND WHICH  
WAS BROADCAST ON LOCAL 1 PM NEWS TODAY:-

BEGINS-

KAMPALA : NOVEMBER 12, 1975.

**PRIME MINISTER'S**

**PERSONAL MESSAGE**

SERIAL No. T/13A/75

DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER:

I HAVE BEEN FOLLOWING CLOSELY AND CAREFULLY THE VIEWS  
OF YOUR GOVERNMENT ON THE QUESTION OF ANGOLA'S INDEPENDENCE  
WHICH, AS YOU ARE AWARE, IS THE MOST TOPICAL PROBLEM CURRENTLY  
FACING THE OAU.

I SHOULD LIKE, ON BEHALF OF THE ENTIRE MEMBERSHIP OF THE OAU,  
TO EXPRESS TO YOU AND TO YOUR GOVERNMENT MY GRATITUDE FOR YOUR  
CORRECT ASSESSMENT AND APPRECIATION OF THE ANGOLAN PROBLEM. IN  
PARTICULAR, I AM GRATEFUL FOR THE SUPPORT THAT YOUR FOREIGN  
SECRETARY CALLAGHAN EXPRESSED IN PARLIAMENT YESTERDAY SUPPORTING  
ME FOR UPHOLDING THE POSITION WHICH HAS BEEN ADOPTED BY THE OAU  
ON THE SITUATION IN ANGOLA. THE STAND TAKEN BY YOUR GOVERNMENT  
WILL UNDOUBTEDLY SWING THE AFRICAN PUBLIC OPINION IN FAVOUR OF  
THE UNITED KINGDOM AS IT IS IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE PEOPLE  
OF ANGOLA THAT A POLITICAL SOLUTION RECOGNISING THE THREE  
LIBERATION MOVEMENTS IS THE BEST ANSWER TO THE CIVIL WAR GOING  
ON IN THAT COUNTRY. THE DECISION I TOOK REGARDING THE SOVIET  
UNION POSITION ON ANGOLA WAS IN THE BEST AFRICAN INTEREST. I WAS  
NOT AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION AS SUCH BUT ONLY TRYING TO FOLLOW  
THE OAU POLICY ON THE SUBJECT. THIS POLICY IN PART IS AGAINST  
THE SUPPLY OF ARMS TO ANGOLA ON A PARTISAN BASIS AND THUS  
ESCALATE THE CIVIL WAR AND BLOODSHED IN ANGOLA. THE SOVIET  
UNION MISUNDERSTOOD ME ON THIS. I AM DELIGHTED TO LEARN THAT  
YOUR GOVERNMENT UNDERSTOOD THE STAND I TOOK CORRECTLY.

/I HAVE NO DOUBT

I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT YOU WILL DO ALL WITHIN YOUR  
POWER TO SUPPORT AFRICA ON THIS POTENTIALLY DIVISIVE  
ISSUE OF ANGOLA WHERE, ACCORDING TO THE INFORMATION AVAILABLE  
TO ME , OVER 30,000 ANGOLANS HAVE ALREADY BEEN KILLED BY  
HIGHLY SOPHISTICATED ARMS SUPPLIED BY THE SOVIET UNION  
SINCE THE COLONIAL WAR FORMALLY ENDED.

I EXPRESS THE HOPE THAT THE UNITED KINGDOM WILL GO  
FARTHER THAN THIS IN DOING EVERYTHING POSSIBLE THROUGH THE  
OAU SET-UP TO RENDER THE AFRICANS MEANINGFUL DIPLOMATIC  
AND MATERIAL ASSISTANCE TO STOP THE BLOODSHED IN ANGOLA .IN  
THIS CONNECTION AND IN VIEW OF THE URGENT SERIOUSNESS OF THE  
SITUATION IN ANGOLA , YOUR GOVERNMENT SHOULD FEEL FREE TO CONTACT  
ME DIRECTLY AS CHAIRMAN OF OAU.

I AM TAKING THE LIBERTY OF COPYING THIS TELEGRAM TO  
ME FELLOW AFRICAN HEADS OF STATE IN THE OAU FOR THEIR INFORMATION  
AND NECESSARY ACTION AS AND WHEN REQUIRED.

ACCEPT , MR. PRIME MINISTER, THE ASSURANCE OF MY HIGHEST  
ESTEEM AND REGARD.

SIGNED: AL-HAJJI FIELD MARSHALL IDI AMIN DADA, VC, DSO, MC

PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA /CURRENT CHAIRMAN OF THE  
ORGANISATION OF AFRICAN UNITY.

ENDS

HENNESSY

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

CSAD

SED

UND

DEFENCE D

PUSD

NEWS D

CONSULAR D

CONS EM UNIT

GIRD

MTD

IRD

EESD

RES D (S E SECT)

OADS

MOD INTERNAL

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

DISTURBANCES IN PORTUGAL AND  
PORTUGUESE AFRICA

PS 800  
IMMEDIATE  
CYPHER CAT A  
FM NAIROBI 231322Z

Copy filed on  
Uganda - May 74

Entn + pa

CONFIDENTIAL

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 2501 DATED 23/9/75 RFI IMMEDIATE KAMPALA,  
PRIORITY KINSHASA

ANGLO/UGANDAN TALKS: FROM HAWLY.

1

1. I DOUBT IF OVERALL WE COULD HAVE REALISTICALLY EXPECTED MUCH MORE TO COME OUT OF THE TALKS THAN EVENTUALLY DID. THE ATMOSPHERE WAS REASONABLY GOOD THROUGHOUT AND IMPROVED AS WE WENT ON : AND WE MOVED A LONG WAY FROM THE WORRYING MOMENT AT THE OUTSET WHEN AMIN SAID THAT THE TALKS COULD BE CONCERNED ONLY WITH TRADE WHILE COMPENSATION WOULD BE RESERVED FOR BILATERAL MINISTERIAL DISCUSSIONS LATER.

2. THERE COULD HAVE BEEN A DANGER THAT WE MIGHT HAVE BEEN PRESSED FOR LOANS OR EXTENDED CREDIT AND THAT IT MIGHT HAVE BEN HARD TO ACHIEVE ANY BALANCING PROGRESS ON THE COMPENSATION SIDE. IN THE EVENT THE GENERAL COURSE OF THE TRADE DISCUSSIONS WAS SATISFACTORY. WE WERE ABLE TO GET ACROSS THE POINT THAT MORE FAVOURABLE TRADE AND CREDIT TERMS CANNOT BE OBTAINED JUST FOR THE ASKING BUT HAVE TO BE EARNED BY SATISFACTORY CONDUCT IN FINANCIAL AFFAIRS. THE UGANDANS ACCEPTED OUR LISTS OF COMMERCIAL AND GOVERNMENT DEBTS FOR STUDY AND GAVE EVERY APPEARANCE OF HAVING THE GENUINE INTENTION OF IDENTIFYING WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE ON THEIR SIDE WITHIN THEIR PRESENT CAPABILITIES. THEY STATED CLEARLY THAT IT WAS NOT UGANDAN POLICY TO FALL INTO ARREAR OVER THE GOVERNMENT DEBTS AND THAT DELAYS IN PAYMENT WERE DUE TO ADMINISTRATIVE AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE DIFFICULTIES. UGANDAN OFFICIALS APPEARED TO ACCEPT OUR REFUTATION OF THEIR CLAIM THAT HMG WERE DELIBERATELY HINDERING TRADE BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES BUT THEY HAVE A VALID POINT IN CLAIMING THAT THERE ARE LARGE SUMS OF UGANDAN MONEY TIED UP IN LONDON IN PRE-PAYMENT DEPOSITS. I HOPE WE CAN ENCOURAG DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE UGANDANS AND BRITISH BANKS AND OTHERS CONCERNED ON THIS QUESTION.

CONFIDENTIAL

3. ON COMPENSATION THE GOING WAS ALWAYS MORE DIFFICULT UNTIL THE VERY LAST DAY. UGANDAN BEHAVIOUR IN UNILATERALLY CHANGING THE RULES OF THE GAME BY ENACTING, AND THEN PRODUCING, NEW LEGISLATION WHILE THE TALKS WERE IN PROGRESS, APPEARED OUTRAGEOUS.

I AM NOT CONVINCED HOWEVER THAT THEIR INTENTIONS WERE NECESSARILY MALICIOUS AND THEIR PREFERENCE FOR A GOVERNMENT TO GOVERNMENT ARRANGEMENT CAN PROBABLY, WITH FURTHER THOUGHT, BE TURNED TO OUR ADVANTAGE. WE ARE IN FACT A FEW PAGES FURTHER FORWARD OVER COMPENSATION. THE UGANDANS SAY THAT VALUATIONS OF ASIAN PROPERTY HAVE NOW BEEN COMPLETED AND WILL BE NOTIFIED AND DISCUSSED WITH US ONCE BRITISH CLAIMANTS HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED. WE HAVE AGREED THE DETAIL OF WHAT FURTHER PARTICULARS THE UGANDANS NEED TO IDENTIFY THE BRITISH ASIANS CONCERNED. THUS THERE WAS, PARTICULARLY ON THE LAST DAY, SOME SUBSTANTIVE

NEGOTIATION DESPITE AMIN'S ORIGINAL GUIDELINES WHICH MADE UGANDAN OFFICIALS FAR FROM FORTHCOMING INITIALLY OVER COMPENSATION.

I STRESSED OUR GREAT CONCERN OVER COMPENSATION AND THE UGANDANS, I THINK, GOT THE MESSAGE, BUT I SUSPECT THAT THEY WERE MORE FORTHCOMING ON MONDAY BECAUSE THEY HAD A NEW BRIEF FROM AMIN ON HIS RETURN FROM ABROAD.

4. I GAINED THE IMPRESSION THAT THE UGANDAN PRESSURE ON US TO TAKE NOTE OF THEIR STRONG BELIEF THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO BAN ON SPARES AND AMMUNITION FOR BRITISH SUPPLIED EQUIPMENT WAS DUE TO A GENUINE DESIRE ON THE PART OF THE ARMY TO RESUME MORE NORMAL RELATIONS WITH US AND THAT THEY WERE INFLUENCED BY THE EXTENT TO WHICH THEY HAVE BECOME DEPENDENT ON THE BLOC. I MADE IT ABSOLUTELY PLAIN THAT ANY REFERENCE TO ARMS AND AMMUNITION, OTHER THAN THE SPARES MENTIONED BY YOU, WAS OUTSIDE MY BRIEF, BUT THE AIRING OF THE QUESTION OPENLY MAY HAVE BEEN HEALTHY AND I WAS ABLE TO EMPHASISE THE POINT THAT, AFTER THE EVENTS OF 1972, THEIR REQUEST POSED VERY CONSIDERABLE POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES FOR US. I HOPE NONETHELESS THAT WHEN THE AGREED MINUTES ARE EXAMINED IT MAY PROVE POSSIBLE TO RESPOND FAVOURABLY TO THE UGANDAN REQUEST THAT SPARES SHOULD BE AVAILABLE ON A CONTINUING BASIS. ( I THINK THIS IS PROBABLY IMPLIED BY THE UNDERTAKING ALREADY GIVEN.) IT COULD BE USEFUL TOO TO CONSIDER THE POSSIBILITY OF SUPPLYING SPORTING GUNS AND SPORTING AMMUNITION.



5. I THINK THAT A USEFUL, IF MODEST, CONTRIBUTION TO THE DIALOGUE ON OUR PROBLEMS WHICH YOU INITIATED DURING YOUR VISIT TO KAMPALA IN JULY HAS BEEN MADE. NSHEKENABO EXPRESSED SATISFACTION IN HIS FORMAL CONCLUDING REMARKS IN WHICH HE INCLUDED A HANDSOME REFERENCE TO OUR AGREEING TO STAY OVER UNTIL MONDAY. HE TOLD ME PRIVATELY THAT AMIN WAS SATISFIED. IT IS A PITY, HOWEVER, THEY DID NOT FEEL ABLE TO REFRAIN FROM TRYING TO SCORE A FINAL POINT. ( KAMPALA TELNO 563)

HANNAM

FILES

EAD  
CLAIMS D

FRD  
TRED

NEWS D

CCD

PS

PS / MRENNALS

PS / PUS

SIR A DUFF

MR ASPIN

MR MASON

MR HAWLEY

MR SCRIVENER

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

ANGLO-UGANDAN TALKS



*File*

Uganda *AV*

10 Downing Street  
Whitehall

12 September 1975

Anglo-Ugandan Relations

Thank you for your letter of today's date with which you enclosed a draft message for the Prime Minister to send to President Amin about the forthcoming talks on Anglo-Ugandan relations.

As I told you on the telephone, the Prime Minister approved the terms of your draft, and I now enclose the signed original of his letter for action as appropriate. I explained to the Prime Minister that it had not been possible yet to consult Mr. Callaghan personally about the idea or the text of this letter but, on the understanding that Mr. Callaghan has personally approved the idea of the talks (which I confirmed), he is content that the letter should issue.

P. R. H. WRIGHT

R. N. Dales, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

2F1

Sub B

bf 26.9.75



PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T8944/75

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

12 September 1975

Dear Mr. President

I am pleased that the official talks on compensation and trade matters which Mr. Callaghan discussed with you during his visit to Kampala on 10 July are due to start on 15 September. It is my hope, and I know it is yours, that these will eventually lead to a normalisation in the relations between our two countries.

The official team will be led by Mr. Donald Hawley, CMG, MBE, a most experienced Under Secretary in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. He will, of course, be advised by Mr. Hennessy with whom you are accustomed to deal.

As you know, my Government's major concern is the payment of compensation to British subjects of both European and Asian origins whose property was expropriated in Uganda under Decrees 27 and 32 of 1972, as subsequently amended. You know, I think, that we regard a degree of real progress on this problem as essential before relations can be truly normalised.

My officials will also be prepared to discuss trade questions with yours. I understand that the Ugandan side will wish to raise the question of credit terms. We have, of course, put no obstacles in the way of trade with Uganda but the very substantial commercial debt in various fields for which the

/Government of

Government of Uganda is responsible has understandably led to caution on the part both of those exporters who are asked to give credit and of their bankers. I very much hope that progress over the debts can be made during the talks so that a good atmosphere for the granting of credit for British exports to Uganda can be created.

I understand that there is now no need for the team from our Ministry of Defence, which Mr. Callaghan and I assured you would be available, to go to Uganda to discuss the requirements of the Ugandan Armed Forces for spares for British-supplied military equipment already in their possession. If the list of requirements, which I understand your authorities have already prepared, could be handed over to the negotiating team, I can assure you that they will be processed swiftly in London.

I look forward to Mr. Hawley's report on his talks in Kampala which I hope will lay the foundation for a new and improved relationship between our two countries which are so closely linked by ties of history and affection.

Yours sincerely

Harold Wilson

His Excellency the President of the Republic of Uganda,  
El Hajji Field Marshal Idi Amin Dada, VC, DSO, MC.



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

12 September 1975

*For Mr Wright*

Anglo-Ugandan Relations

During his talks in Kampala with President Amin in July Mr. Callaghan undertook to despatch an official delegation to Uganda to discuss Anglo-Ugandan relations and, in particular, the questions of compensation for British property, trade and credit, and spare parts for British military equipment in the possession of the Ugandan armed forces. Negotiations about these talks have at Ugandan insistence been conducted through the Zairian Foreign Minister. This has been a complicated and time-consuming exercise, but it has now been accepted that talks will begin in Kampala in the week beginning 15 September.

From the informal discussions between our Acting High Commissioner in Kampala and the Ugandan Acting Foreign Minister it has become clear that the Ugandans are moving away from the position agreed between President Amin and Mr. Callaghan. They are now calling into question our good faith over the negotiations on the grounds that we are insisting on progress over compensation before any arrangements on trade questions agreed upon at the talks can be implemented (we have long insisted on a solution of the compensation problem as a pre-requisite for any normalisation of relations). They have also indicated that they will wish to raise the question of a general renewal of British arms supplies to Uganda. This goes well beyond what Mr. Callaghan agreed with President Amin and the position outlined by the Prime Minister in his letter of 25 June. We cannot consider substantive discussion of a renewal of arms sales. Killings in Uganda continue although on a lower rate and we would come under severe criticism both in this country and from our friends in Africa and Europe if we were to lift the embargo (which has never been openly announced nor communicated to the Ugandans).

/These

Patrick Wright, Esq.,  
10 Downing Street,  
London S.W.1.

CONFIDENTIAL



These difficulties may, if they are not resolved, make it impossible for us to send the delegation to Uganda. However, if the talks do get under way, we consider that there is a good chance that while they may not lead to any dramatic results, they will be conducted in a responsible way and mark the beginning of a more realistic relationship with Uganda.

In view of all this we consider that it would be worthwhile if our desire for the success of the talks were to be made clear to President Amin and if at the same time he were to be left in no doubt of what we consider the scope of the talks to be. This might be best done by means of a personal letter to President Amin. Although it was Mr. Callaghan who set up the talks, all the communications addressed to Amin over the Hills affair were sent by the Prime Minister. We therefore recommend that he should send a letter which the leader of the official delegation would carry with him.

I accordingly attach a draft letter from the Prime Minister to President Amin. If it is agreed we hope it may be possible for us to have it back here by this afternoon.

*Rose Tobey*

*sp.* (R.N. Dales)

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

8507 D.073939 200M 11/74 Cr.P.C. Gp.839/3

Registry  
No.

**DRAFT** LETTER

Type 1 +

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret.  
Secret.  
Confidential.  
Restricted.  
Unclassified.

To:-

HE The President of the  
Republic of Uganda  
El Hajji Field Marshal  
Idi Amin Dada

FROM

THE PRIME MINISTER

Telephone No. Ext.

Department

PRIVACY MARKING

..... In Confidence

VC DOMC

~~Mr President~~

I am pleased that the official talks on compensation and trade matters which Mr Callaghan discussed with you his visit to Kampala on 10 July are due to start on 15 September. It is my hope, and I know it is yours, that these will eventually lead to a normalisation in the relations between our two countries.

The official team will be led by Mr Donald Hawley CMG MBE, a most experienced Under Secretary in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. He will, of course, be advised by Mr Hennessy with whom you are accustomed to deal.

As you know, my Government's major concern is the payment of compensation to British subjects of both European and Asian origins whose property was expropriated in Uganda under Decrees 27 and 32 of 1972, as subsequently amended. You know, I think, that we regard a degree of real progress on this problem as essential before relations can be truly normalised.

My officials will also be prepared to discuss trade questions with yours. I understand that the Ugandan side will wish to raise the question of credit terms. We have, of course, put no obstacles in the way of trade with Uganda but the very substantial commercial

/debt

debt in various fields for which the Government of Uganda is responsible has understandably led to caution on the part <sup>of</sup> those exporters who are asked to give credit and <sup>to</sup> their bankers. I very much hope that progress over the debts can be made during the talks so that a good atmosphere for the granting of credit ~~for~~ British exports to Uganda can be created.

I understand that there is now no need for the team from our Ministry of Defence, which Mrs. Callaghan and I assured you would be available, to go to Uganda to discuss the requirements of the Ugandan Armed Forces for spares for British-supplied military equipment already in their possession. If the list of requirements, which I understand your authorities have already prepared, could be handed over to the negotiating team, I can assure you that they will be processed swiftly in London.

I look forward to <sup>hearing</sup> ~~seeing~~ Mr Hawley's report on his talks in Kampala which I hope will lay the foundation for a new and improved relationship between our two countries which are so closely linked by ties of history and affection.

*Dr*

*13*

*13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100*

*12 Stg*



CONFIDENTIAL

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT

PS/75/2  
DS(L) 599

*Departmental Series*

*Office of the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs*

No. 2

Copy No. 02

Visit of  
the Foreign and Commonwealth  
Secretary to Zaire and Uganda

8-10 July, 1975

CONFIDENTIAL

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT**

PS/75/2  
DS(L) 599

*Departmental Series*

*Office of the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs*

No. 2

Visit of  
the Foreign and Commonwealth  
Secretary to Zaire and Uganda

8-10 July, 1975

**CONFIDENTIAL**

## CONTENTS

<i>Document No.</i>		<i>Page</i>
1.	COMPOSITION OF DELEGATION ... ..	3
2.	PROGRAMME ... ..	3
3.	RECORD OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY AND THE ZAIRIAN COMMISSIONER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS ON TUESDAY, 8 JULY, 1975 ... ..	5
4.	KINSHASA TELEGRAM NO. 257 TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE OF 8 JULY, 1975: SECRETARY OF STATE'S VISIT ... ..	7
5.	RECORD OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY AND PRESIDENT MOBUTU ON WEDNESDAY, 9 JULY, 1975 ...	8
6.	KAMPALA TELEGRAM NO. 004 TO KINSHASA OF 9 JULY, 1975: SECRETARY OF STATE'S VISIT ... ..	11
7.	KINSHASA TELEGRAM NO. 2 TO KAMPALA OF 9 JULY, 1975 ... ..	12
8.	EXTRACT FROM AN IMPROMPTU SPEECH MADE BY THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY AT THE ACTING HIGH COMMISSIONER'S RESIDENCE IN KAMPALA ON WEDNESDAY, 9 JULY, 1975 ... ..	12
9.	KINSHASA TELEGRAM NO. 3 TO KAMPALA OF 9 JULY, 1975 ... ..	13
10.	KINSHASA TELEGRAM NO. 260 TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE OF 9 JULY, 1975: HILLS ... ..	13
11.	KAMPALA TELEGRAM NO. 400 TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE OF 9 JULY, 1975: HILLS ... ..	13
12.	RECORD OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY AND PRESIDENT AMIN ON THURSDAY, 10 JULY, 1975 ...	14
13.	KAMPALA TELEGRAM NO. 403 TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE OF 10 JULY, 1975: HILLS ... ..	16
14.	NOTE FOR THE RECORD: MEETING BETWEEN THE FOREIGN AND COMMON- WEALTH SECRETARY AND PRESIDENT AMIN, 10 JULY, 1975 ... ..	16
15.	RECORD OF PRESS CONFERENCE AT ENTEBBE AIRPORT ON THURSDAY, 10 JULY, 1975 ... ..	17
16.	RECORD OF PRESS CONFERENCE AT HEATHROW ON 10 JULY, 1975 ... ..	18

*Document No. 1***COMPOSITION OF THE PARTY**

The Right Hon. James Callaghan, M P	Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary
Mr. A. H. Campbell, C M G	... Deputy Under Secretary
Mr. R. J. Stratton, C M G	... Her Majesty's Ambassador, Kinshasa
Mr. T. McCaffrey	... Head of News Department
Mr. T. McNally	... Political Adviser
Mr. M. K. Ewans	... Head of East African Department
Mr. D. F. Burden	... Head of Claims Department
Mr. R. N. Dales	... Assistant Private Secretary

*Document No. 2***SECRETARY OF STATE'S VISIT TO ZAIRE AND UGANDA  
TUESDAY, 8 JULY, TO THURSDAY, 10 JULY, 1975****PROGRAMME***Tuesday, 8 July, 1975*

0900	Depart Rome (Fiumicino) Airport by RAF VC 10
1502	Arrive Kinshasa. Met by Mr. Bula, Commissioner for Foreign Affairs
	Press Statement
1520	Leave airport accompanied by Mr. Bula
1545	Arrive OAU Village
1745	Leave OAU Village for Ministry of Foreign Affairs
1800	Talks with Mr. Bula
1905	Leave Ministry of Foreign Affairs
1915	Arrive Mr. Reid's house to meet Embassy staff and wives
2000	Supper party given by Mr. Reid
2230	Return to OAU Village

**CONFIDENTIAL**

*Wednesday, 9 July, 1975*

0820	Leave OAU Village
0830	Breakfast with President Mobuto
0955	Statement to Press
1000	Leave Presidential Palace
1010	Arrive Her Majesty's Ambassador's residence
1030	Leave for Airport
1105	Take off from Kinshasa, accompanied by Mr. Bula
1545	Arrive Entebbe. Met by Lt.-Col. Juma Oris, Minister of Foreign Affairs
1630	Arrive High Commission Office Kampala to meet staff
1655	Arrive Residence
1845	Joint Acting High Commissioner's Reception for the British Community
	Impromptu address to the British Community
2000	Leave Reception
2115	Dinner given by Ugandan Government at International Hotel
2245	After dinner talks in restricted session with Ugandan Ministers 5th Floor of International Hotel

*Thursday, 10 July, 1975*

0100	End of talks
0115-0145	Delegation meeting at Residence
1010	Leave for President Amin's Command Post
1015	Arrive Command Post
1045	Meet President Amin
[1130 approx	Mr. Denis Hills brought to Command Post and "handed over" to Mr. Callaghan]
[1145	Mr. Hills leaves with Acting High Commissioner for High Commission office]
[1200	Mr. Hills meets Mrs. Hills at High Commission]
1210	Leave with President Amin for tour of Kampala and drive to Entebbe
[1215	Mr. and Mrs. Hills leave for Entebbe with Acting High Commissioner]
[1300	Mr. and Mrs. Hills arrive State House, Entebbe. Thereafter programme as for Secretary of State]
1325	Arrive State House, Entebbe
1340	Arrive Entebbe Airport
1345	Press Conference
1410	Take off for London
2020	Arrive Heathrow Press Conference

4. Mr. Bula thought that it was important that from the airport Mr. Callaghan should go to the High Commission for a talk with Mr. Hennessy. This would be perfectly normal and would allow Mr. Callaghan to get a report of the situation on the ground. *Mr. Callaghan* referred to a telegram he had just received which suggested that the Ugandan Foreign and Home Affairs Ministers would come to the airport and would expect to have a preliminary discussion with him. *Mr. Bula* thought this would be a formal reception and purely a courtesy.

5. *Mr. Callaghan* reverted to the problem of President Amin's frequent change of mind. *Mr. Bula* said he understood Mr. Callaghan's scepticism. He thought that recent events had been the result of Amin's sensitivity to the British Press and to the admission of Ugandan refugees. *Mr. Callaghan* explained that no Ugandan had been given political asylum in Britain; those in Britain had been admitted under normal immigration arrangements. He remarked on his lack of control of the British Press. *Mr. Bula* said that all this had been explained to President Amin and there was no problem now. When Mr. Callaghan mentioned the bad treatment Mr. Hennessy had received at Amin's hands, Mr. Bula suggested that this was the sort of problem which should be left to the Zairians. It was important to forget the past. *Mr. Callaghan* emphasised that Britain had gone to the limit over the Hills case; there could be no repetition.

6. *Mr. Bula* asked if Britain was ready to restore normal relations with Uganda. *Mr. Callaghan* explained that he was not yet ready to have normal relations with Uganda. The wounds had been too deep and time was now needed for them to recover. On the commercial side there was nothing to prevent normal trade going ahead. However, in the case of the Crown Agents arrangements would have to be made to settle the Ugandan debt before new orders could be undertaken. *Mr. Bula* said that President Amin had alleged that Britain refused to supply hospital equipment which was urgently needed. *Mr. Callaghan* strongly refuted this and pointed out that he knew from Mrs. Callaghan that the Great Ormond Street Hospital had recently supplied urgently needed equipment. However, one result of Amin's recent actions was that doctors and nurses were no longer ready to go to Uganda to work. This was an indication of the extent of the damage. Answering a question from Mr. Bula Mr. Callaghan said there was nothing Zaire could do about this; only Amin could settle the problem by action. Mere words of guarantee were worth nothing. *Mr. Bula* suggested that Zaire should be a mediator on these matters. They had understanding of colonial problems and had had their own difficulties with the Belgians. He referred to the United Kingdom's moral responsibility to help Uganda. *Mr. Callaghan* pointed to the fact that out of all the ex-colonies it was only with Uganda that Britain faced such problems.

7. Mr. Callaghan mentioned the importance to Britain of obtaining compensation for the Ugandan Asians and others dispossessed. He was willing to send a small team to discuss compensation if the Zairians thought this advisable. President Amin had said in a message to the Prime Minister of 10 April that he was now ready for discussions. *Mr. Bula* suggested that while such discussions of compensation were continuing normal trade, including credit, should be allowed to continue. *Mr. Callaghan* said there was no problem over normal trade, but Uganda could not expect credit while she had such debts outstanding. *Mr. Bula* asked about spare parts for military vehicles, and *Mr. Callaghan* replied that he was willing to arrange for a visiting team to pursue this also. *Mr. Bula* asked whether a small team could go to Uganda to discuss trade and credit. In subsequent discussion it was suggested that the Crown Agents would perhaps be the most appropriate organisation to provide a team in the first instance.

*Mr. Callaghan* explained that in spite of their title, the Crown Agents were an independent commercial organisation. But he would be willing to suggest to them that they send a team.

8. *Mr. Bula* again emphasised Zaire's readiness to help and thought that it would be better for the time being if she continued as mediator. *Mr. Callaghan* asked why *Mr. Bula* thought that Amin would keep his word. *Mr. Bula* replied that Amin would be OAU Chairman for 12 to 18 months. He would keep his word for fear of affronting Africa and President Mobutu in particular. *Mr. Callaghan* asked whether President Mobutu would be prepared to give a public assurance about the future of British subjects in Uganda. *Mr. Bula* thought not. *Mr. Callaghan* asked what he should do therefore when in Kampala he explained to Britons that he had President Mobutu's word that all was well and the Britons pointed out that President Mobutu was in Zaire not Uganda. *Mr. Bula* said there would be no more trouble. Amin now had too much at stake.

9. *Mr. Callaghan* then mentioned that Amin had made a practice of berating *Mr. Hennessy* at audiences attended by Press and television. Britain could not accept this behaviour. If it happened again the High Commission would be withdrawn. *Mr. Bula* advised against raising this matter with President Amin. This was a matter to be left in Zairian hands. Perhaps arrangements could be made to ensure that *Mr. Hennessy* kept in close touch with the Zairian Government through the British Ambassador in Kinshasa. *Mr. Callaghan* mentioned that he would be seeking assurances about consular access to those Britons who might be arrested in future. *Mr. Bula* thought that this was normal.

10. *Mr. Callaghan* said that in conclusion he wanted to emphasise to the Zairian side that when he visited Kampala there could be no love-feast. He would be polite and courteous but there would be no warmth. It would take some time before any warmth could be restored to relations. Britain would have to see how things went but with Zaire's help there could perhaps be an improvement. He was however sceptical. How for instance would *Mr. Bula* deal with a man who sent a message to The Queen, saying that he would be arriving on a particular date and asking Her to ensure that he got enough food and could visit Wales and Scotland whose people he supported in their fight against the English? *Mr. Bula* said he could hardly comment!

11. As *Mr. Callaghan* was leaving *Mr. Bula* again emphasised the importance of establishing machinery to keep the High Commission in Kampala in close touch with the Embassy in Kinshasa so that the Zairians could be kept informed about any problems being experienced in Uganda.

*Document No. 4*

**KINSHASA TELEGRAM No. 257 OF 8 JULY, 1975, TO FOREIGN  
AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE: SECRETARY OF STATE'S VISIT**

Following from Private Secretary.

The following points emerged from Secretary of State's meeting this evening with Zaire Foreign Minister:

- (a) In spite of the Secretary of State's expressed scepticism the Minister remained confident that Amin genuinely wished to establish normal relations with the British.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

2. *President Mobutu* said that naturally the present situation had to take account of the past. He for his part would try to help in building the future. He wanted to explain why he had intervened in this affair. It was entirely by accident. General Amin had planned a visit to Zaire at the beginning of June which had to be put off. He had had to put him off again in mid-June and eventually at the end of June when he said he wanted to come *President Mobutu* felt obliged to agree. After they had had several hours conversation about bilateral relations, he had taken General Amin off on a fishing expedition. It was during this expedition that he felt he ought to take the opportunity to raise the question of Hills. It had taken him an hour's argument before Amin would agree to reprieve Hills. No doubt an important element in Amin's attitude was the support he had had from Zaire alone among African countries when he first came to power. However, he had been surprised when Amin had said that he would reprieve Hills provided that *President Mobutu* would occupy himself with all points of difference between Britain and Uganda. *President Mobutu* said he had plenty to do for his own country but nevertheless thought it was his duty to agree to this request. He felt that deep in his heart General Amin was still very pro-British. Everything about him was British and he seemed genuinely to want rapprochement. Perhaps there was some analogy with the relationship between Belgium and Zaire.

3. The *President* went on to say that he had agreed that his State Commissioner, M. Bula, should go to Kampala in order that he could put proposals to Amin for improving Anglo-Ugandan relations. Was it true as he had read in the Press, that Uganda owed Britain £21 million? *Mr. Callaghan* said that the right figure was £20 million for commercial debts and £8 million State debt. *President Mobutu* said that Zaire owed five times as much to Belgium; indeed it would be 30 times as much if you took into account certain claims made by the Belgians. Yet he had recently received the Belgian Minister of Commerce and had had a friendly letter from the Belgian King. It was surely a moral responsibility of Great Britain to help Uganda? *Mr. Callaghan* said that there were responsibilities on both sides. *President Mobutu* said that there was more moral responsibility on the part of Britain. The Ugandans alleged that Britain had failed to send necessary hospital supplies. *Mr. Callaghan* said that this was not true. We had in fact given supplies. As to our general relationship with our ex-colonial territories we had no serious difficulty except in the case of Uganda. Unfortunately we had now got to the point where British nationals were just not ready to go out to Uganda for commercial business. He had never prevented anybody from going. We had in fact supplied a good deal of equipment to Uganda. We were carrying out orders for 5-ton lorries and Land Rovers. There were Land Rover spares almost ready for delivery. We had quoted for patrol boats and communications equipment. We had offered to take over responsibility for pensions for ex-Colonial Service Officers. However as long as our people did not feel safe in Uganda it would not be possible to get back to normal relations. General Amin's attitude to the British nationals in Uganda was a key factor.

4. *Mr. Callaghan* went on to say that he would like to give *President Mobutu* one example of our experience with General Amin over one of the contentious questions between us, i.e. compensation. In September 1973 General Amin told the previous British Government that he would not pay compensation until the Prime Minister visited Uganda. After the British election in 1974 a senior official was sent out to Uganda in the latter part of that year in order to talk about compensation. Almost immediately after that General Amin ordered a cut in our High Commission down to five people. This temporarily put an end to the prospect



of talks on the subject of compensation. In December 1974 we had sent a Note to the Ugandan Government enquiring by what channels the question of compensation could be pursued. In February 1975 General Amin sent an insulting reply to this Note but ended by saying that he would like to talk about compensation. We then said that we would be prepared to send a delegation to Uganda for this purpose but there was no reply to our offer. Then in April 1975 General Amin said that he would be prepared to pay cash. A week later he said that the issue was closed and there was no question of paying anything. The following month he said that the question could be opened again if the Prime Minister would come to Uganda. This summary of events illustrated the extraordinary methods adopted by General Amin with which we found it impossible to cope. We had never experienced anything quite like this. Could the President advise us how to act?

5. *President Mobutu* said that he certainly intended to help though he would need Mr. Callaghan's help too. He had taken careful note of what Mr. Callaghan had said both about the British community and about the outstanding questions. He would take account of all this when giving instructions to the State Commissioner who would be going to Kampala. In his view, the situation should be tackled in two stages. First it was necessary to settle the Hills affair. There could be no question of bargaining over this or mixing up this question with other matters such as the supply of equipment, etc. *Mr. Callaghan* said that he fully agreed. *President Mobutu* said that thereafter once this question was settled it would be possible to consider some machinery for dealing with the other questions. The first possibility would be a mixed committee to consider all these questions. *Mr. Callaghan* agreed. We must close the old chapter before we could start on the new one. Once the old chapter was closed we should certainly try in good faith to embark on a new and better relationship. But we must remember that public opinion in the United Kingdom had been much inflamed about the Hills case. We should have to go gently and slowly at first. *President Mobutu* agreed. *Mr. Callaghan* said that he would be ready to send a team of experts to look at the requirements for spares for Saladins and Saracens. He would also consider sending a team to look into the question of the commercial debt. Possibly the Crown Agents would be willing to send somebody out for discussions about their outstanding business. But all this must be done quietly and without fuss. General Amin must stop shouting from the roof tops. *President Mobutu* said that he accepted this. The State Commissioner would have this point in mind in preparing for Mr. Callaghan's visit. *Mr. Callaghan* said that he had full confidence in President Mobutu and the State Commissioner but he was bound to express some scepticism about the lasting effect of their interventions with General Amin. It was because General Amin was so changeable in his attitudes that our British traders and other Britons who might go and work in Uganda had become so apprehensive. *President Mobutu* said that he was confident that this time all would be well. At any rate he would do his best.

6. *Mr. Callaghan* said that there was another point which he ventured to raise which was the treatment of our Acting High Commissioner in Kampala. General Amin had several times sent for our Acting High Commissioner and had then proceeded to berate him in public in front of TV cameras. The next time that this happened would be the last time because he had decided that if there were any further incidents of this kind he would withdraw the High Commission. *President Mobutu* said that the State Commissioner would deal with this question also.

7. *Mr. Callaghan* said that he would provide the State Commissioner with a paper summarising the position about the various outstanding questions between us and the Ugandans in order that he might have the facts. But first, as the President had already said, the Hills question must be got out of the way. If he were able to take Hills back with him to England, British public opinion would understand if he then were to try to improve relations with Uganda, but if not any improvement would be out of the question. *President Mobutu* said that he entirely understood. These were two quite separate questions. There was the question of Hills which was a question of human life and liberty. There was no question of mixing this up with other questions such as spare parts, etc. *Mr. Callaghan* asked whether we could be sure that General Amin would accept this way of looking at it. *President Mobutu* said that that was what the State Commissioner would have to arrange in Kampala. He was confident that Hills would be allowed to go with *Mr. Callaghan* the following day, and it would be desirable for him to do so even if he wished later to return to Uganda. If he did return to Uganda he could do so under guarantee from Zaire. *Mr. Callaghan* said that he agreed that the best plan would be for Hills to leave with him the following day. If he did not the case would continue to embitter Anglo-Ugandan relations. He wanted the President to know that Hills was an eccentric not a spy.

8. *President Mobutu* said that he wished to send his best wishes to Her Majesty The Queen. He, his wife and his entourage had the most vivid recollections of the warm welcome they had received from The Queen and members of the Royal Family when he made his State Visit in 1972. *Mr. Callaghan* said that he would certainly convey this message to The Queen who often spoke of President Mobutu's visit. There was no doubt that it had a marked effect in England. He would like to invite the State Commissioner to visit England and when he got back to London he would propose a date. *President Mobutu* said that he was grateful for this invitation which he was sure that the State Commissioner would be very glad to accept. After he had been to England he would try to get *Mr. Callaghan* to pay a visit to Zaire when he could see the great dam at Inga and other large projects in the country.

*Document No. 6*

**KAMPALA TELEGRAM No. 004 OF 9 JULY, 1975, TO KINSHASA :  
SECRETARY OF STATE'S VISIT**

Oseku telephoned this morning to say Secretary of State accompanied by Zairian Foreign Minister would be arriving Entebbe at 2 p.m. repeat 2 p.m. local time (1100 hrs Z).

2. Juma Oris would meet party at airport and then take Zairian Foreign Minister to report to Amin on Kinshasa discussions. He would return to Kampala for talks with Secretary of State at 7 p.m. local time. Two other Ministers would be present. Discussions would continue until dinner, which Juma Oris is offering Secretary of State and his party, at 9.30 p.m. local time at International Hotel.

3. Please confirm by flash Tel. E.T.A. Entebbe

**CONFIDENTIAL**

*Document No. 7***KINSHASA TELEGRAM No. 2 OF JULY, 1975, TO KAMPALA**

Secretary of State left Kinshasa for Kampala 1023 Z. Foreign Minister and party of three are accompanying him. E.T.A. Kampala 1238 Z.

*Document No. 8***EXTRACT FROM AN IMPROMPTU SPEECH MADE BY THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY AT THE ACTING HIGH COMMISSIONER'S RESIDENCE IN KAMPALA ON WEDNESDAY, 9 JULY, 1975, ON THE OCCASION OF A RECEPTION FOR THE BRITISH COMMUNITY**

What I do want you all to know is that there is a very great understanding at home of the situation which you confront. I do not think there is so much understanding of the fact that many of you have made your own choice and you know why you have made your own choice. And you are to be admired for making that choice. Nevertheless some of you have asked me a lot of questions in private this evening and I think you will understand that because we have the Press here it would be improper for me to answer in public.

Nevertheless I do want to say this to you. I understand and indeed feel to some extent the close link that exists between the people of Uganda and many of you. I had the good fortune nearly 20 years ago to come here for the first time. I have been here since although not since independence. My last visit was in 1961 and I had the wonderful experience of going up the mountains and seeing the tremendous scenic beauty of this country.

When you are dealing between States there is a different relationship from the one that exists between people. You may love each other. You may wish to work for the Ugandan people. I believe that the Ugandan people wish to work with you and to be friends with Britain. There is only one principle that must exist between States and Governments and that is this. That relations between States and Governments must be based on mutual respect for each other. No Government can behave in a different way if it wants good relations with its neighbour. Now I am here for only one day and leave at midday tomorrow. I have brought with me, and I am grateful to him for coming, the Foreign Minister of Zaire. I had breakfast this morning with the President of Zaire, to whom I am grateful for his intervention and for his help. And I hope that before I leave tomorrow we shall have some clear understanding of the future relations that are going to exist between us. This is my purpose. This is my intention. I know that many of you will approach it from a different sense of responsibility than the responsibility that I have for the British people. I only want to say this to anybody who may be listening to us tonight. The British community and the British people never fight harder than when the odds are against them and when the going is hardest. I think that is why some of you are here—you can't resist it. I always said we are a little mad, but thank you very much for coming to meet me this evening. I want you to know that your problems will not be forgotten. You will recognise the limits within which they can be dealt with. You will feel, as I do, that our High Commissioner here has done everything that he could.

[Applause] I am sure that round of applause is the best thanks that he could have for his work. We have given him a tough assignment. I have already expressed my gratitude to him. I would like to thank everyone in Zambia—in Uganda—it could be Zambia as well as Uganda, I move around such a lot, everybody in Zambia and Uganda to know that I have complete confidence in our Acting High Commissioner here.

*Document No. 9*

**KINSHASA TELEGRAM No. 3 OF 9 JULY, 1975, TO KAMPALA**

Secretary of State accepts dinner offered by Juma Oris, on condition that it is strictly a working dinner and that there are no Press, TV, and radio photographers present either before, during, or after dinner.

*Document No. 10*

**KINSHASA TELEGRAM No. 260 OF 9 JULY, 1975, TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE: HILLS**

Secretary of State would like you to make a contingency plan in case he is able to bring Hills back with him to England from Kampala. Probably relatives or friends can be warned in time to meet him on arrival but in case not please make a plan for him to be suitably met and book a hotel room for a couple of nights. Hotel should not of course be booked in Hills's name and no indication should be given that Hills may come back with the Secretary of State.

*Document No. 11*

**KAMPALA TELEGRAM No. 400 OF 9 JULY, 1975, TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE: HILLS**

Secretary of State and party had a two-hour meeting after dinner tonight with Ugandan team headed by Foreign Minister Juma Oris. Zairian Foreign Minister Bula was present.

2. Bula started by saying that Mobutu's view was that Hills was no longer a problem: Amin would take his "big decision" tomorrow. The present meeting should exchange views on the subsequent United Kingdom/Ugandan relationship. Secretary of State made it clear that there were still matters to be settled "in closing the existing chapter". These were:

- (a) The precise decision about Hills: if he were to be kept in prison the chapter would not be closed.
- (b) The other two "British spies".
- (c) Reassurances for the British community.
- (d) Treatment of the British High Commissioner.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

3. Juma Oris launched into a harangue about the iniquities of the British media. Secretary of State made it clear that he was not prepared to comment on or discuss any question of the censorship of the British Press. Bula expatiated helpfully over Zairian problems with the Belgian Press. Bula and Ugandans tried to insist that there was "no problem" over the British community. Secretary of State disagreed: the British community were under stress and reassurances were required.

4. Ugandans also mentioned question of trade, by which they appeared to mean refusal by British firms to grant credit facilities. Secretary of State said that official and commercial indebtedness had also to be considered: he was willing to send teams to continue dialogue on compensation and to discuss spare parts for military equipment.

5. At conclusion of the meeting Bula said he would be briefing Amin at 9.30 tomorrow morning and that Secretary of State would be invited to audience with Amin at about 9.45 or 10.00 a.m.

6. This was not an easy meeting. Bula was altogether too glib in assuring us that there were "no problems" and it was clear that Ugandans had no Presidential authority to give any firm assurances, either over Hills or on other matters. The Secretary of State made it clear that without such assurances, he was not prepared to give any ground.

*Document No. 12*

**RECORD OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY AND PRESIDENT AMIN AT 10.30 a.m. ON 10 JULY, 1975, AT THE COMMAND POST, KAMPALA**

Present:

The Right Hon. James Callaghan, M P	President Amin
Mr. J. P. I. Hennessy, C M G, O B E	Citoyen Mandungu Bula Nyati, Zairian
Mr. A. H. Campbell, C M G	State Commissioner for Foreign
Mr. T. McNally	Affairs
Mr. T McCaffrey	Maj. Juma Oris Minister for Foreign
	Affairs
	Minister of Interior
	Minister for Cabinet Affairs
	Chief of Staff

After opening courtesies *President Amin* embarked on a 35-minute rigmarole couched in moderate terms but covering most of the complaints he had made about the British over the last year or so. He started with tributes to President Mobutu and Kenyatta describing both of them as brothers whom he loved and respected. He said that he had asked President Mobutu to offer mediation in this situation rather than Kenyatta because it was President Mobutu who had been the first African Head of State to help him after he took power in 1971. He was extremely grateful to President Mobutu for giving him good advice and particularly for sending Commissioner Bula to explain that advice personally. He fully accepted President Mobutu's views.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

2. He went on to say that he had always been a warm admirer of Britain and everything British. The British people had educated him and trained him. This was why he had been particularly pained by the criticism of the British Press and radio who had mounted a campaign against him ever since 1972. They had criticised him for his economic war to rid the Ugandans of control by Asians. How would Britain like it if her economy was run by Jews? However, although he resented very much the activities of certain journalists and broadcasters such as David Martin he did not hold anything against the British as a people. In fact he wanted more British to come to Uganda. They were very good people who loved Uganda and they need have no fear for their safety. In future if any of them got into trouble or he wanted to get rid of them he would invite the High Commissioner to come and talk privately about the question; they could be asked to leave the country without fuss. As for the High Commissioner he thought very highly indeed of Mr. Hennessy and had no intention of treating him badly. He would ensure that he would be treated with dignity and not molested by the television unless he had given permission for this.

3. As regards compensation there had been much trouble and confusion about this but he wanted to make it clear that compensation would be paid. As to other outstanding questions he did not wish to enter into details since these had already been discussed between Mr. Callaghan and Mr. Bula. He wanted some British equipment and spare parts. If he could not get what he wanted from the British he could get it from the Russians or the Chinese but he did not want this. He would like to ask Mr. Callaghan for his comments before going any further. *Mr. Callaghan* then made a brief reply in which he echoed President Amin's tributes to President Mobutu. He said that he had noted with pleasure the sentiments expressed by President Amin towards the British and he wanted to make it clear that Britain for her part certainly would like to improve relations with Uganda. We had very friendly feelings towards the Ugandans. But we must recognise that for a number of reasons relations between our two Governments had lately been bad. They had got to a very low ebb and it was certainly desirable to improve them. He would be willing to play his part provided that we could satisfactorily close the old chapter. The main object of his visit was to try to settle the question of Mr. Hills. He was not clear what decision President Amin had reached about this case. *President Amin* said that he would do what he said he would do about Mr. Hills. That is to say, he would release him to Mr. Callaghan and he could return to London with him. *Mr. Callaghan* said he was grateful for this magnanimous gesture. This foreshadowed a new chapter in Anglo/Ugandan relations. *President Amin* asked whether Mr. Callaghan did not have some other points such as those mentioned on the previous evening to his Ministers. But he did not himself wish to go into detail about these unless Mr. Callaghan wished. *Mr. Callaghan* said that some of the points had already been covered by what the President had already said. Now we are ready to play our part in trying to make progress in restoring Anglo/Ugandan relations. We should be ready to send officials to visit Uganda for various purposes already agreed. However we must make progress step by step and not think that we shall be able at once to enter a new era in which there would be fully restored friendship between us. We must go slowly and gently in trying to open this new chapter.

4. At this point Mr. Hills was ushered into the room and after greeting President Amin was presented to Mr. Callaghan. He looked decidedly shaken and dazed and obviously had been given no idea in advance of what awaited him, or indeed what was going on. In shaking hands with Mr. Callaghan he said that he recognised him from photographs but it was clear from his manner that he had not known in advance that the Secretary of State was in Uganda.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

5. Subsequent conversations at the President's residence next door over refreshments did not add anything significant. After that the President took Mr. Callaghan in his own car to State House at Entebbe and on the way indulged in a long monologue which is being separately recorded.

*Document No. 13*

**KAMPALA TELEGRAM No. 403 OF 10 July, 1975, TO FOREIGN AND  
COMMONWEALTH OFFICE : HILLS**

Secretary of State had a meeting with President Amin this morning at the command post at which Anglo/Ugandan relations and other matters were discussed. Amin agreed to release Hills to Mr. Callaghan and former was produced in the course of the meeting. Hills will be travelling with the Secretary of State's Party back to London.

2. Secretary of State is now having short private discussion with Amin on the way to Entebbe airport and party are expected to leave Entebbe airport at approximately 1030 hrs. Z.

*Document No. 14*

**NOTE FOR THE RECORD : MEETING BETWEEN THE FOREIGN AND  
COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY AND PRESIDENT AMIN OF  
UGANDA IN KAMPALA, 10 JULY, 1975**

Following their meeting at the Command Post President Amin took Mr. Callaghan for a drive round Kampala before going on to State House Entebbe. No one else was present; President Amin drove the car.

2. The drive included a visit to the Kabaka's Tomb where Mr. Callaghan was met by the Kabaka's surviving wives, who greeted him on their knees. President Amin and Mr. Callaghan then removed their shoes and together entered the Tomb through a low door which required both to stoop low. President Amin also drove Mr. Callaghan past the Conference Centre built for the OAU meeting and other prestige buildings. During the course of this drive President Amin delivered a monologue which, with frequent interruptions as President Amin pointed out the sights the Secretary of State should see, included the following points.

3. President Amin wanted Mr. Callaghan to know that he and President Kenyatta were the only two genuine non-Communist leaders in Africa and Britain should help both with the supply of arms. He had told President Kenyatta of the attempts that had been made on his life by the Russians and Chinese. President Kenyatta was his best friend. President Nyerere was also a good friend but he was a Communist. Presidents Kaunda, Nyerere and Seretse Khama had forfeited the respect of other Africans because of their co-operation with South Africa in its attempt to maintain white rule in Rhodesia and southern Africa. He (Amin) on the other hand would shortly be appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Liberation Armies. Mr. Callaghan should however tell Sir Seretse that now that Hills was released Sir Seretse should make arrangements to attend the OAU Summit.

**CONFIDENTIAL**



President Amin said that the dispute between Iran and Iraq had been solved following his visit to Iraq and he thought that he could similarly solve the Arab/Israeli dispute. He wanted to get in touch with the Israelis through secret channels through the British for he had full information on Arab intentions which would enable the Israelis to be assured of their safety. President Amin asked Mr. Callaghan to tell Dr. Kissinger that the Americans were regarded as friends in Uganda and should re-open their embassy in Kampala.

4. Mr. Callaghan was not required to comment on any of this. When President Amin turned to improving Anglo/Ugandan relations he told Mr. Callaghan that he had established a Commission to handle all aspects of relations. This would be chaired by Mr. Nsnekanabo, the Minister of Public Services and Cabinet Affairs, and include the Acting Minister of Finance, Mr. Oboth-Ofumbi, and the Minister of Home Affairs. The Commission would operate without publicity and there would be no attempt to force the pace of improvement in relations. Mr. Callaghan should send officials to meet the Commission. The Acting British High Commissioner should see the Chairman of the Commission to make arrangements. Mr. Callaghan agreed that teams of officials would go to Uganda to discuss compensation for British citizens, trade and credit terms and spare parts for military equipment. Mr. Callaghan also agreed to consider sending officials to discuss help with the provision of teachers and technical training.

5. President Amin repeated his assurances that he wanted the British to remain in Uganda. Indeed he wanted more Britons to go there since Uganda had a great need for their skills. In particular he wanted more British lecturers at Makerere University. He referred to the fact that the numbers of Protestant missionaries were being reduced and he thought it important that a balance should be maintained with Roman Catholics and Moslems. He wanted the Christian Missionary Society to stay in Uganda.

6. On arrival at State House, Entebbe, President Amin took the Secretary of State on a short tour of the gardens, during which he pointed out the various shrubs and flowers which had been planted in honour of members of the British Royal Family.

*Document No. 15*

**PRESS CONFERENCE AT ENTEBBE AIRPORT, 10 JULY, 1975**

Introducing Mr. Hills, Mr. Callaghan said Mr. Hills was feeling a little fatigued and naturally was feeling some emotion.

*Mr. Hills:* I would like to say how genuinely I have loved Uganda during my 12 years here, and still do. As you can see for yourselves it is a very beautiful country, and I am very sorry that I am leaving Uganda but I will never forget this country and the kindness of the people and my pleasure in teaching Ugandan students.

Mr. Hills to Mrs. Hills: You look after yourself.

Mr. Callaghan was asked what agreements have been reached. *Mr. Callaghan* said: The President has made a gesture of magnanimity. He did not wish to bargain and no one wished to enter into a bargain over Mr. Hills. And Mr. Hills has been released to me, indeed the Minister has just given me his passport which I will hand back to him at London—he is accompanying me to London.



*Question:* President Amin had made some demands earlier. Can you comment on whether any agreement was reached on any of those requests?

*Mr. Callaghan:* Discussions between the President and myself are confidential and will so remain as normal, between Ministers of different Governments.

*Question:* Is there any bar to giving spare parts or substantive aid to Uganda?

*Mr. Callaghan:* These are confidential matters between Governments. I would like to just first of all express my thanks to President Amin. He has expressed a very sincere desire for an improvement in relations between Uganda and Britain and his action today foreshadows an improvement in those relations. That I have told him, and he accepts it as I accept his desire that our relations should be improved. On the question of the two persons who claimed to be British spies he has told me that in the general amnesty they have been released and have now left Uganda.

On the question of the future of the British community in Uganda President Amin has said that he would like them to remain and is very anxious and glad to have their assistance to his country. And I have told him that from my personal conversations with them that those I have spoken to who are working here love the people of Uganda and wish to stay here and work in security.

So I think this has been a good day's work. If we can improve Anglo-Ugandan relations as a result of what has happened, as a result of the good start we have made today, then that will be for the benefit of the British people as well as for the benefit of the people of Uganda. I would like to express my thanks to you all for your understanding during this period and for the assistance that you have rendered to us all.

Questioned about the future of Mr. Hills' book "The White Pumpkin", he said it was not for him to answer. "I do not censor books".

*Question:* Are there any future talks planned?

*Mr. Callaghan:* Yes, there are future talks planned. They are at an official level and we shall build on what has happened today and try to see what accommodations we can come to.

*Document No. 16*

**PRESS CONFERENCE AT HEATHROW AIRPORT, 10 JULY, 1975, ON  
ARRIVAL FROM KAMPALA**

*Mr. Callaghan:* We have brought him home safe and sound. That's the main object of the mission and that's what we have done. It has been a long ordeal for Mr. Hills—a three months' ordeal—since he was first arrested, a month since the sentence was passed on him. And I think he needs to be spared a lot of our intrusions at the present time. But he has as Tom McCaffrey said, kindly agreed to answer a few questions and perhaps in a moment you will allow him to say something and as you know his family are waiting and he will go with them. I think what I would like to say is that President Mobutu of Zaire has been a very great assistance in this matter. He kindly sent his Foreign Minister, Mr. Bula, with me, from Zaire, from Kinshasa to Kampala and I there had discussions with him and with the Foreign Minister and other Ministers in President Amin's Government last night. We went on until one o'clock this morning and then Mr. Bula went and saw President Amin and as you now know President Amin agreed to release Mr. Hills into my care.

CONFIDENTIAL

*Mr. Callaghan:* Thank you very much.

*John Bierman:* Mr. Hills, while you were under sentence of death, did you ever believe that you would come out of it alive?

*Mr. Hills:* Well I think I have that veiled quotation about hope springs eternal. But I had accepted the decision and now that the decision has been revoked I am now adjusting to being here which is a new problem for me. I have accepted the punishment and after all having been in the army, I had accepted it.

*Peter Snow:* Don't you think it was a bit foolish to say that President Amin was a village tyrant. What do you think . . . ?

*Mr. Hills:* I think it was unparliamentary language. I regret it now. And some other phrases for which I have in fact expressed my regret in writing to the President.

*Question:* Mr. Hills, are you going ahead with the publication of your book?

*Mr. Hills:* I haven't been in touch with my publishers. I would think so. I might like to revise part of it—or even add to it. I haven't seen my publishers and 98 per cent of my book is very harmless. It is autobiographical.

*Question:* Do you hope, Mr. Hills, that your wife and children in Kampala will join you soon?

*Mr. Hills:* Oh yes. My wife is lecturing at University. She has a duty to finish her contract and I am looking forward to seeing my family in the fairly near future.

*Question:* But you are confident that they will be able to join you again?

*Mr. Hills:* Oh yes, there will be no difficulty at all.

*Mr. Callaghan:* Mr. Hills saw his wife at State House. We arranged with the British High Commission that they should meet before we left on the aircraft this morning. Well look, we have given him a good commercial for his book. I have told him he is bound to have a paperback edition and I think on that note we ought to let him go. His family is waiting. He's still got a three hours' drive. It's for him to say, but as I understand it he doesn't wish to give interviews for the time being. And indeed I think it probably would be wise for him not to go into much detail at the present time but that of course is a decision that he himself will take.

*Question:* . . . remaining Britons in Uganda?

*Mr. Callaghan:* I think they know exactly the position and they will take their own decisions.

*Question:* Are you not going to give them any advice?

*Mr. Callaghan:* There is no need to . . . They are grown up. They have many of them lived there for a long time. I have talked to them and they know exactly what the position is.

*Question:* Can you tell us exactly what happened when Mr. Hills came in and met you this morning, in your own words?

*Answer:* Yes, he came in and bowed to the President. And then the President indicated I was there. He shook hands with me and obviously he wasn't altogether composed. He was extremely tense but he looked up and said, "Mr. Callaghan isn't it?". I said "yes that is right" and I felt a little like Stanley when he said "Dr. Livingstone I presume?".

We owe a debt of gratitude to President Mobutu and to Mr. Bula which I would like to express now. Of course we also are grateful for the magnanimity which President Amin has shown. There have been no concessions made and no secret bargains struck. What we have undertaken to do is what I undertook to do before, namely to send out a team of officials to discuss such questions as the compensation that is owed to British citizens, the terms of credit and commercial indebtedness which exists at the present time and the prospects of future trade and other issues that either side may wish to raise. I ought also to add that on the question I discussed with President Amin the question of the British community, President Amin has made clear to me that he wishes the community to stay there, that he values their presence and indeed that he would like further British citizens to go and work there. I have told him that I would indicate this. The community there of course have made up their own minds about the future. I saw I suppose probably three-quarters of them last night. They travelled in from all the way round Uganda. They only knew I was there 24 hours beforehand. Some of them travelled as much as 300 miles or so in order to come. We had a very good meeting at the High Commissioner's house and I found that they are aware of the situation very fully. They don't need any nannying from anybody. They know what the position is and they know how to make up their own minds about their own decisions. I ought to pay tribute to the work of our Acting High Commissioner. He has been operating with a very small staff. I have complete confidence in him. As I expressed to President Amin. And he will continue with his work and I hope perhaps on a rather better basis than before. Now I think that is all I wish to say at the moment. I will be glad to answer questions after Mr. Hills has said anything he wishes to say and has answered two or three questions. You will no doubt want to ask me more. I have one more thing to do. Before I left Uganda I was given a small memento by the Ugandan authorities which I now proceed to hand to you. Here it is.

*Mr. Hills:* Well, I am a British subject again. I have considered what I wish to say this evening and I made a note or two about it. I am a little bit bewildered of course at the sudden change in my fortunes. I am very glad and happy to be back in England, home. Of course I have been happy in Uganda as a teacher there . . . We have been doing constructive work teaching in Uganda. I like Uganda very much and I hope to go back to Uganda one day. It wouldn't be fair of me to make any sort of criticism of my treatment. It has been perfectly correct according to the prison regulations which are much the same all over the world. And in military custody I was also treated according to the manual of military law which is based on British Army Law and it would really be untrue of me to make a complaint about my treatment by the Ugandan people.

Now I haven't known what has been going on at all, since 1 April. I haven't seen newspapers and have had no information. I now realise what a debt of gratitude I owe the British Government and to all of you who have been helping me to get out of this situation, for which I take responsibility. I should apologise in fact for causing all this trouble but I hope that perhaps something positive may have come out of it, in so far as things have been said no doubt and people have met each other. I am sure in fact that perhaps some good may have come out of this event. Mr. Callaghan, I feel very humble of course to have Mr. Callaghan and Her Majesty—you see this is something which is fantastic for an ordinary British subject who is distressed should get such assistance. And I feel that very deeply and I am proud of my country for having done this.

*Question:* Relations with Uganda?

*Mr. Callaghan:* I think we have got to work at relations with Uganda and there will be a long period of convalescence but this release foreshadows the possibility of improved relations.

*Question:* Can you describe the atmosphere between yourself and General Amin?

*Mr. Callaghan:* Yes, the atmosphere was calm. He told me he thought the mission was going to be a success because I was from Wales. He expounded his philosophy and his thinking to me. I indicated some of my views and then we got down to business.

*Question:* Congratulations for your safe return from considerable danger. Now as General Amin has publicly congratulated Hitler for killing 6 million Jews and admires him greatly, do you really think one can now understand a little bit better the citizens of Rhodesia for not wanting an Idi Amin under any circumstances.

*Mr. Callaghan:* That question is too involved for me to answer at this time of night.

*Question:* Was anything else discussed other than Mr. Hills?

*Mr. Callaghan:* Between the President and myself? No, although we had a long ride to the airport together and we did then discuss a great many questions but he said he wanted that to be a private conversation between us and of course I respect that. He drove me himself in the car and we roamed over a number of subjects that he wanted to talk about. The only actual decision that I have taken is that we should send a team out to discuss the questions I have already outlined.

*Question:* The question of indebtedness is that going to . . .

*Mr. Callaghan:* Yes, that will certainly be taken, that is to say the indebtedness to British companies and of course to British citizens and there is also a Governmental indebtedness.

*Question:* This is in no way personal but do you really think for example that Hitler should have been congratulated for anyone he did not kill?

*Mr. Callaghan:* I am not here to discuss Hitler or anything else. These questions are simply not helpful at the present stage.

*Question:* Aid, is it likely to be increased at all?

*Mr. Callaghan:* Questions of aid don't come up while we are discussing questions of indebtedness.

HILLS: ADVANCE COPIES

1" a.a

259

PS

PS/MR ENNALS

PS/MR HATTERSLEY

PS/MR ROWLANDS

PS/PUS

MR CAMPBELL

MR ASPIN

SIR D TEBBIT

MR HAWLEY

HD/EAD

HD/CONS DEPT

CONS EM UNIT

LEGAL ADVISERS

GIPD (2)

PUSD (2)

HD/PCD

HD/UND

NEWS DEPT

PS NO 10 DOWNING ST

DIO CABINET OFFICE

DIC MOD

DOC MOD

ADVANCE COPY

FLASH

(over)

GRS .425...

CYPHER CAT A

FM ROME 040810Z

CONFIDENTIAL

TO FLASH FCO TELNO.356 OF 4/7/75, INFO FLASH KINSHASA, IMMEDIATE KAMPALA.

KINSHASA TELNO.234: HILLS,

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY.

1. TO CONFIRM MY TELEPHONE CONVERSATION YESTERDAY WITH ALAN CAMPBELL, THE SECRETARY OF STATE WOULD LIKE HIM TO FLY TO KINSHASA TODAY 4 JULY. THE PURPOSE OF THE TRIP WOULD BE TO CONTACT MOBUTU OR HIS FOREIGN MINISTER AND TO ASSESS WHETHER THE SECRETARY OF STATE SHOULD GO TO KINSHASA AND/OR KAMPALA; AND IF SO WHEN.

2. MR CAMPBELL SHOULD TRY TO GET INFORMATION ABOUT:-

(A) TERMS OF CLEMENCY FOR HILLS:

(B) WHETHER AMIN IS WILLING TO LET HILLS LEAVE PREFERABLY BEFORE

ANY VISIT TO UGANDA BY MR CALLAGHAN:

(C) POSITION IN REGARD TO THE TWO ALLEGED SPIES;

(D) WHAT BILATERAL ISSUES AMIN WANTS DISCUSSED AND HOW FAR MOBUTU IS LIKELY TO BE INVOLVED IN THEM.

3. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SEES LITTLE ATTRACTION IN VISITING KAMPALA AND KINSHASA BUT WOULD DO SO NEXT WEEK IF THIS WERE NECESSARY TO CONSOLIDATE FURTHER THE REMOVAL OF THE DEATH SENTENCE OR IF HE KNEW THAT HILLS WOULD BE PERMITTED TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY BEFORE OR NO LATER THAN HIS OWN DEPARTURE FROM UGANDA. ON THE OTHER HAND, AMIN'S PUBLIC UTTERANCES SEEM TO INDICATE THAT HE HAS COOLED OFF A VISIT BY MR CALLAGHAN AND HE WOULD GO TO KAMPALA ONLY IF IT WAS NECESSARY THAT HE SHOULD DO SO IN ORDER TO CARRY OUT THE UNDERTAKING HE GAVE PREVIOUSLY.

4. THE BEST OUTCOME WOULD THEREFORE BE ONE IN WHICH IT COULD BE ESTABLISHED THAT HILLS' LIFE WAS SAFE AND THAT AMIN, FOR WHATEVER REASON, NO LONGER WANTED A VISIT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE. IT MAY THEREFORE BE THAT CAMPBELL'S DISCUSSIONS IN KINSHASA CAN BE REGARDED AS DISCHARGING THE REQUIREMENT TO DISCUSS ANGLO-UGANDAN RELATIONS WITH MOBUTU AND THAT NO FURTHER VISIT OR TALKS WERE CALLED FOR. IF CAMPBELL CAN STEER MATTERS THIS WAY, WELL AND GOOD. OTHERWISE, AFTER CAMPBELL HAS REPORTED AND MADE HIS RECOMMENDATIONS, THE SECRETARY OF STATE WILL WANT TO CONSIDER URGENTLY WHAT SHOULD BE DONE.

5. THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAS SEEN THE TIMETABLE PROPOSED IN YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 186 TO ROME (NOT REPEATED ELSEWHERE). IF THE VISIT TAKES PLACE NEXT WEEK VIA KINSHASA, THE PROPOSALS ARE SATISFACTORY ALTHOUGH IF HE GOES TO KINSHASA HE DOES NOT NOW REGARD THE KENYAN LEG OF THE TRIP AS VITAL. HE WILL IN ANY CASE WISH TO RETURN TO LONDON BY THURSDAY EVENING. YOU WILL BE AWARE OF THE TIMETABLE DIFFICULTIES OVER ANY OTHER DATE BEFORE THE AUTUMN.

6. YOU SHOULD KNOW THAT SOME DAYS AGO I MENTIONED TO SIR MARTIN CHARTERIS THAT THE SECRETARY OF STATE MIGHT WISH TO BE AWAY DURING THE SWEDISH STATE VISIT. HE INDICATED THAT IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES THIS WOULD BE ALL RIGHT, BUT YOU MAY IN THE MEANTIME WISH TO SPEAK TO HIM ONCE MORE AND CONSIDER WHETHER ANY FORMAL NOTIFICATION TO THE PALACE IS REQUIRED.

SECRET



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

20 June, 1975

Prime Minister Kree.

Mr. Peter L.

H

27/6

pe

Uganda

... We have been considering contingency planning in the event of Amin's carrying out his threat to execute Mr. Denis Hills. Mr. Callaghan has not yet seen any of the papers attached below, but the Department envisage the following sequence of events:

... (a) a total breach of diplomatic relations involving the withdrawal of the High Commission in Kampala and the expulsion of the Ugandan mission in London. I attach a telegram which has been despatched to Kampala about this;

... (b) the evacuation of those members of the British community willing to leave Uganda. There are two possibilities here; a civil evacuation and a military evacuation. I attach papers on both. You will see that in practice both civil and military evacuation plans require the cooperation of the Ugandan authorities. An evacuation opposed by the Ugandan authorities would require a large-scale military operation which would take too long to mount, would leak to the Ugandan authorities and almost certainly result in a loss of the lives of many of those it was intended to save;

(c) retaliatory measures; these would be for consideration next week; a paper is in preparation;

(d) action in the U.N. Security Council and in other international organisations. The draft of an approach to the President of the Security Council is already prepared;

(e) the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary would make a statement to the House on Monday afternoon, 23 June. A contingency draft is being prepared.

/I

SECRET



I am copying this letter to Chris Brearley and to Frank Brenchley in the Cabinet Office.

*You. cov.*  
*16-1-77*

(R. N. Dales)

P. R. H. Wright Esq.,  
No. 10



FOR  
COMMS. DEPT.  
USE

Despatched

(Date).....

(Time).....Z

POSTBY .....

PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin).....Z(G.M.T.)

(Restrictive Prefix).....

(Security Class.) CONFIDENTIAL

(Caveat)  
Privacy Marking).....

(Codeword).....

(Deskby).....

TO FLASH KAMPALA  
(precedence) (post)

Tel. No. .... of .....

AND TO (precedence/post) .....

AND SAVING TO .....

ROUTINE NAIROBI  
REPEATED TO (for info) .....

SAVING TO (for info) .....

Distribution :-

HILLS  
DIST.

Copies to :-

[TEXT]

FROM EWANS

YOUR TELNO 257: EVACUATION OF BRITISH COMMUNITY

1. If, as now indicated by Uganda Radio, Hills is executed on Monday, we would wish to be in a position, if Ministers so decide, to announce a break in relations or an intention to withdraw your Mission very shortly thereafter. We think this should be done through a Note to Isingoma of which you would deliver a copy to MFA.
2. In this Note we think we might inform the Ugandans that they have two weeks to get out, in hope that the same treatment would be accorded to your mission and that this would give you some time to help those of the British Community who would also wish to leave Uganda. Although this would not be normal practice, you yourself might,

/if

if permitted, aim to stay for that period, in view of small numbers of your staff. What do you think of this?

3. Also grateful for your advice on what, if anything, should be said in that event to the British Community. We must clearly not leave them without proper advice but should presumably try if possible to avoid saying anything publicly which might appear provocative. Would it be adequate to allow them mostly <sup>to</sup> draw their own conclusions and for you to advise privately those who enquire? *And what should our advice be?*

4. We are considering separately civil and military aircraft availability in case an air lift becomes necessary.

5. Grateful for any further <sup>thoughts</sup> ~~advice~~ you may have ~~on this subject~~ (para 5 of your t.u.r.).

*Send*

*me 20/11*

SECRET

Mr Wigan, EAD

cc: Mr Hellings, Consular Dept  
Mr Cormack

## EVACUATION OF BRITISH COMMUNITY FROM UGANDA

1. As requested by Mr Hellings I have prepared the attached Note for inclusion in your report to the Secretary of State this evening on contingency planning for the above.
2. EAD will wish to consider whether the Secretary of State should be advised as we suggest in the last sentence.
3. A copy of Operation SPARVA (JTP (Africa) No 91) and of Part 1 of the Compendium of SAE plans is available in Defence Department Registry.
4. Your contact in the MOD would be Defence Operations Centre, Commander H M Balfour, Tel No 6717MB, Room MB 5256.

20 June 1975



F H Brown  
Defence Department

SECRET

SERVICES-ASSISTED EVACUATION OF THE  
BRITISH COMMUNITY FROM UGANDA

1. Under the Services-assisted evacuation (SAE) plan (Operation SPARVA) evacuation would be by RAF aircraft (almost certainly VC 10s) deployed from the UK. Evacuees would be flown from Entebbe Airport to Nairobi (the preferred 'safe haven') or alternatively to Kinshasa, by a shuttle service.
2. Once approval of FCO and MOD Ministers to implement the plan has been given, and been promulgated by the Chiefs of Staff, the first aircraft could arrive in Entebbe in 42 hours. The operation would be completed in a further 18 hours. The necessary aircraft are available and the Ministry of Defence are ready to implement the plan.
3. The SAE plan would normally only be implemented should evacuation by civil means be impracticable - for instance, if commercial airlines refused to fly into Entebbe because of disorder.
4. The SAE plan envisages as a possible option the deployment of troops to protect the movement and embarkation of evacuees. The use of such forces even with the consent of the Uganda Government would in our view involve serious risk of general conflict.

20 June 1975

BRITISH HIGH COMMISSION, KAMPALA.

CIVIL CONTINGENCY PLANS

A 1. A copy of the complete plan is attached.

B 2. The numbers and location of persons for whom the High Commission are responsible are given in the attached list. They comprise:

UK Belongers	782
UKPH Asians	80
Irish and Commonwealth	200
	<hr/>
Grand Total	1,062
	<hr/>

3. The action contemplated by the High Commissioner in his civil contingency plan for total evacuation comes under Phase 5 of the plan. The country is divided into 3 separate areas which it is planned to evacuate as follows:

a. Communities in the north east and east of Uganda would be advised to cross the border into Kenya where BHC Nairobi would be requested to make arrangements for their reception.

b. Communities in the Kampala/Jinja and Entebbe areas would be advised to assemble in Entebbe for air evacuation to Nairobi or UK.

c. Communities in the north west and the west of Uganda would be advised to cross into Rwanda or Zaire if conditions there were stable, or alternatively to assemble in Kampala (or possibly Gulu) for onward movement to Entebbe as aircraft become available to evacuate them.

4. The Uganda Government will be informed of the decision to evacuate British subjects and will be requested to arrange police escorts and guards as necessary and to facilitate exit procedures at border posts and Entebbe and Gulu airports. They will also be informed of the details of any unscheduled aircraft being deployed to Entebbe for evacuation purposes.

5. Mr Hennessy has been asked to provide the text of any message to British residents which he may wish to be broadcast by the BBC Overseas Service.

6. The FCO have also asked Nairobi, Khartoum, Dar-es-Salaam and Kinshasa to check that evacuees from Uganda will be permitted to enter the country; Nairobi have also been asked to check that aircraft will be available for a shuttle service Entebbe-Nairobi.

7. The posts mentioned will be instructed to make reception arrangements in their territories should this become necessary.

10 June 1975

Uganda: Message to the Prime Minister

Thank you for your letter of 9 June with which you enclosed a draft telegram incorporating a message for the Prime Minister to send to President Amin.

As I told you on the telephone this morning, the Prime Minister has approved the terms of the proposed message, but would like a sentence inserted referring to the conversations which he had at Kingston with the Head of the Uganda Delegation and the friendly references which he made to him both about President Amin personally and about Uganda. You kindly agreed to dispatch a telegram, amended accordingly.

PRHW

R.N. Dales, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL.

CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE

GRS 100

CYPHER CAT A

FM KAMPALA 101400Z

CONFIDENTIAL

D E S K BY 101445Z

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 233 OF 10 JUNE AND TO IMMEDIATE  
NAIROBI .

NAIROBI TEL NOS 24 AND 25 : HILLS.

1. THIS IS VERY HELPFUL . TAKEN WITH THE PRIME MINISTER'S  
MESSAGE ( YOUR TELNO 129)- FOR WHICH I AM MOST GRATEFUL-  
AMIN MAY WELL BE ENCOURAGED NOT TO ACT PREMATURELY.

2. IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES , RATHER THAN RISK FOULING UP  
KENYATTA'S INITIATIVE , I NOW PROPOSE TO SUGGEST TO MY  
COLLEAGUES (IF THE DEATH SENTENCE IS PASSED TONIGHT) THAT  
WE POSTPONE OUR AGREED DEMARCHE FOR AT LEAST 48 HOURS IN  
THE HOPE THAT A PRESIDENTIAL ANNOUNCEMENT OF CLEMENCY WILL BE  
FORTHCOMING.

HENNESSY

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

F I L E S

EAD

CONS D

NEWS D

LEGAL ADVISERS

GIPD

WED

PCD

PUSD

PS

PS/MISS LESTOR

PS/PUS

MR CAMPBELL

MR ASPIN

MR HAWLEY

MR WILFORD

MR TEBBIT

COPIES TO

LT COL THE RT HON

SIR MARTIN CHARTERIS

KCB KCVO OBE

BUCKINGHAM PALACE

CONFIDENTIAL

CR..180

MEDIATE

CYPHER/CAT A

FM F C O 101000Z

(2 rel).

(JEN 3/548/1)

CONFIDENTIAL

TO IMMEDIATE KAMPALA TELNO 129 OF 10 JUNE INFO LUSAKA NAIROBI  
KINSHASA DAR ES SALAAM LAGOS AND ACCRA.

MY TELNO 124 (NOT TO ALL):

PRESIDENT AMIN'S MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER.

1. THE PRIME MINISTER HAVING CONSIDERED OUR ADVICE SEES  
ADVANTAGE PARTICULARLY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE HILLS CASE IN A  
FRIENDLY AND REASONED REPLY BEING RETURNED TO THIS MESSAGE.  
PLEASE THEREFORE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO AMIN FROM  
MR. WILSON.

BEGINS:

QUOTE THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE OF 6 JUNE ABOUT THE OAU  
SUMMIT. I WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT CONTRARY TO WHAT YOU HAVE BEEN  
TOLD I TOOK NO INITIATIVE AT KINGSTON OR ELSEWHERE TO PERSUADE  
AFRICAN LEADERS AGAINST ATTENDING THE SUMMIT IN KAMPALA. INDEED  
I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT THE HEAD OF YOUR DELEGATION AT KINGSTON  
WILL HAVE REPORTED TO YOU ON OUR CONVERSATIONS THERE AND THE  
FRIENDLY REFERENCES I MADE BOTH TO YOURSELF AND TO YOUR COUNTRY.  
ATTENDANCE AT THE SUMMIT IN KAMPALA IS AS YOU RIGHTLY SAY A  
DECISION FOR AFRICANS TO TAKE WITHOUT INTERFERENCE FROM ANYONE  
OUTSIDE THE CONTINENT UNQUOTE.

ENDS.

2. PLEASE REPORT BY IMMEDIATE TELEGRAM WHEN THE MESSAGE HAS BEEN  
DELIVERED.

CALLAGHAN

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

FILES

EAD

OADs

CCD

NEWS D

GIPD

MR ASPIN

MR CAMPBELL

PS/PUS

PS

PS/MISS LESTOR

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL



*Prime Minister*

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

*Subject to Mr Callaghan's views.*

*are you content with the telegram?*

9 June 1975

*You will see mine to*

*see §3 below.*

*9/6*

*For Patrick*

Uganda: Message to the Prime Minister

Thank you for your letter of 9 June.

The advice contained in my letter of 6 June reflected our view, now proved to be erroneous, that the Prime Minister would not countenance propitiation of Amin on this issue. But as Mr Wilson is prepared to envisage a friendly and reasoned response, we see advantage in his proposal and on the basis of past experience would expect Amin to be pleased to receive such a message. This may, as the Prime Minister suggests, prove helpful in the context of Mr Hills' case. We know that some of the Commonwealth countries, most notably Tanzania and Zambia, are highly critical of Amin and unlikely to send senior representatives to the Kampala conference. We should not wish them to feel that our response to Amin's message isolated them to any degree and in ... the attached telegram we recommend that the Prime Minister should send a simple message dealing with the allegation of British complicity.

We note the Prime Minister's interest in the contingency plans which have been made for reprisals or sanctions if Mr Hills is killed. This is something that the Department has had much in mind, although it has been difficult to take things very far until we know the exact circumstances which will surround the execution. In all of our thinking we have had to bear in mind the possible danger to the remaining 800 or so UK citizens resident in Uganda and the need to preserve such prospects as there are of our achieving compensation for those UK citizens whose property was expropriated in Uganda in 1972. In view of the Prime Minister's concern, we shall now review urgently what could be done.

Mr Callaghan has not seen this advice, but a copy will be in his box tonight. I shall let you know his comments.

*Mr Wilson*  
*Mr 7/6*

(R. N. Dales)

Patrick Wright, Esq.,  
10 Downing Street.

CONFIDENTIAL

File No. ....  
Department EAD  
Drafted by  
(Block Capitals) R A NEILSON  
Tel. Extn. MB 1471

OUTWARD  
TELEGRAM

Security Classification  
CONFIDENTIAL

Precedence  
IMMEDIATE

DESKBY ..... Z

FOR  
COMMS. DEPT.  
USE

Despatched

(Date) .....  
(Time) ..... Z

POSTBY ..... Z

PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin) ..... Z(G.M.T.) (Restrictive Prefix) .....  
(Security Class.) CONFIDENTIAL (Caveat/Privacy Marking) .....  
(Codeword) ..... (Deskby) .....

TO IMMEDIATE KAMPALA Tel. No. .... of  
(precedence) (post)

AND TO (precedence/post) .....

AND SAVING TO .....

REPEATED TO (for info) LUSAKA NAIROBI KINSHASA DAR ES SA  
LE GOS ACCRA

SAVING TO (for info) .....

Distribution :-

EAD  
OADS  
OCD  
NEWS D  
GIFD  
MR ASPIN  
MR CAMPBELL  
PS FUS  
P.  
MR MISS LESTOR

[D]

[TEXT]

124  
MY TELNO ~~219~~ (NOT TO ALL): PRESIDENT AMIN'S MESSAGE TO  
PRIME MINISTER

1. The Prime Minister having considered our advice sees  
advantage particularly in the context of the Hills case  
a friendly and reasoned reply being returned to this  
message. Please therefore deliver the following message  
to Amin from Mr Wilson.

Regins.

2. Please report by immediate telegram when the message has been delivered.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN



BP 16/6/75

Uganda  
MA

10 Downing Street  
Whitehall

9 June 1975

Uganda: Message to the Prime Minister

Thank you for your letter of 6 June with which you enclosed a copy of the message sent to the Prime Minister by President Amin.

The Prime Minister has noted your advice that we should treat President Amin's latest communication as unworthy of reply. He has however suggested that, particularly in the context of the threat against Mr. Hills, he might send a reasoned and friendly reply saying simply that the allegations are not true and that we want him to know this. I should be grateful if you could reconsider this in the light of the Prime Minister's comment and let me have a draft.

So far as Mr. Hills is concerned, I have of course been seeing the exchanges of telegrams with Kampala. The Prime Minister has however asked what contingency planning is going on for reprisals or sanctions if Mr. Hills is killed.

P. R. H. WRIGHT

R.N. Dales, Esq.  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

*The message is attached.*

6 June 1975

Uganda: Message to the Prime Minister

You have already seen the message sent to the Prime Minister by President Amin, accusing him of attempting to persuade African Commonwealth Heads of State to boycott the OAU summit conference due to be held in Kampala in July-August this year and attacking the policies of members of the "Mulungushi Club" (composed of the Presidents of Zambia, Tanzania and Zaire). We do not know whether Amin has yet made the message public. He is almost sure to do so.

Anglo-Ugandan relations are at an even lower than usual ebb as a result of the threatened trial and execution of the British lecturer, Mr Denis Hills, and of the efforts of our High Commissioner in Kampala on Mr Hill's behalf. To give the lie direct to President Amin's accusation in a personal reply from the Prime Minister might put Hills' life in greater jeopardy and prejudice the international representations we have organised on Hills' behalf.

The Prime Minister might therefore be best advised to treat President Amin's communication as unworthy of reply. If he agreed to do so we would propose to instruct our News Department to confirm in response to questions that a message from Amin has been received and deny that we in any way interfered in Kingston with the OAU's summit plans, which we regard as a purely African affair.

(R. N. Dales)

Patrick Wright, Esq.,  
10 Downing Street.

CONFIDENTIAL

DOWN LONDON  
C.007 ADMINISTER

TO THE RT. HONOURABLE--HAROLD WILSON, PRIME MINISTER OF THE  
UNITED KINGDOM, 10, DOWNING STREET,  
LONDON.

6/6/1975.

505. MR PRIME MINISTER COMMA IT HAS COME TO OUR ATTENTION THAT DURING THE LAST COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT CONFERENCE HELD IN KINGSTON COMMA JAMAICA COMMA YOU PERSONALLY CONSULTED WITH SOME AFRICAN COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF STATE TRYING TO PERSUADE THEM NOT TO ATTEND THE FORTH-COMING OAU SUMMIT CONFERENCE IN KAMPALA STOP I UNDERSTAND THAT THIS WAS AIMED AT HUMILIATING ME PERSONALLY STOP OU WERE ALSO AWARE THAT YOUR COVERT MACHINATIONS WITH THE SO-CALLED MEMBERS OF MULUNGUSHI CLUB WAS NO DOUBT AN IMPERIALIST MANOUVRE DESIGNED TO SPLIT THE AFRICAN RANKS AND TO INVOLVE YOURSELF IN THE AFFAIRS OF THE OAU THROUGH THE BACK DOOR STOP THIS BLATANT MANIFESTATION OF BRITISH NEO-COLONIALISM AND IMPERIALISM SHOULD BE A SOURCE OF SHAME TO YOU ALTHOUGH IT COMES AS NO GREAT SURPRISE TO US STOP I NEED NOT REMIND YOU THAT THE DAYS WHEN THE BRITISH CONTROLLED THE WORLD ARE OVER AND IN AFRICA WE DO NOT TOLERATE INTERFERENCE FROM ANY QUARTERS ON OUR AFFAIRS STOP

YOU SHOULD BE AWARE THAT THE DECISION TO HOLD THE NEXT SUMMIT CONFERENCE OF THE OAU IN KAMPALA WAS NOT A MATTER OF THE AFRICAN COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES ALONE STOP IT WAS A DECISION BY THE WHOLE OF AFRICA THROUGH ITS CONTINENTAL WIDE ORGANISATION NAMELY THE OAU STOP ANY DECISION TO POSTPONE OR TO CHANGE THE VENUE OF THE CONFERENCE IS A MATTER FOR OAU COUNTRIES TO DECIDE ACCORDING TO THE RULES OF THAT ORGANISATION STOP YOU ARE AWARE THAT IT IS ALREADY TOO LATE TO CYANGE THE VENUE OF THE NEXT SUMMIT CONFERENCE OF THE OAU AND YOUR MULUNGUSHI CLUB COLLABORATORS SHOULD EQUALLY BE AWARE THAT THE REST OF AFRICA LOOKED ON WITH HORROR AS THEY COMPETED FOR IMPERIALIST AND ZIONIST FAVOURS AT THE CONFERENCE STOP THEY CAME OUT IN THEIR TRUE COLOURS AS THE QUISLINGS OF THIS CONTINENT STOP MOREOVER COMMA THE SO-CALLED MULUNGUSHI CLUB DID NOT SEEM TO BE SUPPORTED BY OTHER AFRICAN COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES PRESENT IN KINGSTON STOP AS FOR YOUR MR PRIME MINISTER COMMA IT IS SURPRISING THAT A PRIME MINISTER AHOSE HEAD OF STATE IS THE HEAD OF THE COMMONWEALTH SHOULD STOOP SO LOW AS TO ENGAGE IN SUCH NAKED DIVISIONIST BACK-DOOR IM PERIALISM STOP FOR US WHILE WE BELIEVE IN THE COMMONWEALTH WE SHALL NOT ALLOW OURSELVES TO BE USED BY NEO-COLONIALIST AS THE SO-CALLED MULUNGUSHI CLUB MEMBERS WERE USED IN KINGSTON FOR THE DIVISION OF AFRICA STOP WE BELIEVE IN OUR TOTAL COMMITMENT TO AFRICA COMMA TO ITS LIBERATION WITHOUT IN ANY WAY SUCCUMBING TO WHITE RACISM WHICH SEEKS TO LIQUIDATE THE LIBERATION MOVEMENTS STOP WE KNOW THAT YOU HAVE FAILED TO SOLVE THE ZIMBABWE PROBLEM BECAUSE IAN SMITH AND HIS WHITE RACISTS ARE YOUR KITH AND KIN STOP WE WONDER WHETHER YOUR MACHINATIONS IN KINGSTON ARE PART AND PARCEL OF THE HAUNTED SO-CALLED BRITISH DIPLOMACY IT IS HEARTENING COMMA HOWEVER COMMA THAT YOU MAY PERHAPS UNDERSTAND THE QUISLINGS OF AFRICA BUT YOU DO NOT AT ALL UNDERSTAND THE TRUE SENTIMENTS OF THE THIRD WORLD STOP FINALLY I WOULD LIKE TO INFORM YOU THAT I AM VERY POPULAR AMONV OAU MEMBER STATES AND MOST OF THEIR HEADS OF STATE ARE MY PERSONAL FRIENDS AND I HAVE BEEN ASSURED BY 37 MEMBER STATES OUT OF THE 42 OAU MEMBER STATES THAT THEY WILL ATTEND THE FORTHCOMING OAU SUMMIT IN KAMPALA AND THIS DOES NOT INCLUDE MOZAMBIQUE COMMA SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE WHICH ARE DUE TO BE INDEPENDENT SOON STOP ACCEPT MR PRIME MINISTER COMMA ASSURANCES OF MY HIGHEST CONSIDERATION AND ESTEEM ENDS =====

PRIME MINISTER

c.c. Mr. Haines

*See file letter admitted  
to the PM*

*[Signature]*  
6/6

Message from President Amin

I attach a copy of a message which we have received today from President Amin about discussions you are alleged to have had with other Commonwealth Heads of Government at Kingston.

At Departmental level, the FCO are inclined to advise that no reply should be sent to this message, but that it should be made clear to the Press that there is no foundation in President Amin's allegations.

*[Signature]*

6 June, 1975.

TO THE RT. HONOURABLE HAROLD WILSON, PRIME MINISTER OF THE  
UNITED KINGDOM, 10, DOWNING STREET,  
LONDON.

6/6/1975.

505. MR PRIME MINISTER COMMA IT HAS COME TO OUR ATTENTION THAT DURING THE LAST COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT CONFERENCE HELD IN KINGSTON COMMA JAMAICA COMMA YOU PERSONALLY CONSULTED WITH SOME AFRICAN COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF STATE TRYING TO PERSUADE THEM NOT TO ATTEND THE FORTH-COMING OAU SUMMIT CONFERENCE IN KAMPALA STOP I UNDERSTAND THAT THIS WAS AIMED AT HUMILIATING ME PERSONALLY STOP OU WERE ALSO AWARE THAT YOUR COVERT MACHINATIONS WITH THE SO CALLED MEMBERS OF MULUNGUSHI CLUB WAS NO DOUBT AN IMPERIALIST MANOUVRE DESIGNED TO SPLIT THE AFRICAN RANKS AND TO INVOLVE YOURSELF

[i.e. Nybra  
Kanda a  
Mobu]

IN THE AFFAIRS OF THE OAU THROUGH THE BACK DOOR STOP THIS BLATANT MANIFESTATION OF BRITISH NEO-COLONIALISM AND IMPERIALISM SHOULD BE A SOURCE OF SHAME TO YOU ALTHOUGH IT COMES AS NO GREAT SURPRISE TO US STOP I NEED NOT REMIND YOU THAT THE DAYS WHEN THE BRITISH CONTROLLED THE WORLD ARE OVER AND IN AFRICA WE DO NOT TOLERATE INTERFERENCE FROM ANY QUARTERS ON OUR AFFAIRS STOP

RH

YOU SHOULD BE AWARE THAT THE DECISION TO HOLD THE NEXT SUMMIT CONFERENCE OF THE OAU IN KAMPALA WAS NOT A MATTER OF THE AFRICAN COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES ALONE STOP IT WAS A DECISION BY THE WHOLE OF AFRICA THROUGH ITS CONTINENTAL WIDE ORGANISATION NAMELY THE OAU STOP ANY DECISION TO POSTPONE OR TO CHANGE THE VENUE OF THE CONFERENCE IS A MATTER FOR OAU COUNTRIES TO DECIDE ACCORDING TO THE RULES OF THAT ORGANISATION STOP YOU ARE AWARE THAT IT IS ALREADY TOO LATE TO CYANGE THE VENUE OF THE NEXT SUMMIT CONFERENCE OF THE OAU AND YOUR MULUNGUSHI CLUB COLLABORATORS SHOULD EQUALLY BE AWARE THAT THE REST OF AFRICA LOOKED ON WITH HORROR AS THEY COMPETED FOR IMPERIALIST AND ZIONIST FAVOURS AT THE CONFERENCE STOP THEY CAME OUT IN THEIR TRUE COLOURS AS THE QUISLINGS OF THIS CONTINENT STOP MOREOVER COMMA THE SO-CALLED MULUNGUSHI CLUB DID NOT SEEM TO BE SUPPORTED BY OTHER AFRICAN COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES PRESENT IN KINGSTON STOP AS FOR YOUR MR PRIME MINISTER COMMA IT IS SURPRISING THAT A PRIME MINISTER AHOSE HEAD OF STATE IS THE HEAD OF THE COMMONWEALTH SHOULD STOOP SO LOW AS TO ENGAGE IN SUCH NAKED DIVISIONIST BACK-DOOR IM PERIALISM STOP FOR US WHILE WE BELIEVE IN THE COMMONWEALTH WE SHALL NOT ALLOW OURSELVES TO BE USED BY NEO-COLONIALIST AS THE SO-CALLED MULUNGUSHI CLUB MEMBERS WERE USED IN KINGSTON FOR THE DIVISION OF AFRICA STOP WE BELIEVE IN OUR TOTAL COMMITMENT TO AFRICA COMMA TO ITS LIBERATION WITHOUT IN ANY WAY SUCCUMBING TO WHITE RACISM WHICH SEEKS TO LIQUIDATE THE LIBERATION MOVEMENTS STOP WE KNOW THAT YOU HAVE FAILED TO SOLVE THE ZIMBABWE PROBLEM BECAUSE IAN SMITH AND HIS WHITE RACISTS ARE YOUR KITH AND KIN STOP WE WONDER WHETHER YOUR MACHINATIONS IN KINGSTON ARE PART AND PARCEL OF THE HAUNTED SO-CALLED BRITISH DIPLOMACY IT IS HEARTENING COMMA HOWEVER COMMA THAT YOU MAY PERHAPS UNDERSTAND THE QUISLINGS OF AFRICA BUT YOU DO NOT AT ALL UNDERSTAND THE TRUE SENTIMENTS OF THE THIRD WORLD STOP FINALLY I WOULD LIKE TO INFORM YOU THAT I AM VERY POPULAR AMONV OAU MEMBER STATES AND MOST OF THEIR HEADS OF STATE ARE MY PERSONAL FRIENDS AND I HAVE BEEN ASSURED BY 37 MEMBER STATES OUT OF THE 42 OAU MEMBER STATES THAT THEY WILL ATTEND THE FORTHCOMING OAU SUMMIT IN KAMPALA AND THIS DOES NOT INCLUDE MOZAMBIQUE COMMA SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE WHICH ARE DUE TO BE INDEPENDENT SOON STOP ACCEPT MR PRIME MINISTER COMMA ASSURANCES OF MY HIGHEST CONSIDERATION AND ESTEEM ENDS =====

ALHAJJI GENERAL IDI AMIN DADA  
VC , DSO , MC ,  
PRESIDENT OF THE RPEEE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA.



GRS 1000  
IMMEDIATE

ENCLAIR

FM KAMPALA 061030Z

UNCLASSIFIED

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 220 OF 6 JUNE INFO IMMEDIATE NAIROBI.

M I P T ✓

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT BEGINS

FROM : EXTERIOR KAMPALA

TO: THE RT HONOURABLE HAROLD WILSON PRIME MINISTER OF THE  
UNITED KINGDOM DOWNING ST LONDON.

TEXT COMMENCES:

MR PRIME MINISTER, IT HAS COME TO OUR ATTENTION THAT DURING THE LAST COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT CONFERENCE HELD IN KINGSTON, JAMAICA, YOU PERSONALLY CONSULTED WITH SOME AFRICAN COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF STATE TRYING TO PERSUADE THEM NOT TO ATTEND THE FORTHCOMING OAU SUMMIT CONFERENCE IN KAMPALA. I UNDERSTAND THAT THIS WAS AIMED AT HUMILIATING ME PERSONALLY. YOU WERE ALSO AWARE THAT YOUR COVERT MACHINATIONS WITH THE SO CALLED MEMBERS OF MULUNGUSHI CLUB WAS NO DOUBT AN IMPERIALIST MANOUVRE DESIGNED TO SPLIT THE AFRICAN RANKS AND TO INVOLVE YOURSELF IN THE AFFAIRS OF THE OAU THROUGH THE BACK DOOR. THIS BLATANT MANIFESTATION OF BRITISH NEO COLONISALISM AND IMPERIALISM SHOULD BE A SOURCE OF SHAME TO YOU ALTHOUGH IT COMES AS NO GREAT SURPRISE TO US. I NEED NOT REMIND YOU THAT THE DAYS WHEN THE BRITISH CONTROLLED THE WORLD ARE OVER AND IN AFRICA WE DO NOT TOLERATE INTERFERENCE FROM ANY QUARTERS ON OUR AFFAIRS. YOU SHOULD BE AWARE THAT THE DECISION TO HOLD THE NEXT SUMMIT CONFERENCE OF THE OAU IN KAMPALA WAS NOT A MATTER OF THE AFRICAN COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES ALONE. IT WAS A DECISION BY THE WHOLE OF AFRICA THROUGH ITS CONTINENTAL WIDE ORGANISATION NAMELY THE OAU. ANY DECISION TO POSTPONE OR TO CHANGE THE VENUE OF THE CONFERENCE IS A MATTER FOR OAU COUNTRIES TO DECIDE ACCORDING TO THE RULES OF THAT ORGANISATION. YOU ARE AWARE THAT IT IS ALREADY TOO LATE TO CHANGE THE VENUE OF THE NEXT SUMMIT CONFERENCE OF THE OAU AND YOUR MULUNGUSHI CLUB COLLABORATORS SHOULD EQUALLY BE AWARE THAT THE REST OF AFRICA LOOKED ON WITH HORROR AS THEY COMPETED FOR IMPERIALIST AND ZIONIST FAVOURS AT THE CONFERENCE. /THEY

THEY CAME OUT IN THEIR TRUE COLOURS AS THE QUISLINGS OF THIS CONTINENT.. MOREOVER, THE SO CALLED MULUNGUSHI CLUB DID NOT SEEM TO BE SUPPORTED BY OTHER AFRICAN COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES PRESENT IN KINGSTON. AS FOR YOU MR PRIME MINISTER, IT IS SURPRISING THAT A PRIME MINISTER WHOSE HEAD OF STATE IS THE HEAD OF THE COMMONWEALTH SHOULD STOOP SO LOW AS TO ENGAGE IN SUCH NAKED DIVISIONIST BACK DOOR IMPERIALISM. FOR US WHILE WE BELIEVE IN THE COMMONWEALTH WE SHALL NOT ALLOW OURSELVES TO BE USED BY NEO COLONIALIST AS THE SO CALLED MULUNGUSHI CLUB MEMBERS WERE USED IN KINGSTON FOR THE DIVISION OF AFRICA. WE BELIEVE IN OUR TOTAL COMMITMENT TO AFRICA, TO ITS LIBERATION WITHOUT IN ANY WAY SUCCUMBING TO WHITE RACISM WHICH SEEKS TO LIQUIDATE THE LIBERATION MOVEMENTS. WE KNOW THAT YOU HAVE FAILED TO SOLVE THE ZIMBABWE PROBLEM BECAUSE IAN SMITH AND HIS WHITE RACISTS ARE YOUR KITH AND KIN. WE WONDER WHETHER YOUR MACHINATIONS IN KINGSTON ARE PART AND PARCEL OF THE HAUNTED SO CALLED BRITISH DIPLOMACY, IT IS HEARTENING, HOWEVER, THAT YOU MAY PERHAPS UNDERSTAND THE QUISLINGS OF AFRICA BUT YOU DO NOT AT ALL UNDERSTAND THE TRUE SENTIMENTS OF THE THIRD WORLD. FINALLY I WOULD LIKE TO INFORM YOU THAT I AM VERY POPULAR AMONG OAU MEMBER STATES AND MOST OF THEIR HEADS OF STATE ARE MY PERSONAL FRIENDS AND I HAVE BEEN ASSURED BY 37 MEMBER STATES OUT OF THE 42 OAU MEMBER STATES THAT THEY WILL ATTEND THE FORTHCOMING OAU SUMMIT IN KAMPALA AND THIS DOES NOT INCLUDE MOZAMBIQUE, SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE WHICH ARE DUE TO BE INDEPENDENT SOON. ACCEPT MR PRIME MINISTER, ASSURANCES OF MY HIGHEST CONSIDERATION AND ESTEEM ENDS.

SIGNED: ALHAJJI GENERAL IDI AMIN DADA

VC DSO MC

PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA

ENDS

HENNESSY

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

F I L E S

EAD

CONS D

NEWS D

OADS

LEGAL ADVISERS

GIPD

P & CD

PUSD

PS

PS/MISS LESTOR

PS/PUS

MR CAMPBELL

MR ASPIN

MR HAWLEY

MR WILFORD

MR TEBBIT

IMMEDIATE

10X

ADVANCE COPY

DWF E102/6

PS  
PS/Mrs Lorton  
PS/PUS  
Mr Campbell  
Mr Ashwin  
Mr Hawley  
Mr Wilford  
Mr Tebbitt

LHH 364/86

Duty officer No 10 Downing St  
Hd EAD  
Hd Cons D

OO FCO

PP NAIROBI

GRS

120

CYPHER CAT A

FM KAMPALA 061005Z

CONFIDENTIAL

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 219 OF 6 TH JUNE REPEATED PRIORITY  
FOR NAIROBI.

[Files]

MESSAGE FOR PRIME MINISTER.

I WAS SUMMONED AT VERY SHORT NOTICE THIS MORNING TO SEE THE  
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN HIS OFFICE. HEAD OF CHANCERY  
ACCOMPANIED ME . ON ARRIVAL HE SAID HE HAD CONSULTED THE  
M O D ABOUT THE QUESTIONS I HAD ASKED YESTERDAY CONCERNING  
HILLS (MY TELNO 218). BUT THAT HE HAD NOT YET HAD A  
REPLY . HE WOULD LET ME KNOW AS SOON AS POSSIBLE . MEANWHILE  
HE WISHED TO GIVE ME A COPY OF A TELEGRAM WHICH HE SAID HIS  
PRESIDENT HAD SENT TO MY HEAD OF STATE(SIC) . THE COPY WAS FOR  
MY INFORMATION . HAVING FORMALLY HANDED IT OVER IN FRONT OF THE  
PRESS AND TELEVISION , WHO WERE PRESENT, AND- BEFORE I HAD A  
CHANCE TO READ IT- HE INDICATED THAT THE MEETING WAS AT AN END.

2. SEE TEXT IN M I F T.

CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE

Uganda

GRS 200

CYPHER CAT A

FM KAMPALA 180710Z

CONFIDENTIAL

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 134 OF 18 TH APRIL REPEATED FOR INFORMATION  
TO NAIROBI.

YOUR TELNO 72 : COMPENSATION.

1. I HAVE ASKED AGAIN TO SEE PRESIDENT, BUT HE IS SAID TO BE  
IN A MEETING.

2. I HAVE ALREADY POINTED OUT TO OSEKU THAT THE PRIME  
MINISTERS MESSAGE WAS MUCH MORE FORTHCOMING THAN THE REUTERS  
REPORT OF IT-- AND IN ANY CASE NO SUBSTITUTE.

3. BUT IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY COUNTER PROPOSAL ON LINES SUGGESTED  
IN PARA 3 OF MY TELNO 133 I AM NOT OPTIMISTIC ABOUT CHANCES OF  
ANY CHANGE OF HEART . PRESIDENT IS LIKELY TO STAND ON THE  
FACT THAT HIS INVITATION WAS REJECTED AND NO ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL  
MADE.

4. IF RETALIATORY ACTION HAS TO BE TAKEN (YOUR PARA 3) A MORE  
EFFECTIVE LEVER SO FAR AS UGANDANS ARE CONCERNED MIGHT BE THREAT  
TO TAKE ACTION AT I M F OR U N - POSSIBLY EVEN AT COMMONWEALTH  
HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING. BUT I SUGGEST WE FIRST SEE  
WHETHER THERE IS ANY POSSIBILITY OF PROGRESS HERE AFTER TEMPER  
HAVE COOLED - BEFORE CASTING THE DIE.

HENNESSY

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

EAD

CLAIMS DEPT

NEWS DEPT

GIPD

FRD

FINANCE DEPT

POD

PSD

CONSULAR DEPT

[COPIES SENT TO NO.10 DOWNING STREET]

CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE

GRS 300

CYPHER CAT A

FM KAMPALA 171700Z

CONFIDENTIAL

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 133 OF 17 TH APRIL REPEATED FOR  
INFORMATION TO NAIROBI.

MY TELNO 132 : ANGLO UGANDAN RELATIONS.

1. IN A PREDICTABLE ANGRY RESPONSE TO THE REUTERS REPORT UGANDA RADIO TONIGHT QUOTED THE PRESIDENT AS SAYING INTER ALIA THAT THE COMPENSATION OFFICES HAD BEEN CLOSED AND THE SUBJECT FORGOTTEN. ( YOU WILL NO DOUBT SEE FULL TEXT).
2. IT IS STILL NOT CLEAR WHETHER THE PRESIDENT KNEW, WHEN MAKING THIS STATEMENT , THAT THE RESTRICTIONS ON THE UGANDA HIGH COMMISSION IN LONDON HAD BEEN LIFTED , BUT THIS WOULD NOT OF ITSELF HAVE BEEN ENOUGH TO PREVENT THE OUTBURST. THE PRIME CAUSE WAS THE PRIME MINISTERS REJECTION OF PRESIDENT AMIN'S INVITATION TO GO TO UGANDA.
3. ALTHOUGH I DOUBT WHETHER AMIN EXPECTED THE PRIME MINISTER TO COME IN PERSON- ANYMORE THAN HE EXPECTED MR HEATH LAST YEAR- HE WOULD HAVE HOPED FOR SOME COMPROMISE PROPOSAL E.G. A MEETING ELSEWHERE OR THE OFFER TO SEND SOMEONE ELSE. IN OTHER WORDS THE INVITATION WAS PROBABLY AN OPENING BID.
3. IN THE LIGHT OF UGANDA'S CONTINUING FINANCIAL DIFFICULTIES IT IS TEMPTING TO REGARD THE PRESIDENT'S RECENT OVERTURES AS PART OF AN ELABORATE HOAX. I DO NOT THINK IT WAS. I BELIEVE THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS FOR ONCE SINCERE IN MOST OF WHAT HE SAID AND PROPOSED. WHETHER THE PRIME MINISTER'S REPLY (RATHER THAN THE REUTERS VERSION OF IT) WOULD HAVE PRODUCED A DIFFERENT REACTION IS ANOTHER MATTER BUT HAD I BEEN GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY OF SPEAKING TO IT THERE WAS AT LEAST A CHANCE THAT THINGS WOULD HAVE TURNED OUT DIFFERENTLY.
5. THE PRESIDENT'S PRIDE HAS OBVIOUSLY BEEN SEVERELY HURT. THE SLAMMED DOOR WILL NOT EASILY BE REOPENED. IN HIS PRESENT MOOD I DOUBT WHETHER THREATS ARE LIKELY TO HAVE ANY EFFECT. ANOTHER

CONFIDENTIAL

/ MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT DRAWING HIS ATTENTION TO THE  
FORTHCOMING TONE OF THE EARLIER ONE AND SUGGESTING THAT A  
UGANDAN MINISTER MIGHT VISIT LONDON - IN VIEW OF THE  
P.M.'S INABILITY TO LEAVE ENGLAND- OR THAT SOMEONE ELSE SHOULD  
COME HERE IN PLACE OF THE P.M. COULD POSSIBLY DO THE  
TRICK.

HENNESSY

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

EAD  
CLAIMS DEPT  
NEWS DEPT  
GIPD  
FRD  
FINANCE DEPT  
POD  
PSD  
CONSULAR DEPT

[COPIES SENT TO NO. 10 DOWNING STREET]

CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE

GRS 200  
CYPHER CAT A  
FM KAMPALA 171330Z  
CONFIDENTIAL

pa

Prime Minister  
You shall see these telegrams  
with some for an informed letter  
Report that you had declined Amin's  
invitation.

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 132 OF 17 TH APRIL REPEATED FOR  
INFORMATION TO NAIROBI .

MY TELNO 131 ✓: ANGLO UGANDA RELATIONS.

1. THERE HAS BEEN AN OMINOUS SILENCE FROM THE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE  
SINCE HE RETURNED FROM ZAIRE, DUE NO DOUBT TO THE UNFORTUNATE  
REUTERS REPORT , WHICH PROBABLY LED AMIN TO BELIEVE THAT HE  
HAD BEEN REBUFFED ON ALL COUNTS ; THE COMPENSATION VISIT: THE  
NORMALISING OF RELATIONS, THE LIFTING OF RESTRICTIONS AND THE  
ASSISTANCE OF BRITISH ACCOUNTANTS.
2. I HAVE THEREFORE TAKEN THE OPPORTUNITY , WHEN ACKNOWLEDGING  
THE PRINCIPAL PRIVATE SECRETARY'S LETTER TODAY(PARA 5 OF T UR  
REFERS) , TO SEND EKOCHU A COPY OF MY LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT  
CONVEYING THE PRIME MINISTER'S REPLY- WHILE AT THE SAME TIME  
REITERATING MY READINESS TO DELIVER THE REPLY PERSONALLY TO  
THE PRESIDENT AT ANY TIME THAT IS CONVENIENT. IN THIS WAY  
I HOPE THAT THE PRESIDENT MAY BE MADE AWARE OF THE CONTENTS OF  
MR WILSON'S REPLY BEFORE HE TAKES ANY ACTION HE MAY LATER REGRET.

HENNESSY

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION  
EAD  
CLAIMS DEPT  
NEWS DEPT  
GIPD  
FRD  
FINANCE DEPT  
POD  
PSD  
CONSULAR DEPT

[COPIES SENT TO NO. 10 DOWNING STREET]

CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

Nb 10 D.S.

GRS 250

CYPHER CAT A

FM KAMPALA 170730Z

CONFIDENTIAL

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 131 OF 17 TH APRIL REPEATED FOR  
INFORMATION TO NAIROBI .

MY TELNO (129) : ANGLO/UGANDAN RELATIONS.

1. UGANDA RADIO LAST NIGHT QUOTED REUTERS AS SAYING THAT THE  
PRIME MINISTER HAD TURNED DOWN PRESIDENT AMIN'S INVITATION TO  
VISIT KAMPALA TO DISCUSS THE PRESIDENT'S OFFER TO PAY COMPENSATION  
IN CASH. I UNDERSTAND THAT THE REPORT ALSO APPEARED IN THE

KENYAN PAPERS YESTERDAY MORNING.

2. I SPOKE TO CHIEF OF PROTOCOL THIS MORNING (FOLLOWING  
PRESIDENT'S RETURN YESTERDAY AFTERNOON) AND ASKED WHEN I MIGHT

BE ABLE TO DELIVER THE MESSAGE .

3. OSEKU UNDERTOOK TO CONSULT AMIN AND LET ME KNOW THE  
PRESIDENTS WISHES.

4. I HOPE THIS DEVELOPMENT WILL NOT UNDULY SOUR THE ATMOSPHERE  
AT THE TOP, THOUGH I EXPECT IT HAS PUT AN END TO ANY HOPE WE  
MIGHT HAVE HAD OF BUILDING ON THE MESSAGE AN AGREEMENT TO  
CONTINUE THE COMPENSATION DISCUSSIONS AT OFFICIAL LEVEL.

5. IN A FURTHER DEVELOPMENT YESTERDAY AFTERNOON I RECEIVED  
FROM THE PRESIDENTS P P S WRITTEN CONFIRMATION OF AMIN'S  
" DECISION..... TO NORMALISE RELATIONS WITH THE  
BRITISH GOVERNMENT..... ". IT IS CLEAR , I THINK , THAT  
THE PRESIDENT DOES NOT USE THE WORD "NORMALISE" IN THE ACCEPTED  
DIPLOMATIC SENSE, BUT MERELY TO EXPRESS HIS DESIRE TO  
IMPROVE RELATIONS BY LIFTING THE RESTRICTIONS ON THIS MISSION  
AND ALLOWING IT TO OPERATE NORMALLY.  
(COPY FOLLOWS BY BAG).

HENNESSY

[Copies sent to Nb 10 D.S.]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

EAD

PCD

CLAIMS DEPT

NEWS DEPT

OTHER AFRICAN DEPARTMENTS

CONFIDENTIAL



X

RESTRICTED

GPS 90  
IMMEDIATE  
CYPHER/CAT A

FM FCO 161150Z APR

RESTRICTED

TO IMMEDIATE KAMPALA TELNO 70 OF 16 APRIL 1975.

YOUR TELNO 65 THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO GENERAL AMIN.

1. THERE IS CONSIDERABLE PRESS INTEREST HERE IN THE TERMS OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE. WE HAVE SO FAR SOUGHT TO AVOID COMMENT UNTIL WE HAD CONFIRMATION THAT YOU HAD DELIVERED THE MESSAGE IN KAMPALA. MAY WE ASSUME THAT THE PRESIDENT'S ABSENCE IN ZAIRE AND THAT OF HIS FOREIGN MINISTER HAVE SO FAR PREVENTED, YOU FROM DELIVERING THE MESSAGE AND THAT YOU WILL REPORT WHEN YOU HAVE BEEN ABLE TO DO SO.

CALLAGHAN

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

F I L E S

EAD  
CLAIMS D  
NEWS D  
PS  
PS/MISS LESTOR  
MR CAMPBELL  
MR ASPIN  
MR HAWLEY  
MR WILFORD

RESTRICTED

CONFIDENTIAL

GPS300

FLASH

CYPHER CAT A

FM FCO 171800Z

CONFIDENTIAL

TO FLASH KAMPALA TELNO 72 OF 17 APRIL.

COMPENSATION

1. WE HAVE SEEN THE TEXT OF A KAMPALA RADIO BROADCAST QUOTING SOURCES CLOSE TO THE COMMAND POST QUOTING GENERAL AMIN AS SAYING THAT QUOTE THE OFFICES WHICH HAVE BEEN DEALING WITH COMPENSATION OF THE ABANDONED PROPERTY OF THE BRITISH NATIONALS WHO WERE EXPELLED FROM UGANDA HAVE BEEN CLOSED AND THE SUBJECT FORGOTTEN UNQUOTE, AS A RESULT OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S QUOTE REJECTION OF PRESIDENT AMIN'S INVITATION TO GO TO UGANDA AND NEGOTIATE COMPENSATION DIRECTLY WITH THE GENERAL UNQUOTE. THE COMPENSATION MONEY WILL BE DIVERTED TO DEVELOPMENTAL PLANS. THOSE AFFECTED QUOTE SHOULD NEVER APPROACH UGANDA BUT THEIR PRIME MINISTER WHO WILL PAY THEM UNQUOTE. UGANDANS TRYING TO DISCUSS COMPENSATION QUOTE SECRETLY UNQUOTE WOULD FACE A SPECIAL MILITARY COURT. AMIN IS QUOTED AS SAYING THAT THE PRIME MINISTER IS QUOTE ASHAMED TO FACE PRESIDENT AMIN UNQUOTE. THE BROADCAST CONCLUDES WITH UNFLATTERING (TO US) COMPARISONS BETWEEN UK AND THE USA.
2. WE ASSUME THAT AMIN HAD NOT, REPEAT NOT, SEEN THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE, AND IS ACTING PURELY ON THE BASIS OF REUTERS REPORTS (WHICH QUOTED NO GOVERNMENT SOURCES).
- 3/ FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION OUR FIRST REACTION IS THAT IF THIS REPORT IS CONFIRMED AS OFFICIAL UGANDAN POLICY WE SHALL HAVE TO RESORT TO THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE.
- /4. PLEASE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

4. PLEASE CONTINUE WITH YOUR EFFORTS TO SEE THE PRESIDENT, POINTING OUT TO YOUR INTERMEDIARIES THAT THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE IS BY NO MEANS NEGATIVE AND THAT REPORTS IN THE MEDIA ARE NO SUBSTITUTE FOR THE REAL THING.

5. NEWS DEPT WILL TAKE THE LINE, ON THE RECORD, THAT WE DO NOT UNDERSTAND THE KAMPALA RADIO BROADCAST SINCE SO FAR AS WE KNOW THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE HAS NOT YET BEEN DELIVERED TO THE PRESIDENT. THEY WILL ADD UNATTRIBUTABLY THAT IF THE BROADCAST REPRESENTS UGANDA GOVERNMENT OPINION IT APPEARS TO BE IN DIRECT CONTRADICTION TO THE FREQUENTLY STATED UGANDAN ADMISSION OF LIABILITY TO PAY COMPENSATION.

CALLAGHAN

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

EAD  
CLAIMS D  
NEWS D  
GIPD  
FRD  
FINANCE D  
POD  
PSD  
CONS D

9PS 250A

IMMEDIATE

CYPHERCAT A

FM FCO 140850Z

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Uganda

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE

TO IMMEDIATE KAMPALA TEL NO 65 OF 14 APRIL 1975

REF ID: A66475

PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO GENERAL AMIN.

BEGINS. I WAS PLEASED TO RECEIVE YOUR MESSAGE OF 10 APRIL AND MR HENNESSY HAS OF COURSE REPORTED HIS TWO RECENT CONVERSATIONS WITH YOU ABOUT RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES. I WAS GRATIFIED TO HEAR THAT WORK ON THE COMPENSATION FOR OUR CITIZENS WHOSE PROPERTY IN UGANDA WAS EXPROPRIATED IN 1972 HAS BEEN COMPLETED AND THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT WILL PAY COMPENSATION TO ALL THOSE AFFECTED. THIS PROBLEM HAS OF COURSE LONG BEEN A THORN IN BOTH OUR SIDES. I WELCOMED THE TALKS BETWEEN OUR OFFICIALS IN KAMPALA IN SEPTEMBER 1974 AND THE PROGRESS THERE MADE, AND I SHALL BE READY TO SEND A FURTHER TEAM TO BUILD ON THE AGREEMENT REACHED ON THAT OCCASION. I MUST THANK YOU FOR YOUR INVITATION TO VISIT KAMPALA. BUT YOU WILL I AM SURE REALISE THAT I SHALL BE HEAVILY PRE-OCCUPIED WITH THE COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING OVER THE NEXT FEW WEEKS AND YOU WILL KNOW THAT THIS COUNTRY IS ALSO MOVING INTO A CRITICAL STAGE IN DECIDING IF WE ARE TO REMAIN IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY. I HAVE, OF COURSE, TO PLAY MY FULL PART IN THIS PROCESS AND I REGRET THAT THERE IS JUST NO POSSIBILITY THAT I SHALL BE ABLE TO UNDERTAKE ANY ADDITIONAL VISITS OUTSIDE THIS COUNTRY IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. HOWEVER, I WELCOME YOUR RAISING OF THE RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED ON THE NUMBERS OF THE STAFF AT OUR HIGH COMMISSION IN KAMPALA AND I AM PLEASED TO TELL YOU THAT WE ARE LIKEWISE LIFTING THE RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED ON MR ISINGOMA'S MISSION HERE. I WAS ALSO PLEASED TO SEE THAT YOU FIND MR HENNESSY, IN WHOM I HAVE FULL TRUST, ACCEPTABLE TO YOU AS ACTING HIGH COMMISSIONER IN KAMPALA. WE TOO HAVE FOUND MR ISINGOMA ENTIRELY ACCEPTABLE. BUT I AM NOT SURE THAT THE TIME IS RIGHT FOR THE FORMAL RAISING OF THE STATUS OF OUR RESPECTIVE MISSIONS AND I SUGGEST THAT WE WAIT AND SEE HOW MATTERS DEVELOP BEFORE TAKING A DECISION ON THIS POINT. ENDS.

CALLAGHAN

FCO/WH DISTRIBUTION

EAD

CONFIDENTIAL



*cc Teal Denlan*

*HM*

10 Downing Street  
Whitehall

14 April 1975

Thank you for your letter of 11 April, with which you enclosed a draft reply for the Prime Minister to send to President Amin's personal telegram of 10 April.

As I have already told you on the telephone, the Prime Minister has approved the draft with certain minor amendments.

P. R. H. WRIGHT

R.N. Dales, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL



*Prime Minister*

*✓ Agreed, subject to the*  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
London *Removal of a few* SW1A 2AH *superlatives*  
*✓*  
11 April 1975  
*1 agree*  
*on*  
*REA*  
*12 id*

*Dear Patrick,*

*✓* Thank you for your letter of 10 April in which you asked for our urgent advice on the response which the Prime Minister might make to President Amin's personal telegram of the same date. We think that the Prime Minister should reply to this message and I enclose a draft for his consideration.

*✓* In giving this advice, we have it in mind that both the British companies whose assets have been expropriated in Uganda and the British Asians who were expelled in 1972 will expect us to do everything possible to obtain compensation for them. President Amin has now made very definite proposals and, in conversation with our Acting High Commissioner, has promised compensation in cash. We know that he has recently received large subventions from Saudi Arabia. In this situation we think it would be difficult to justify ignoring President Amin's message completely.

*How did he know?*  
The Prime Minister will obviously not wish to take up President Amin's invitation to visit Uganda. We think it would be unwise to suggest their meeting in Kingston, even though President Amin has declared his intention of not going there, since that might encourage him to change his mind. We could also hardly ask The Queen to sign a letter to President Amin accrediting our Acting High Commissioner as High Commissioner so soon after Amin has put himself forward to replace her as Head of the Commonwealth. There are, therefore, limits to the extent to which the Prime Minister can give Amin a forthcoming reply. Within these limits, however, we have tried to make the reply as helpful as possible.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary will have a copy of this letter and the draft telegram in his box to consider on his return from Dublin, but he has not yet seen this advice. Unless the Prime Minister wants to despatch the telegram before the weekend, we should be able to let you have his comments on 14 April.

*Tom was*  
*10/4/75*  
(R. N. Dales)

Patrick Wright, Esq.,  
10, Downing Street,

Department .....	OUTWARD	Security Classification CONFIDENTIAL
Drafted by (Block Capitals) EAD Mr Wigan	TELEGRAM	Precedence IMMEDIATE
Tel. Extn. MB 1497		DESKBY .....Z

FOR COMMS. DEPT. USE	Despatched	(Date) .....	POSTBY.....Z
		(Time) .....Z	

PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin) .....Z(G.M.T.) (Restrictive Prefix).....

(Security Class.) ..... CONFIDENTIAL (Caveat/ Privacy Marking).....

(Codeword) ..... (Deskby).....Z

TO..... IMMEDIATE KAMPALA Tel. No. .... of .....

(precedence) (post)

AND TO (precedence/post).....

AND SAVING TO.....

REPEATED TO (for info).....

SAVING TO (for info).....

<p>Distribution:-</p> <p>FCO Whitehall</p> <p>Copies to:-</p>	<p>[TEXT]</p> <p>Please pass the following message from the Prime Minister to General Amin.</p> <p>Begins. I was pleased to receive your message of 10 April and Mr Hennessy has of course reported his two recent conversations with you about relations between our countries.</p> <p>I was <del>most</del> gratified to hear that work on the compensation for our citizens whose property in Uganda was expropriated in 1972 has been completed and that your Government will pay compensation to all those affected. This problem has of course long been a thorn in both our sides. I welcomed the talks between our officials in Kampala in September 1974 and the progress there made, and I shall be <del>most happy</del> <sup>Ready</sup> to send a further team to build</p>
---------------------------------------------------------------	------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

build on the agreement reached on that occasion.

I must thank you for your invitation to visit Kampala.

But you will I am sure realise that I shall be heavily pre-occupied with the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting over the next few weeks and you will know that this country also is moving into a critical stage in deciding if we are to remain in the European Community. I have, of course, to play my full part in this process and I regret that there is just no possibility that I shall be able to undertake any additional visits outside this country in the foreseeable future.

However, I ~~warmly~~ welcome your raising of the restrictions imposed on the numbers of the staff at our High Commission in Kampala and I am pleased to tell you that we are likewise lifting the restrictions imposed on Mr Isingoma's mission here. I was also pleased to see that you find Mr Hennessy, in whom I have full trust, acceptable to you as Acting High Commissioner in Kampala. We too have found Mr Isingoma an entirely acceptable. But I am not sure that the time is right for the formal raising of the status of our respective missions and I suggest that we wait and see how matters develop before taking a decision on this point. Ends

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN





B.F. 14/4/75

Uganda  
10 Downing Street *HE*  
Whitehall

10 April 1975

The Prime Minister has seen Kampala telegram No. 113 of 10 April about Mr. Hennessy's call on General Amin and the Uganda High Commission's note with the text of the personal telegram from General Amin to him.

The Prime Minister would be grateful for your urgent advice as to the response which should be made.

MFF

R.N. Dales, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

**IMMEDIATE**

*Advance Copy 4*

DMF NR E 175/802/10 *DEPT L.*

LHH 201/10

OO FCO

RR NAIROBI

RR UKMIS NEW YORK

RR WASHINGTON

GRS 1000

CYPHER CAT A

FM KAMPALA 101315Z

CONFIDENTIAL

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 113 OF 10 TH APRIL REPEATED FOR  
INFORMATION TO NAIROBI, UKMIS NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON.

ADVANCE COPIES	
PS	
PS	MISS LESTOR
PS to PUS	MR CAMPBELL
HD	EAD. MR ASPIN
HD	CLAIMS D.
HD	C.C.D.
HD	NEWS D.

HD NEWS D.

NO. 10 DOWNING ST.

MY TEL NO 108: ANGLO UGANDAN RELATIONS

1. I WAS SUMMONED TO SEE THE PRESIDENT AT THE COMMAND  
POST LATE THIS MORNING. HEAD OF CHANCERY ACCOMPANIED  
ME. MINISTERS OF HOME AFFAIRS AND JUSTICE, HEAD OF  
STATE RESEARCH BUREAU (SECRET POLICE) COMMANDER OF  
AIRBORNE REGIMENT, UGANDAN ACTING HIGH COMMISSIONER IN LONDON  
AND HIS COUNSELLOR TOGETHER WITH VARIOUS OTHER OFFICIALS,  
TV AND PRESS WERE PRESENT.

2. THE PRESIDENT BEGAN BY REFERRING TO OUR LAST  
CONVERSATION (MY TEL NO 94) WHEN I HAD POINTED OUT THAT  
THERE WERE AT LEAST TWO MAIN OBSTACLES IN THE WAY OF HIS  
DESIRE TO NORMALISE RELATIONS, THE FIRST OF WHICH HE HAD  
REMOVED (BY LIFTING RESTRICTIONS ON THIS MISSION)  
AND THE SECOND OF WHICH (COMPENSATION) HE HAD SAID HE  
WOULD MAKE ARRANGEMENTS TO DISPOSE OF AS SOON AS  
POSSIBLE. HE HAD SUMMONED ME NOW TO SAY THAT HE HAD  
COMPLETED ALL THE WORK ON THE COMPENSATION CLAIMS OF  
BOTH BRITISH AND NON-CITIZEN ASIANS. IT HAD BEEN A LONG  
TIME BUT, HE ADDED, UGANDA HAD BEEN MUCH QUICKER THAN  
MANY OTHER COUNTRIES WHICH STILL OWED BRITAIN  
COMPENSATION. HE WAS READY TO PAY COMPENSATION NOW (A  
PREGNANT PAUSE) IN CASH.

3. HE WOULD SEND A TELEGRAM TO THE PRIME MINISTER  
INVITING THE LATTER TO VISIT KAMPALA SO THAT THE MATTER  
COULD BE FINISHED. IF THERE WERE ANY DIFFICULTIES OR  
COMPLICATIONS THESE COULD BE SORTED OUT LATER BY OFFICIALS.

4. BEFORE HE COULD CONCLUDE THE INTERVIEW I MANAGED  
TO MAKE THE POINT THAT UGANDAN LAW AS I UNDERSTOOD IT  
REQUIRED THE COMPENSATION TO BE PAID TO THE EXPROPRIATED  
COMPANIES - AND NOT TO HIM. HE WAS READY FOR THIS.

*PM*  
*I am seeing*  
*advice on*  
*this, and Ann's*  
*telegram,*  
*which has just*  
*arrived.*  
*MT.*

THE MINISTER OF JUSTICE WAS AT THE MEETING, H. SO  
THAT THESE LEGAL DIFFICULTIES COULD BE IRONED THE  
DECREE WOULD BE AMENDED. HE WISHED TO DEAL WITH HER  
MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WAS  
RESPONSIBLE FOR ITS CITIZENS AND THE COMPENSATION COULD  
BE GIVEN TO BRITISH SUBJECTS AS HMG CHOSE. HE HIMSELF  
DID NOT KNOW WHERE ALL THE CLAIMANTS WERE. THIS WAS A  
MATTER FOR HMG.

5. HE THEN MADE MORE MOVES TO CLOSE THE DISCUSSION,  
BUT AGAIN I MANAGED TO GET IN A QUICK QUESTION. WE KNEW,  
I SAID, WHAT OFFER THE UGANDANS HAD MADE TO BRITISH  
COMPANIES, BUT WHAT ABOUT THE ASIANS? I ASSUMED THERE  
WOULD HAVE TO BE FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS ON THIS?

6. THE MONEY WAS THERE, HE SAID. THE MINISTER  
RESPONSIBLE, ODOTH-OFUMBI, WAS PRESENT AND HAD THE MATTER  
IN HAND. HE, AMIN WOULD IN ANY CASE BE DISCUSSING THIS  
WITH THE PRIME MINISTER.

7. . AND SO THE DISCUSSION ENDED. AMIN GAVE NO INDICATION THAT  
HE WAS ANYTHING BUT SINCERE IN HIS DELIGHT AT HAVING, AS HE  
SAW IT, REMOVED THE MAIN OBSTACLE IN THE WAY OF NORMALISING  
RELATIONS. ASSUMING THAT HIS TELEGRAM TO THE PRIME MINISTER-  
AND TONIGHT'S PRESS REPORT OF THE TALKS- BEARS ANY RELATIONS  
TO THE FACTS (A RATHER BIG ASSUMPTION PERHAPS IN THE LIGHT  
OF THE FIRST ROUND) THIS DEVELOPMENT IS, AS FAR AS IT  
GOES, ENCOURAGING. THERE ARE OF COURSE MANY UNANSWERED QUESTIONS  
ARISING OUT OF THE PRESIDENT'S REMARKS, NEVERTHELESS THERE  
APPEARS TO BE AN OPPORTUNITY NOW TO BRING THE COMPENSATION ISSUE  
A STEP NEARER TO A CONCLUSION - AN OPPORTUNITY WHICH I BELIEVE WE  
SHOULD NOT LET SLIP.

8. THE DIFFICULTY PRESENTED BY THE INVITATION TO THE PRIME  
MINISTER TO VISIT UGANDA MIGHT I SUGGEST BE OVERCOME BY A MESSAGE  
FROM THE MR WILSON WELCOMING THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE AND ADDING  
THAT, WHILE OTHER COMMITMENTS RULE OUT A VISIT AT PRESENT, HE WOULD  
BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS THE PRESIDENT'S OFFER WITH AMIN AT THE  
HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING IN KINGSTON. AMIN MIGHT WELL VIEW  
SUCH A MESSAGE AS A SATISFACTORY RESPONSE- BEQ IT COULD CLEAR THE  
WAY FOR FURTHER TALKS YW OFFICIAL SSVEL.

✓ 9. THERE IS OF COURSE A RISK THAT HE WOULD DECIDE TO TAKE UP THEIR  
INVITATION (ALTHOUGH I AM INCLINED TO STICK BY MY ORGINAL JUDGEMENT)  
BUT I ASSUME THAT HIS WILLINGNESS TO MAKE PROGRESS ON THE  
COMPENSATION ISSUE WOULD REMOVE MUCH OF THE EMBARRASSMENT THAT  
HIS PRESENCE AT THE MEETING MIGHT OTHERWISE CAUSE.  
HENNESSY

[Corrected version being obtained]

TELEPHONE: 01-559 1999/8  
TELEGRAMS: UGANDA COM  
TELEX: 502241



HIGH COMMISSION OF THE  
REPUBLIC OF UGANDA  
UGANDA HOUSE  
P.O. BOX 257  
TRAFALGAR SQUARE  
LONDON, WC2N 5DX

OUR REFERENCE C.1/52

*F. A. D.  
for advice, pl. Dis.  
cc Mr. Finester No 10 with my compl.  
Mr. Aspin.*

The High Commission of the Republic of Uganda presents its compliments to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and has the honour to enclose herewith, a telex message from H.E. Al-Hajji General Idi Amin Dada, President of the Republic of Uganda, addressed to the Prime Minister, The Right Honourable Harold Wilson, M.P.

The High Commission of the Republic of Uganda avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the assurances of its highest consideration.

LONFON

10th April, 1975



CONFIDENTIAL

4. PLEASE CONTINUE WITH YOUR EFFORTS TO SEE THE PRESIDENT, POINTING OUT TO YOUR INTERMEDIARIES THAT THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE IS BY NO MEANS NEGATIVE AND THAT REPORTS IN THE MEDIA ARE NO SUBSTITUTE FOR THE REAL THING.

5. NEWS DEPT WILL TAKE THE LINE, ON THE RECORD, THAT WE DO NOT UNDERSTAND THE KAMPALA RADIO BROADCAST SINCE SO FAR AS WE KNOW THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE HAS NOT YET BEEN DELIVERED TO THE PRESIDENT. THEY WILL ADD UNATTRIBUTABLY THAT IF THE BROADCAST REPRESENTS UGANDA GOVERNMENT OPINION IT APPEARS TO BE IN DIRECT CONTRADICTION TO THE FREQUENTLY STATED UGANDAN ADMISSION OF LIABILITY TO PAY COMPENSATION.

CALLAGHAN

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

EAD  
CLAIMS D  
NEWS D  
GIPD  
FRD  
FINANCE D  
POD  
PSD  
CONS D

9PS 250A

IMMEDIATE

CYPHERCAT A

FM FCO 140850Z

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Uganda

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE

TO IMMEDIATE KAMPALA TEL NO 65 OF 14 APRIL 1975

REF ID: A66475

PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO GENERAL AMIN.

BEGINS. I WAS PLEASED TO RECEIVE YOUR MESSAGE OF 10 APRIL AND MR HENNESSY HAS OF COURSE REPORTED HIS TWO RECENT CONVERSATIONS WITH YOU ABOUT RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES. I WAS GRATIFIED TO HEAR THAT WORK ON THE COMPENSATION FOR OUR CITIZENS WHOSE PROPERTY IN UGANDA WAS EXPROPRIATED IN 1972 HAS BEEN COMPLETED AND THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT WILL PAY COMPENSATION TO ALL THOSE AFFECTED. THIS PROBLEM HAS OF COURSE LONG BEEN A THORN IN BOTH OUR SIDES. I WELCOMED THE TALKS BETWEEN OUR OFFICIALS IN KAMPALA IN SEPTEMBER 1974 AND THE PROGRESS THERE MADE, AND I SHALL BE READY TO SEND A FURTHER TEAM TO BUILD ON THE AGREEMENT REACHED ON THAT OCCASION. I MUST THANK YOU FOR YOUR INVITATION TO VISIT KAMPALA. BUT YOU WILL I AM SURE REALISE THAT I SHALL BE HEAVILY PRE-OCCUPIED WITH THE COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING OVER THE NEXT FEW WEEKS AND YOU WILL KNOW THAT THIS COUNTRY IS ALSO MOVING INTO A CRITICAL STAGE IN DECIDING IF WE ARE TO REMAIN IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY. I HAVE, OF COURSE, TO PLAY MY FULL PART IN THIS PROCESS AND I REGRET THAT THERE IS JUST NO POSSIBILITY THAT I SHALL BE ABLE TO UNDERTAKE ANY ADDITIONAL VISITS OUTSIDE THIS COUNTRY IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. HOWEVER, I WELCOME YOUR RAISING OF THE RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED ON THE NUMBERS OF THE STAFF AT OUR HIGH COMMISSION IN KAMPALA AND I AM PLEASED TO TELL YOU THAT WE ARE LIKEWISE LIFTING THE RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED ON MR ISINGOMA'S MISSION HERE. I WAS ALSO PLEASED TO SEE THAT YOU FIND MR HENNESSY, IN WHOM I HAVE FULL TRUST, ACCEPTABLE TO YOU AS ACTING HIGH COMMISSIONER IN KAMPALA. WE TOO HAVE FOUND MR ISINGOMA ENTIRELY ACCEPTABLE. BUT I AM NOT SURE THAT THE TIME IS RIGHT FOR THE FORMAL RAISING OF THE STATUS OF OUR RESPECTIVE MISSIONS AND I SUGGEST THAT WE WAIT AND SEE HOW MATTERS DEVELOP BEFORE TAKING A DECISION ON THIS POINT. ENDS.

CALLAGHAN

FCO/WH DISTRIBUTION

EAD

CONFIDENTIAL



*cc Teal Denlan.*

*HM*  
10 Downing Street  
Whitehall

14 April 1975

Thank you for your letter of 11 April, with which you enclosed a draft reply for the Prime Minister to send to President Amin's personal telegram of 10 April.

As I have already told you on the telephone, the Prime Minister has approved the draft with certain minor amendments.

P. R. H. WRIGHT

R.N. Dales, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL



*Prime Minister*

*✓ Agreed, subject to the*  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
London *Removal of a few* SW1A 2AH *superlatives*  
*✓*  
11 April 1975  
*1 agree*  
*on*  
*REA*  
*12 id*

*Dear Patrick,*

*✓* Thank you for your letter of 10 April in which you asked for our urgent advice on the response which the Prime Minister might make to President Amin's personal telegram of the same date. We think that the Prime Minister should reply to this message and I enclose a draft for his consideration.

*✓* In giving this advice, we have it in mind that both the British companies whose assets have been expropriated in Uganda and the British Asians who were expelled in 1972 will expect us to do everything possible to obtain compensation for them. President Amin has now made very definite proposals and, in conversation with our Acting High Commissioner, has promised compensation in cash. We know that he has recently received large subventions from Saudi Arabia. In this situation we think it would be difficult to justify ignoring President Amin's message completely.

*How did he know?*  
The Prime Minister will obviously not wish to take up President Amin's invitation to visit Uganda. We think it would be unwise to suggest their meeting in Kingston, even though President Amin has declared his intention of not going there, since that might encourage him to change his mind. We could also hardly ask The Queen to sign a letter to President Amin accrediting our Acting High Commissioner as High Commissioner so soon after Amin has put himself forward to replace her as Head of the Commonwealth. There are, therefore, limits to the extent to which the Prime Minister can give Amin a forthcoming reply. Within these limits, however, we have tried to make the reply as helpful as possible.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary will have a copy of this letter and the draft telegram in his box to consider on his return from Dublin, but he has not yet seen this advice. Unless the Prime Minister wants to despatch the telegram before the weekend, we should be able to let you have his comments on 14 April.

*Tom was*  
*10/4/75*  
(R. N. Dales)

Patrick Wright, Esq.,  
10, Downing Street,



Department .....	OUTWARD	Security Classification CONFIDENTIAL
Drafted by (Block Capitals) EAD Mr Wigan	TELEGRAM	Precedence IMMEDIATE
Tel. Extn. MB 1497		DESKBY .....Z

FOR COMMS. DEPT. USE	Despatched	(Date) ..... (Time) .....Z	POSTBY.....Z
----------------------------	------------	-------------------------------	--------------

PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin) .....Z(G.M.T.) (Restrictive Prefix).....  
 (Security Class.) CONFIDENTIAL (Caveat/  
 Privacy Marking).....  
 (Codeword) ..... (Deskby).....Z

TO..... IMMEDIATE KAMPALA Tel. No. .... of .....  
 (precedence) (post)

AND TO (precedence/post).....

AND SAVING TO.....

REPEATED TO (for info).....

SAVING TO (for info).....

<p>Distribution:-</p> <p>FCO Whitehall</p> <p>Copies to:-</p>	<p>[TEXT]</p> <p>Please pass the following message from the Prime Minister to General Amin.</p> <p>Begins. I was pleased to receive your message of 10 April and Mr Hennessy has of course reported his two recent conversations with you about relations between our countries.</p> <p>I was <del>most</del> gratified to hear that work on the compensation for our citizens whose property in Uganda was expropriated in 1972 has been completed and that your Government will pay compensation to all those affected. This problem has of course long been a thorn in both our sides. I welcomed the talks between our officials in Kampala in September 1974 and the progress there made, and I shall be <del>most happy</del> <sup>Ready</sup> to send a further team to build</p>
---------------------------------------------------------------	------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

build on the agreement reached on that occasion.

I must thank you for your invitation to visit Kampala.

But you will I am sure realise that I shall be heavily pre-occupied with the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting over the next few weeks and you will know that this country also is moving into a critical stage in deciding if we are to remain in the European Community. I have, of course, to play my full part in this process and I regret that there is just no possibility that I shall be able to undertake any additional visits outside this country in the foreseeable future.

However, I ~~warmly~~ welcome your raising of the restrictions imposed on the numbers of the staff at our High Commission in Kampala and I am pleased to tell you that we are likewise lifting the restrictions imposed on Mr Isingoma's mission here. I was also pleased to see that you find Mr Hennessy, in whom I have full trust, acceptable to you as Acting High Commissioner in Kampala. We too have found Mr Isingoma an entirely acceptable. But I am not sure that the time is right for the formal raising of the status of our respective missions and I suggest that we wait and see how matters develop before taking a decision on this point. Ends

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN



B.F. 14/4/75

Uganda  
10 Downing Street *HE*  
Whitehall

10 April 1975

The Prime Minister has seen Kampala telegram No. 113 of 10 April about Mr. Hennessy's call on General Amin and the Uganda High Commission's note with the text of the personal telegram from General Amin to him.

The Prime Minister would be grateful for your urgent advice as to the response which should be made.

MFF

R.N. Dales, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

**IMMEDIATE**

*Advance Copy 4*

DMF NR E 175/802/10 *DEPT L.*

LHH 201/10

OO FCO

RR NAIROBI

RR UKMIS NEW YORK

RR WASHINGTON

GRS 1000

CYPHER CAT A

FM KAMPALA 101315Z

CONFIDENTIAL

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 113 OF 10 TH APRIL REPEATED FOR  
INFORMATION TO NAIROBI, UKMIS NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON.

ADVANCE COPIES	
PS	
PS	MISS LESTOR
PS to PUS	MR CAMPBELL
HD	EAD. MR ASPIN
HD	CLAIMS D.
HD	C.C.D.
HD	NEWS D.

HD NEWS D.

NO. 10 DOWNING ST.

MY TEL NO 108: ANGLO UGANDAN RELATIONS

1. I WAS SUMMONED TO SEE THE PRESIDENT AT THE COMMAND  
POST LATE THIS MORNING. HEAD OF CHANCERY ACCOMPANIED  
ME. MINISTERS OF HOME AFFAIRS AND JUSTICE, HEAD OF  
STATE RESEARCH BUREAU (SECRET POLICE) COMMANDER OF  
AIRBORNE REGIMENT, UGANDAN ACTING HIGH COMMISSIONER IN LONDON  
AND HIS COUNSELLOR TOGETHER WITH VARIOUS OTHER OFFICIALS,  
TV AND PRESS WERE PRESENT.

2. THE PRESIDENT BEGAN BY REFERRING TO OUR LAST  
CONVERSATION (MY TEL NO 94) WHEN I HAD POINTED OUT THAT  
THERE WERE AT LEAST TWO MAIN OBSTACLES IN THE WAY OF HIS  
DESIRE TO NORMALISE RELATIONS, THE FIRST OF WHICH HE HAD  
REMOVED (BY LIFTING RESTRICTIONS ON THIS MISSION)  
AND THE SECOND OF WHICH (COMPENSATION) HE HAD SAID HE  
WOULD MAKE ARRANGEMENTS TO DISPOSE OF AS SOON AS  
POSSIBLE. HE HAD SUMMONED ME NOW TO SAY THAT HE HAD  
COMPLETED ALL THE WORK ON THE COMPENSATION CLAIMS OF  
BOTH BRITISH AND NON-CITIZEN ASIANS. IT HAD BEEN A LONG  
TIME BUT, HE ADDED, UGANDA HAD BEEN MUCH QUICKER THAN  
MANY OTHER COUNTRIES WHICH STILL OWED BRITAIN  
COMPENSATION. HE WAS READY TO PAY COMPENSATION NOW (A  
PREGNANT PAUSE) IN CASH.

3. HE WOULD SEND A TELEGRAM TO THE PRIME MINISTER  
INVITING THE LATTER TO VISIT KAMPALA SO THAT THE MATTER  
COULD BE FINISHED. IF THERE WERE ANY DIFFICULTIES OR  
COMPLICATIONS THESE COULD BE SORTED OUT LATER BY OFFICIALS.

4. BEFORE HE COULD CONCLUDE THE INTERVIEW I MANAGED  
TO MAKE THE POINT THAT UGANDAN LAW AS I UNDERSTOOD IT  
REQUIRED THE COMPENSATION TO BE PAID TO THE EXPROPRIATED  
COMPANIES - AND NOT TO HIM. HE WAS READY FOR THIS.

*PM*  
*I am seeking  
advice on  
this, and Ann's  
telegram,  
which has just  
arrived.*  
*MT.*

THE MINISTER OF JUSTICE WAS AT THE MEETING, H. SO  
THAT THESE LEGAL DIFFICULTIES COULD BE IRONED THE  
DECREE WOULD BE AMENDED. HE WISHED TO DEAL WITH HER  
MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WAS  
RESPONSIBLE FOR ITS CITIZENS AND THE COMPENSATION COULD  
BE GIVEN TO BRITISH SUBJECTS AS HMG CHOSE. HE HIMSELF  
DID NOT KNOW WHERE ALL THE CLAIMANTS WERE. THIS WAS A  
MATTER FOR HMG.

5. HE THEN MADE MORE MOVES TO CLOSE THE DISCUSSION,  
BUT AGAIN I MANAGED TO GET IN A QUICK QUESTION. WE KNEW,  
I SAID, WHAT OFFER THE UGANDANS HAD MADE TO BRITISH  
COMPANIES, BUT WHAT ABOUT THE ASIANS? I ASSUMED THERE  
WOULD HAVE TO BE FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS ON THIS?

6. THE MONEY WAS THERE, HE SAID. THE MINISTER  
RESPONSIBLE, ODOTH-OFUMBI, WAS PRESENT AND HAD THE MATTER  
IN HAND. HE, AMIN WOULD IN ANY CASE BE DISCUSSING THIS  
WITH THE PRIME MINISTER.

7. . AND SO THE DISCUSSION ENDED. AMIN GAVE NO INDICATION THAT  
HE WAS ANYTHING BUT SINCERE IN HIS DELIGHT AT HAVING, AS HE  
SAW IT, REMOVED THE MAIN OBSTACLE IN THE WAY OF NORMALISING  
RELATIONS. ASSUMING THAT HIS TELEGRAM TO THE PRIME MINISTER-  
AND TONIGHT'S PRESS REPORT OF THE TALKS- BEARS ANY RELATIONS  
TO THE FACTS (A RATHER BIG ASSUMPTION PERHAPS IN THE LIGHT  
OF THE FIRST ROUND) THIS DEVELOPMENT IS, AS FAR AS IT  
GOES, ENCOURAGING. THERE ARE OF COURSE MANY UNANSWERED QUESTIONS  
ARISING OUT OF THE PRESIDENT'S REMARKS, NEVERTHELESS THERE  
APPEARS TO BE AN OPPORTUNITY NOW TO BRING THE COMPENSATION ISSUE  
A STEP NEARER TO A CONCLUSION - AN OPPORTUNITY WHICH I BELIEVE WE  
SHOULD NOT LET SLIP.

8. THE DIFFICULTY PRESENTED BY THE INVITATION TO THE PRIME  
MINISTER TO VISIT UGANDA MIGHT I SUGGEST BE OVERCOME BY A MESSAGE  
FROM THE MR WILSON WELCOMING THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE AND ADDING  
THAT, WHILE OTHER COMMITMENTS RULE OUT A VISIT AT PRESENT, HE WOULD  
BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS THE PRESIDENT'S OFFER WITH AMIN AT THE  
HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING IN KINGSTON. AMIN MIGHT WELL VIEW  
SUCH A MESSAGE AS A SATISFACTORY RESPONSE- BEQ IT COULD CLEAR THE  
WAY FOR FURTHER TALKS YW OFFICIAL SSVEL.

✓ 9. THERE IS OF COURSE A RISK THAT HE WOULD DECIDE TO TAKE UP THEIR  
INVITATION (ALTHOUGH I AM INCLINED TO STICK BY MY ORGINAL JUDGEMENT)  
BUT I ASSUME THAT HIS WILLINGNESS TO MAKE PROGRESS ON THE  
COMPENSATION ISSUE WOULD REMOVE MUCH OF THE EMBARRASSMENT THAT  
HIS PRESENCE AT THE MEETING MIGHT OTHERWISE CAUSE.  
HENNESSY

[Corrected version being obtained]

TELEPHONE: 01-559 1999/5  
TELEGRAMS: UGANDA COM  
TELEX: 502241



HIGH COMMISSION OF THE  
REPUBLIC OF UGANDA  
UGANDA HOUSE  
P.O. BOX 257  
TRAFALGAR SQUARE  
LONDON, WC2N 5DX

OUR REFERENCE C.1/52

*F. A. D.  
for advice, pl. Dis.  
cc Mr. Finester No 10 with my compl.  
Mr. Aspin.*

The High Commission of the Republic of Uganda presents its compliments to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and has the honour to enclose herewith, a telex message from H.E. Al-Hajji General Idi Amin Dada, President of the Republic of Uganda, addressed to the Prime Minister, The Right Honourable Harold Wilson, M.P.

The High Commission of the Republic of Uganda avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the assurances of its highest consideration.

LONFON

10th April, 1975



UGANDA COM LDN )  
61007 ADMINISTER

10TH APRIL, 1975.



TO: THE RT. HON. HAROLD WILSON, M.P.,  
PRIME MINISTER OF THE UNITED KINGDOM,  
10, DOWNING STREET,  
LONDON.

328 DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER,

I TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO INFORM YOU THAT I HAVE  
TODAY RECEIVED YOUR ACTING HIGH COMMISSIONER, MR. J.P.I.  
HENNESSY AND INFORMED HIM OFFICIALLY THAT THE BOARD OF VALUERS  
APPOINTED BY MY GOVERNMENT TO ASSESS THE PROPERTIES LEFT IN  
UGANDA BY THE DEPARTED NON-CITIZEN ASIANS AND BRITISH CITIZENS,  
HAS COMPLETED ITS DIFFICULT WORK IN THE SHORTEST POSSIBLE TIME  
AS I PROMISED WHEN I DECLARED THE ECONOMIC WAR IN AUGUST 1972  
THAT MY GOVERNMENT WILL PAY COMPENSATION TO ALL THOSE AFFECTED.  
I WANT YOU AND THE WORLD TO KNOW THAT I HAVE KEPT MY PROMISE.  
I AM NOW READY TO PAY CASH DIRECTLY TO THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT  
AND IT IS UP TO THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO PAY ITS CITIZENS  
AFFECTED WHEREVER THEY MAY BE.

MY GOVERNMENT WILL DEAL DIRECTLY WITH THE BRITISH  
GOVERNMENT ON THIS MATTER. MY INVITATION TO YOU TO HOLD TALKS  
ON COMPENSATION MATTERS IN UGANDA WHERE I DECLARED OUR SUCCESSFUL

IN KAMPALA AND YOU WILL BE MY GUEST. DETAILED DISCUSSIONS ON THIS MATTER WILL BE LEFT TO OUR TECHNICAL EXPERTS AFTER OUR TALKS. MY GOVERNMENT HAS DONE ITS BEST TO COMPLETE THE EXERCISE IN RECORD TIME. YOU ARE AWARE THAT SOME COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE NATIONALIZED PROPERTIES HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO PAY THOSE AFFECTED FOR MORE THAN 50 YEARS. MY GOVERNMENT HAS TAKEN THIS EXERCISE AS TOP PRIORITY ON HUMANITARIAN BASIS BECAUSE WE KNOW THAT THERE ARE MANY FAMILIES AFFECTED. I, THEREFORE, HOPE THAT YOU WILL GIVE THE MATTER URGENT CONSIDERATION AND COME TO KAMPALA AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO INITIATE COMPENSATION TALKS.

I WISH ALSO TO INFORM YOU THAT AFTER RECEIVING THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S REQUEST AND DESIRE, THROUGH YOUR ACTING HIGH COMMISSIONER, TO NORMALIZE RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES I LIFTED THE BAN ON STAFF RESTRICTION AT THE UGANDA HIGH COMMISSION WITH EFFECT FROM 4TH APRIL, 1975 AND I REQUEST THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO DO THE SAME WITH THE UGANDA HIGH COMMISSION IN LONDON.

I ALSO INFORMED THE ACTING BRITISH HIGH COMMISSIONER THAT I AM READY TO APPOINT MY PRESENT ACTING HIGH COMMISSIONER IN LONDON TO FULL HIGH COMMISSIONER IF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT ACCEPTS TO APPOINT THE PRESENT ACTING HIGH COMMISSIONER TO FULL STATUS OF HIGH COMMISSIONER. I AM CONFIDENT THAT THE



58  
ECONOMIC WAR, STILL STANDS. I AM READY TO RECEIVE YOU ANY TIME  
IN KAMPALA AND YOU WILL BE MY GUEST. DETAILED DISCUSSIONS ON  
THIS MATTER WILL BE LEFT TO OUR TECHNICAL EXPERTS AFTER OUR  
TALKS. MY GOVERNMENT HAS DONE ITS BEST TO COMPLETE THE EXERCISE  
IN RECORD TIME. YOU ARE AWARE THAT SOME COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE  
NATIONALIZED PROPERTIES HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO PAY THOSE  
AFFECTED FOR MORE THAN 50 YEARS. MY GOVERNMENT HAS TAKEN THIS  
EXERCISE AS TOP PRIORITY ON HUMANITARIAN BASIS BECAUSE WE KNOW  
THAT THERE ARE MANY FAMILIES AFFECTED. I, THEREFORE, HOPE  
THAT YOU WILL GIVE THE MATTER URGENT CONSIDERATION AND COME  
TO KAMPALA AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO INITIATE COMPENSATION  
TALKS.

I WISH ALSO TO INFORM YOU THAT AFTER RECEIVING THE  
BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S REQUEST AND DESIRE, THROUGH YOUR ACTING  
HIGH COMMISSIONER, TO NORMALIZE RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO  
COUNTRIES I LIFTED THE BAN ON STAFF RESTRICTION AT THE BRITISH  
HIGH COMMISSION WITH EFFECT FROM 21TH APRIL, 1975 AND I REQUESTED  
THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO DO THE SAME WITH THE UGANDA HIGH  
COMMISSION IN LONDON.

I ALSO INFORMED THE ACTING BRITISH HIGH COMMISSIONER  
THAT I AM READY TO APPOINT MY PRESENT ACTING HIGH COMMISSIONER  
IN LONDON TO FULL HIGH COMMISSIONER IF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT  
ACCEPTS TO APPOINT THE PRESENT ACTING HIGH COMMISSIONER

PRESENT ACTING BRITISH HIGH COMMISSIONER WHOM I CONSIDER  
TO BE A VERY CAPABLE AND MOST UNDERSTANDING DIPLOMAT WILL  
BE ABLE TO PROMOTE THE STRONG, FRIENDLY TIES WHICH HAVE EXISTED  
FOR MANY YEARS BETWEEN THE PEOPLE OF UGANDA AND THE PEOPLE OF  
BRITAIN. THE HIGH COMMISSIONER SHOULD BE ASSISTED BY YOUNG,  
REVOLUTIONARY BRITISH CITIZENS WHO HAVE NOT SERVED IN THE  
BRITISH COLONIES IN THE PAST AND THUS DO NOT HARBOUR ANY COLONIAL  
MENTALITY THAT THE AFRICANS CANNOT DO WHAT THE BRITISH CAN DO.  
I SHALL, THEREFORE, ACCEPT ANY WELCOME FRESH AND PROGRESSIVE  
DIPLOMATS TO UGANDA BUT NOT THOSE WHO WILL INDULGE IN SUBVERSIVE  
ACTIVITIES AGAINST UGANDA. WE SHALL ALSO WELCOME DIRECT INVESTMENT  
FROM YOUR COUNTRY.

I WISH TO ASSURE YOU, ONCE AGAIN, THAT I HAVE NO  
HATRED WHATSOEVER TOWARDS THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT NOR TO THE  
BRITISH PEOPLE. THE ECONOMIC WAR WHICH I DECLARED WAS PURELY  
FOR THE GOOD OF MY PEOPLE AND HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH RACISM.  
FOR YOUR INFORMATION WE NOW HAVE NATIONALS FROM INDIA, PAKISTAN  
AND BANGLADESH WHO ARE EMPLOYED BY UGANDA GOVERNMENT IN VARIOUS  
FIELDS. THEY ARE HERE TO ASSIST US IN OUR DEVELOPMENT BUT NOT  
TO CONTROL OUR ECONOMY AS IT WAS IN THE PAST.

I FIRMLY BELIEVE THAT IT WILL STOP MALICIOUS  
PROPAGANDA AGAINST UGANDA AND ALSO STOP INDIA EXILES IN BRITAIN

SUCH AS WANJIE KIREDI , KAZOORA, NAKINTEYA, BIRALEA AND MANY  
FROM ENGINEERING OR PUBLISHING MALICIOUS PROPAGANDA AGAINST  
THEIR MOTHERLAND , THE STRONG, FRATERNAL TIES WHICH HAVE EXISTED  
BETWEEN BRITAIN AND UGANDA WILL BE RESTORED IMMEDIATELY AND  
STRENGTHENED EVEN FURTHER.

ALL THOSE WHO HAVE IN THE PAST BELIEVED IN THE  
MALICIOUS PROPAGANDA THAT UGANDA IS BANKRUPT SHOULD NOW ACCEPT  
THE TRUTH. WE ARE NOT BANKRUPT AND ARE READY TO PAY COMPENSATION  
AS I PROMISED. THE DOOR IS OPEN AND WE ARE READY TO RECEIVE  
YOU AND TO ACCORD YOU THE WARM UGANDA TRADITIONAL HOSPITALITY.

WITH HIGHEST CONSIDERATION,

AL-HAJJI GENERAL IDI AMIN DADA, VC, DSO  
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA

CONFIDENTIAL

Uganda X

GR 100

IMMEDIATE

CYPHER CAT A

FM KAMPALA 240700Z

CONFIDENTIAL

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 87 OF 24 TH MARCH.

MY TELNO 86 : PRESIDENT AMIN.

1. AMIN'S LATEST TELEGRAM TO THE PRIME MINISTER SEEMS TO IMPLY A WILLINGNESS TO IMPROVE RELATIONS. AT ANY RATE IT WOULD I THINK BE WORTH EXPLORING THE POSSIBILITIES, PERHAPS TAKING AS A STARTING POINT HIS PENULTIMATE PARAGRAPH. TO ENABLE ME TO DO SO IT WOULD BE USEFUL IF I COULD BE GIVEN EARLY INSTRUCTIONS TO DELIVER A SUITABLE REPLY.

HENNESSY

FILES

EAD

GIRD

NEWSD

PS

PS/MISSLESTOR

PS/AUS

MR CAMPBELL

MR ASPIN

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

CONFIDENTIAL

X  
IMMEDIATE

GRS 55

EN CLAIR

FM KAMPALA 211100Z

UNCLASSIFIED

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 86 OF 21 ST MARCH.  
PRESIDENT AMIN.

1. THE PERMANENT SECRETARY M F A HAS JUST TELEPHONED TO SAY  
THAT THE PRESIDENT HAS SENT A TELEGRAM OF CONDOLENCE TO THE  
PRIME MINISTER ABOUT THE DEATH OF HIS PPS. IT WILL BE BROADCAST  
ON RADIO UGANDA AT 1100 GMT.

2. COPY FOLLOWS IN TODAY'S BAG.

HENNESSY

/COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET/

F I L E S

EAD

GIPD

NEWS D

PS

PS/MISS LESTOR

PS/PUS

MR CAMPBELL

MR ASPIN



*I am aware of this view*  
CONFIDENTIAL

Uganda

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London S.W.1

27 January 1975

Prime Minister

*Spoken to Mr. P. R. to discuss.*

*pa*

*Mr. Patrick 27/1*

*In case we do reply later, I have suggested you find it under to the FCO. But meanwhile, are you content with this?*

General Amin

*27/1*

Please refer to my letter of 23 January.

Our Acting High Commissioner in Kampala has recommended (Kampala telegram No. 37) <sup>attached.</sup> that, in accordance with the discretion given to him, he should not carry out the instructions in our telegram No. 19 to deliver to the Ugandans our rejection of General Amin's proposal to visit the UK from 4 August this year.

We have recognised that there might be a risk to the remaining British community, numbering nearly one thousand. Mr. Hennessy believes that this risk is a real one and that General Amin might well react sharply to our rejection. He considers that no reply at all would in African terms be considered a refusal. We consider that we should accept his advice. We have consulted the Palace who agree that a dignified silence at present would be acceptable to them.

There is of course a risk that the Press might seize on our non-reply as indicating that General Amin's message to The Queen was beneath contempt. They might also surmise as they have in the past that the risk to our community precludes a negative reply. However, our News Department judge that interest in the message is waning and that they should be able to hold the simple line that we have decided not to reply.

Should General Amin persist with his plan to come to Britain, we may need at a later stage to consider a more clearly expressed negative. In that case it might be prudent to do so through the Ugandan Acting High Commissioner in London, Mr. Isingoma.

Because of the short time available before the Prime Minister's departure for Washington, I am sending this letter in parallel with

/ our submission

Patrick Wright, Esq.,  
10, Downing Street,  
S.W.1.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL



our submission of advice to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary. I shall let you know Mr. Callaghan's decision. Subject to his agreement and to that of the Prime Minister we would send a telegram to Kampala on the lines of the ... attached draft.

*Yours ever,*

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read 'R. N. Dales'.

(R. N. Dales)

CONFIDENTIAL

Department EAST AFRICAN  
Drafted by MR M K EWANS  
(Block Capitals) MB 1471  
Tel. Extn.....

OUTWARD  
TELEGRAM

Security Classification  
CONFIDENTIAL

Precedence  
PRIORITY

DESKBY .....Z

FOR  
COMMS. DEPT.  
USE

Despatched

(Date) .....

(Time) .....Z

POSTBY.....Z

PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin) .....Z(G.M.T.)

(Restrictive Prefix).....

(Security Class.) CONFIDENTIAL

(Caveat)

Privacy Marking).....

(Codeword) .....

(Deskby).....Z

TO.....  
(precedence) PRIORITY KAMPALA (post) Tel. No. .... of .....

AND TO (precedence/post).....

AND SAVING TO.....

REPEATED TO (for info).....ROUTINE NAIROBI

SAVING TO (for info).....

Distribution:-

Departmental  
10  
100  
100  
100/FUS  
100/Miss Lester  
100

Copies to:-

No. 10

The Charteris  
Sackingham Palace

[TEXT]

Your telno 37: President Amin

1. I accept the arguments in your paragraph 1 and agree that you should not (not) deliver to the Ugandans the message suggested in my telegram No. 19. If pressed you should speak along the lines proposed in your paragraph 2.
2. News Department will continue for a day or two to hold the line that Amin's message is under consideration and will then reply, if asked, that it has been decided not to respond to it. They will not be drawn on reasons.
3. Essential point remains that Amin should not be announced or unannounced, in this country. You should therefore continue to watch for evidence of his intention. If he shows further interest in coming here we will consider how a more clearly negative answer might best be given. We see merit in your suggestion that Isingoma might be used in such circumstances.

CONFIDENTIAL



IMF NR E 34/27

(25)

LIH 88/27

OO FCO

GRS300

CYPHER CAT A

FM KAMPALA 270905Z

DESKBY 271100Z

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPT 17  
ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

ADVANCE COPIES	
PS	
PS/MISS LEE	
PS to PUS	
Mr Campbell	
Mr. [unclear]	
Mr. [unclear]	

HD EAD

HD PCD

HD NEWS D

No. 10 Downing St.

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 37 OF 27 TH JANUARY AND SAVING TO NAIROBI.  
PRESIDENT AMIN : MY TELEGRAM NO 36.

1. I HAVE SPOKEN INFORMALLY OVER THE WEEKEND TO TRUSTWORTHY COLLEAGUES, (PARTICULARLY AFRICAN) TO MINISTERS, OFFICIALS AND OTHERS. I AM NOW CONFIRMED IN THE VIEW EXPRESSED IN MY TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE THAT AMIN WOULD REGARD AS PROVOCATION ANY OFFICIAL REPLY TO THE EFFECT THAT HIS PROPOSED VISIT TO THE UK WAS "INCONVENIENT". TO HAVE TOLD HIM ON THE DAY WHEN HE WAS RECEIVING DELEGATIONS AND TELEGRAM BEARING MESSAGES OF CONGRATULATIONS AND GOOD WISHES (ON THE ANNIVERSARY OF THE FOUNDING OF THE SECOND REPUBLIC) WOULD IN THE VIEW OF MOST OBSERVERS HAVE BEEN CALCULATED TO BRING A SWIFT REACTION. IT PROBABLY STILL WOULD. THE CONSENSUS APPEARED TO BELIEVE THAT THE PRESIDENT'S TELEGRAM WOULD BE BEST IGNORED. THIS WOULD BE THE AFRICAN WAY OF SAYING THAT THE VISIT WOULD NOT BE WELCOME. IF AMIN WERE THICK SKINNED ENOUGH NOT TO TAKE THE POINT AND PRESSED FOR A REPLY (OPINION IS DIVIDED ON THE QUESTION OF HOW SERIOUSLY HE EXPECTED TO BE TAKEN) IT MIGHT, IN THE VIEW OF OUR AFRICAN FRIENDS, BE NECESSARY TO SPELL OUT THE REASONS FOR OUR SILENCE. AND ACCORDING TO AFRICAN CUSTOM THIS WOULD BEST BE DONE INDIRECTLY (I E BY SUMMONING ISINGOMA AND ASKING HIM TO EXPLAIN THE POSITION TO HIS MASTER)

2. I DOUBT WHETHER THE MATTER WILL BE RAISED HERE. IF IT IS I

WOULD PROPOSE TO REPLY ON THE LINES OF YOUR TELEGRAM NO 19 MAKING IT CLEAR THAT I HAD NOT RECEIVED - AND DID NOT EXPECT TO RECEIVE - INSTRUCTIONS, BUT THAT THIS IS WHAT I IMAGINED THE POSITION TO BE.

3. AUGUST IS A LONG WAY OFF - AND MUCH CAN HAPPEN BEFORE THEN - BUT SHOULD THE WORST BEFALL US THERE IS PROBABLY LITTLE WE CAN DO TO STOP HIM. AS WE FOUND OVER THE ASIANS ATTEMPTS TO DEFLECT

10 10 100

ADVANCE COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE

GRS300

CYPHER CAT A

FM KAMPALA 270905Z

D E S K B Y 271100Z

CONFIDENTIAL

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 37 OF 27 JANUARY 1975 AND SAVING TO NAIROBI.  
PRESIDENT AMIN : MY TELEGRAM NO 36.

1. I HAVE SPOKEN INFORMALLY OVER THE WEEKEND TO TRUSTWORTHY COLLEAGUES, (PARTICULARLY AFRICAN) TO MINISTERS, OFFICIALS AND OTHERS. I AM NOW CONFIRMED IN THE VIEW EXPRESSED IN MY TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE THAT AMIN WOULD REGARD AS PROVOCATION ANY OFFICIAL REPLY TO THE EFFECT THAT HIS PROPOSED VISIT TO THE UK WAS "INCONVENIENT". TO HAVE TOLD HIM ON THE DAY WHEN HE WAS RECEIVING DELEGATIONS AND TELEGRAMS BEARING MESSAGES OF CONGRATULATIONS AND GOOD WISHES (ON THE ANNIVERSARY OF THE FOUNDING OF THE SECOND REPUBLIC) WOULD IN THE VIEW OF MOST OBSERVERS HAVE BEEN CALCULATED TO BRING A SWIFT REACTION. IT PROBABLY STILL WOULD. THE CONSENSUS APPEARED TO BELIEVE THAT THE PRESIDENT'S TELEGRAM WOULD BE BEST IGNORED. THIS WOULD BE THE AFRICAN WAY OF SAYING THAT THE VISIT WOULD NOT BE WELCOME. IF AMIN WERE THICK SKINNED ENOUGH NOT TO TAKE THE POINT AND PRESSED FOR A REPLY (OPINION IS DIVIDED ON THE QUESTION OF HOW SERIOUSLY HE EXPECTED TO BE TAKEN) IT MIGHT, IN THE VIEW OF OUR AFRICAN FRIENDS, BE NECESSARY TO SPELL OUT THE REASONS FOR OUR SILENCE. AND ACCORDING TO AFRICAN CUSTOM THIS WOULD BEST BE DONE INDIRECTLY (I E BY SUMMONING ISINGOMA AND ASKING HIM TO EXPLAIN THE POSITION TO HIS MASTER)

2. I DOUBT WHETHER THE MATTER WILL BE RAISED HERE. IF IT IS I

WOULD PROPOSE TO REPLY ON THE LINES OF YOUR TELEGRAM NO 19 MAKING IT CLEAR THAT I HAD NOT RECEIVED - AND DID NOT EXPECT TO RECEIVE - INSTRUCTIONS, BUT THAT THIS IS WHAT I IMAGINED THE POSITION TO BE.

3. AUGUST IS A LONG WAY OFF - AND MUCH CAN HAPPEN BEFORE THEN - BUT SHOULD THE WORST BEFALL US THERE IS PROBABLY LITTLE WE CAN DO TO STOP HIM. AS WE FOUND OVER THE ASIANS ATTEMPTS TO DEFLECT HIM USUALLY MAKE HIM MORE DETERMINED, WHEREAS IF TREATED AS

CONFIDENTIAL

/ NOT WORTHY OF

CONFIDENTIAL

NOT WORTHY OF SERIOUS CONSIDERATION THE PROPOSAL COULD BE FORGOTTEN, LIKE SO MUCH ELSE. IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS IF THE VISIT CAME OFF IT MIGHT PROVE A SPECTACULAR CLIMB DOWN. HAVING ALREADY SEEN HIM GIVE WAY ON THE QUESTION OF OFFICIAL TALKS ON COMPENSATION IN KAMPALA , A VISIT TO LONDON COULD COMPLETE THE PROCESS.

HENNESSY

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

EAD  
P & C D  
NEWS D  
OAD's

COPIES TO:

LT COL THE RT HON  
SIR MARTIN CHARTERIS  
KCB KCVO OBE  
BUCKINGHAM PALACE

CONFIDENTIAL



10 Downing Street  
Whitehall

27 January 1975

Message from President Amin

As you know, the Prime Minister and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary had a word on the morning of 24 January about the proposed reply to be sent to the Deputy High Commissioner in Kampala to deliver to President Amin.

When he saw the precise terms of the draft reply over the weekend, the Prime Minister wondered whether an alternative form of words, indicating that a visit of the type proposed in the President's message "would not be in accordance with H.M. Government's list of priorities in the coming year" might not be preferable. I understand from our conversation this morning that the Deputy High Commissioner has now recommended that no reply should be given to the message, but in case we decide after all to proceed with a reply, you may wish to bear the Prime Minister's proposed formulation in mind.

P. R. H. WRIGHT

R. N. Dales, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

S250

CYPHER CAT A  
FM KAMPALA 241445Z

CONFIDENTIAL

1975

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 36 OF 24 TH JANUARY/ REPEATED FOR  
INFORMATION TO NAIROBI.

YOUR TELNO (19) : AMIN.

1. GIVEN AMIN'S GENERAL UNPREDICTABILITY AND HIS PRESENT HIGH BLOOD PRESSURE IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO SAY THAT THERE WOULD BE NO RISK TO THE COMMUNITY OR TO OUR STAFF SHOULD A NOTE ON THE LINES PROPOSED BE DELIVERED NOW.
2. IF THE NOTE WERE LEFT UNTIL AFTER THE WEEKEND THE RISK MIGHT WELL BE LESS: AMIN USUALLY COOLS OFF QUICKLY. AND WHILE I PERSONALLY WOULD DOUBT IF HE WOULD EVER GO SO FAR AS TO EXPEL US OR THE COMMUNITY THERE IS NO DOUBT IN MY MIND THAT HARRASSING ACTION OF SOME KIND WOULD BE LIKELY . HE RARELY IF EVER FAILS TO REACT. NEVERTHELESS MY STAFF AND I ARE PERFECTLY PREPARED TO FACE THIS POSSIBILITY . I CANNOT SPEAK FOR THE COMMUNITY.
3. I HAVE NOT SEEN AMIN OR HIS MINISTERS FOR THE LAST FEW DAYS- EVERYONE IS OCCUPIED WITH RECEIVING DELEGATIONS- SO I AM IN NO POSITION TO JUDGE THE CURRENT MOOD BUT I SHOULD BE BETTER PLACED TO REPORT ON LIKELY REACTIONS AFTER TOMORROW'S CELEBRATIONS.
4. THERE IS A FURTHER DIFFICULTY . FROM TO-NIGHT UNTIL MONDAY NIGHT IT WILL PROBABLY BE IMPOSSIBLE TO FIND ANYONE IN MFA DUE TO THE CELEBRATIONS . TWO RECENTLY ARRIVED AMBASSADORS HAVE TOLD ME THAT THEY HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO CONTACT ANYONE SO FAR. THUS DELIVERING THE NOTE PROMPTLY MIGHT PRESENT FURTHER PROBLEMS.

HENNESSY

[COPIES SENT TO NO.10 DOWNING STREET]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION:

EAD  
PCD  
NEWS D  
OADS

COPIES TO:

LT. COL RT HON SIR MARTIN CHARTERIS.  
KCB, KCVO, OBE  
BUCKINGHAM PALACE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER

Message from President Amin

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary discussed with you briefly this morning the message from President Amin to The Queen, and the reply which he proposed to send via the Acting High Commissioner in Kampala.

Buckingham Palace have been consulted on the terms of the reply, and agree that, while it should be made clear to General Amin that Her Majesty has received his message, it would be inappropriate for her to become directly involved in an exchange on this subject.

I attach for your information a copy of the message, a telegram from the Deputy High Commissioner, and the telegram of instructions sent to Kampala today.

*[Handwritten signature]*

24 January, 1975.

CONFIDENTIAL

6  
I agree. Query as a  
alter at last  
sentence -  
after message  
"wd. not be in  
circumstances not  
14th's list of  
provisions for the  
coming year."

CONFIDENTIAL

59  
PRIME MINISTER

Message from President Amin

I attach a copy of President Amin's much publicised message to The Queen, which I have received from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Although the message claims to have been copied to you, we have not yet received a direct copy here. In reply to Press enquiries, Buckingham Palace are saying that the questions raised in the message are matters on which The Queen will need advice from the Prime Minister.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary is considering what reply should be sent to the message, and may wish to discuss this with you during the meeting at 9.30 tomorrow morning. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office attach importance to sending a prompt reply, and I hope that it may therefore be possible for you to agree on the terms of a reply when you see Mr. Callaghan tomorrow.

Also attached is a telegram from the Acting High Commissioner in Kampala (who, as you will see, has also not received a copy of the telegram).



23 January, 1975.

CONFIDENTIAL





Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

23 January, 1975

General Amin

....  
....  
I am writing to offer advice on what reply might be sent to General Amin's message to The Queen, of which a copy is attached. I also attach a telegram from our Acting High Commissioner in Kampala, commenting on the message.

The General's message was received via the Crown Agents. Copies were addressed to the Prime Minister and Mr. Heath but not to our High Commission in Kampala. Radio Uganda broadcast a lengthy summary of the telegram simultaneously with its despatch.

As you will see from the text, the message is intemperate in language, its general tenor is insulting, and its content is unacceptable in that it indicates an intention to make contact with advocates of the secession of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland from the United Kingdom. Its appearance is somewhat surprising, coming as it does only a short while after General Amin professed a wish to 'turn over a new leaf' in his relations with us. Our Acting High Commissioner considers that it may have been prompted by recent articles in the British Press, by the omission of Uganda from the Secretary of State's African tour and by the recent defection to the UK of Amin's Minister of Finance, Mr. Wakhweya.

There would seem to us to be some advantage in our showing General Amin that his presence here is unwelcome and in making our reply public. As one would expect with a dictator, he is reported to be impressed by firm action on our part (e.g. our reciprocal reduction to five of the Ugandan High Commission here). He has been known

Patrick Wright Esq.,  
10, Downing Street,  
London S.W.1.

CONFIDENTIAL



in the past to believe that Her Majesty would be more inclined than Her Ministers to have dealings with him and it would be worthwhile demonstrating the fallacy of this. His interventions in world affairs are known to be a source of embarrassment to other African leaders who face the prospect of his assuming the Presidency of the OAU in June of this year. They could be expected to appreciate a firm reply from us. Above all, it is just possible, even if unlikely, that if no reply is sent, he will turn up at Heathrow on 4 August, with embarrassments that are hideous to contemplate.

The only possible objection which we see to the delivery to General Amin of a reply turning down his proposal, is that he might see fit to retaliate against our High Commission and/or the British Community. This is unlikely, but we think that our Acting High Commissioner should be given discretion to withhold the reply if he feels that the risk is a serious one. The reports which we have received and which Mr. Wakhweya has confirmed, of Uganda's approaching economic bankruptcy, indicate that there is little risk of our reply damaging our commercial or compensation interests.

The Palace have been consulted and agree that whilst it should be made clear to General Amin that Her Majesty has received his message, it would be inappropriate for her to become directly involved in an exchange on this subject.

... I attach a draft telegram which, if the Prime Minister agrees, we would send to our High Commissioner.

(R.N. Dales)

CYPHER CAT A

IMMEDIATE

CE S K B Y 231100Z

FM KAMPALA 230840Z

CONFIDENTIAL

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 33 OF 23 RD JANUARY REPEATED FOR INFORMATION  
TO NAIROBI. 23/

AMIN.

1. PRESIDENT AMIN'S TELEGRAM TO THE QUEEN ANNOUNCING HIS INTENTION TO VISIT ENGLAND ON AUGUST 4 WAS BROADCAST ON RADIO UGANDA LAST NIGHT . WE HAD NO PRIOR WARNING , NOR HAVE WE RECEIVED A COPY OF THE TELEGRAM . (AMIN WOULD HAVE KNOWN THAT I WOULD BE UNLIKELY TO ACCEPT IT). *how can I get.*
2. ITS IMPERTINENT TONE BRINGS TO MIND SIMILAR TELEGRAMS TO PRESIDENT NIXON AND MRS GOLDA MEIR LAST YEAR. NO DOUBT IT REFLECTS HIS MOUNTING CHAGRIN AT RECENT DEVELOPMENTS , STARTING WITH THE OMISSION OF UGANDA FROM YOUR AFRICAN TOUR(I HAVE IT ON GOOD AUTHORITY THAT THIS UPSET HIM MORE THAN MANY THOUGHT AT THE TIME) AND ENDING WITH MINISTER WAKHWEYA'S DECISION LAST WEEK TO RESIGN AND SEEK REFUGE IN THE UK. THE GARBLED VERSION OF THE SUNDAY TELEGRAPH COMMENT (YOUR TELNO 12) WHICH HE APPEARS TO BELIEVE WAS BROADCAST BY THE BBC AS A CALL TO ASSASSINATE HIM, ALSO TOUCHED A RAW NERVE.( BUT THERE SEEMS NO DOUBT , FROM TIMING INVOLVED , THAT AMIN'S TELEGRAM WAS AT LEAST IN DRAFT BEFORE MFA RECEIVED OUR NOTE DECLINING INVITATION TO SEND DELEGATION TO CELEBRATIONS-MY TEL 31 REFERS).
3. THE TELEGRAM DOES NOT APPEAR TO CALL FOR A REPLY .IT IS IN ANY CASE BENEATH CONTEMPT. IF ASKED TO COMMENT I WOULD FEEL INCLINED TO SAY THAT IT SEEMS THAT THE PRESIDENT IS IN A STATE OF DEEP DEPRESSION OVER MR WAKHWEYA'S LIKELY REVELATIONS AND CAN NO LONGER BE HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR HIS ACTIONS .AS FOR THE VISIT TO BRITAIN WE SHALL HAVE TO SEE WHETHER AMIN IS STILL PRESIDENT NEARER THE TIME . IT WOULD CERTAINLY BE UNWELCOME ; AND THE PRESIDENT HIMSELF MIGHT JUDGE ON REFLECTION THAT IT MIGHT BE WISE TO RECONSIDER THE VISIT IN THE LIGHT OF THE REACTION THAT COULD BE EXPECTED FROM THE MANY UGANDANS WHO NOW PREFER BRITAIN TO UGANDA .

CONFIDENTIAL

*ILL BUT YOU*

CONFIDENTIAL

4. BUT YOU WOULD PROBABLY PREFER THAT I SAID ONLY THAT WE HAD NOT RECEIVED THE TELEGRAM AND COULD NOT THEREFORE OFFER ANY COMMENT. I SHALL REPLY ACCORDINGLY -IF ASKED -UNLESS INSTRUCTED TO THE CONTRARY.

HENNESSY

[COPIES SENT TO NO. 10 DOWNING STREET]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

EAD  
OADS  
P & CD  
GIPD  
IRD  
NEWS D

COPY TO: LT COL THE RT HON  
SIR MARTIN CHARTERIS  
KCB KCVO OBE  
BUCKINGHAM PALACE

- 2 -

CONFIDENTIAL

File No. .... EAST AFRICAN  
Department .....  
Drafted by .....  
(Block Capitals) MR M K EWANS  
Tel. Extn. MB 1471

OUTWARD  
TELEGRAM

Security Classification  
CONFIDENTIAL

Precedence  
IMMEDIATE

DESKBY .....

FOR  
COMMS. DEPT.  
USE

Despatched (Date) .....  
(Time) .....Z

POSTBY.....

PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin) .....Z(G.M.T.) (Restrictive Prefix).....

(Security Class.) CONFIDENTIAL (Caveat/  
Privacy Marking).....

(Codeword) ..... (Deskby).....

TO IMMEDIATE KAMPALA  
(precedence) (post) Tel. No. .... of .....

AND TO (precedence/post).....

AND SAVING TO.....

REPEATED TO (for info) NAIROBI

SAVING TO (for info).....

Distribution:-

Departmental

EAD  
FCD  
OADs  
News Dept

Copies to:-  
Sir I. Charteris  
Buckingham Palace  
No. 10.

[TEXT]


Your telno 33: General Amin.

1. We would like to reply promptly to General Amin making it clear that, a visit here by him would not be welcome. But we would not of course wish to do so if you felt that there would be a risk that a prompt rejection of his proposal might provoke him to take action against your High Commission or the British Community.

2. Provided you see no such risk, you should, therefore, despatch as soon as possible a Note to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, substantive text of which should read:

("President Amin's message") to Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II has been referred to Prime Minister. The High Commission have been instructed to say that a visit of the type proposed in the President's message would be inconvenient to Her Majesty's

CROWN LONDON  
61007 ADMINISTER



TO HER MAJESTY,  
QUEEN ELIZABETH II  
OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND  
BUCKINGHAM PALACE.

99 YOUR MAJESTY,

YOUR ARE, NO DOUBT, KEPT ABREAST WITH THE GREAT  
STRIDES IN THE ECONOMIC FIELDS UGANDA HAS MADE SINCE I ASKED  
YOUR AUTHORITIES TO ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY OVER YOUR NATIONALS  
OF ASIAN EXTRACTION WHO HAD VOWED TO PERPETUALLY DOMINATE AND  
SHAPE THE ECONOMIC DESTINY OF UGANDA FOR THEIR OWN SELFISH  
AND SITUATIONAL AIMS STOP SINCE I GAVE THE DIRECTIVE THAT NON-  
CITIZEN ASIANS OF BRITISH NATIONALITY RETURN TO THEIR MOTHERLAND  
COMMA BRITAIN COMMA SO MUCH HAS TAKEN PLACE AND SO MUCH HAS  
BEEN SAID STOP THE ECONOMIC WAR WHICH WE HAVE BEEN FIGHTING  
TOOTH AND NAIL HAS BEEN HONOURABLY WON STOP THIS IS A FACT  
NON STOP THIS IS A FACT COMMA NOT A FUSS STOP WE HAVE ENCOUNTERED  
A PARADE OF INTERICATE PROBLEMS ON OUR ROAD TO ECONOMIC INDEPENDENCE  
AND THE CONSOLIDATION OF OUR POLITICAL SOVEREIGNTY STOP NOW THE  
QUEST IS SETTLING COMMA OR SHOULD I SAY COMMA IT HAS SETTLED

I HAVE NOW THE TIME TO RELAY A BIT STOP CONSEQUENTLY

2  
THAT I HAVE DECIDED TO SPEND MY ECONOMIC WAR HONEYMOON IN  
ENGLAND ON THE 4TH AUGUST 1975 STOP

UR MAJESTYYCOMMA IT IS ARDENTLY HOPED AND EXPECTED  
THAT YOU WILL COMMA THROUGH VARIOUS AGENCIES COMMA ARRANGE FOR  
ME SO THAT I CAN SEE AND VISIT SCOTLAND COMMA WALES AND NORTHERN  
IRELAND STOP I SHOULD LIKE TO USE THAT CHANCE TO TALK TO THESE  
PEOPLE WHO ARE STRUGGLING FOR SELF-DETERMINATION AND INDEPENDENCE  
FOR YOUR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SYSTEM STOP AS A REVOLUTIONARY  
LEADER COMMA I AM PREPARED COMMA WHEN IT IS NECESSARY COMMA TO  
ADVISE ON VARIOUS LIBERATION FRONTS AND ON WAYS AND MEANS OF  
DEFEATING NOT ONLY REAL BUT ALSO IMAGINARY IMPERIALISM COMMA  
RACISM AND ECONOMIC SERFDOM STOP

I SHALL ALSO BE OBLIGED IF ARRANGEMENTS ARE MADE  
FOR ME TO MEET AND EXCHANGE VIEWS WITH THE NON-CITIZEN ASIANS  
OF BRITISH NATIONALITY THAT I BOOTED OUT OF THIS COUNTRY  
IN SEPTEMBER 1972 BECAUSE OF OUR UNEQUIVOCAL DETERMINATION  
TO RID UGANDA OF ECONOMIC SLAVERY AND LOYALTY TO CORRUPTION  
STOP

I SHALL BE IN A POSITION TO APPRAISE THEM OF THE  
ECONOMIC SITUATION IN THE PRESENT DAY UGANDA STOP I SHALL TRY NOT  
TO FORGET TO TELL THEM THAT I DO NOT REGRET THEIR ABSENCE IN  
UGANDA AT ALL AS I KNEW AND I STILL CONTINUE TO KNOW THAT

3  
THEIR STAY IN UGANDA WAS PERPETUALLY IDENTIFIED WITH SYSTEMATIC  
LOOTING OF OUR ECONOMY AND A CONCERTED EFFORT TO VORACIOUSLY  
SURJUGATE AND FRUSTRATE EFFORTS AND INTENTS OF THE BLACK MAN  
TO SHARE HIS OWN ECONOMIC COMMA POLITICAL COMMA CULTURAL AND  
SOCIAL DESTINY STOP

DURING MY STAY IN YOUR COUNTRY COMMA I SHALL HAVE  
THE CHANCE TO MEET MY OLD COLLEAGUES AND FRIENDS STOP NOW THAT  
UGANDA IS COMMA BEYOND DISPUTE COMMA ECONOMICALLY FREE  
AND POLITICALLY SOVEREIGN COMMA MY PROPOSED VISIT TO YOUR COUNTRY  
WILL BE A GOOD OVEN IN THE DIRECTION OF NORMALISING RELATIONS  
BETWEEN US AND THE BRITISH STOP WE ARE COMMITTED TO SAFEGUARDING  
OUR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INDEPENDENCE JEALOUSLY STOP ANY  
TENDENCIES COMMA REAL OR IMAGINARY COMMA DISTANT OR NEAR COMMA  
AIMED AT DISPLACING THE ECONOMIC STATUS QUO IN UGANDA SHALL MEET  
ORGANISED OPPOSITION FROM US STOP

AS MY FORMER COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE KINGS AFRICAN  
RIFLES AND HEAD OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS COMMA I WISH  
YOU AND THE PEOPLE OF BRITAIN ON BEHALF OF THE PEOPLE OF UGANDA  
AND MY OWN BEHALF COMMA A HAPPY AND PROSPEROUS NEW YEAR COMMA  
COMMA LONG LIFE AND A BRIGHT FUTURE STOP

HI AM SENDING THIS MESSAGE EARLY SO THAT YOU MAY HAVE  
AMPLE TIME TO HELP YOU ARRANGE ALL THAT IS REQUIRED FOR MY  
COMFORTABLE STAY IN YOUR COUNTRY STOP FOR EXAMPLE COMMA



I HAVE THE HONOUR TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE RECEIPT OF YOUR LETTER DURING MY STAY IN UGANDA

4

AND YOUR AND RELIABLE SUPPLY OF ESSENTIAL COMMODITIES BECAUSE

I KNOW THAT YOUR ECONOMY IS AILING IN MANY A FIELD STOP

AND I LOOK FORWARD TO MEETING YOU COMMA YOUR MAJESTY

STOP ACCEPT COMMA YOUR MAJESTY COMMA THE ASSURANCES OF MY

HIGHEST ESTEEM STOP ===

AL-HAJJI GENERAL IDI AMIN DADA ,VC,DSO,MC,

PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA .

C.C. PRIME MINISTER WILSON HAROLD,  
10 DOWNING STREET,  
LONDON

C.C. MR. EDWARD HEATH,  
LEADER OF THE OPPOSITION,  
LONDON

22ND JANUARY , 1975:

.....

CYPHER CAT A  
IMMEDIATE  
PD E S K B Y 231100Z

FM KAMPALA 230840Z

CONFIDENTIAL

75  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 33 OF 23 RD JANUARY REPEATED FOR INFORMATION  
TO NAIROBI.

AMIN.

1. PRESIDENT AMIN'S TELEGRAM TO THE QUEEN ANNOUNCING HIS INTENTION TO VISIT ENGLAND ON AUGUST 4 WAS BROADCAST ON RADIO UGANDA LAST NIGHT. WE HAD NO PRIOR WARNING, NOR HAVE WE RECEIVED A COPY OF THE TELEGRAM. (AMIN WOULD HAVE KNOWN THAT I WOULD BE UNLIKELY TO ACCEPT IT).
2. ITS IMPERTINENT TONE BRINGS TO MIND SIMILAR TELEGRAMS TO PRESIDENT NIXON AND MRS GOLDA MEIR LAST YEAR. NO DOUBT IT REFLECTS HIS MOUNTING CHAGRIN AT RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, STARTING WITH THE OMISSION OF UGANDA FROM YOUR AFRICAN TOUR (I HAVE IT ON GOOD AUTHORITY THAT THIS UPSET HIM MORE THAN MANY THOUGHT AT THE TIME) AND ENDING WITH MINISTER WAKHWEYA'S DECISION LAST WEEK TO RESIGN AND SEEK REFUGE IN THE UK. THE GARBLED VERSION OF THE SUNDAY TELEGRAPH COMMENT (YOUR TELNO 12) WHICH HE APPEARS TO BELIEVE WAS BROADCAST BY THE BBC AS A CALL TO ASSASSINATE HIM, ALSO TOUCHED A RAW NERVE. (BUT THERE SEEMS NO DOUBT, FROM TIMING INVOLVED, THAT AMIN'S TELEGRAM WAS AT LEAST IN DRAFT BEFORE MFA RECEIVED OUR NOTE DECLINING INVITATION TO SEND DELEGATION TO CELEBRATIONS-MY TEL 31 REFERS).
3. THE TELEGRAM DOES NOT APPEAR TO CALL FOR A REPLY. IT IS IN ANY CASE BENEATH CONTEMPT. IF ASKED TO COMMENT I WOULD FEEL INCLINED TO SAY THAT IT SEEMS THAT THE PRESIDENT IS IN A STATE OF DEEP DEPRESSION OVER MR WAKHWEYA'S LIKELY REVELATIONS AND CAN NO LONGER BE HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR HIS ACTIONS. AS FOR THE VISIT TO BRITAIN WE SHALL HAVE TO SEE WHETHER AMIN IS STILL PRESIDENT NEARER THE TIME. IT WOULD CERTAINLY BE UNWELCOME; AND THE PRESIDENT HIMSELF MIGHT JUDGE ON REFLECTION THAT IT MIGHT BE WISE TO RECONSIDER THE VISIT IN THE LIGHT OF THE REACTION THAT COULD BE EXPECTED FROM THE MANY UGANDANS WHO NOW PREFER BRITAIN TO UGANDA.

CONFIDENTIAL

*10 Best You*

CONFIDENTIAL

4. BUT YOU WOULD PROBABLY PREFER THAT I SAID ONLY THAT WE  
HAD NOT RECEIVED THE TELEGRAM AND COULD NOT THEREFORE OFFER  
ANY COMMENT. I SHALL REPLY ACCORDINGLY -IF ASKED -UNLESS INSTRUCTED  
TO THE CONTRARY.

HENNESSY

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION  
EAD  
OADs  
P & CD  
GIPD  
IRD  
NEWS D

COPY TO: LT COL THE RT HON  
SIR MARTIN CHARTERIS  
KCB KCVO OBE  
BUCKINGHAM PALACE

- 2 -

CONFIDENTIAL



10 Downing Street  
Whitehall

7 January, 1975.

Uganda

In case you have not seen this by other means, I am sending you a copy of the telegram from President Amin to a number of addressees which, as you will see, is copied, among others, to The Queen and the Prime Minister.

The enclosure reached us today in an envelope postmarked in London on 6 January.

J.D.F. Holt, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

R7-1

T E L E G R A M

TO:

MR. ABDELMAZIZ BOULEFELKA,  
PRESIDENT OF UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY,  
ALGIERS.

DR. HURT WALDBERG,  
SECRETARY GENERAL OF UNITED NATIONS,  
NEW YORK.

MR. WILLIAM ESTHÉ MBOMBUA,  
SECRETARY GENERAL OF O.A.U.,  
ADDIS ABABA.

HIS EXCELLENCY COLONEL HOURI BOUMEDIENNE,  
CHAIRMAN OF NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES,  
ALGIERS.

MR. BREZHNEV,  
GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE SOVIET COMMUNIST PARTY,  
CREMLIN, MOSCOW.

CHAIRMAN MAO TSE TUNG,  
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA,  
PEKING.

FOLLOWING THE FORMATION OF A SCOTTISH PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT WHICH AIMS AT ACHIEVING COMPLETE INDEPENDENCE FOR THE PEOPLE OF SCOTLAND, THE LEADERS OF THAT GOVERNMENT HAVE APPROACHED ME AND REQUESTED ME TO BRING THEIR CASE BEFORE YOUR EXCELLENCIES AND THE UNITED NATIONS COMMITTEE ON DECOLONISATION WHICH MUST CONSIDER THEIR POINTS FOR INDEPENDENCE.

THEY EXPLAINED TO ME THAT THE PEOPLE OF SCOTLAND ARE TIRED OF BEING EXPLOITED BY THE ENGLISH. FOR A LONG TIME, ENGLAND HAS THRIVED ON THE ENERGIES AND BRAINS OF THE SCOTTISH PEOPLE, YET THE WEALTH THEY HAVE DERIVED FROM SCOTLAND HAS NOT BEEN PLOUGHED BACK.

- 2 -

INSTEAD, THEY HAVE BUILT MULTIPLE INDUSTRIES IN ENGLAND IN ORDER TO PROVIDE EMPLOYMENT FOR THE ENGLISH PEOPLE LEAVING THE PEOPLE OF SCOTLAND IN ECONOMIC SLAVERY. THE LEADERS OF THE SCOTTISH PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT HAVE ALSO ASKED ME TO INFORM YOUR EXCELLENCIES THAT ENGLAND IS NOW BANKRUPT AND THEIR GOVERNMENT HAS NO MONEY. THEY ARE NOW IN A BIG INTERNATIONAL DEBT WHICH THEY CANNOT AFFORD TO PAY ON THEIR OWN WITHOUT SCOTTISH MONEY. THE BILLS THEY ARE RECEIVING ARE NOT IN MILLIONS, BUT BILLIONS OF POUNDS.

THEY ARE NOW WORKING OUT PLANS TO EXPLOIT SCOTLAND FURTHER BY GRABBING THE MONEY WHICH IS TO BE OBTAINED FROM THE NORTH SEA OIL IN ORDER TO PAY UP THE ENORMOUSLY HEAVY BILLS.

THE LEADERS OF THE GROUP HAVE ASKED ME TO INFORM YOU THAT THE NORTH SEA OIL DEPOSITS ARE PART OF SCOTLAND'S NATURAL RESOURCES WHICH MUST BE EXPLOITED FOR THE GOOD OF THE SCOTTISH PEOPLE. WHILE THEY AGREE THAT THE OIL SHOULD BE USED FOR THE GOOD OF MANKIND BY WAY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE, THE MONEY SO OBTAINED MUST GO TO THE SCOTTISH TREASURY BUT NOT TO THE ENGLISH EXCHEQUER.

THE LEADERS OF THE SCOTTISH PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT HAVE ALSO ASKED ME TO INFORM YOU THAT THEY ARE FED UP WITH ENGLISH DISCRIMINATION BOTH WITHIN ENGLAND ITSELF AND ALSO IN COUNTRIES LIKE SOUTH AFRICA AND IN RHODESIA. THE PEOPLE OF SCOTLAND ARE ABSOLUTELY SOCIAL PEOPLE AND HATE COLOURBAR OF ANY SORT. THEY ARE THEREFORE COMPLETELY EMBARRASSED BY WHAT GOES ON IN ENGLAND, RHODESIA AND SOUTH AFRICA, AND THE DAILY MASSACRES BEING CARRIED OUT BY THE ENGLISH IN NORTHERN IRELAND.

...../3

THEY HAVE ALSO INFORMED ME THAT THE ENGLISH ARE THE ONES HIGHLY INVOLVED IN THE SUPPORT OF ZIONIST ISRAELIS AGAINST THE PALESTINIANS.

ON THE OTHER HAND, THE SCOTTISH LEADERS HAVE ASSURED ME THAT THEY WANT TO BE FRIENDLY WITH ALL THE PEOPLES OF THE WORLD AND THAT IS WHY THEY WOULD LIKE TO BE COMPLETELY DETACHED FROM THE ENGLISH. UNLESS THEY ARE GIVEN INDEPENDENCE PEACEFULLY, THEY WILL TAKE UP ARMS AND FIGHT THE ENGLISH UNTIL THEY REGAIN THEIR FREEDOM.

YOUR EXCELLENCIES, YOU WILL APPRECIATE THERE IS ALREADY TOO MUCH CONFLICT IN THE WORLD TODAY IN WHICH HUMAN LIFE IS BEING LOST DAILY AND PROPERTY DESTROYED. NO ONE WOULD LIKE TO SEE ANOTHER CONFLICT FLARE UP IN THE WORLD BETWEEN SCOTLAND AND ENGLAND. FOR THE GOOD OF MANKIND, THEREFORE, I AM APPEALING TO YOUR EXCELLENCIES TO USE YOUR GOOD OFFICES AND PREVAIL ON THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO GRANT INDEPENDENCE TO SCOTLAND IMMEDIATELY WITHOUT BLOODSHED.

THE LEADERS OF THE SCOTTISH PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT HAVE ALSO ASKED ME TO PASS ON THE FOLLOWING NOTES TO YOUR EXCELLENCIES TO HELP YOUR EXCELLENCIES UNDERSTAND BETTER THE BACK-GROUND AGAINST WHICH THEY ARE ASKING FOR INDEPENDENCE FROM ENGLAND.

1. SCOTLAND WAS ONCE AN INDEPENDENT SOVEREIGN STATE, HAPPY, WELL GOVERNED AND ADMINISTERED WITH PEACE AND PROSPERITY.
2. THIS WAS SHATTERED BY WAR MADE BY THE ENGLISH WHO ATTEMPTED TO IMPOSE A PUPPET KING IN SCOTLAND IN THE 13TH CENTURY.
3. THE ENGLISH WERE DEFEATED AND PEACE CAME TO A WHILE IN THE 15TH CENTURY.
4. HENRY VII OF ENGLAND MARRIED HIS DAUGHTER TO THE KING OF SCOTS. THEIR DESCENDANT JAMES VI OF

SCOTLAND BECAME JAMES I OF ENGLAND IN 1603.

5. THE KING MOVED TO LONDON TO RULE BUT PARLIAMENTS REMAINED IN EDINBURGH AND IN LONDON.

6. LATER, A REBELLION BROKE OUT AGAINST THE LAWFUL KING JAMES II IN 1689.

7. AN ILLEGAL TREATY, UNITING BOTH PARLIAMENTS CAME IN TO FORCE IN 1707. THUS WHAT ENGLAND COULD NOT WIN IN WAR SHE WON BY STEALTH.

8. THE ENGLISH ILLEGALLY KEPT CONTROL OF THE NEW BRITISH PARLIAMENT (NOT EVEN KEEPING THEIR OWN ILLEGAL TREATY.)

9. IN 1715 JAMES SON OF JAMES VII OF SCOTLAND RAISED AN ARMY TO THROW THE ENGLISH OUT, BUT HE FAILED. MURDER AND PILLAGE FOLLOWED. HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS DIED.

10. IN 1745 PRINCE CHARLIE SON OF THE ABOVE CLAIMED SCOTLAND FOR HIS FATHER, HE TOO WAS DEFEATED. MORE MASS MURDER OCCURRED. A SCOTS GOVERNMENT IN EXILE WAS FORMED IN FRANCE.

11. 1750-1800 MASS IMMIGRATION OF SCOTS TO CANADA, AMERICA AND OTHER COLONIES CONTINUED AS THE ENGLISH BURNED HOUSES AND FARMS TO ALLOW SHEEP TO GRAZE CHEAPLY IN VAST NUMBERS.

12. MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE FROM THE HIGHLANDS TO INDUSTRIAL TOWNS. STILL. 1820-1880.

13. (1880) SCOTISH LABOUR PARTY FOUNDED HOME. IN 1947 SELF RULE BILLS APPEARED REGULARLY BUT NEVER BECAME LAW.

14. 40% VOTED IN 1974 FOR INDEPENDENCE OF SOME SORT. UNDER THIS INTERNATIONAL TREATY, IF YOU ACCEPT IT AS VALID, THE SCOTS HAVE BEEN CHEATED OF THEIR LEGAL RIGHTS. THE UNITED NATIONS SHOULD ENFORCE THEM BY SANCTIONS AGAINST ENGLAND.

15. ENGLAND NOW HOPES TO CONTINUE ITS EXPANSION BY STEALING SCOTLAND'S OIL TO FINANCE IT.



16. ALL NATIONS SHOULD HAVE WRITTEN CONSTITUTIONS FILE AT U.N. AND THE GOVERNMENTS BE SUBJECT TO COURT DECISION. TREATIES OF UNION: HEAVY PENALTIES SHOULD DETER THE PARTY ATTEMPTING TO BREAK A CLAUSE IN THE TREATY. IF ONE NATION HAS ALREADY DONE SO, BUT WISHES THE BEST OF THE CLAUSES TO CONTINUE, THE WRONG NATION IS RELEASED FROM THE TOTAL CONTACT.

SCOTLAND IS ON A PEACEFUL SEARCH FOR JUSTICE, ALL NATIONS MUST SUPPORT HER IN THIS.

THE SCOTS HAD FOR HUNDREDS OF YEARS BEEN AN INDEPENDENT NATION TILL THE EVIL ENGLISH, WITH NO LEGAL CLAIM TO THE LAND OR RIGHT TO RULE THE SCOTS, BY PRETENDING FRIENDSHIP AND GOOD FAITH AND USING STEALTH, CORRUPTION AND TRICKERY ATTEMPTED TO SUPPRESS THE SCOTS.

A LONG WAR WAS FOUGHT FOR MANY YEARS IN 1314 AT THE BATTLE OF BANNOCKBURN. THE ENGLISH KING EDWARD II, ALTHOUGH OUTNUMBERING THE SCOTS BY 150,000 TO 20,000 WAS ROUTED BY ROBERT THE BRUCE, KING OF SCOTLAND WHO WAS BORN 700 YEARS AGO IN 1274.

IN 1320 AT ARBRATH ABBEY THE SCOTTISH PEOPLE OF ALL CLASSES RE-AFFIRMED THEIR RIGHT TO SELF-GOVERNMENT AND INDEPENDENCE IN THE BEAUTIFULLY PHRASED ARBROATH DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE WHICH INCLUDES THESE WORDS:- SO LONG AS THERE SHALL BUT ONE HUNDRED OF US REMAIN ALIVE WE WILL NEVER SUBMIT TO THE DOMINION OF THE ENGLISH. FOR IT IS NOT GLORY, IT IS NOT RICHES, NEITHER IS IT HONOUR, BUT IT IS LIBERTY ALONE THAT WE FIGHT FOR, WHICH NO MAN WILL LOSE BUT WITH HIS LIFE.

EXHORT THE KING OF ENGLAND WHO MAY WELL REST SATISFIED WITH HIS OWN POSSESSIONS, SINCE ENGLAND OF OLD USED TO BE SUFFICIENT FOR SEVEN OR MORE KINGS TO SUFFER US TO LIVE AT PEACE IN SCOTLAND

SINCE WE DESIRE NOTHING BUT OUR OWN.

FOR THE SAFETY OF THE LEADERS OF THE SCOTTISH PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT WHO LIVE IN BRITAIN, I HAVE BEEN ASKED BY THEM NOT TO REVEAL THEIR IDENTITY FOR THE TIME BEING, BECAUSE THE ENGLISH ARE BUSY EXECUTING SECRETLY THOSE WHO ARE OPPOSING THEM.

FOR THE INFORMATION OF YOUR EXCELLENCIES, THE LEADERS OF THE SCOTTISH PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT HELD A MEETING IN KAMPALA LASTING ABOUT ELEVEN HOURS AT WHICH THEY BRIEFED ME ON THEIR AIMS FOR INDEPENDENCE.

THEY ALSO HANDED ME THREE BOOKLETS DETAILING THE REASONS WHY THEY WANT SCOTLAND TO BE INDEPENDENT.

THEY TOLD ME THAT THEY HAD COME TO ME BECAUSE THEY KNOW THAT I AM THE ONLY LEADER IN THE WORLD WHO SPEAKS THE TRUTH, AND WHO BELIEVES IN THE FREEDOM OF ALL THE PEOPLE OF THE WORLD. THEY KNOW VERY WELL THAT MY PEOPLE ARE FREE, DESPITE THE PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN WHICH THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT, A GOVERNMENT THAT CONTAINS MINORITY PEOPLE OF BRITAIN, MOUNTS AGAINST UGANDA. THEY TOLD ME THAT THE BRITISH PROPAGANDA AGAINST UGANDA IS FALSE.

THE SCOTTISH PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT LEADERS, EXPLAINED FURTHER THAT THE ENGLISH DO NOT WANT ANYBODY ELSE TO DISCOVER THEIR MISTAKES IN THE SAME WAY AS I HAVE DONE. THEY ARE TOO ASHAMED OF WHAT I HAVE ALREADY DISCOVERED ABOUT THEM AND THAT IS WHY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN MOUNTING PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGNS AGAINST UGANDA, IN ORDER TO COVER UP THE UGLY THINGS WHICH I KNOW ABOUT THE ENGLISH.

THE GROUP ADDED THAT THEY HAD COME TO ME BECAUSE THEY KNOW I AM THE ONLY LEADER WHO CAN PRESENT THEIR CASE TO THE UNITED NATIONS: THE ORGANISATION OF AFRICAN UNITY; ASIA, SOCIALIST COUNTRIES AND TO THOSE AMERICANS WHO DO NOT BELIEVE IN BRITISH PROPAGANDA. THEY EXPLAINED THAT THERE ARE SOME AMERICANS WHO HAVE BEEN BRAIN WASHED AND

- 7 -

CONFUSED BY THE ENGLISH AND WHO BELIEVE IN BRITISH PROPAGANDA.

THE LEADERS OF THE SCOTTISH PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT PLEDGED THAT THEY ARE FULLY BEHIND ME, THE PEOPLE OF AFRICA, THE ARAB WORLD AND THAT THEY ARE PREPARED TO HELP AND SUPPORT THE PALESTINIANS IN THEIR STRUGGLE TO REGAIN THEIR OCCUPIED LANDS. THE GROUP TOLD ME THAT THERE ARE ONLY A FEW SCOTTISH PEOPLE WHO HAVE BEEN CONFUSED BY THE ENGLISH AND THESE ARE THE ONES WHO SUPPORT RHODESIA, ZIONIST ISRAEL, AND RACIST SOUTH AFRICA. THEY SAID ON ACHIEVING INDEPENDENCE, THE SCOTTISH PEOPLE WOULD FIGHT SIDE BY SIDE WITH THE AFRICANS AND THE ARABS AGAINST RACIST REGIMES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA AND AGAINST ZIONIST ISRAELIS IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

THE GROUP POINTED OUT THAT THEY ARE AWARE THAT THE ZIONIST ISRAELIS ARE CONTROLLING THE ECONOMY IN BRITAIN, THE UNITED STATES, GERMANY AND IN CERTAIN OTHER COUNTRIES ALL OVER THE WORLD. THEY REQUESTED ME TO PUT THEIR CASE TO THE UNITED NATIONS AND ASK THE WORLD BODY TO RECOGNISE SCOTLAND, AS AN INDEPENDENT SOVEREIGN STATE OF SCOTLAND. THEY, ON THEIR PART, HAVE DECLARED DECEMBER 31ST AS SCOTISH NATIONAL DAY.

THEY DREW UPPOINTS BASED ON THE THREE BOOKS ALREADY MENTIONED IN ORDER TO HELP ME PRESENT THEIR CASE AT THE UNITED NATIONS.

THE LEADERS OF THE SCOTTISH PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT ASSURED ME THAT THEY CONSIDER ME, GENERAL AMIN, AS THEIR LEADER AND THEY HAVE MADE ME CHAIRMAN OF UGANDA/SCOTTISH COMMUNITY. THEY PLEDGED THAT NO SCOTTISH MAN OR WOMAN, YOUNG OR OLD WILL BE AGAINST ME, EVEN THOUGH THERE MAY BE A FEW UGANDANS, WHO AFTER BEING BRAIN WASHED AND CONFUSED BY THE ENGLISH, MAY BE AGAINST ME.

THE GROUP ASKED ME TO INFORM THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT THAT SCOTLAND WOULD LIKE TO HAVE FRIENDLY DEALINGS WITH FRANCE, AS USED TO BE THE CASE BEFORE SCOTLAND WAS COLONISED BY THE ENGLISH BUT THAT SHE DOES NOT WANT TO HAVE DEALINGS WITH THE ENGLISH ANY MORE. THE ENGLISH ARE RACISTS OF THE HIGHEST ORDER AND EVERYONE KNOWS THIS. WHEN PEOPLE OF ALL RACES FROM ALL OVER THE WORLD GO TO SCOTLAND, THEY ARE WELL RECEIVED AND MIX UP WELL WITH THE LOCAL PEOPLE. BUT WHEN THEY GO TO ENGLAND, THEY ARE DISCRIMINATED AGAINST, ESPECIALLY THE BLACK PEOPLE AND ASIANS.

EVEN AT THE HIGH COMMISSION IN KAMPALA IT WAS NOT SURPRISING TO SEE THAT AMONG THE HIGH COMMISSION STAFF, THERE WERE FIFTY-FIVE ENGLISH, SCOTISH ZERO, WELSH, ZERO AND NORTHERN IRISH, ZERO. THAT IS WHY SCOTLAND NO LONGER WANTS TO HAVE DEALINGS WITH THE ENGLISH. THE QUESTION OF THE SO CALLED UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN NO LONGER EXISTS AND THAT ALSO EXPLAINS WHY THE QUEEN'S LIFE IS ALWAYS THREATENED WHENEVER SHE VISITS SCOTLAND, WALES AND NORTHERN IRELAND.

THE LEADERS OF THE SCOTTISH PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT EXPLAINED FURTHER THAT THE ENGLISH ARE BANKRUPT AND HAVE NO MONEY. THEY ARE ALWAYS RECEIVING HEAVY BILLS FOR LOAN REPAYMENTS, NOT IN MILLIONS OF POUNDS BUT IN BILLIONS. BECAUSE OF THEIR BANKRUPTCY, THE GROUP ADDED, THE ENGLISH ARE HOPING TO PAY THESE BILLS WITH THE MONEY TO BE OBTAINED FROM SCOTTISH OIL WHICH HAS BEEN DISCOVERED IN THE NORTH SEA, THUS AGAIN ROBBING SCOTLAND OF HER RIGHTFUL NATURAL WEALTH.

EVEN THE WARSHIPS WHICH THE ENGLISH HAVE BEEN SENDING TO SOUTH AFRICA ARE NOT THEIRS, THE GROUP EXPLAINED. THEY ARE SCOTTISH SHIPS. "WE DO NOT WANT OUR RESOURCES TO BE USED IN KILLING FRIENDLY PEOPLE," THEY TOLD ME. "WE WANT TO BE FRIENDLY WITH ALL THE PEOPLE OF THE WORLD. THE GROUP ASSURED ME THAT THEIR FOLLOWERS ARE NOT ONLY IN SCOTLAND. THEY ARE ALSO IN COUNTRIES LIKE THE UNITED


- 9 -

STATES OF AMERICA, AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND.

FOR THE SAKE OF THEIR SAFETY AND THAT OF THEIR PROPERTY, THE LEADERS OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF SCOTLAND HAVE TOLD ME THAT THE ENGLISH ARE CURRENTLY CARRYING OUT SECRET EXECUTIONS OF THOSE PEOPLE WHO ARE CITIZENS THERE AND FOR THAT REASON THEY DO NOT WANT THEIR IDENTITY TO BE KNOWN.

IN REPLY, I ASSURED THE LEADERS OF THE SCOTTISH PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT THAT I WILL CONTACT THE CURRENT PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND RAISE WITH THEM ALL THE POINTS THEY PUT TO ME. I WILL ALSO SEE TO IT THAT THE MATTER IS PUT ON THE AGENDA FOR DISCUSSION DURING THE NEXT UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY DEBATE ON DECOLONISATION, AND ENSURE THAT SCOTLAND ATTAINS INDEPENDENCE.

I TOLD THE GROUP THAT I HAVE ALSO ALREADY BEEN APPROACHED BY THE LEADERS OF THE WELSH NATIONAL AND LEADERS OF NORTHERN IRELAND, TO HELP THEM TO OBTAIN INDEPENDENCE FROM THE ENGLISH. I PROMISED ALSO TO INFORM THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE OAU; THE CURRENT CHAIRMAN OF THE THIRD WORLD AND GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE SOVIET COMMUNIST PARTY.

  
ALHAJJI GENERAL IDI AMIN DADA, VC., DSO., MC.,  
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA.

COPIES TO:

HER MAJESTY QUEEN ELIZABETH II,  
BUCKINGHAM PALACE,  
LONDON.

COL. GADDAFI,  
CHAIRMAN OF THE LIBYAN REVOLUTIONARY COMMAND  
COUNCIL,  
TRIPOLI.

HIS EXCELLENCY VALERY GISCARD' D'ESTAING,  
PRESIDENT OF FRANCE,  
PARIS.

MR HAROLD WILSON,  
PRIME MINISTER,  
10, DOWNING STREET,  
LONDON.

MR. EDWARD HEATH,  
LEADER OF THE OPPOSITION,  
HOUSE OF COMMONS,  
PALACE OF WESTMINSTER,  
LONDON.

MR. YASSAR ARAFAT,  
LEADER OF THE PALESTINIAN LIBERATION ORGANISATION,  
BEIRUT.

THE SHAH OF IRAN,  
TEHRAN.

30TH DECEMBER, 1974.

RESTRICTED



10 Downing Street  
Whitehall

14 October 1974

UGANDA

The Prime Minister has seen Kampala telegrams numbers 938 and 939 of 11 October about the latest message from General Amin.

The Prime Minister thinks it presumptuous of General Amin to offer advice about the political organisation of this country, given the lack of democratic freedom in Uganda itself. I do not think that Mr. Wilson sees any necessity for him to reply to the message personally.

The Department may, however, wish to ensure that Mr. Hennessy is fully briefed about the naval exercises in South African waters, so that he may inform the Ugandans of our views, at the appropriate time.

BRIDGES

R.N. Dales, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

RESTRICTED

CRS 475

EN CLAIR

FM KAMPALA 111415Z

UNCLASSIFIED

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TEL 0950 OF 11TH OCTOBER.

+(MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT AMIN .

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T137/74

*Prime Minister*

*well! He seems  
fonder of the SNP  
than Plaid Cymru  
The best way of  
dealing with this  
might be for our  
High Commissioner to  
GREAT BRITAIN on  
naval exercises,  
and for no other  
reply to be sent.*

1. M .I.P.T. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MESSAGE BEGINS:-

" TO THE RT HON HAROLD WILSON PRIME MINISTER OF  
BRITAIN 10 DOWNING STREET LONDON .

FROM PRESIDENT AMIN

DEAR MR PRIME MINISTER

*He should give freedom  
with due regard to B.  
Uganda, for a  
state  
the*

I WISH TO CONGRATULATE YOU AND YOUR PARTY UPON THE SUCCESS  
YOU HAVE JUST ACHIEVED IN THE BRITISH GENERAL ELECTIONS. I ALSO  
WISH TO CONGRATULATE ALL THE BRITISH VOTERS IN THE DECISION  
THAT THEY HAVE JUST TAKEN TO RETURN YOUR GOVERNMENT TO POWER WITH  
AN OVERALL, THOUGH SLENDER MAJORITY.

AT THIS MOMENT WHEN YOU ARE THINKING OF HOW TO FULFIL  
YOUR ELECTION PROMISES AND RE-ORGANISING YOUR NEW  
ADMINISTRATION , I WISH TO EXPRESS THAT WE IN UGANDA  
AND , INDEED , IN THE ENTIRE AFRICAN CONTINENT , ARE NOT AT  
ALL HAPPY ABOUT BRITISH MILITARY EXERCISE AND MANOEUVRES  
JOINTLY WITH THE RACIST REGIME OF SOUTH AFRICA , ALLEGEDLY  
FOR THE PURPOSE OF PROTECTING BRITISH INTERESTS AROUND THE  
CAPE OF GOOD HOPE . THE SECURITY OF THE CAPE IS SQUARELY  
A RESPONSIBILITY OF THE AFRICAN COUNTRIES AND WE ARE,  
THEREFORE , UNAWARE OF ANY GENUINE BRITISH INTERESTS IN  
THE CAPE THAT SHOULD INVOLVE BRITISH COLLABORATION WITH THE  
APARTHEID REGIME OF SOUTH AFRICA .

I ALSO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO CALL UPON YOU TO SERIOUSLY  
CONSIDER GRANTING FREEDOM AND FULL INDEPENDENCE TO  
SCOTLAND, WALES AND NORTHERN IRELAND WHOSE PEOPLE HAVE  
REPEATEDLY DEMANDED AND HAVE DEMONSTRATED IN THE ELECTIONS  
AND TECHNICAL ABILITY , THEIR RESPECTIVE EAGERNESS AND WISHES  
TO BECOME INDEPENDENT OF LONDON . THE SCOTTISH CLAIM TO  
NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION , FOR EXAMPLE , HAS BEEN FURTHER  
STRENGTHENED BY THE DISCOVERY OF RICH OIL DEPOSITS IN THE  
NORTH SEA ABOUT WHICH YOU, YOURSELF , IN THE RECENT PAST,  
CLAIMED TO BE WORTH HUNDREDS OF MILLIONS OF POUNDS . EACH  
OF THESE COUNTRIES SHOULD BE PERMITTED NOT ONLY AUTONOMOUS  
SELF-GOVERNMENT BUT FULL SOVEREIGN INDEPENDENCE WITH THEIR  
OWN FLAGS AND THUS LIMITING THE UNION JACK TO ENGLAND ONLY.  
IT IS ALSO OPPORTUNE FOR ME TO REMARK THAT COUNTRIES WHICH  
ARE SUPPOSED TO HAVE HAD INDEPENDENCE FROM BRITAIN A LONG





LHM 759/11

00 FCO

GRS 400

CYPHER CAT A

FM KAMPALA 111520Z

CONFIDENTIAL

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 938 OF 11 TH OCTOBER .

MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT AMIN .

1. I WAS SUMMONED BY MINISTER OF STATE IN PRESIDENT'S OFFICE (PAUL ETIANG) AT SHORT NOTICE LATE THIS AFTERNOON. HE HANDED ME A MESSAGE FOR THE PRIME MINISTER (SEE M I F T) SAYING THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD INSTRUCTED HIM TO ENSURE THAT IT WAS DELIVERED TO ME IMMEDIATELY FOR ONWARD TRANSMISSION. HE ADDED THAT HE THOUGHT IT LIKELY THAT THWMESSAGE WOULD BE BROADCAST HERE THIS EVENING .

2. HAVING BEEN GIVEN AN OPPORTUNITY TO READ IT I ASKED IF I MIGHT COMMENT . ETIANG SAID HE WAS ACTING PURELY AS A MESSENGER AND COULD NOT UNDERTAKE TO DISCUSS THE CONTENTS OF THE MESSAGE OR WHAT LAY BEHIND IT . BUT HE SAID THAT HE KNEW THE PRESIDENT WAS AWARE OF THE BRITISH ELECTION RESULTS AND IMPLIED THAT AMIN HAD DECIDED IN HIS IMPETUOUS WAY TO PASS ON TO THE NEW ADMINISTRATION THE VIEWS OF THE LEADERS OF VARIOUS LIBERATION GROUPS HE HAD BEEN SEEING THIS AFTERNOON .

3. I REVERSED TO ETIANG THE REPRESENTATION THAT I HAD MADE EARLIER TO THE ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER ABOUT ANGLO UGANDAN RELATION (MY TEL 914) SAYING THAT IT SEEMED TO ME THAT THE MESSAGE AS IT STOOD COULD WELL DO DAMAGE TO OUR RELATIONS AT A PARTICULAR DELICATE TIME . I ADDED THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD OFTEN CLAIMED TO SUPPORT THE OAU POLICY OF NON INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF A FOREIGN STATE BUT THAT THIS PRESENT MESSAGE WAS A BLATANT EXAMPLE OF SUCH INTERFERENCE. I WENT OVER THE GROUND COVERED IN RECENT GUIDANCE TELEGRAMS ABOUT THE OPERATIONAL VISITS OF HM SHIPS TO SOUTH AFRICA . AND ENDED BY ASKING WHETHER HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR ME TO SEE THE PRESIDENT THIS EVENING WITH A VIEW TO PERSUADING THE LATTER TO DROP THE IDEA OF SENDING THE MESSAGE. ETIANG WAS SYMPATHETIC BUT SAID IT WAS PHYSICALLY NOT POSSIBLE AS THE PRESIDENT HAD ALREADY LEFT TOWN . HE OFFERED TO ARRANGE A MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT LATER . I DID NOT TAKE

THIS UP .

4. DIPLOMATIC OBSERVERS HAVE READ INTO VARIOUS PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENTS MADE DURING THE RECENT 12 TH ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATIONS A CONTINUING DESIRE FOR BETTER RELATIONS. IT IS I SUGGEST WITH THIS IN MIND THAT THIS LATES MISSIVE SHOULD BE READ. LIKE SO MANY OF HIS TELEGRAM TO WORLD LEADERS IT BEARS ALL THE HALL MARKS OF AN ALAN COREN QUOTE AND MIGHT BE BEST TREATED AS SUCH.

HENNESSY

*Handwritten mark*

THESE ARE THE ONLY TWO POINTS WHICH WERE MADE IN THE  
12 TH ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATIONS AND THE RECEPTION OF THE  
12 TH ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATIONS

THESE ARE THE ONLY TWO POINTS WHICH WERE MADE IN THE  
12 TH ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATIONS AND THE RECEPTION OF THE  
12 TH ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATIONS

THESE ARE THE ONLY TWO POINTS WHICH WERE MADE IN THE  
12 TH ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATIONS AND THE RECEPTION OF THE  
12 TH ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATIONS

THESE ARE THE ONLY TWO POINTS WHICH WERE MADE IN THE  
12 TH ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATIONS AND THE RECEPTION OF THE  
12 TH ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATIONS

THESE ARE THE ONLY TWO POINTS WHICH WERE MADE IN THE  
12 TH ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATIONS AND THE RECEPTION OF THE  
12 TH ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATIONS

UGANDA

GRP 472

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIORITY

CYPHER CAT A

FM KAMPALA 221150Z MARCH

CONFIDENTIAL

/74

TO PRIORITY FCO TELNO 306 OF MARCH 22 INFO NAIROBI.

MYTEL NO 300: PRIME MINISTER'S REPLY TO PRESIDENT AMIN.

*text in tel 289 on file*

1. THE PRESIDENT KEPT HIS PROMISE AND WE MET YESTERDAY AFTERNOON. HEAD OF CHANCERY ACCOMPANIED ME. THE MEETING TOOK PLACE IN THE SHADED GARDEN OF MAKINDYE LODGE OVERLOOKING LAKE VICTORIA. THE RELAXED ATMOSPHERE OF THE OLD COLONIAL GOVERNOR'S RESIDENCE MADE IT POSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE A GREATER DEGREE OF FRANKNESS THAN EVER BEFORE. AMIN - APPEARING LONELY AND OFF COLOUR, AS WELL HE MIGHT AFTER RECENT EVENTS - KEPT THE DISCUSSION GOING FOR ABOUT 2 HOURS. THE MAIN CONCLUSIONS WERE:-

(I) P.M.'S REPLY (YOUR TEL 151) *tel 151 gives text, copy on file*  
THE MESSAGE, TOGETHER WITH THE GOVERNMENT'S STATEMENT ON FOREIGN POLICY, WERE WARMLY WELCOMED AS SIGNALLING A NEW FORWARD LOOKING POLICY TOWARDS AFRICA.

(II) COMPENSATION.

THE VALUATION COMMITTEE HAD COMPLETED THREE-QUARTERS OF ITS TASK. WHEN FINISHED TALKS WOULD BEGIN. MEANWHILE NO ASSETS WOULD BE TOUCHED AND FULL COMPENSATION WOULD BE PAID IN DUE COURSE. THE PRESIDENT HIMSELF WOULD KEEP ME INFORMED OF PROGRESS AT REGULAR MEETINGS IN FUTURE. IF UK OFFICIALS WISHED TO COME OUT AND SATISFY THEMSELVES THAT WORK WAS GOING FORWARD PROPERLY AND FAIRLY THEY WOULD BE WELCOME.

(III) EAST AFRICAN RAILWAYS DEBT TO CROWN AGENTS. THE PRESIDENT VIEWED THE MATTERS REFERRED TO IN EWANS LETTER JEC 21/1 OF 15 MARCH TO SIR A DUFF VERY SERIOUSLY AND AGREED TO TAKE THE QUESTION UP AT FORTHCOMING MEETING OF EAST AFRICAN AUTHORITY. (HE IMPLIED THAT HE WOULD SEE MONIES WERE PAID).

(IV) SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN UGANDA.

THE PRESIDENT VOLUNTEERED THAT HE WOULD NOT ALLOW UGANDA TO GO COMMUNIST. IN RESPONSE TO MY EXPRESSIONS OF MISGIVING HE REPEATED THAT HE WAS NOT IN POCKETS OF COMMUNISTS. HE WAS SOLELY CONCERNED WITH GETTING THE ARMS HE NEEDED FROM WHERE HE COULD.

(V) TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE.

THE PRESIDENT HOPED FOR EARLY RESUMPTION OF T.A. IN CERTAIN FIELDS BUT AGREED NORMALISATION OF RELATIONS MIGHT HAVE TO BE FIRST AIM.

CONFIDENTIAL

/2. THE MEETING WAS

CONFIDENTIAL

2. THE MEETING WAS CORDIAL THROUGHOUT. SOME PROGRESS WAS MADE. PROVIDED THERE IS NO FURTHER INTERFERENCE FROM THE DEFENCE COUNCIL WE CAN REGARD IT AS A BASIS FROM WHICH TO MOVE - OR AT LEAST INCH - FORWARD.

3. LETTER FOLLOWS. [COPIES SENT TO NO.10 DOWNING ST]  
HENNESSY

FILES

EAD

NEWS D

PS

PS/MISS LESTOR

PS/PUS

MR.CAMPBELL

MR.ASPIN

- 2 -

CONFIDENTIAL

CES 240  
PRIORITY

EN CLAIR

(JE)

FM ECO 081920Z

UNCLASSIFIED

TO PRIORITY KAMPALA TELNO 152 OF 8/3. 1974

NIPT.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MESSAGE:-

DEAR RT HONOURABLE PRIME MINISTER

1. PLEASE ACCEPT, ON YOUR OWN BEHALF, THAT OF YOUR GOVERNMENT AND OUR OTHER BRITISH FRIENDS, MY HEARTIEST CONGRATULATIONS, THOSE OF MY GOVERNMENT AND THE ENTIRE PEOPLE OF UGANDA, ON YOUR FORMATION OF THE NEW BRITISH GOVERNMENT. WE WISH YOU, YOUR GOVERNMENT AND OUR OTHER BRITISH FRIENDS, ALL THE VERY BEST.

2. I SPEAK ONLY THE TRUTH. I AM A MAN OF ACTION. DURING ELECTION CAMPAIGN, YOU AND YOUR COLLEAGUES PLEDGED TO IMPLEMENT CERTAIN POLICIES IF RETURNED TO POWER. AMONG THESE ARE THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT WOULD FIND URGENT SOLUTIONS TO THE PRESENT BRITISH ECONOMIC CRISIS AND THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT WOULD ALSO ENSURE THAT ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST THE MINORITY, RACIST AND REBELLIOUS REGIME IN RHODESIA ARE SO EFFECTIVE THAT MAJORITY RULE WILL BE ESTABLISHED IN ZIMBABWE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. WE LOOK VERY MUCH FORWARD TO WITNESSING THE FULFILMENT OF YOUR GOVERNMENT'S PLEDGES.

3. MY GOVERNMENT STRONGLY SUPPORTS THE COMMONWEALTH. I AND THE OTHER UGANDANS HAVE THE GREATEST REGARD FOR AND LOVE BRITAIN AND THE BRITISH. WE ARE THEREFORE, NATURALLY VERY MUCH CONCERNED THAT BRITAIN RECOVERS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE FROM THE ECONOMIC CHAOS THAT SHE IS FACING AT THE MOMENT AND THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT GIVES THE BEST POSSIBLE IMAGE TO THE WORLD THROUGH THE FULFILMENT OF ITS PLEDGES.

/4. I ASSURE



A. I ASSURE YOU, THE RT. HON. PRIME MINISTER, OF MY HIGHEST  
CONSIDERATIONS AND ESTEEM.

AL-HAJJI GENERAL YI AMIN DADA, VC, DSO, MC PRESIDENT OF THE  
REPUBLIC OF UGANDA, KAMPALA.

CALLAGHAN  
FILES  
E A D  
NEWS DEPT  
PRIVATE SECRETARY  
MR CAMPBELL  
MR ASPIN

*Subject*

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

FO 753/E 070/21

SERIAL No. *TJB 4/14 File*

ADVANCE COPY

LHH 834/21

PP FCO

GRS 500

ENCLAIR

FM KAMPALA 210730Z

UNCLASSIFIED

*Ha ERD*

*.. News*

*m Campbell*

*PS*

*No 10*

TO PRIORITY FCO TELNO 299 OF 21 ST MARCH.

PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER.

1. AT THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S RECEPTION LAST NIGHT ETIANG  
HANDED ME THE FOLLOWING TELEGRAM WHICH HE SAID THE PRESIDENT  
HAD SENT TO THE PRIME MINISTER.

BEGINS

FROM: HIS EXCELLENCY ALHAJJI GENERAL IDI AMIN DADA,  
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA.

TO: THE RIGHT HONOURABLE HAROLD WILSON,  
THE PRIME MINISTER OF BRITAIN,  
LONDON.

DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER ,

I HAVE HEARD THROUGH PRESS OF YOUR GOVERNMENT'S FOREIGN  
POLICY AS ANNOUNCED IN PARLIAMENT BY YOUR FOREIGN SECRETARY.  
I AM MOST PLEASED TO NOTE THAT YOU INTEND TO RE-INTRODUCE  
EMBARGO ON THE SALE OF BRITISH ARMS TO SOUTH AFRICA AND  
PORTUGAL ,THE STRENGTHENING OF SANCTIONS AGAINST THE REBEL  
REGIME IN RHODESIA AND TO SUPPORT THE RESTORATION OF THE  
RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINEAN PEOPLES. THESE ARE LAUDABLE  
DECISIONS WHICH CONFIRM YOUR WISDOM AND STATESMANSHIP IN  
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS FOR WORLD PEACE AND CO-OPERATION.

AS STATED IN MY TELEGRAM TO YOU BEFORE THE RECENT  
BRITISH ELECTIONS, MY GOVERNMENT WILL FULLY SUPPORT YOUR  
GOVERNMENT IN ANY PROGRESSIVE MEASURES WHICH RECOGNISE THE  
TRUE ASPIRATIONS AND BEAR RESPECT FOR THE WISHES OF THE



AS STATED IN MY TELEGRAM TO YOU BEFORE THE RECENT  
BRITISH ELECTIONS, MY GOVERNMENT WILL FULLY SUPPORT YOUR  
GOVERNMENT IN ANY PROGRESSIVE MEASURES WHICH RECOGNISE THE  
TRUE ASPIRATIONS AND BEAR RESPECT FOR THE WISHES OF THE  
VAST MAJORITY OF THE AFRICAN AND ARAB PEOPLES. IF YOUR  
ANNOUNCED POLICIES ARE TRULY FULLY IMPLEMENTED INSPITE  
OF THE OPPOSITION YOU FACE IN PARLIAMENT, I WILL NOW DO  
MY BEST TO CONTACT SOME ARAB COUNTRIES TO REVIEW THEIR  
RETRICTED DEALINGS WITH BRITAIN IN TRADE MATTERS SUCH AS  
OIL SO THAT, AS I AGAIN STATED IN MY EARLIER TELEGRAM,  
BRITAIN IS ASSISTED TO RECOVER QUICKLY FROM HER ECONOMIC  
PROBLEMS.

FURTHERMORE, YOUR GOVERNMENT'S POSITIVE POLICY TOWARDS  
AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST WILL VERY GREATLY CONTRIBUTE TO  
THE RESTORATION OF NORMAL RELATIONS BETWEEN BRITAIN AND  
UGANDA TO THE EXTENT THAT AS AND WHEN YOU COME TO UGANDA  
FOR A VISIT, YOU WILL BE VERY WELL RECEIVED BY ALL UGANDANS.

HIGHEST CONSIDERATIONS AND REGARD,

ALHAJJI GENERAL IDI AMIN DADA, V.C., D.S.O., M.C.,

PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA.

CC. THE CHAIRMAN OF THE O.A.U.,  
LAGOS, NIGERIA.

MR. JASSER ARAFAT,  
CHAIRMAN OF THE  
PALESTINEAN LIBERATION ORGANISATION.

ENDS.

2. SEE M I F T.

HENNESSY

NNNN

in sent the Prime Minister a  
on his appointment, including  
to the Rhodesian Situation,  
rule in Africa, and inviting  
to visit Uganda

April 1976

Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
6						
7						
8						
9						
10						
11						
12						
13						
14						
15						
16						
17						
18						
19						
20						
21						
22						
23						
24						
25						
26						
27						
28						
29						
30						
31						
32						
33						
34						
35						
36						
37						
38						
39						
40						
41						
42						
43						
44						
45						
46						
47						
48						
49						
50						
51						
52						
53						
54						
55						
56						
57						
58						
59						
60						
61						
62						
63						
64						
65						
66						
67						
68						
69						
70						
71						
72						
73						
74						
75						
76						
77						
78						
79						
80						
81						
82						
83						
84						
85						
86						
87						
88						
89						
90						
91						
92						
93						
94						
95						
96						
97						
98						
99						
100						

Subject <sup>OTH</sup>  
Uganda

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE



SERIAL NO. T21AC/76 10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

20 May 1976

*Dear Mr. President,*

Thank you for your further letter of 6/ May which was delivered to me via your High Commissioner in London and for the friendly words, which I reciprocate, about the improvement in our bilateral relations and the Government's policies towards Africa.

I understand that contact is continuing between our Ministers and officials about the compensation question, and repeat my hope that a mutually satisfactory conclusion can be reached at an early date.

*Yours sincerely  
Jim Callaghan*

His Excellency Al-Hajji Field Marshal Dr. Idi Amin Dada,  
VC, DSO, MC.

*IM*

FL

20 May 1976

The Prime Minister agreed that he should send a brief acknowledgement to the message of 6 May from President Amin, and I enclose the signed original of his letter for onward transmission.

P. R. H. WRIGHT

RNN. Dales, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



PRIME MINISTER

Pine Mining

Although President Amis's message is itself an acknowledgment of your acknowledgment, it does deal with some substance and the FCO think, if you agree, that a brief reply would help on the compensation issue.

*[Signature]*  
18/5



Uganda  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

18 May 1976

Type for P<sub>ri</sub>'s signature. pm.  
S. H. K. P.

Rea Leitch,

R. H. 18/5

Message from President Amin

President Amin of Uganda has responded to the Prime Minister's letter acknowledging the President's message of congratulations on his election as leader of the Labour Party and appointment as Prime Minister.

... We would not normally recommend that the Prime Minister continue indefinitely a correspondence of this sort, but as we may now be moving towards a decisive stage in the long saga of obtaining compensation for the property of British subjects expropriated in Uganda, we consider that there would be value in extending a further courtesy to him. I therefore attach a short draft letter to President Amin for the Prime Minister's signature.

1/ am. ev.  
H. H.

(R. N. Dales)

P. R. H. Wright, Esq.,  
10 Downing Street,  
SW 1.

Registry  
No.

**DRAFT** LETTER

Type 1 +

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret.  
Secret.  
Confidential.  
Restricted.  
Unclassified.

To:-

Al-Hajji Field Marshal Dr Idi  
Amin Dada  
President of the Republic of  
Uganda

FROM

Prime Minister

Telephone No. Ext.

Department

PRIVACY MARKING

.....In Confidence

Dear President

Thank you for your further letter of 6 May which  
was delivered to me via your High Commissioner in  
London and for the friendly words, which I reciprocate,  
about the improvement in our bilateral relations and  
the Government's policies towards Africa.

I understand that contact is continuing between our  
Ministers and officials about the compensation  
question, and repeat my hope that a mutually satisfactory  
conclusion can be reached at an early date.

SUBJECT

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE



THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA

SERIAL No. T14<sup>AAC</sup>/76

KAMPALA: 6th May, 1976.

Dear Mr. Prime Minister,

I am very grateful for your letter of 20th April which the Acting High Commissioner delivered to me personally. I thank you for the keen interest you have always shown in the affairs of Uganda and indeed Africa's problems in general. The people of Uganda will always remember the positive contribution you made personally to improve our mutual relations. I have said several times that Uganda and Great Britain have had strong links for many years and it is our sincere wish that such friendly links and cooperation continue to thrive.

I have already indicated to your Acting High Commissioner our desire to get from the U.K. experts, professors and doctors for Makerere University. I hope you will give favourable consideration to this request. I was, however, pleased to note that your Government agreed to assist us in placing our Military and Police Officers to some of the Staff Colleges. Arrangements are being made to utilise this kind offer.

With regard to compensation question, I am pleased to inform you that the Committee I appointed to deal with this question is trying its best to sort out the matter as soon as possible. I have, however, been briefed by my Minister of Finance who is the Chairman of the Valuation Committee that there are certain important details which are still

The Rt. Hon. James Callaghan,  
10 Downing Street,  
L O N D O N.





THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA

- 2 -

awaited from London and, in addition to that, more claims are still being sent even during this month. The Committee needs time to scrutinise all the claims sent together with all the necessary details in order to enable the members to come to a fair assessment. As soon as the necessary details are received by the Valuation Committee, Her Majesty's Government will be advised as to when a team from Britain should come to hold further discussions with Uganda officials. The untiring efforts of the Liaison Officer, Mr. Woodruff, has greatly facilitated the work of the Valuation Committee and, with his continued cooperation, the matter will be amicably resolved.

As Current Chairman of the Organisation of African Unity, I am very pleased to note the stand you have taken on Africa question, particularly the problem of Rhodesia. I welcome your statement that, as Prime Minister, you will continue to take whatever action you can to contribute to a speedy and peaceful transfer of power to the African majority in Rhodesia. I wish, however, to point out that the Smith illegal regime should realise that, when peaceful negotiations fail, the freedom fighters, who have the full support of African States, will have no other alternative but to intensify armed struggle.

I wish you every success in your efforts to lead your country to greater prosperity and to foster international understanding, cooperation and peace.

With best regards.



THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA

- 3 -

A large, stylized handwritten signature in black ink, consisting of a series of loops and a long horizontal stroke. To the right of the signature, the word 'Dada' is written in a cursive script.

Al-Hajji Field Marshal Dr. Idi Amin Dada, VC, DSO, MC  
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA AND CURRENT  
CHAIRMAN OF THE ORGANISATION OF AFRICAN UNITY

---

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIORITY

GR 120

CYPHER CAT A

FM KAMPALA 291330Z APR

CONFIDENTIAL

TO PRIORITY FCO TEL NO 154 OF 29/4/76.

ANGLO/UGANDAN RELATIONS.

1. AMIN, CLEARLY PLEASED AT THE PRIME MINISTER'S REFERENCE TO DISCUSSIONS ON THE COMPENSATION ISSUE, SAID HE WOULD SPEAK TO THE MINISTER RESPONSIBLE (OOTH-OFUMBI) TO ENSURE SPEEDY PROGRESS ON THE UGANDAN SIDE.
2. ETOORI, PERMANENT SECRETARY ATTACHED TO THE VALUATION COMMITTEE, TOLD ME THIS MORNING THAT HE STILL EXPECTS THE VALUATION

TO BE COMPLETED SOMETIME IN MAY. BUT HE WAS UNCERTAIN HOW MUCH TIME WOULD BE NEEDED THEREAFTER TO RESOLVE OUTSTANDING QUERIES ON INDIVIDUAL CLAIMS.

HORROCKS

FILES  
EAD  
CLAIMS D  
FRD  
SIR A DUFF  
MR ASPIN  
MR KEEBLE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION  
ANGLO/UGANDAN TALKS

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIORITY

GR 220

CYPHER CAT A

FM KAMPALA 291305Z APR

CONFIDENTIAL

TO PRIORITY FCO TEL NO 153 OF 29/4/76

RPTD PRIORITY NAIROBI FOR INFORMATION.

MY TEL NO 152: KENYA/UGANDA RELATIONS.

1. AMIN SAID THAT HE WOULD LIKE THE PRIME MINISTER TO KNOW THAT HE WANTED A RETURN TO NORMAL GOOD RELATIONS WITH KENYA AND THAT HE HAD DROPPED ALL PROPAGANDA AGAINST THAT COUNTRY. HE HAD TOLD MOI WHEN THE LATTER HAD TELEPHONED HIM DURING THE UGANDA HELICOPTERS INCIDENT (NAIROBI TEL NO 899 TO FCO) THAT HE WOULD SEND A SPECIAL ENVOY TO KENYA WITH A DETAILED UGANDAN REPORT OF THE INCIDENT ONCE THE 17 OFFICERS AND MEN WERE RETURNED. THIS REPORT WAS NOW ALMOST COMPLETE AND WHEN DESPATCHED AMIN WOULD ENSURE WE WERE GIVEN A COPY.

2. AMIN MENTIONED, MORE IN SORROW THAN IN ANGER, THAT WHEN A CONSIGNMENT OF MERCEDES LORRIES (A GIFT FROM LIBYA) REACHED UGANDA FROM MOMBASA SPARE WHEELS, TOOL KITS AND SPARES WERE MISSING AND REPLACEMENTS WERE BEING BROUGHT DIRECT FROM LIBYA IN UGANDA C 130 AIRCRAFT. BUT HE MADE NO ALLEGATIONS OF ANY SERIOUS DISRUPTION BY THE KENYANS OF UGANDA'S IMPORTS.

HORROCKS

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

F I L E S

EAD

OADS

CONS D

NEWS D

PS

PS/MR ROWLANDS

PS/PUS

SIR A DUFF

MR ASPIN

COPIES TO

ANGLO UGANDAN TALKS

CONFIDENTIAL

JS

20 April 1976

MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT AMIN

Thank you for letting me have a draft reply to the message which the Prime Minister received from President Amin, and which was delivered by Mr. Hennessey on 12 April.

Mr. Callaghan has approved the draft, and I now enclose the signed copy of his reply for onward transmission as appropriate.

P. R. H. WRIGHT

D

R.N. Dales, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

GRPS 100

PRIORITY

CYPHER CAT A

FM KAMPALA 291300Z APR

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

*Pine Mink*

*27/4*

TO PRIORITY FCO TEL NO 152 OF 29/4/76.  
AND TO NAIROBI AND MOGADISHU FOR INFORMATION

M I P T (NOT TO ALL) : AMIN.

1. I DELIVERED PRIME MINISTER'S REPLY TO THE PRESIDENT  
AT CAPE TOWN VIEW THIS LUNCHTIME.

AMIN EXPRESSED PLEASURE AT CONTENTS OF THE MESSAGE AND CHATTED  
FOR ALMOST AN HOUR.

AMONG TOPICS HE RAISED DURING OUR MEETING WERE:-

- (A) KEYNA/UGANDA RELATIONS (SEE MY TEL NO 153)
- (B) ANGLO-UGANDAN RELATIONS (SEE MY TEL NO 154)

2. I TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO SPEAK ABOUT THE DETENTION OF WEBB  
(SEE MY TEL NO 155)

HORROCKS

FILES

EAD

OADS

CONS DEPT

NEWS DEPT

PS

PS/MR ROWLANDS

PS/PUS

SIR A DUFF

MR ASPIN

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

ANGLO/UGANDAN TALKS

[COPIES SENT TO NO. 10 DOWNING STREET]

CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE

20 April 1976

THE PRIME MINISTER

SERIAL No. T 7c / 76

*My dear President*

I am most grateful for your letter of 6 April which Mr. Hennessy delivered to me personally. You had some very kind things to say in it.

I too well remember my visit to Kampala last year and the talks we had then to improve our mutual relations. I share your pleasure at the improvement in our relations which has since taken place and I join you in wishing to see these continue to thrive.

I particularly welcome your desire to dispose of the compensation question as soon as possible. I am ready to send a team out again as soon as your people are in a position to pursue discussions with them.

I shall of course continue to be concerned with African questions from No. 10 and I note with interest what you said in your letter about the problem of Rhodesia. As Prime Minister, I shall continue to take whatever action I can to contribute to a speedy and peaceful transfer of power to the African majority there.

*James Callaghan*  
*Jim Callaghan*

His Excellency Al-Hajji Field Marshal Dr. Idi Amin Dada, VC, DSO, MC.



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

15 April 1976

*See Pch 1,*

*put in for his  
signature.*

Message to the Prime Minister from  
President Amin

*15/4*

Thank you for your letter of 12 April enclosing President Amin's congratulatory message to the Prime Minister.

I enclose a draft reply. The draft assumes that the Prime Minister will not wish to respond, on this occasion, to the courtesy invitation to him and his family to visit Uganda.

*from over  
date*

(R. N. Dales)

Patrick Wright Esq.,  
No. 10 Downing Street



Registry  
No.

**DRAFT** LETTER

Type 1 +

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret.  
Secret.  
Confidential.  
Restricted.  
Unclassified.

PRIVACY MARKING

.....In Confidence

To:-

HE Alhajji Field Marshal  
Dr Idi Amin Dada  
President of the Republic of Uganda  
KAMPALA

FROM

Prime Minister  
Telephone No. Ext.

Department

I am most grateful for your letter of 6 April which Mr Hennessy delivered to me personally. You had some very kind things to say in it.

I too well remember my visit to Kampala last year and the talks we had then to improve our mutual relations. I share your pleasure at the improvement in our relations which has since taken place and I join you in wishing to see these continue to thrive.

I particularly welcome your desire to dispose of the compensation<sup>question</sup> as soon as possible. I am ready to send a team out again as soon as your people are in a position to pursue discussions with them.

I shall of course continue to be <sup>unconcerned with</sup> ~~involved in~~ African questions from Number 10 and I note with interest what you said in your letter about the problem of Rhodesia. As Prime Minister, I shall continue to take whatever action I can to contribute to a speedy and peaceful transfer of power to the African majority there.

12 April 1976

Message from President Amin

I enclose a copy of a signed message from President Amin which was delivered to 10 Downing Street today by our High Commissioner in Kampala.

I should be grateful if you could let me have a draft for Mr. Callaghan's reply to this message. Although it was not possible this morning to arrange for James Hennessy to hand it personally to Mr. Callaghan, I should be grateful if you could ensure that the reply makes the point that Mr. Callaghan has received it personally from him, since President Amin was apparently rather insistent that it should be delivered in this way.

PRHW

R.N. Dales, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA

## PRIME MINISTER'S

## PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. TIA476.

6th April, 1976.

*W. J. A. J.*

The Rt. Hon. James Callaghan,  
10, Downing Street,  
L O N D O N.

*Prime Minister*

*Delivered by Mr. Hemmings today. I have asked the F.O. for a date reply.*

Dear Mr. Prime Minister,

I wish, on behalf of the Government, the people of the Republic of Uganda and on my own behalf, to congratulate you upon your election as leader of the Labour Party and consequently as the new British Prime Minister. *13/4*

The news of your election came as no surprise to us because we knew all along that your eminent qualities of leadership, pragmatism, coupled with your immense experience as a Member of Parliament, the Labour Party, successive Labour Governments and also your experience in the Navy qualify you as the most suitable statesman to lead Britain particularly at this time when your Country and the entire World is going through difficult times caused by the World wide inflation and growing unemployment. I earnestly appeal to the people of Great Britain to rally behind you as their new Prime Minister, in order to find solutions to the problems affecting their country because there is no other person outside Britain who can effectively solve these problems except the British people themselves.

We in Uganda, still recall your memorable visit to this country last year, when you were still Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary. That visit coupled with your clear understanding of the problems involved at the time, greatly helped to normalise relations between Uganda and the United Kingdom and I am confident that under your brilliant and able leadership, the already cordial relations happily existing between our two countries, will continue to thrive for the mutual benefit of our two peoples. On the question of compensation, I wish to assure you that my Government is ready to speed up the discussions and finalise the matter as soon as possible.

It is also my personal wish and desire and that of my Government that the traditional co-operation that has existed between our two countries in the various areas such as Educational, Trade, Technical and Scientific fields should be continued and strengthened further.

As the current Chairman of the Organisation of African Unity, I wish to state that your leadership comes at the most opportune moment when the problems in Zimbabwe have reached a stage where your Government has to come up with a decisive action to ensure that the principle of majority rule is not only said but also seen to be put in practice. You are no doubt aware that the Organisation of African Unity still holds Britain responsible for the affairs

.... / 2



THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA

- 2 -

of Zimbabwe until genuine independence is achieved by the people of that country. With this in mind I would like to recall what rebel Ian Smith has recently said that Zimbabwe will not be independent even in one thousand years to come. Under the circumstances, the O.A.U. especially the neighbouring States to Zimbabwe have no other course of action but to intensify the armed struggle as the only means of liberating their country. I would therefore like to call upon Great Britain to facilitate some of her innocent subjects to get out of Zimbabwe because they may find themselves unfortunate victims of the intensified guerrilla action. At the same time Britain should take immediate steps to abandon Ian Smith with his stubbornness to suffer the consequences of his political crimes and miscalculations because instead of heeding the voice of warning, he is carrying out provocative activities as shown by his recent arrest and detention of 158 Nationalists fighting for their freedom.

On a personal note, I wish to reiterate my personal happiness upon your election as the new Prime Minister because I have known you in person particularly during the meeting we held at the Command Post when you visited Uganda. At that meeting, I realised that you are a leader capable of understanding intricate problems and pondering over them with a sincere desire to find concrete solutions. Permit me in the same spirit and on behalf of my family especially my son Mwanga who is a great friend of the British people to extend to you and your family their sincere congratulations.

In the same representative manner, I wish, once again, on behalf of the Government and the people of Uganda to extend through you our great appreciation to the outgoing Prime Minister, the Honourable Harold Wilson, for the dedicated service he rendered to his country, the Commonwealth and the World at large and for the active part he played in normalising relations between Great Britain and Uganda, during his term of office.

While wishing you success in your new office, I wish, on my own behalf that of the Government and the entire people of Uganda, to extend an invitation to you and your family to visit Uganda at a time convenient to you and our two Governments. I assure you Mr. Prime Minister that while here we will accord you the traditional Ugandan hospitality and welcome.

With highest regards from a sincere friend of the British people,

AL-HAJJI FIELD MARSHAL DOCTOR IDI AMIN DADA, VC., DSO., MC.,  
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA AND CURRENT CHAIRMAN OF THE O.A.U.



Confidential Filing

The assassination attempt on President Amin

UGANDA

JUNE 1976

[illegible]

CYPHER CAT A

FM KAMPALA 151245Z JUNE

RESTRICTED

TO ROUTINE FCO TEL NO 188 OF 15 JUNE 1976.

YOUR TELNO 874 ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT.

1. MESSAGES CONGRATULATING PRESIDENT AMIN ON HIS ESCAPE HAVE BEEN SENT BY THE FOLLOWING :

(A) HEADS OF STATE: EGYPT, GHANA, INDIA, LIBERIA, SAUDI ARABIA, SOMALIA, SUDAN.

(B) PRIME MINISTER OF MAURITIUS.

(C) SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE ARAB LEAGUE.

HORROCKS

FILES

HEAD EAD

HEAD NEWS DEPT

PS

PS/MR ROWLANDS

PS/PUS

SIR A DUFF

MR ASPIN

[COPIES SENT TO NO. 10 DOWNING STREET AND  
CABINET OFFICE]

RESTRICTED

Z

PRIME MINISTER

You asked on Friday whether you should send a message of congratulations to President Amin on his escape from assassination on the previous day.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Office were consulted and their advice was that you should not send any message unless it turned out that we would be in the minority by our silence. So far as is known, no other messages have been sent, and today's press reports of acts of retribution support the case for not sending any message.

*[Handwritten signature]*

p.

14 June 1976

FM KAMPALA 141200Z JUNE

RESTRICTED

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TEL NO 183 OF 14 JUNE 1975

INFO IMMEDIATE NAIROBI.

YOURTEL 89 (NOT TO ALL): ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT.

1. ALTHOUGH IN THE WAKE OF THIS ATTEMPT THERE HAVE INEVITABLY BEEN ARRESTS AND POSSIBLY A NUMBER OF KILLINGS, FOREIGN PRESS REPORTS ARE GROSSLY EXAGGERATED.

2. THER IS A ROAD BLOCK BETWEEN ENTEBEE AIRPORT AND KAMPALA BUT THIS HAS PRESENTED NO PROBLEMS FOR TRAVELLERS. OTHERWISE THE SITUATION APPEARS COMPLETELY NORMAL.

HORROCKS

NNNN



IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT A  
GRS 70

FROM F C O 111730Z

pa  
Rw  
14/6

CONFIDENTIAL

TO IMMEDIATE KAMPALA TELEGRAM NUMBER 87 OF 11 JUNE.

YOUR TELEGRAM NUMBER ~~183~~: ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT.

1. YOU WILL NO DOUBT REPORT IF AMIN APPEARS TO BE RECEIVING A  
SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF MESSAGES FROM HEADS OF STATE/GOVERNMENT,  
CONGRATULATING HIM ON HIS ESCAPE.

CROSLAND

[COPIES SENT TO NO.10 DOWNING ST]

FILES:

HEAD EAD

HEAD NEWS D

PS

PS/MR ROWLANDS

PS/PUS

SIR A. DUFF

MR ASPIN

RESIDENT CLERK

COPIES TO:

DUTY OFFICER, CABINET OFFICE

CONFIDENTIAL

FDW E 196/11

*Do I send any message?*  
*[File]*

*Prime Minister*

*R 17/6*

ADVANCE COPY

LHH NR 307  
ZZ FCO  
GR 300  
CYPHER CAT A

FLASH

ADVANCE COPIES
PS
PS/Mr Rowlands.
PS to PUS
Sir A Duff
Mr Capin.
Hd EAD

*Hd News D.*

*Rc.*

*No 10 Downing St.  
D/o Cabinet Office*

*R.C.*

FM KAMPALA 111500Z JUNE

CONFIDENTIAL

TO FLASH FCO TEL NO 183 OF 11 JUNE

1. SHORTLY BEFORE 7 PM 10 JUNE AS PRESIDENT AMIN WAS LEAVING THE POLICE TRAINING COLLEGE AT NSAMBYA, KAMPALA, AFTER ATTENDING A POLICE PASSING OUT PARADE, THREE HAND GRENADES WERE HURLED TOWARDS HIS CAR. AMIN WAS

BELIEVED NOT TO HAVE BEEN INJURED BUT HIS DRIVER WAS KILLED. THE AREA WAS IMMEDIATELY CORDONED OFF BY TROOPS BUT THERE WERE NO FURTHER INCIDENTS AND ALL OTHER DISTRICTS OF KAMPALA REMAINED CALM.

2. THE 5 PM RADIO NEWS TODAY INCLUDED A LENGTHY STATEMENT BY A MILITARY SPOKESMAN CONFIRMING THE ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT AND ADDING THAT 39 PEOPLE HAD BEEN INJURED 4 OF THEM SERIOUSLY (ONE OF WHOM SINCE DIED) THE STATEMENT ALLEGED THAT THE GRENADES WERE OF ISRAELI AND AMERICAN ORIGIN, BLAMED THE ATTACK ON ENEMIES OF PRESIDENT AMIN AND UGANDA, AND SAID THAT THE PERPETRATORS WERE NOW IN CUSTODY UNDERGOING INTEROGATION.

3. THE SITUATION IN KAMPALA HAS SEEMED NORMAL TODAY WITH NO OBVIOUS SIGNS OF TENSION. THE FOREIGN MINISTER (WITH OTHER UGANDAN OFFICIALS) ATTENDED MY CBP CELEBRATION AT 10 AND WENT AFTERWARDS TO THE NILE HOTEL TO WITNESS THE PRESENTATION OF THE AUSTRIAN AMBASSADOR'S CREDENTIALS TO PRESIDENT AMIN HORROCKS

NNNN



EN CLARK

FROM DR IDI AMIN DADA

UNCLASSIFIED

TO THE RT. HON. EDWARD HEATH, FORMER BRITISH PRIME MINISTER,  
LONDON, HOUSE OF COMMONS.

10/1/1977.

NO39 I AM MADE TO UNDERSTAND THAT FROM THE HIGH POST YOU HELD AS  
PRIME MINISTER OF FORMER BRITISH EMPIRE YOU HAVE NOW BEEN ~~RELEGATED~~  
IN FACT DEMOTED TO THE OBSECURE RANK OF MUSIC BAND MASTER STOP

DEPITE THAT HOWEVER I UNDERSTAND THAT YOU HAVE ESTABLISHED  
YOURSELF WELL IN THE NEW PROFESSION AND YOU ARE ONE OF THE BEST BAND  
MASTERS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM STOP BECAUSE OF THIS I AM TAKING THE  
LIBERTY OF INVITING YOU TO COME TO UGANDA ALONG WITY YOUR BAND TO  
PLAY BEFOREME AND THE BRITISH NATIONALS AT THE COMMAND POST STOP

THIS WOULD ALSO OFFER YOU AN OPPORTUNITY TO VISIT OUR  
BEAUTIFUL COUNTRY UGANDA AND I AM PREPARED TO TAKE YOU TO OUR  
NATIONALS PARKS AND OTHER PLACES OF INTEREST STOP

I WILL PROVIDE YOU ALONG WITH YOUR MUSICIANS FREE RETURN  
AIR TICKETS OR PUT AT YOUR DISPOSAL UGANDA AIRLINES WHICH WILL  
FLY YOU TO AND FROM UGANDA STOP

YOUR ACCOMMODATION AND EXPENDITURE WILL CATERED FOR AND IN  
ADDITION I WILL ASSIST YOU WITH FOREIGN ~~EXCHANGE~~ FOR YOU EXCELLENT  
PERFORMANCE HERE STOP

I AM EXTENDING THIS INVITATION NOW BECAUSE DURING THE  
TENURE OF YOUR PREMIERSHIP YOU HAD BEEN VERY BUSY ESPECIALLY DEALING  
WITH BRITISH ASIANS WHO I EXPELLED FROM UGANDA STOP

I WILL BE MOST GRATEFUL IF YOU COULD ACCEPT THIS INVITATION  
TO COME TO UGANDA DURING THE CELEBRATIONS MARKING THE 6TH ANNIVERSARY  
OF THE MILITARY TAKEOVER AND I PROPOSE THAT YOU ARRIVE HERE ON 22ND  
JANUARY 1977 STOP

/ I AM DOING ALL

I AM DOING ALL THIS WITH THE FULL AWARENESS OF THE IMMENSE  
DIFFICULTIES THE BRITISH ECONOMY AND WORSE STILL THE CRIPPLING  
STATE THE POUND STERLING IS UNDERGOING STOP A GREAT MAJORITY OF  
UGANDANS ARE WILLING TO CONTRIBUTE GENEROUSLY TOWARDS ASSISTING YOU  
BY GIVING YOU NOT ONLY MONEY BUT EVEN CHICKENS GOATS AND SOME  
AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES STOP

I WISH YOU THE BEST OF LUCK AND PROSPERITY IN YOUR NEW  
UNDERTAKING STOP

AL-HAJJI FIELD MARSHAL DR IDI AMIN DADA VC DSO MC  
LIFE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA

C C RT HON JAMES CALLAGHAN  
PRIME MINISTER  
LONDON

=====

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

F I L E S

EAD  
NEWS D  
PS  
PS/IR ROWLANDS  
PS/PUS  
SIR A. DUFF

Confidential Filing

UGANDA

tion of Human Rights in Myanmar

February 1977

[illegible]





Uganda  
AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION LONDON

Top copy  
CPMM PC 3

*Prime Minister*

THE HIGH COMMISSIONER

Sir John Bunting, KBE

28 February 1977

*I would like to draft this*  
Dear Prime Minister,

*I have asked  
Sir John Bunting to write, and  
copy to you*

*[Large circular scribble]*  
I have been asked to let you know that my Prime Minister has written privately to you about President Amin's attendance at the forthcoming Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting in London. As the original of the letter will take a little time getting here, I have also been asked to give you now its terms, which are as follows:

"You will, I am sure, have been saddened and disgusted as I was by the circumstances of the deaths of Archbishop Luwum and of the two Ugandan Cabinet Ministers.

Needless to say, the prevailing mood among my colleagues and throughout Australia is one of horror at this latest outrage. We made our concern known in Kampala after the Archbishop's arrest and before his death, and we shall make our views known there again now.

You will, I imagine, share my feelings of extreme distaste at the prospect that we might have to sit in conference with Idi Amin at the forthcoming Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting in London.

I am writing to you to express my strong hope that we shall in fact not be faced with Amin's attendance at the meeting. I should like you to know that you can count on my support for moves to discourage Amin from coming to London. "

Yours sincerely,

*[Signature of E.J. Bunting]*

(E.J. Bunting)

The Rt Hon James Callaghan, MP

CONFIDENTIAL

GRPS 480

IMMEDIATE

CYPHER CAT A

FM UKMIS GENEVA 251642Z

CONFIDENTIAL

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 118 OF 25 FEBRUARY  
INFO KAMPALA PARIS UKMIS NEW YORK WASHINGTON

TELCON CALLAN/BROAD

COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: UGANDA

1. PLEASE SEE MY 4 IFTS (NOT TO ALL) FOR THE TEXTS OF A) THE NON-  
ALIGNED DECISION D) OUR TWO PROPOSALS AND C) A STATEMENT BY THE  
SECRETARY-GENERAL CIRCULATED TO THE COMMISSION.

2. AT THE REQUEST OF THE US DELEGATION, WHICH COULD NOT OBTAIN  
INSTRUCTIONS IN TIME, VOTING HAS BEEN DEFERRED TO THE AFTERNOON OF  
28 FEBRUARY IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE 24-HOUR RULE. THE UGANDANS HAD  
STATED THEY COULD ACCEPT THE NON-ALIGNED DECISION AND NO OTHER. WE  
ACCORDINGLY WITHDREW OUR SECOND PROPOSAL ON PARAGRAPH 6B OF  
RESOLUTION 1503 AND REQUESTED A VOTE ON OUR ORIGINAL PROPOSAL.  
SENEGAL AND EGYPT MOVED PRIORITY FOR THE NON-ALIGNED DRAFT, WHILE  
INDIA ARGUED THAT WITH THE WITHDRAWAL OF OUR SECOND PROPOSAL THE  
NON-ALIGNED DRAFT NOW HAD PRIORITY IN ANY CASE. THE CHAIRMAN IS  
LIKELY TO UPHOLD INDIA'S POSITION AND RATHER THAN OPEN A  
PROCEDURAL DEBATE ON PRIORITY WHICH WE WOULD IN ANY EVENT LOSE, WE  
WOULD PROPOSE ONCE THE NON-ALIGNED DRAFT HAS BEEN ADOPTED TO  
REQUEST A VOTE ON OUR OWN PROPOSAL IN ACCORDANCE WITH RULE 61(2).  
ALTHOUGH WE WOULD EXPECT TO LOSE THIS VOTE, IT WOULD ALLOW  
US TO SHOW THAT WE BELIEVE ONLY A STUDY UNDER PARAGRAPH 6 OF RESO-  
LUTION 1503 IS ADEQUATE TO THE SITUATION AND PERMIT LIKE-MINDED  
DELEGATIONS TO PLACE THEIR POSITION ON RECORD.

3. ON THE NON-ALIGNED RESOLUTION, UNLESS THE US CAN JOIN US, WE  
SHALL PROBABLY BE ALONE IN VOTING AGAINST. YOU MAY WISH TO CONSIDER  
WHETHER IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR US TO ABSTAIN IN THE LIGHT OF  
THE PRESSURE AFRICAN DELEGATIONS HAVE SUCCESSFULLY EXERCISED ON  
UGANDA TO ACCEPT THE NON-ALIGNED DRAFT. IN INTRODUCING IT, /SENEGAL

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

SENEGAL ARGUED THAT IN SUBSTANCE IT CONSTITUTED ACTION UNDER PARAGRAPH 6A OF RESOLUTION 1533 BUT IF THIS WERE STATED EXPLICITLY THE UGANDANS WOULD CEASE TO CO-OPERATE. THE NON-ALIGNED GROUP INTEND TO PRESS AHEAD WITH THEIR TEXT AS DRAFTED SO LONG AS IT IS NOT STATED ON BEHALF OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IN TERMS THAT HE IS NOT IN A POSITION TO IMPLEMENT ITS PROVISIONS. HOWEVER, THE INVOLVEMENT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, DESPITE HIS STATED RELUCTANCE DOES PROVIDE US WITH A USEFUL ARGUMENT FOR VOTING AGAINST THE NON-ALIGNED TEXT.

4. ON PUBLICITY, THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION INTENDS TO MAKE A STATEMENT TO THE PRESS WHEN WE HAVE TAKEN A DECISION EXPLAINING THAT THE COMMISSION HAS TAKEN ACTION UNDER RESOLUTION 1533 ADEQUATE TO THE NEEDS OF THE SITUATION. AT THIS POINT, YOU MAY WISH TO STATE THAT ALTHOUGH THE COMMISSION HAS INDEED ACTED ON THE SITUATION IN UGANDA OUR PROPOSAL FOR AN ENQUIRY HAS NOT BEEN ACCEPTED IN THE FORM PROPOSED AND WE ARE NOW ASSESSING HOW IT CAN BEST BE FURTHERED DURING THIS SESSION.

5. YOU WILL ALSO WISH TO KNOW THAT EARLIER IN THE DEBATE, THE US (LOWENSTEIN) ANNOUNCED THEY WOULD PROPOSE IN OPEN SESSION A UN ENQUIRY INTO THE DEATHS OF THE ARCHBISHOP AND TWO MINISTERS. WE SHALL REPORT NEXT WEEK ON THE APPROACHES THAT COULD BE TAKEN IN OPEN DEBATE UNDER ITEM 12 IF THE COMMISSION GETS TO IT ON ITS AGENDA.

BOTTOMLEY

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

DEPARTMENTAL	DISTRIBUTION
UND	CONS D
EAD	CONS EM UNIT
OSAD	LAD
OADS	FED
NEWS D	CCD
	GIPD

REPETITION TO KAMPALA REFERRED  
FOR DEPARTMENTAL DECISION  
REPEATED AS REQUESTED TO  
OTHER POSTS



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

25 February 1977

*Dr 25/2*

*MSL*

*ps*

Cabinet: 24 February 1977

The minutes of Cabinet record the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary as having said under the Foreign Affairs item about Uganda that the Philippines and Cubans were conducting a filibuster at the meeting of the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva. What Dr Owen said was that the Libyans, Cubans and others were conducting a filibuster. I should be grateful if you would note this correction on the entered copy of the minutes. I do not think it needs wider correction but I am sending a copy of this letter to Patrick Wright.

(R.N. Dales)

Martin Vile Esq.,  
PS/Sir John Hunt KCB,  
Cabinet Office,  
Whitehall SW1.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL



1BF 23/2/77

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

21 February 1977

Uganda: Human Rights

Thank you for your letter about the line which our Mission should take on Uganda at the meeting of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights.

The Prime Minister fully agrees with the line proposed, and you kindly agreed to let us have a form of words which the Prime Minister might use if there is a Question on this subject in the House of Commons on either Tuesday or Thursday this week.

Form of words

LGW  
2/2

P. R. H. WRIGHT

R.N. Dales, Esq.  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL



Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

21 February 1977

*Any further action with this?*

*2 1/2*

*cc. Mr. McCaffrey  
Mr. McNeilly*

*Dear Mr Wright,*

Uganda: Human Rights (attached)

*Quite right.  
(See if I  
can refer to  
it at  
Austen  
time)*

Since your letter of 11 February about President Amin, there has, as you know, been considerable public outrage at the death of Archbishop Luwum and two senior Government Ministers and an Early Day Motion has been put down in the House, calling on HMG to urge the United Nations to undertake a full inquiry into these deaths. Uganda is in fact already on the agenda of the meeting of the UN Commission on Human Rights which is currently meeting in Geneva and we have instructed our Mission to support a call for an investigation into the human rights situation in that country. It is however possible that the Ugandans may, as they have done on previous occasions, wriggle out of a substantive discussion, and Dr Owen feels that we should be prepared if necessary to speak out at Geneva to prevent this happening and to make public our position. In so doing we should be acting in a manner consistent with our declared policy on human rights and should be going some way towards meeting public opinion over the most recent outrages. We could make public our position (either at Prime Minister's Questions on Thursday or through the Lord President in response to probable questioning on the Early Day Motion).

We do not yet know when exactly open discussion of Uganda will be taking place in Geneva. There is however a closed session tomorrow, 22 February, in which our Mission will need to be in a position to take the initiative on Uganda if there appears to be any danger of the Ugandans evading open discussion later. I should therefore be grateful if you could let me know by telephone before close of play today if you think the Prime Minister would have any objection to our taking the initiative, if necessary, within the UN Commission on Human Rights and to making our position on this public.

*Yours sincerely,  
Elizabeth Dales*

*pp. (R. N. Dales)*

Patrick Wright Esq.,  
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 93

FLASH

Q PER CAT A

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 181230Z

CONFIDENTIAL

TO FLASH KAMPALA TELNO 21 OF 18 FEBRUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS, UKMIS GENEVA, UKMIS NEW YORK, NAIROBI.

DEATH OF ARCHBISHOP LUWUM.

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF STATEMENT TO BE MADE BY FCO SPOKESMAN  
AT 12.30 GMT TODAY:-

THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT ARE SHOCKED AT THE DEATH OF ARCHBISHOP  
LUWUM.

REPORTS OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE DEATH OF THE ARCHBISHOP AND  
TWO UGANDAN MINISTERS ARE REGARDED BY MANY PEOPLE WITH GREAT  
SCEPTICISM.

H M GOVERNMENT THINK THE UGANDAN GOVERNMENT WOULD DO WELL TO AGREE  
TO A FULL AND IMPARTIAL ENQUIRY.

CROSLAND

F I L E S

EAD

UND

CONS DEPT

NEWS DEPT

GIPD

PS

PS/DR OWEN

PS/LORD GORONWY ROBERTS

PS/MR ROWLANDS

PS/MR LUARD

PS/MR TOMLINSON

PS/PUS

SIR A DUFF

MR MANSFIELD

MR HAWLEY

[COPIES TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

CONFIDENTIAL

# PRESS OFFICE BULLETIN

date:

*Luh sp =*

*[Signature]*

*18/2*

STATEMENT ON UGANDA ISSUED BY THE FCO AT 1230 on FRIDAY, 18 FEBRUARY

"HMG are shocked at the death of Archbishop Luwum and two Ugandan ministers.

Reports of the circumstances of the death of the Archbishop and the two Ugandan ministers are regarded by many people with great scepticism. HMG think that the Ugandan Government would do well to agree to a full and impartial enquiry"

PM. Yes, make part at  
news conference

PRIME MINISTER

DEATHS IN UGANDA

Mr. Fajman  
inform

You asked me this evening to discuss with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office the possibility of an FCO statement on the death of the Anglican Archbishop in Uganda. 18 1/2

As you probably know, the Archbishop of Canterbury has already issued a statement on the Archbishop's death. The FCO referred to the death at their News Department briefing this afternoon, and said that the Government were distressed at it. They take the view that it would be most unusual to issue a statement about the death of a non-British citizen (other than a Head of Government or Head of State) but propose to repeat the line at tomorrow's news conference that the British Government very much regret the death of this distinguished Ugandan.

Unless you want me to press them further on this, I think that this should probably be sufficient.

John

17 February 1977



Question of President Amin's  
inclusion at the Commonwealth  
of Government Meeting 8-15 June 1977.

possibility of President Amin Transiting  
through en route to the United  
Nations General Assembly in New York.

UGANDA

February 1977

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
<del>5-77</del>							
<del>5-77</del>							
<del>6-77</del>							
<del>6-77</del>							
<del>6-77</del>							
<del>8-77</del>							
<del>9-77</del>							
<del>9-77</del>							
<del>10-77</del>							
<del>11-77</del>							
2-78							



CONFIDENTIAL

FILE

*Uganda - VUS*

15 February 1978

General Amin

I spoke to you on the telephone yesterday about the line which Government spokesmen should take on General Amin's reported intention of seeking to visit the U.K.

Following our conversation, I informed the Prime Minister of the comments which had already been made during the day, on and off the record, by the F.C.O. News Department and of the view at official level in the F.C.O. that there would be advantage in letting the matter rest at that rather than giving General Amin further encouragement to be mischievous.

The Prime Minister has taken note of this advice and does not dissent from it.

B. G. CARTLEDGE

J. S. Wall, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

*6 C/m*

PRIME MINISTER

General Amin

You asked me to get the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to consider whether there should not be some discouraging public response to General Amin's latest announcement that he intends to visit the United Kingdom.

The FCO spokesman has already said on the record today that no approach has been made by General Amin; and this is being supplemented this afternoon by the unattributable line that the question of a visit by Amin is very hypothetical, and that the attitude which the Government adopted last year at the time of the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting has not changed. (You will remember that the line which you and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary took at that time was that it would not be taken amiss if General Amin decided not to come.)

It seems that General Amin's latest remark was made as a teasing response to a leading question from a BBC interviewer, along the lines "when are you next going to visit the United Kingdom?". In the circumstances, FCO advice is that it might be better to let the matter rest rather than giving General Amin further encouragement to be mischievous.

*J. E. H. M. Lomen*  
*cc: Mr Cantledge.*

14 February, 1978.



SECRET

HOME OFFICE

QUEEN ANNE'S GATE LONDON SW1H 9AT

26 November 1977

30

OKB/M

BM

Q11

PRESIDENT AMIN

26 Oct  
You copied to Bob Morris your letter of 21st October about the arrangements made against the possible arrival in the United Kingdom of President Amin. The Home Secretary agrees that the revised arrangements summarised in your letter constitute an adequate level of preparedness against such an eventuality.

I am sending copies of this letter to Bryan Cartledge (10 Downing Street), Roger Facer (MOD), Martyn Baker (Department of Trade) and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

J. A. INGMAN

Stephen Wall, Esq.

SECRET



FILE

29.

Uganda

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

31 October 1977

President Amin

Thank you for your letter of 26 October about the level of preparedness which is needed against the continuing possibility of a surprise visit to the UK by President Amin.

Subject to the views of his colleagues, the Prime Minister agrees with the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's view that some degree of relaxation in our precautions could prudently be initiated; and he would be content with the revised arrangements summarised in your letter.

I am sending copies of this letter to Bob Morris (Home Office), Roger Facer (MOD), Martyn Baker (Department of Trade) and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

B. G. CARLEDGE

Stephen Wall, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

**SECRET**



*Prime Minister*  
*Agree, subject to*  
*views of colleagues?*

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

26 October 1977

*Dear Buzan,*

President Amin

Now that the General Debate in the United Nations General Assembly has finished, it should be possible to relax to some degree our level of preparedness for an attempt by President Amin to enter the United Kingdom on his way to New York. We can only relax to this extent because we have seen a report suggesting that President Amin may still plan to visit the United Nations later this year. Although the General Debate is over, it is open to a Head of State to address the General Assembly at any time during its sitting provided the Secretariat is given advance notice, which would not normally be less than three days. It is also conceivable that President Amin could seek at some stage to muscle in on a Security Council Debate, which would also be possible at little notice.

It is clear that the problem of a surprise visit to this country by President Amin is one that will be with us indefinitely. However, except in periods of particular risk, such as that immediately before the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting and the General Debate in the UN General Assembly, we do not need to be in a constant stage of advanced preparedness and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary is aware of the strain that this places upon the resources of all concerned e.g. through police and transport being on permanent stand-by. He would therefore like to suggest that we settle now for a system whereby the Immigration Services remain under standing instructions to refuse Amin entry and the National Air Traffic Services remain under permanent instructions to inform the Department of Trade if President Amin's personal aircraft should enter UK airspace or seek to land here (in which case the pilot should be told that he does not have permission to land) or if they receive advice that a commercial aircraft is approaching UK airspace with President Amin on board.

We and the other departments concerned are confident that the continuing precautions outlined in this letter would enable us to move into action at short notice, drawing on the contingency plan as necessary.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries of the Home Secretary, the Secretary of State for Defence and the Secretary of State for Trade and to the Cabinet Secretary.

*Yours ever,*  
*Stephen*

J S Wall  
Private Secretary

B G Cartledge Esq

28.

**SECRET**



HOME OFFICE  
QUEEN ANNE'S GATE LONDON SW1H 9AT

23 September 1977

*Letter to  
Bm  
29/9*

*Prime Minister  
(for information)*

*Bm  
26/9*

*Dear Brian*

PRESIDENT AMIN

Since the Home Secretary's minute of 12 September to the Prime Minister about the possibility that President Amin might travel via the United Kingdom on his way to the UN General Assembly in New York, officials have met and revised the contingency plans made for last June.

Plans have been made to prevent President Amin's formal admission to the United Kingdom, and to ensure that if he does arrive he is sent on his way as quickly as possible and kept away from the Press and public during any time in transit. Arrangements are being made for suitable inter-airport transport and overnight accommodation, should these prove necessary. Apart from transport, there are no plans to deploy units of the armed services.

I am sending copies of this letter to Stephen Wall (FCO), Roger Facer (MOD), Martyn Baker (D/Trade) and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

*Yours ever*

*Bob Morris*

R. M. MORRIS

B. G. Cartledge, Esq.,

**SECRET**

CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

15 September 1977

Dear Stephen,

President Amin

Since I wrote to Kieran Prendergast on 30 August recording the Prime Minister's agreement with the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's minute (PM 77/84) about the possibility that President Amin might transit through Heathrow on his way to the UNGA in New York, the Prime Minister has also seen the Home Secretary's minute of 12 September on the same subject. The Prime Minister agrees with Mr. Rees' view that the revised arrangements set out in his minute should be adequate to meet the new contingency and that the wider arrangements which were made in June should not be necessary on this occasion.

I am sending copies of this letter to Bob Morris (Home Office), Roger Facer (Ministry of Defence), Martyn Baker (Department of Trade) and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,  
Roger Carver

J.S. Wall, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

Uganda 1175

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



PRIME MINISTER

PRESIDENT AMIN

Prime Minister

Do you agree that the revised arrangements ~~will~~ are adequate for the new eventuality? B1 B1

[initials]

I have seen a copy of the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's minute of 24th August to you (PM/77/84) about arrangements to deal with the possibility that President Amin may pass through London in transit to New York to attend the U.N. General Assembly later this month and your Private Secretary's letter of 30th August in response to this. I agree that even a brief stop while in transit could arouse protest and affront Parliamentary and public feeling, though not on anything like the scale which would have met his coming to the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting and the Silver Jubilee celebrations. My personal direction under the Immigration Act 1971, that he should be excluded from the United Kingdom, remains in force.

The elaborate contingency plans we made to counter his coming in June were aimed at countering a deliberate attempt to force or bluff his way into the country to attend the C.H.G.M., and to resist departure. I doubt whether the present contingency requires measures on that scale; some of those measures would in any event be irrelevant to it. But I agree that adequate precautions should be taken to prevent, so far as possible, his landing and to control him until he leaves on his onward (or return) flight.

I suggest, therefore, that officials in the Departments concerned should be instructed to prepare revised arrangements. Two practical problems have been identified in this situation if the media


~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

( are not to be manipulated by him while in transit: the possible need for secure inter-airport transport and escort; and the possible need for secure overnight accommodation (e.g. if he arrives on a commercial flight too late in the day for any onward or return flight. Apart from those aspects, the existing instructions to the National Air Traffic Services that his aircraft be denied permission to enter our airspace or to land, and to the Immigration Service to refuse him leave to enter and detain him pending removal (copied to Chief Officers of Police whose force areas cover Heathrow, Stansted and Gatwick) should in my judgment be sufficient. The wider arrangements, including deployment of units of the Armed Services in various parts of the country, which were made in June, do not appear to me to be necessary.

I am copying this minute to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, the Secretary of State for Defence, the Secretary of State for Trade and the Secretary of the Cabinet.



12 September 1977

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



*Uganda file 16*

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

30 August 1977

PRESIDENT AMIN

The Prime Minister has seen the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's minute (PM 77/84) of 24 August about the action which should be taken if President Amin does, in the event, seek to attend the United Nations General Assembly in New York and to pass through Heathrow in transit.

The Prime Minister agrees with Dr. Owen's recommendations both on the action which should be taken in this event and with regard to our public position.

I am sending copies of this letter to Bob Morris (Home Office), Martyn Baker (Department of Trade) and to Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

B. G. CARTLEDGE

W. K. Prendergast, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL



PRIME MINISTER

CONFIDENTIAL

Prime Minister

Agree?

RSN

24/8

PM/77/84

President Amin

1. You will have seen the press reports that President Amin has announced his intention of attending the United Nations General Assembly in New York and of transitting Heathrow en route.
2. This may be another of Amin's extravagant jokes and the chances of him attending the General Assembly are probably not very great. Even if he does come via Heathrow he may well simply pass straight through in the normal way (although there will undoubtedly be problems with the press if he does). I do not think however we can afford to take the risk of being caught napping if he does turn up and seek to enter the UK. He has a former wife here and there has been a suggestion that he has a child or children at school here under assumed names (although we have been unable to confirm this); he might use their presence as a pretext for a visit. I am quite sure that if Amin were to seek admission to the United Kingdom we should exclude him. We agreed in the context of his proposed attendance at the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting that his presence here would be totally unacceptable to public and

/Parliamentary

CONFIDENTIAL




Parliamentary opinion. Furthermore he could be subjected to hostile demonstrations which could result in insult or injury which might in turn provoke retaliation against the British community in Uganda.

3. I also consider that if he should try to come here in his personal aircraft, this should be denied permission to enter British air space or to land; and that if he does land or arrives in a commercial aircraft, while we cannot prevent him from transitting in the normal way, we should do everything possible to keep him away from the press. (We should face a particularly tricky problem if he were to turn up at Stansted and wish to travel by road to Heathrow for his onward flight; but this is unlikely.) This means that as the General Assembly approaches we should reactivate the Comprehensive Contingency plans which we drew up at the time of the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting.

4. As to our public position, my recommendation is that we should avoid making any statement unless and until it is absolutely necessary (we have no wish to provoke Amin unnecessarily or invite retaliation against the British community in Uganda); but that if the issue were to become live we should be prepared if necessary to make clear that Amin would not be allowed entry into the United Kingdom.

5. I am copying this letter to the Home Secretary, the Secretary of State for Trade and the Secretary of the Cabinet.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

  
(DAVID OWEN)  
24 August 1977

GR 203

OPS

CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE

HER CAT A

FM FCO 231500Z

*Subject a CPM.*  
*Agreed Feb 77*  
PRIME MINISTER  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL NO. T 138/77

CONFIDENTIAL

TO IMMEDIATE LAGOS TELNO 431 OF 23 JUNE.

PRESIDENT AMIN AND THE COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING (CHGM).

1. PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO GENERAL OBASANJO:-

BEGINS

QUOTE DEAR GENERAL OBASANJO,

NOW THAT THE COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING IS OVER,

I AM WRITING TO LET YOU KNOW HOW MUCH I VALUED MY TALKS WITH BRIGADIER YAR'ADUA AND BRIGADIER GARBA AND HOW USEFUL IT WAS FOR

ME TO BE ABLE TO DISCUSS WITH THEM THE HANDLING OF SOME OF THE ISSUES WHICH FACED US AT THE MEETING. I WAS PARTICULARLY GRATEFUL FOR THEIR VIEWS ON THE QUESTION OF PRESIDENT AMIN'S ATTENDANCE.

I NOW HAVE A MUCH BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF YOUR CONCERN OVER THIS MATTER AND I BELIEVE THAT THE EFFORTS WHICH WE ALL MADE ON THIS AND OTHER DIFFICULT ISSUES HELPED ENSURE THAT THE MEETING WAS A VALUABLE AND SUCCESSFUL ONE.

I HOPE WE CAN CONTINUE TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH IN FUTURE. I BELIEVE THAT IT IS IMPORTANT FOR US TO EXCHANGE VIEWS ON THE MANY AFRICAN AND OTHER ISSUES WHICH CONCERN BOTH OUR COUNTRIES.

WITH BEST WISHES,

JIM CALLAGHAN UNQUOTE.

ENDS.

OWEN

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

FILES

WAD  
CCD  
NEWS D  
PS  
PS/MR ROWLANDS  
PS/PUS  
SIR A DUFF  
MR GRAHAM  
MR MANSFIELD  
MR LEAHY

COPIES TO:

SIR J HUNT, CABINET OFFICE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

23 June 1977

Nigeria and Uganda

Thank you for your letter of 22 June with which you enclosed a draft telegram incorporating a message for the Prime Minister to send to General Obasanjo in connection with Uganda.

The Prime Minister has approved the message with the following amendments:

Page 1, line 3 to read:

".....how much I valued my talks with Brigadier Yar'Adua....."

Page 2, lines 4 and 5 to read:

"..... on this and other difficult issues helped ensure that the meeting ....."

Page 2, First line of last paragraph to read:

"I hope we can continue to keep in close touch in future."

I should be grateful if you would arrange for the telegram to be despatched, as amended, as soon as possible.

P. R. H. WRIGHT

J.S. Wall, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister

*Amiga cabinet?*

22 June 1977

Dear Patrick,

Nigeria and Uganda

During his meeting with Dr Owen on 13 June, Brigadier Garba suggested that a further message should be sent to General Obasanjo telling him how the issue of President Amin's attendance at the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting had developed and what position the British Government had finally adopted on it.

It was clear that the point Brigadier Garba was trying to get over was that Nigeria was now a major, if not the major, power in black Africa and that she should be informed and consulted about matters of interest to her. Dr Owen believes that we should respond to Brigadier Garba's request. We should not go into further detail about President Amin since this would only revive a contentious issue and because the question was covered pretty fully both in the Prime Minister's meeting with Brigadier Garba and in his subsequent meeting with Brigadier Yar'Adu. We should, however, get across the fact that we intend to keep in close touch with the Nigerians about matters of mutual interest. I enclose a draft message on these lines and would be grateful to know if the Prime Minister agrees to its despatch.

*Yours ever,*  
*Stephen*

J S Wall  
Private Secretary

P.R.H. Wright Esq.,  
10 Downing Street,  
London SW1.

CONFIDENTIAL

File No. ....	OUTWARD	Security Classification CONFIDENTIAL
Department <u>PRIVATE OFFICE</u>	TELEGRAM	Precedence IMMEDIATE
Drafted by (Block Capitals) <u>J. S. WALL</u>		
Tel. Extn. ....		DESKBY .....

FOR COMMS. DEPT. USE	Despatched	(Date) .....	POSTBY .....
		(Time) .....Z	

PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin) .....Z(G.M.T.) (Restrictive Prefix).....

(Security Class.) CONFIDENTIAL (Caveat/Privacy Marking).....

(Codeword) ..... (Deskby).....Z

TO IMMEDIATE LAGOS Tel. No. .... of .....

(precedence) (post)

AND TO (precedence/post).....

AND SAVING TO.....

REPEATED TO (for info).....

SAVING TO (for info).....

Distribution:-

Files  
EAD  
WAD  
CCD  
PS  
PS/Mr Rowlands  
PS/Mr Judd  
PS/PUS  
Mr Graham  
Mr Mansfield

Copies to:-

10 Downing Street  
Sir J Hunt, Cab  
Office.

[TEXT]

PRESIDENT AMIN AND THE COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING (CHGM)

1. Please pass the following message from the Prime Minister to General Obasanjo:-

Begins

"Dear General Obasanjo,

Now that the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting

is over, I am writing to let you know how much I

*valued my talks with*  
~~enjoyed meeting~~ Brigadier Yar'Adua and Brigadier Garba

and how useful it was for me to be able to discuss with them the handling of some of the issues which faced us at the meeting. I was particularly grateful for their



CONFIDENTIAL

view on the question of President Amin's attendance.

I now have a much better understanding of your concern over this matter and I believe that the efforts which we all made on this and other <sup>difficult</sup> ~~tricky~~ issues helped ensure that <sup>the</sup> ~~our~~ meeting was a valuable and successful one.

<sup>Continue to keep</sup>  
I hope we can ~~keep~~ in close touch in future. I believe that it is important for us to exchange views on the many African and other issues which concern both our countries.

With best wishes,

JIM CALLAGHAN".

Ends.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIORITY  
IPHER CAT A

FM FCO 171833Z

CONFIDENTIAL

TO PRIORITY JEDDA TELNO 389 OF 17 JUNE.

PLEASE PASS FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRINCE SAUD AS SOON AS POSSIBLE:

BEGINS

I KNOW THAT THE PRIME MINISTER EXPRESSED HIS THANKS TO HIS HIGHNESS CROWN PRINCE FAHD AT THE TIME FOR YOUR HELP TO US OVER PRESIDENT AMIN'S POSSIBLE ATTENDANCE AT THE COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING. NOW THAT THE MEETING IS OVER, I WANT TO EXPRESS TO YOU AGAIN OUR GRATITUDE FOR THE WAY IN WHICH YOU HELPED US. THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THE INTERESTS OF THE COMMONWEALTH WOULD HAVE SUFFERED IF PRESIDENT AMIN HAD DECIDED TO TRY TO COME TO LONDON. THE ACTION WHICH YOU TOOK SO PROMPTLY AT OUR REQUEST SUCCEEDED IN AVERTING THAT DANGER AND, AS YOU WILL HAVE SEEN, WE HAD A SUCCESSFUL MEETING.

I ALSO WANTED TO LET YOU KNOW THAT, IN ASKING YOUR EMBASSY IN LONDON TO CLOSE THE UGANDAN INTERESTS SECTION, I WAS MAKING AN INEVITABLE RESPONSE TO THE MEASURES WHICH THE UGANDAN GOVERNMENT TOOK AGAINST OUR INTERESTS SECTION IN KAMPALA. MY ACTION WAS IN NO WAY A CRITICISM OF THE WAY YOUR EMBASSY HAVE LOOKED AFTER UGANDAN INTERESTS IN THIS COUNTRY. ON THE CONTRARY, YOUR AMBASSADOR HAS THROUGHOUT HANDLED A DELICATE ISSUE IN AN EXEMPLARY FASHION.

WITH WARM GOOD WISHES. DAVID OWEN. ENDS.

OWEN

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

FILES

MED  
EAD  
CCD

PS

PS/MRROWLANDS

PS/MR JUDD

PS/PUS

MR GRAHAM

MR WEIR

MR MANSFIELD

CABINET OFFICE

CONFIDENTIAL

6/2/67 ps  
RS1  
10/6

FLASH  
CYPHER CAT A

CONFIDENTIAL

FM KAMPALA 091600Z

CONFIDENTIAL

TO FLASH FCO TELNO 132 OF 9 JUNE

AND TO IMMEDIATE PARIS WASHINGTON NAIROBI KINSHASA

NY TELNO 131 CHCM

TODAYS ANNOUNCEMENTS COULD OF COURSE HERALD AN ATTEMPT BY AKIN  
TO DRAW YOU INTO A PUBLIC DIALOGUE.

CLASBY

NNNN

[RECEIVED VIA FRENCH EMBASSY]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION:

EAD

CONS D

CONS EM UNIT

NEWS D

CCD

WED

COPIES TO:

PS/NO.10 DOWNING ST

DIO CABINET OFFICE

CONFIDENTIAL

GR 80  
FLASH

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT A

FM KAMPALA 090930Z

CONFIDENTIAL

TO FLASH F C O TELNO 129 OF 9 JUNE 1977,  
AND TO IMMEDIATE NAIROBI PARIS KINSHASA WASHINGTON.

MY TELNO 128: C H G M.

WE HAVE JUST RECEIVED OUR FIRST LEAD ON AMINS WHEREABOUTS. A UGANDAN OFFICIAL OF MINISTRY OF HEALTH ENTEBBE OFFICES HAS TOLD U K C THAT YESTERDAY MORNING (8 JUNE), AMIN WAS IN PRESIDENTIAL SUITE AT ENTEBBE AIRPORT. U K C HAS KNOWN HIS INFORMANT FOR A LONG TIME AND DESCRIBES HIM AS RELIABLE. HE WAS HOWEVER A SECONDARY SOURCE.

2. THE STORY WOULD MAKE SENSE BECAUSE BY STAYING WITHIN AIRPORT PRECINCTS AMIN COULD KEEP ALL TRAVEL OPTIONS OPEN E G FLY TO LONDON OR STAGE A FICTITIOUS RETURN TO UGANDA FROM C H G M.

GLASBY.

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION  
EAD

CCD  
M AND C D  
CSAD  
OADS  
HAD  
SAD  
SEAD  
SED  
SWPD  
PCD  
WIAD  
N & TD  
TRED  
EESD  
ORD  
1977 CONF UNIT

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION  
CHG MEETING

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE

GRS 250A

CYPHER CAT A

FM COPENHAGEN 081059Z

CONFIDENTIAL

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 188 OF 8 JUNE 1977

INFO PRIORITY BONN BRUSSELS DUBLIN PARIS AND THE HAGUE

YOUR TELSNOs 380 AND 381 TO BONN : PRESIDENT AMIN

1. ACTION TAKEN WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTRY AND DANISH SECURITY AUTHORITIES ON 7 JUNE.
2. THE DANES HAVE SO FAR HAD NO INDICATION THAT AMIN'S AIRCRAFT IS PLANNING TO LAND IN DENMARK.
3. THE DEPUTY POLITICAL DIRECTOR AT THE MFA INFORMED US ON 8 JUNE THAT THE DANISH AUTHORITIES HAD INSTRUCTED ALL CIVIL AND MILITARY AIRPORTS TO REPORT IMMEDIATELY IF THEY RECEIVED ANY REQUEST FROM PRESIDENT AMIN'S AIRCRAFT FOR PERMISSION TO LAND ON DANISH TERRITORY. THE DANES ESTIMATED THAT THEY WOULD HAVE SOME TWENTY MINUTES TO TAKE A FINAL DECISION ON WHETHER OR NOT TO GRANT PERMISSION TO LAND.
4. THEIR PRESENT VIEW IS THAT IF THE AIRCRAFT REQUESTED PERMISSION TO LAND FOR URGENT REFUELLING I.E. A STATE OF TECHNICAL EMERGENCY EXISTED, THEN THEY WOULD AGREE THAT THE AIRCRAFT SHOULD LAND, REFUEL AND LEAVE. AMBASSADOR DYVIG EMPHASISED THAT THE TECHNICAL EMERGENCY WOULD BE AN ABSOLUTE PRE-REQUISITE FOR ANY DANISH PERMISSION TO LAND.

CONFIDENTIAL

15. —

5. DYVIG, SPEAKING CONFIDENTIALLY, WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAD ALSO CONSIDERED A THEORETICAL SITUATION WHERE AMIN, HAVING LANDED, MIGHT EXPRESS A WISH TO REST AT AN HOTEL FOR A SHORT WHILE, BEFORE RESUMING HIS FLIGHT. EMPHASISING FIRMLY THAT NO FINAL DECISION HAD YET BEEN TAKEN TO DEAL WITH THIS CONTINGENCY HE STATED THAT IT WAS JUST POSSIBLE THAT AMIN MIGHT THEN BE INFORMED, THAT SINCE THERE WAS NO ACTUAL LEGAL OR VISA BARRIER TO HIS ENTERING DENMARK, HE WOULD BE PERMITTED TO ENTER PURELY AS A PRIVATE PERSON WHEN HE WOULD RECEIVE NO OFFICIAL RECOGNITION OR ASSISTANCE WHATSOEVER.

WARBURTON

## DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

EAD	WED
CCD	PCD
M AND C D	WIAD
CSAD	N & T D
OADS	TRED
NAD	EESD
SAD	CRD
SEAD	1977 CONF UNIT
SED	
SWPD	

## ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

CHGM

Enter & pm  
RSN  
8/6

CONFIDENTIAL

FLASH

CYPHER/CAT A

FM KAMPALA 070605Z

CONFIDENTIAL

TO FLASH FCO TELEGRAM NO 122 OF 07 JUNE  
INFO IMMEDIATE LAGOS NAIROBI

MY TEL NO 120 CHGM

YOU WILL BE AWARE FROM TRANSCRIPT OF LAST NIGHT'S RADIO UGANDA ANNOUNCEMENT THAT AMIN PROPOSES TO LEAVE UGANDA TODAY TO ATTEND CHGM. THE PROPOSAL TO ARRIVE BY BOAT PRESUPPOSES A GRANT OF AIRCRAFT LANDING RIGHTS EITHER IN ADVANCE OR IN QUOTE AN EMERGENCY UNQUOTE BY GOVERNMENT OF NEIGHBOURING COUNTRY (EG IRELAND OR CONTINENT). - A LANDING BY SEA COULD PRESUMABLY BE EITHER LEGAL OR ILLEGAL, BUT EITHER WAY, SUCH A MOVE WOULD NOT BE IN AMIN'S STYLE. - NOR IS THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF AN ABSENCE FROM UGANDA IN ADVANCE.

2. THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR WAS LAST NIGHT TOLD BY NIGERIAN HIGH COMMISSIONER THAT LATTER'S VISITING MISSION LEFT KAMPALA UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT AMIN WOULD NOT (NOT) ATTEND, HAVING COME HERE TO DISSUADE HIM FROM DOING SO; HOWEVER, THEY RECEIVED NO ASSURANCES. NONETHELESS, DESPITE THE UNPREDICTABILITY OF THE SITUATION, OUR FEELING, BACKED BY INFORMED OPINION HERE, IS THAT AMIN WILL NOT GO AND THAT LAST NIGHT'S ANNOUNCEMENT WAS A FINAL PRE-CHGM ATTEMPT TO EMBARRASS HMG. ACCORDINGLY, WE WOULD RECOMMEND THAT ANY MINISTERIAL STATEMENT TO THE HOUSE SHOULD BE DELAYED AS LONG AS POSSIBLE.

CONFIDENTIAL

/3.

CONFIDENTIAL

3. WELBORN IS AT ENTEBBE TRYING TO ASCERTAIN MOVEMENTS OF THREE  
UGANDAN AIRCRAFT WHICH COULD BE USED FOR UK FLIGHT, NAMELY TWO  
BOEINGS AND GULFSTREAM. WE KNOW OF NO REQUEST FOR LANDING RIGHTS TO  
A EUROPEAN GOVERNMENT.

GLASBY

[RECEIVED VIA FRENCH EMBASSY]  
[REPEATED TO PARIS, LAGOS AND  
NAIROBI]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

CCD  
M AND C D  
CSAD  
OADS  
EAD  
PCD  
N & T D  
1977 CONF UNIT

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

CHGM

CONFIDENTIAL



IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

G. 150

FM PARIS 070940Z

*Conte & pc*  
*RSK*  
*8/6*

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY071000Z

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 569 OF 7 JUNE 1977

INFO ROUTINE BONN, BRUSSELS, COPENHAGEN, THE HAGUE, DUBLIN.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 380 : PRESIDENT AMIN

1. I HAVE SPOKEN TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IN THE QUAI D'ORSAY, AND WE HAVE ALSO TOLD BOTH THE CABINET OF M DE GUIRINGAUD AND THE ELYSEE. THE QUAI HAVE THEMSELVES INFORMED THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR AND OTHER FRENCH AUTHORITIES WHO COULD LEARN OF AMIN'S APPROACH. WE HAVE ALSO SPOKEN TO THE DST (FRENCH SECURITY SERVICE) DIRECT OURSELVES.

2. THE QUAI HAVE ALSO BEEN INFORMED OF THE RADIO UGANDA BROADCAST BY THEIR EMBASSY IN KAMPALA. FOR WHAT IT IS WORTH, THEIR AMBASSADOR THERE HAS COMMENTED THAT THE NIGERIAN DELEGATION RECENTLY IN KAMPALA LEFT UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT AMIN WOULD NOT REPEAT NOT BE COMING TO LONDON. THE NIGERIANS HAD SAID THAT THEY HAD NOT TRIED TO DISSUADE AMIN FROM ATTENDING. THEIR VIEW WAS THAT, IN TELLING AMIN THAT HE WOULD NOT BE WELCOME, HMG WAS VIOLATING THE CUSTOMS ON WHICH COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETINGS WERE BASED.

HENDERSON

DEPARTMENTAL DISTN

CCD

M AND CD

CSAD

OADS

N AM D

SAD

SEAD

SED

SWPD

WED

PCD

WIAD

NTD

----

TRED

EESD

CRD

1977 CONF UNIT

ADDITIONAL DISTN

CHGM

COPY TO

SIR J HUNT CABINET OFFICE

CONFIDENTIAL

IPS TO PM NO 10 DOWNING ST  
CONFIDENTIAL

FLASH

GR 320

CYPHER CAT A

FM KAMPALA 071230Z

CONFIDENTIAL

TO FLASH FCO TELNO 125 OF 7 JUNE

INFO NAIROBI

MY TELNO 123 CHGN

WE HAVE SO FAR BEEN UNABLE TO OBTAIN HARD INFORMATION ABOUT AMIN'S WHEREABOUTS. WELBORN'S VISIT TO ENTEBBE REVEALED THAT TWO 707'S ONE UNDER HEAVY ARMY GUARD WERE THERE, BUT NO GULFSTREAM. HOWEVER, TWELVE STATE RESEARCH CARS WERE PARKED IN AIRPORT PRECINCTS AT ABOUT MIDDAY TODAY AND THE PRESIDENTIAL RANGE ROVER, FOLLOWED BY MERCEDES WITH DARKENED WINDOWS, WERE SEEN TRAVELLING TOWARDS AIRPORT WITH HEADLIGHTS FLASHING AND AT SPEED AT ABOUT 12.30 HRS. PASSENGERS IN LATTER VEHICLE WERE NOT IDENTIFIED. THUS, THE EVIDENCE POINTS TO A PEAK OF SECURITY ACTIVITY AT ENTEBBE AT LUNCH TIME AND TO A PRESIDENTIAL MOVEMENT.

2. YOU WILL HAVE NOTED FROM 1300 HRS RADIO UGANDA NEWS THAT VICE PRESIDENT THIS MORNING RECEIVED DEPARTING SOUTH KOREAN AMBASSADOR AND STRESSED HIS RESPONSIBILITY FOR RUNNING COUNTRY IN AMIN'S ABSENCE ABROAD. ADRISI'S STATEMENT THAT LATTER LEFT FROM AN AIRFIELD BETWEEN ENTEBBE AND GULU (IE NAKASONGOLA) IS OF COURSE QUITE PLAUSIBLE.

HOWEVER, THE DISCLOSURE OF ADVANCE INFORMATION ABOUT AMIN'S DEPARTURE, PLUS THE TIMINGS, PERSUADES US THAT HE WAS IN UGANDA AT LUNCHTIME OR WAS ABOUT TO DEPART FOR SOME FRIENDLY COUNTRY EG ZAIRE OR LIBYA, WHERE HE COULD AWAIT HMGS REACTIONS TO DEVELOPMENTS SO FAR, EITHER SWITCHING TO GULFSTREAM OR KEEPING BOEING ON STANDBY FOR ONWARD TRIP TO UK OR RETURN TO UGANDA. IN THIS CONNECTION YOU WILL HAVE NOTED THAT FOREIGN MINISTER, JUMA ORIS, CALLED AT BANGUI ON RETURN TRIP FROM KINSHASA EARLIER THIS WEEK.

CONFIDENTIAL

/3.

CONFIDENTIAL

3. THE AIM OF THESE MANOEUVRES COULD BE TO DRAW HMG INTO FORMALLY DEBARRING AMIN FROM THE CHGM IN ORDER TO GAIN PERSONAL KUDOS AND TO PROVIDE AN EXCUSE FOR RETALIATORY ACTION AGAINST UK COMMUNITY HERE. WE ACCORDINGLY URGE THAT ANY DEBARMENT ACTION AND ASSOCIATED MINISTERIAL STATEMENTS SHOULD BE WITHHELD UNTIL FORMER HAS BEEN TAKEN IF INDEED THIS PROVES NECESSARY.
4. WE HAVE NO KNOWLEDGE OF A REPORT JUST RECEIVED FROM AFP , NDI, THAT UKCS HAVE BEEN ORDERED NOT (NOT) TO LEAVE UGANDA.

GLASBY

[RECEIVED VIA FRENCH EMBASSY]  
[PASSED TO NAIROBI AND PARIS]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

CCD	SWPD
M AND C D	PCD
CSAD	WIAD
OADS	N & T D
NAD	TRED
SAD	EESD
SEAD	CONS D
SED	CONS EM UNIT
	CRD
	1977 CONF UNIT

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION  
CHGM

IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

Enter per  
RJA  
8/6

005 600A

CYPHER/CAT A

FROM F C O 070553Z

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 070800Z

TO IMMEDIATE LAGOS TELEGRAM NUMBER 397 OF 7 JUNE

INFO PRIORITY NAIROBI AND JEDDA.

PRESIDENT AMIN.

IN THE LIGHT OF THE REPORT IN KAMPALA TELEGRAM NUMBER 120 AND SUBSEQUENT PRESS REPORTS THAT KAMPALA RADIO HAD ANNOUNCED PRESIDENT AMIN'S INTENTION OF FLYING TO EUROPE ON 7 JUNE, THE PRIME MINISTER INVITED BRIGADIER YAR ADUA AND BRIGADIER GARBA TO CALL AT 10 DOWNING STREET ON THEIR ARRIVAL IN LONDON. BRIGADIER YAR ADUA EXCUSED HIMSELF ON THE GROUNDS OF ILLNESS, BUT BRIGADIER GARBA CALLED AT 2230, ACCOMPANIED BY THE ACTING HIGH COMMISSIONER. THE MEETING LASTED FOR ABOUT THREE-QUARTERS OF AN HOUR.

2. THE PRIME MINISTER REFERRED TO HIS MESSAGE TO GENERAL OBASANJO, AND SAID THAT HE WANTED TO MAKE CLEAR THAT WE HAD THROUGHOUT FOLLOWED GENERAL OBASANJO'S ADVICE IN PLAYING THE AMIN AFFAIR QUIETLY AND AVOIDING PUBLIC STATEMENTS. HE HAD BEEN CONCERNED TO PROTECT THE COMMONWEALTH, BUT EMPHASISED THAT THE DECISIONS HAD BEEN OURS, AND THAT WE HAD NO QUARREL WITH THE PEOPLE OF UGANDA. IF A UGANDAN DELEGATION WERE TO VISIT LONDON, IT WOULD BE RECEIVED WITH DUE COURTESY.

3. BRIGADIER GARBA ARGUED THAT THE NIGERIANS WERE ONLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE AFFAIR BECAUSE WE HAD CONSULTED THEM IN THE FIRST PLACE, AND FELT THAT WE SHOULD HAVE MADE THE PRIME MINISTER'S LETTER TO PRESIDENT AMIN AVAILABLE TO THEM. THE PRIME MINISTER EXPLAINED THAT WE HAD NOT WISHED TO INVOLVE THE NIGERIANS OR THE COMMONWEALTH AND HAD HOPED THAT PRESIDENT AMIN WOULD TAKE A FRIENDLY WORD OF ADVICE NOT TO COME. IF OTHERS CHOSE TO ASSOCIATE WITH HIM, THE VALUE OF THE COMMONWEALTH WAS LIKELY TO BE QUESTIONED BY BRITISH PUBLIC OPINION.

CONFIDENTIAL

/4. IN

4. IN SPITE OF REPEATED REQUESTS BY BRIGADIER GARBA TO SEE THE TEXT OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S LETTER, THE PRIME MINISTER DECLINED TO GIVE THIS ON THE GROUNDS THAT IT WAS A PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL COMMUNICATION AND NOT THEREFORE OPEN TO HIM TO REVEAL TO OTHERS. BRIGADIER GARBA ASKED WHO HAD DELIVERED THE MESSAGE, AND THE PRIME MINISTER AGREED TO CHECK WITH THE GOVERNMENT CONCERNED THAT THEY HAD NO OBJECTION TO US INFORMING THE NIGERIANS. AFTER SUBSEQUENT CONTACT WITH THE SAUDI ARABIAN AMBASSADOR, THE PRIME MINISTER TELEPHONED BRIGADIER GARBA LATER TO-NIGHT TO TELL HIM THAT THE MESSAGE HAD BEEN DELIVERED BY THE SAUDIS AFTER DISCUSSION BETWEEN HIMSELF AND PRINCE FAHD LAST MONTH.

5. BRIGADIER GARBA SEEMED INTENT ON MAKING AN ISSUE OF THE FACT THAT WE HAD NOT REVEALED THE TEXT OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S LETTER TO THE NIGERIANS, ALTHOUGH THE INFORMATION ABOUT THE SAUDI ROLE PROBABLY WENT SOME WAY TO MOLLIFY HIM. THE PRIME MINISTER EMPHASISED SEVERAL TIMES THAT HE HAD THROUGHOUT HANDLED THE AFFAIR IN ACCORDANCE WITH GENERAL OBASANJO'S ADVICE, AND THAT IF HE HAD IN ANY WAY BEEN UNFAIR TO THE NIGERIANS, HE WAS GENUINELY SORRY FOR THIS. HE ASKED BRIGADIER GARBA TO ACCEPT THAT HIS MESSAGE TO GENERAL OBASANJO HAD CONTAINED A FULL EXPLANATION OF OUR ATTITUDE.

6. FULL RECORD FOLLOWS BY BAG.

OWEN

DEPARTMENTAL DISTN  
CCD  
EAD  
PCD  
OADS  
PUSD  
1977 CONF UNIT  
WAD  
MED  
NEWS D

ADDITIONAL DISTN  
CHGM  
NIGERIA

Clerk pa

RIN  
8/6

GRS 100

F L A S H

CYPHER CAT A

FM PARIS 071545Z

CONFIDENTIAL

TO F L A S H FCO TELNO 571 OF 7 JUNE 1977

MY TELEGRAM NO 570 : PRESIDENT AMIN

1. WE HAVE SPOKEN AGAIN TO THE QUAI D'ORSAY TO ASK IF THEY HAD ANY MORE DETAILED INFORMATION TO ADD TO THAT GIVEN IN OUR TUR. THEY SAID THAT THEY HAD HEARD NOTHING FURTHER.

2. IN SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION IT EMERGED THAT THEIR ORIGINAL WARNING, REPORTED IN OUR TUR, HAD BEEN GIVEN AS A RESULT OF OUR REQUEST TO BE INFORMED OF ANY INDICATION THAT AMIN'S AIRCRAFT WAS APPROACHING. THEY WERE WORKING ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THIS WAS LIKELY TO BE THE CASE FOLLOWING REPORTS FROM DUBLIN AND BRUSSELS THAT PERMISSION TO LAND THERE HAD BEEN REFUSED.

HENDERSON

## DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

CCD	SWPD
M AND C D	PCD
CSAD	WIAD
OADS	N & T D
NAD	TRED
SAD	EESD
SEAD	CRD
SED	1977 CONF UNIT

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION  
CHGM

COPIES TO  
SIR J HUNT  
CABINET OFFICE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Entapp  
RJA  
81

GRS 65

FLASH  
CYPHER CAT A

FM PARIS 071430Z

CONFIDENTIAL

TO FLASH FCO TELNO 570 OF 7 JUNE 1977

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 380 : PRESIDENT AMIN

1. GEORGY, THE DIRECTEUR D'AFRIQUE IN THE QUAI D'ORSAY, HAS JUST TELEPHONED TO SAY THAT HE HAS HEARD THAT AMIN'S AIRCRAFT IS HEADING FOR NORTHERN FRANCE AND THAT IT WILL BE SEEKING PERMISSION TO LAND. THE FRENCH WILL REPEAT WILL GIVE THIS PERMISSION.

2. GEORGY COULD NOT TELL US EITHER THE LIKELY TIME OF ARRIVAL OR THE AIRPORT WHERE THE AIRCRAFT IS EXPECTED.

HENDERSON

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

CCD	SWPD
M AND C D	PCD
CSAD	WIAD
OADS	N & T D
NAD	TRED
SAD	EESD
SEAD	CRD
SED	1977 CONF UNIT

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION  
CHGM

COPIES TO  
SIR J HUNT  
CABINET OFFICE

CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

*P M.*

0705 600A

CYPHER/CAT. A

*Enk + p.*

FROM F C O 070553Z

*R 7/c*

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 070800Z

TO IMMEDIATE LAGOS TELEGRAM NUMBER 397 OF 7 JUNE

INFO PRIORITY NAIROBI AND JEDDA.

PRESIDENT AMIN.

IN THE LIGHT OF THE REPORT IN KAMPALA TELEGRAM NUMBER 120 AND SUBSEQUENT PRESS REPORTS THAT KAMPALA RADIO HAD ANNOUNCED PRESIDENT AMIN'S INTENTION OF FLYING TO EUROPE ON 7 JUNE, THE PRIME MINISTER INVITED BRIGADIER YAR ADUA AND BRIGADIER GARBA TO CALL AT 10 DOWNING STREET ON THEIR ARRIVAL IN LONDON. BRIGADIER YAR ADUA EXCUSED HIMSELF ON THE GROUNDS OF ILLNESS, BUT BRIGADIER GARBA CALLED AT 2230, ACCOMPANIED BY THE ACTING HIGH COMMISSIONER. THE MEETING LASTED FOR ABOUT THREE-QUARTERS OF AN HOUR.

2. THE PRIME MINISTER REFERRED TO HIS MESSAGE TO GENERAL OBASANJO, AND SAID THAT HE WANTED TO MAKE CLEAR THAT WE HAD THROUGHOUT FOLLOWED GENERAL OBASANJO'S ADVICE IN PLAYING THE AMIN AFFAIR QUIETLY AND AVOIDING PUBLIC STATEMENTS. HE HAD BEEN CONCERNED TO PROTECT THE COMMONWEALTH, BUT EMPHASISED THAT THE DECISIONS HAD BEEN OURS, AND THAT WE HAD NO QUARREL WITH THE PEOPLE OF UGANDA. IF A UGANDAN DELEGATION WERE TO VISIT LONDON, IT WOULD BE RECEIVED WITH DUE COURTESY.

3. BRIGADIER GARBA ARGUED THAT THE NIGERIANS WERE ONLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE AFFAIR BECAUSE WE HAD CONSULTED THEM IN THE FIRST PLACE, AND FELT THAT WE SHOULD HAVE MADE THE PRIME MINISTER'S LETTER TO PRESIDENT AMIN AVAILABLE TO THEM. THE PRIME MINISTER EXPLAINED THAT WE HAD NOT WISHED TO INVOLVE THE NIGERIANS OR THE COMMONWEALTH AND HAD HOPED THAT PRESIDENT AMIN WOULD TAKE A FRIENDLY WORD OF ADVICE NOT TO COME. IF OTHERS CHOSE TO ASSOCIATE WITH HIM, THE VALUE OF THE COMMONWEALTH WAS LIKELY TO BE QUESTIONED BY BRITISH PUBLIC OPINION.

CONFIDENTIAL

/4. IN



4. IN SPITE OF REPEATED REQUESTS BY BRIGADIER GARBA TO SEE THE TEXT OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S LETTER, THE PRIME MINISTER DECLINED TO GIVE THIS ON THE GROUNDS THAT IT WAS A PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL COMMUNICATION AND NOT THEREFORE OPEN TO HIM TO REVEAL TO OTHERS. BRIGADIER GARBA ASKED WHO HAD DELIVERED THE MESSAGE, AND THE PRIME MINISTER AGREED TO CHECK WITH THE GOVERNMENT CONCERNED THAT THEY HAD NO OBJECTION TO US INFORMING THE NIGERIANS. AFTER SUBSEQUENT CONTACT WITH THE SAUDI ARABIAN AMBASSADOR, THE PRIME MINISTER TELEPHONED BRIGADIER GARBA LATER TO-NIGHT TO TELL HIM THAT THE MESSAGE HAD BEEN DELIVERED BY THE SAUDIS AFTER DISCUSSION BETWEEN HIMSELF AND PRINCE FAHD LAST MONTH.

5. BRIGADIER GARBA SEEMED INTENT ON MAKING AN ISSUE OF THE FACT THAT WE HAD NOT REVEALED THE TEXT OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S LETTER TO THE NIGERIANS, ALTHOUGH THE INFORMATION ABOUT THE SAUDI ROLE PROBABLY WENT SOME WAY TO MOLLIFY HIM. THE PRIME MINISTER EMPHASISED SEVERAL TIMES THAT HE HAD THROUGHOUT HANDLED THE AFFAIR IN ACCORDANCE WITH GENERAL OBASANJO'S ADVICE, AND THAT IF HE HAD IN ANY WAY BEEN UNFAIR TO THE NIGERIANS, HE WAS GENUINELY SORRY FOR THIS. HE ASKED BRIGADIER GARBA TO ACCEPT THAT HIS MESSAGE TO GENERAL OBASANJO HAD CONTAINED A FULL EXPLANATION OF OUR ATTITUDE.

6. FULL RECORD FOLLOWS BY BAG.

OWEN

DEPARTMENTAL DISTN

CCD

EAD

PCD

OADS

PUSD

1977 CONF UNIT

WAD

MED

NEWS D

ADDITIONAL DISTN

CHGM

NIGERIA

GR 80  
FLASH  
CYFHER/CAT A

CONFIDENTIAL

*Enter + 1/2*

*R*  
*2/6*

FM F C O 070855Z

CONFIDENTIAL

TO F L A S H BONN TELEGRAM NO. 381 OF 7 JUNE 1977  
AND TO BRUSSELS, DUBLIN, COPENHAGEN, THE HAGUE AND PARIS.

MY TELNO 380: PRESIDENT AMIN.

1. THE HOME SECRETARY HAS DIRECTED, UNDER THE TERMS OF THE IMMIGRATION ACT 1971, THAT PRESIDENT AMIN SHOULD NOT (NOT) BE ALLOWED TO ENTER THE UNITED KINGDOM ON THE GROUND THAT HIS EXCLUSION WOULD BE CONDUCTIVE TO THE PUBLIC GOOD.

2. PLEASE SO INFORM THE AUTHORITIES OF THE GOVERNMENT TO WHICH YOU ARE ACCREDITED WITH THE UTMOST URGENCY. THEY SHOULD REALISE THAT IF AMIN ARRIVES AND TRIES TO PROCEED TO THE UK, HE MAY BE RETURNED TO THEIR COUNTRY.

OWEN

FCO / WH DISTN

EAD

MR MANSFIELD

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Interp  
RS  
16

FLASH

GR 80

CYPHER CAT A

FM FCO 071430Z

CONFIDENTIAL

TO FLASH CAIRO TELNO 378 OF 7 JUNE AND TO FLASH TRIPOLI JEDDA  
KUWAIT DAMASCUS BAGHDAD AMMAN BEIRUT TUNIS ALGIERS ADEN SANAA  
MUCCAT ABU DHABI BAHRAIN RABAT  
PRESIDENT AMIN.

1. WE HAVE REPORTS FROM RADIO KAMPALA THAT AMIN IS ON HIS WAY HERE  
VIA AN ARAB COUNTRY DUE TO LAND IN LONDON TOMORROW OR THURSDAY.
2. PLEASE REPORT BY FLASH TELEGRAM ANY INFORMATION ABOUT AMIN'S  
ARRIVAL IN YOUR COUNTRY AND ANY INFORMATION INDICATING THAT  
HE WILL NOT BE ARRIVING.

OWEN

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

CCD	SWPD
M AND C D	PCD
CSAD	WIAD
OADS	N & T D
NAD	TRED
SAD	EESD
SEAD	CRD
SED	1977 CONF UNIT

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION  
CHGM

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER

I have since contacted Nyira a Sub-Saharan  
report on Kampala Radio.

President Amin

1  
JHW  
7/6

As you probably know, the reports that President Amin was about to land at Dublin Airport turned out to be a false alarm, and the Irish have now told us that they have no knowledge of any Ugandan aircraft destined for Ireland.

Both the Irish and the Belgians have already issued statements to say that President Amin would not be allowed to land in their respective territories. The French, according to Reuters, have said that he would be allowed to land in France, but we have no confirmation of this yet. The French have undertaken to let us know at once of any indication they have that he might be flying to France.

In spite of attempts to do so, we have still not had positive confirmation that Amin has left Uganda, although the Ugandans have, of course, announced his departure and the Vice President of Uganda has announced that he is in charge during Amin's absence. The Home Secretary has left a skeleton staff in charge of the Cabinet Office Briefing Room, and has returned home. He would like to have a word with you on the telephone, and we suggested that he might ring at about 16.00, before your meeting with Mr. Desai.

He is  
amiable in  
his flight if  
you would  
like to  
talk to him.

Meanwhile, the Home Secretary's meeting today concluded that a statement should now be put out on the following lines:

"Police and immigration officers throughout the UK have been put on the alert following reports from Uganda that President Amin had left to pay a visit to Britain.

"The President has already been informed in a letter from the Prime Minister that his presence in Britain would be inappropriate."

/Tom McCaffrey

Tom McCaffrey and I have doubts whether a statement of this sort is required, in the absence of any further indication of Amin's plans, particularly since all the information in it is already known to the media and is being used by them. The situation has not in fact changed since last night, and our feeling is that we should continue to play it cool. The Home Secretary has been asked to ensure that no statement is put out until you have been consulted, and you may wish to discuss this with Mr. Rees.

I attach a copy of the press notice which would be used if we received firm notification of President Amin's arrival in the UK or elsewhere in Europe.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'R. H. W.' or similar, located on the right side of the page.

7 June 1977

NOT FOR USE UNTIL ADVISED

Proposed Press Statement to be given if President Amin's arrival in Dublin is confirmed.

"The Home Secretary has personally given a direction under Section 13 (5) of the Immigration Act 1971 that President Amin should not be given entry to the United Kingdom, on the ground that his exclusion is conducive to the public good"

Background to be given in answer to questions:

1. There is no right of appeal.
2. It is the Home Secretary's decision.
3. President Amin was told that he would not be permitted to enter the United Kingdom.
4. He was informed in the Prime Minister's letter of May 22.
5. The UK has a common travel area arrangement with the Republic of Ireland but it does not permit free entry from Ireland in a case such as this.
6. Appropriate instructions have been given to the Immigration Authorities who will be supported as necessary by the police.

CONFIDENTIAL

FILE



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

6 June 1977

*Dear Resident Clerk,*

Prime Minister's Meeting With  
Brigadier Garba

Thank you for your assistance in arranging for Brigadier Garba of Nigeria to call on the Prime Minister at 10 Downing Street this evening.

I enclose a copy of the note of the meeting together with a telegram which I suggest should be sent off to Lagos as soon as possible, subject to any amendments or additions the Department may wish to make to it. Since Brigadier Garba himself will no doubt be sending an account of his meeting with the Prime Minister to General Obasanjo, I think that Sir Sam Falle will need to have an account of this meeting as soon as possible.

*Yours Em.*

*David Lloyd*

Resident Clerk  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

cc Munt Ret.

NOTE OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE NIGERIAN  
FEDERAL COMMISSIONER FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS AT 10 DOWNING STREET  
ON MONDAY 6 JUNE 1977 AT 2245 HOURS

Present

The Prime Minister  
Mr. P.R.H. Wright

Brigadier Joseph Garba  
General J.O. Omolodun

\*\*\*\*\*

President Amin and the Commonwealth Heads of  
Government Meeting

After welcoming Brigadier Garba, and after some introductory remarks, the Prime Minister referred to his recent message to General Obasanjo in response to the concern which Brigadier Garba himself had expressed about the British Government's attitude to President Amin. He wanted to make clear to Brigadier Garba that we had followed General Obasanjo's advice, and had tried to play the whole affair quietly, and to avoid saying anything publicly in spite of very strong pressure, and unanimous resolutions, in Parliament. His own letter to President Amin had been intended as a private communication, but Brigadier Garba would know that President Amin himself had not attended the last two Commonwealth Conferences. The acting High Commission would have told Brigadier Garba of the strength of public opinion in this country about President Amin. If he were to arrive in London, there was no doubt that there would be writs served by private citizens, and the outcry would not provide an atmosphere conducive to a successful Commonwealth Conference. We had played the affair in such a way as to protect the Commonwealth, but the Prime Minister emphasised that the decisions had been ours, and ours alone. We had no quarrel with the people of Uganda, and if a delegation were to come from Uganda to the Conference, it would be treated with all courtesies. We had however, to face the practicalities of the situation.

/Brigadier Garba

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

Brigadier Garba said that he would be lying if he were to say that Nigeria was not concerned with this affair. The British had sought the Nigerian Government's views, e.g. by approaches from their High Commissioner in Lagos. He had himself told Sir Sam Falle that his own view was that President Amin would not come to London, and that it would be better for HMG not to make public statements on the matter. The Commonwealth as a body had a large number of detractors, but would use a row with President Amin as an excuse to attack it. The Nigerians had therefore advised against any over-dramatisation of the affair. They had made the same point to Lord Thomson, and had told him that the way the Amin question was developing was likely to have a negative effect. If President Amin were to call for a boycott in his own support, he might well achieve some support. The Nigerians understood Britain's problems, but their view was that the latest message to President Amin ought not to have been sent, although they had no knowledge either of its contents or of the channel used to deliver it.

The Prime Minister said that no one would ever have known anything about the message if President Amin himself had not chosen to publicise it. We had not tried to dramatise anything, although one could do nothing about the Press. Brigadier Garba said that the Nigerians had asked to see a copy of the Prime Minister's letter. The Prime Minister said that he had no wish to involve Nigeria in this. If President Amin chose to cause difficulties about his message, this was his responsibility and not the Prime Minister's. It had been open to President Amin to take a friendly word of advice, but he had chosen not to take it. If others chose to associate with President Amin over this, the value of the Commonwealth was bound to be put in question in the eyes of British public opinion. He repeated that he had himself tried to play this in a way which would not harm the Commonwealth. Brigadier Garba said that he found the Prime Minister's words very ominous. He asked whether it would not be better to let people see the terms of the Prime Minister's letter to President Amin and to judge it for themselves.

/President Amin

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 3 -

President Amin claimed that the Prime Minister had told him not to come to London. The Nigerian view was that if President Amin wanted to come, it was up to him to judge the consequences, including the consequences for his own security. A Nigerian mission had been to Uganda, but had seen President Amin in Entebbe and the Prime Minister's letter had been left behind in Kampala. The Nigerians would like to see the letter, since they would like to be able to speak in full knowledge of it.

Brigadier Garba said that the Prime Minister had experience of Commonwealth Conferences, and would know how easily people could whip up emotion. The Prime Minister said that if the Commonwealth mattered so little, people in this country were bound to wonder how much use the Commonwealth was to them. To accept President Amin at the Conference would create enormous problems here. Brigadier Garba asked whether Britain was ready for these problems? The Prime Minister said that we were not and this was why he had taken the line he had. By so doing, he was already exposed to accusation of gutlessness in the British press. His aim had been to hold the Commonwealth together, and he hoped that our friends would understand this. Brigadier Garba said that the Nigerians did indeed understand, but that a lot of people in Africa also questioned the value of the Commonwealth. If it was to be held together, he thought that a different way should be found to approach these difficulties. Mr. Callaghan knew President Amin from his time as Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary. If only the British public had not become so pre-occupied with Amin, there would have been no problem. The Prime Minister said that one had to accept reality. The British public were pre-occupied, and the Commonwealth Secretary General had found today that most of the interest at his Press Conference had been directed towards President Amin. We looked to Nigeria to help us on this question. Brigadier Garba said that this was why the Nigerians would like to see the Prime Minister's letter.

/The Prime Minister

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 4 -

The Prime Minister asked Brigadier Garba to trust him. He did not think that there would be any difficulties from President Kaunda or President Nyerere or Mr. Arap Moi. None of them seemed to think that he had done anything improper. Brigadier Garba said that he was not accusing the Prime Minister of impropriety but the BBC had published a version of the Prime Minister's letter. The British should trust Nigeria. After all, Lord Thomson had been to see them, and if the British had taken the Nigerians into their confidence, the Nigerians could have helped. He did not think the Prime Minister would have lost anything by explaining things frankly both to the Nigerians and to other Africans. The Prime Minister said that he understood this, but repeated that he had not wanted to involve the Commonwealth; on the contrary he had wanted to protect it. Brigadier Garba recognised that the Prime Minister's position was difficult and that this year's Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting was not only being held in London, but at the time of The Queen's Silver Jubilee. This was bound to increase the pressures.

In the course of further discussion, the Prime Minister repeated that we had followed General Obasanjo's advice in the way we had played the affair, although it was true we had not consulted the Nigerians about the terms of his message to President Amin.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

-5-

Brigadier Garba said that they had not expected to be consulted, but it was necessary to look at the Commonwealth from the point of view of Africa. If the Nigerians were to make a stand, perhaps a quarter of the African countries would follow. Since the British Government had kept in touch with the Nigerians over this from the beginning, it would have done no harm to have told them about the Prime Minister's letter. The Prime Minister said that this was perhaps a case of being wise after the event. He had not known that President Amin would choose to play the affair this way. General Obasanjo had advised that we should think of our own existence first and it was precisely with this in mind that we had drawn up contingency plans against President Amin's possible arrival.

Brigadier Garba continued to press the Prime Minister to be allowed to see his letter to President Amin. The Prime Minister explained that when someone sent a private and confidential letter to someone else, the right of publication was not solely on one side. He hoped that Brigadier Garba would understand that this was in no way intended to show disrespect to Nigeria. Brigadier Garba said that the Prime Minister could argue that it was none of Nigeria's business to know what he had told President Amin, but he thought that this attitude would set up a chain reaction. It was obvious that Britain was prepared for the worst. The Prime Minister said that he had the warmest feelings for Nigeria, as many people did in this country. He was not saying that this affair was none of Nigeria's business, but his correspondence with President Amin had been personal and confidential. As soon as he had heard of Nigeria's concern he had sent General Obasanjo a full explanation. He could fully understand that he should perhaps have got in touch with the Nigerian Government earlier, but he repeated that he had been handling the affair in accordance with General Obasanjo's advice. If he had been unfair to the Nigerians, he was sincerely sorry for this. Brigadier Garba accepted this, but said that

/since

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

-6-

since President Amin had published his own version of the letter, he saw no reason why the Prime Minister should not do likewise. He then asked if the Prime Minister could tell him who had carried the letter to Uganda. The Prime Minister said that he would certainly ask the Government concerned whether they had any objection to the Nigerians being informed of this.

In conclusion, the Prime Minister said that the Nigerians had heard President Amin's version of his letter, and had also seen his own message to General Obasanjo. Brigadier Garba said that he did not want to give the impression that the Nigerians were the watchdogs of Africa. They would never have raised this matter, if the British had not approached them in the first place. The Prime Minister said that he was genuinely sorry if there appeared to have been a lack of consultation. It was certainly not intended. But he did not think that the Nigerians should underrate their importance in Africa. Their mediation between Zaire and Angola had been of great importance.

The meeting concluded at 2330. Following the meeting, and after consultation with the Saudi Ambassador, the Prime Minister later telephoned Brigadier Garba and told him that he had been in touch with the Government concerned and was able to tell him, for his personal information, that his message to President Amin had been delivered by the Saudi Arabian Government, following discussions between himself and Crown Prince Fahd in London last month. Prince Fahd had not only agreed to convey the message but to arrange for President Amin to be told that the Saudis also thought it would be inappropriate for him to visit London. Brigadier Garba thanked the Prime Minister for telling him this.



Distribution

Private Secretary to Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary  
Sir John Hunt

6 June 1977

CONFIDENTIAL

GPS 150

CONFIDENTIAL

*Enter per  
R3N  
8/6*

IMMEDIATE

CYPHER/CAT A

FM FCO 062321Z

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 070800Z

TO IMMEDIATE BONN TELNO 380 OF 6 JUNE

AND TO BRUSSELS DUBLIN COPENHAGEN THE HAGUE AND PARIS

PRESIDENT AMIN

1. KAMPALA RADIO HAVE THIS EVENING SAID THAT, ACCORDING TO RELIABLE SOURCES, AMIN IS TO TRAVEL TO EUROPE TOMORROW BY A SPECIAL PLANE TO ATTEND THE COMMON WEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING. THE RADIO SAID THAT AMIN IS LIKELY TO LAND QUOTE SOMEWHERE NEAR ENGLAND UNQUOTE FROM WHERE HE CAN TRAVEL BY BOAT TO LONDON FOR THE CONFERENCE.

2. PLEASE INFORM THE AUTHORITIES OF THE GOVERNMENT TO WHICH YOU ARE ACCREDITED. YOU MAY ADD THAT THE STORY SOUNDS FAR FETCHED; BUT THAT WE ARE OBLIGED TO TAKE IT SERIOUSLY. WE SHOULD THEREFORE BE GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD ASK YOUR HOST GOVERNMENT TO LIAISE WITH YOU AND LET YOU KNOW IMMEDIATELY IF THEY RECEIVE ANY INDICATION THAT AMIN'S AIRCRAFT IS APPROACHING OR PLANNING TO LAND IN THEIR TERRITORY. ANY SUCH INDICATION SHOULD BE REPORTED BY FLASH TELEGRAM.

OWEN

DEPARTMENTAL DISTN

ADDITIONAL DISTN

CCD

CHGM

EAD

PCD

WED

/COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST/

CADS

PUSD

1977 CONF UNIT

NEWS D

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

6/12/77  
RSH  
16.

IMMEDIATE

GR110

CYPHER/CAT A

FM KAMPALA 060920Z

CONFIDENTIAL

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 120 OF 6 JUNE

AND TO LAGOS AND NAIROBI

CHGM NIGERIAN MISSION

APEADU, THE GHANAIAH HEAD OF KAMPALA UNDP OFFICE, HAS TODAY TOLD UKC RESIDENT THAT THE VISITING NIGERIAN MISSION IS AIMING TO PERSUADE AMIN TO ATTEND CHGM REGARDLESS OF HMG'S EXHORTATIONS TO THE CONTRARY. THE NIGERIANS, STILL CROSS AT HMGS DECISION TO PERMIT GEN. GOWON TO RESIDE IN THE UK ARE HOPING THAT AMIN WOULD BE DEBARRED AND THAT THE NIGERIANS WOULD THEN HAVE A PLAUSIBLE EXCUSE TO LEAVE THE COMMONWEALTH.

2. YOU WILL NO DOUBT BE ABLE TO CHECK THE VALUE OF THIS REPORT FROM OTHER SOURCES.

GLASBY

/RECEIVED VIA FRENCH EMBASSY/

/COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET/

DEPARTMENTAL DISTN

CCD

EAD

OADS

PCD

PUSD

1977 CONF UNIT

NEWS D

ADDITIONAL DISTN

CHGM

CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

GPS 380

\*AMENDED DISTRIBUTION\* - 5 JUNE 1977

CYPHER/CAT A

*6/12/77*  
*RS1*  
*8/6*

FROM KAMPALA 051330Z

CONFIDENTIAL

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TEL NO 119 OF 5 JUNE  
INFO ROUTINE NAIROBI LAGOS  
MY TEL NO 110 CHGM

RADIO UGANDA TODAY ANNOUNCED THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF NIGERIA HAD, THROUGH A VISITING DELEGATION COMPRISING BRIGADIER MOHAMED WUSHISHI AND MR AKADIRI, DIRECTOR OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS, MFA DL DELIVERED A SPECIAL MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT AMIN FROM PRESIDENT ACHEAMPONG. THE LATTER EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE DISTURBING REPORTS HE HAD HEARD AS A RESULT OF WHICH THE BRITISH PRIME MINISTER HAD ADVISED AMIN THAT HIS PRESENCE AT CHGM WOULD BE INAPPROPRIATE. THE MESSAGE REFERRED TO A LETTER FROM H M THE QUEEN, DATED 22 MAY, BUT SIGNED BY THE PM, EXPRESSING HER UNWILLINGNESS TO RECEIVE HIM. THE GOVT OF NIGERIA CONSIDERED THIS AN UNPRECEDENTED STEP IN COMMON - WEALTH RELATIONS BECAUSE THE COMMONWEALTH IS A FREE ASSOCIATION OF INDEPENDENT SOVEREIGN STATES AND THE RIGHT TO ATTEND A CHGM OF ANY MEMBER STATE HAD NEVER PREVIOUSLY BEEN QUESTIONED.

2. AMIN REPLIED THAT OBVIOUSLY REVOLUTIONARY LEADERS LIKE HIMSELF WOULD NOT BE WELCOMED BY HMG AND THAT LATTER WISHES TO ISOLATE UGANDA. THE UK COULD FAVOUR ESCAPING UGANDA GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, BUT IT WAS WASTING ITS TIME BECAUSE IT WOULD CHANGE NOTHING HERE. THE UGANDA QUESTION HAD ALREADY CAUSED DIFFERENCES AMONG COMMON-WEALTH COUNTRIES, MANY OF WHICH WOULD NOT BE REPRESENTED AT CHGM AT HIGHEST LEVEL. UGANDA WOULD BE REPRESENTED AT 1979 CONFERENCE. AMIN WAS CONTEMPLATING SOME SERIOUS ACTION AGAINST THE BRITISH IN UGANDA BECAUSE THEY (THE BRITISH) WERE THE SAME EVERYWHERE (EG SOUTH AFRICA AND RHODESIA), BUT HE WOULD NOT DISCLOSE WHAT THIS ACTION WOULD BE.

3. ON THE UGANDAN SIDE, BRIGADIER MOSES ALI, MINISTER OF FINANCE, AND EKOCHU, PPS TO PRESIDENT, ATTENDED.

CONFIDENTIAL

/4. THIS



CONFIDENTIAL

4. THIS WOULD APPEAR TO BE THE CLEAREST INDICATION YET THAT AMIN DOES NOT INTEND TO VISIT CHGM, BUT THE STATEMENT DOES NOT CATEGORICALLY SAY THAT HE WILL NOT DO SO. THE REFERENCE TO QUOTE ESCAPING OFFICIALS UNQUOTE IS SO FAR THE ONLY REACTION TO KYEMBA'S DEFECTION, ANNOUNCED APPLICATION TO RESIDE IN UK AND PROPOSED TIMES ARTICLES. THE TERMINAL THREAT OF RETALIATION AGAINST COMMUNITY HERE MUST OF COURSE BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY.

GLASBY

[REPEATED TO PARIS AND INFO POSTS]  
[RECD VIA FRENCH EMBASSY]  
[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

CCD  
M AND C D  
CSAD  
OADS  
NAD  
SAD  
SEAD  
SED  
SWPD  
PCD  
WIAD  
N & T D  
TRED  
EESD  
CRD  
1977 CONF UNIT  
CONS D  
CONS EM UNIT

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION  
CHGM

GR 235

CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE

CYPHER CAT A

FM LAGOS 041037Z JUN

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 041200Z

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 497 OF 4 JUNE.

MY TELNO 496: COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING.

ALTHOUGH OBASANJO'S COMMENTS IN PARA 3 OF MY T.U.R. WERE NOT ADDRESSED TO US IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR ME TO KNOW WHO DELIVERED OUR MESSAGE TO AMIN AND THE TEXT.

2. IF THE MESSENGER WAS A EUROPEAN OR OTHER NON-AFRICAN GOVERNMENT I WOULD LIKE TO BE AUTHORISED TO TELL THE NIGERIANS, SHOULD THEY ASK.

3. OBASANJO MAY GO TO THE EXTENT OF ASKING AMIN WHAT THE PRIME MINISTER SAID TO HIM. IN THAT CASE AMIN WOULD BE TEMPTED TO GIVE HIS OWN VERSION WHICH MIGHT NOT ACCORD WITH YOUR TELNO 394. IF ASKED TO CLARIFY, I WOULD LIKE TO BE IN A POSITION TO DO SO QUICKLY BUT WITHOUT SPEAKING FROM AN ACTUAL TEXT. THIS OF COURSE RAISES THE DANGER THAT THE NIGERIANS WILL BE IMPORTUNATE ENOUGH TO ASK FOR THE TEXT OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO AMIN. BUT WE CAN RESIST THAT ON REASONABLE GROUNDS.

4. I HAVE THOUGHT ABOUT WHETHER I SHOULD TRY TO SPEAK TO GARBA EITHER TONIGHT OR TOMORROW. ON THE WHOLE I THINK IT IS BEST NOT TO. I BELIEVE GARBA BLOWS WITH THE WIND WHEN IT COMES TO

/IMPORTANT

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

IMPORTANT ISSUES. OBASANJO IS GOING TO CARRY THE GREATEST CLOUT,  
AND HIS VIEWS SHOULD BE MORE BALANCED. IN ANY CASE I DO NOT NOW  
WANT TO UPSTAGE SANUSI.

JOHNSON

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

CCD  
M AND C, D  
CSAD  
OADS  
HAD  
SAD  
SEAD  
SED  
SWPD  
PCD  
WIAD  
N & TD  
TRED  
EESD  
CRD  
1977 CONF UNIT

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION  
CHG MEETING

IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

GPS 300

CYPHER CAT A

FM LAGOS 021017Z

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 021100Z

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 487 OF 2 JUNE.

COMMONWEALTH HEAD OF GOVERNMENT MEETING

*See letter from FCO  
+ this was sent.  
Obasanjo.*

*Ph 3/6  
pe*

1. I WAS CALLED IN TODAY TO SEE THE PERMANENT SECRETARY OF THE MEA. SANUSI TOLD ME THAT HE HAD BEEN TELEPHONED FROM DODAN BARRACKS IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE NTV NEWS LAST NIGHT AND ASKED TO SEEK CLARIFICATION FROM US OF WHAT THE PRIME MINISTER SAID IN HIS LETTER TO PRESIDENT AMIN.
2. SANUSI SAID THAT THE FMG WERE CONCERNED ABOUT A REPORT THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAD NOW TOLD AMIN THAT HE COULD NOT ATTEND THE CHGM. THE NIGERIANS TOOK THE VIEW THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT COULD NOT EXCLUDE A HEAD OF STATE FROM THE MEETING. WHATEVER HIS FAULTS, THEY SAT WITH AMIN AT THE OAU AND WERE PREPARED TO SIT WITH HIM AT THE CHGM IF HE CHOSE TO COME.
3. SANUSI TOLD ME THAT A DECISION HAD BEEN MADE THAT BRIG. YAR'ADUA WOULD LEAD THE NIGERIAN DELEGATION. THE ANNOUNCEMENT WAS TO HAVE BEEN MADE TODAY BUT WOULD BE HELD BACK. HE INDICATED THAT THIS WOULD NOW DEPEND ON NIGERIAN CONSIDERATION OF WHETHER THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WERE EXCLUDING AMIN.
4. I TOLD SANUSI THAT I DID NOT KNOW WHAT MESSAGE HAD BEEN SENT TO AMIN, BUT WE HOPED, IN THE INTERESTS OF THE COMMONWEALTH, THAT AMIN WOULD DECIDE TO STAY AWAY FROM THE CHGM. I UNDERTOOK TO REPORT THE NIGERIAN REQUEST.

CONFIDENTIAL

/5.

5. DESPITE THE SYMPATHETIC REACTION WHICH LORD THOMPSON RECEIVED FROM GEN OBASANJO ON THE QUESTION OF AMIN'S ATTENDANCE AT THE CHGM, THE NIGERIANS APPEAR NOW TO BE PREPARING TO TAKE ISSUE WITH US IF AMIN IS EXCLUDED. THE FMG HAVE CLEARLY HOPED LIKE US THAT AMIN WOULD STAY AWAY AND THAT THEY WOULD NOT HAVE TO MAKE ANY STATEMENT ABOUT HIS ATTENDANCE. BUT THERE IS A DANGER THAT THEY WILL MAKE THIS AN ISSUE OF AFRICAN SOLIDARITY.

6. I WOULD BE GRATEFUL TO KNOW WHAT I CAN TELL THE NIGERIANS ABOUT THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE. I HAVE BEEN ASKED TO SEE THE DIRECTOR OF THE EUROPEAN DEPT AT 0730Z TOMORROW.

JOHNSON.

FILES

CCD

EAD

PCD

OADS

PUSD

1977 CONF UNIT

NEWS D

PS

PS/MR JUDD

PS/LORD GORONWY-ROBERTS

PS/MR ROWLANDS

PS/MR TOMLINSON

PS/MR LUARD

PS/PUS

SIR A DUFF

MR GRAHAM

MR CORTAZZI

MR MANSFIELD

MR STANLEY

MR HENNINGS

MR MURRAY

MR LEAHY

COPIES TO

SIR J HUNT

CABINET OFFICE

SIR C ROSE

" "

/COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST/

GPS 160  
Priority

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER CAT A

FM FCO 021012Z

*Info spc*

*R 3/6*

CONFIDENTIAL

TO PRIORITY KAMPALA TELEGRAM NO 128 OF 2 JUNE  
INFO NAIROBI, PARIS.

BRITISH COMMUNITY.

1. SUNDAY TIMES PROPOSE PUBLISHING ON 5 JUNE THE FIRST IN A SERIES OF ARTICLES ABOUT THE AMIN REGIME BY FORMER MINISTER OF HEALTH, KYEMBA, COVERING, AMONGST OTHER THINGS, HOW MRS BLOCH AND ARCHBISHOP LUWUM DIED.
2. THIS, ESPECIALLY IF NEWS OF ELIAS' DISAPPEARANCE ALSO BREAKS IN THE PRESS, COULD LEAD TO A REACTION BY AMIN, FURTHER HOSTILE COMMENT IN THE BRITISH PRESS, AND TO AN ESCALATION CONCEIVABLY INVOLVING MEMBERS OF THE COMMUNITY.
3. WE DO NOT SUGGEST THERE IS ANY ACTION YOU CAN AND SHOULD TAKE AT PRESENT. YOU SHOULD HOWEVER WARN M. RENARD AND YOU WILL WISH TO ENSURE THAT YOU ARE AS PREPARED AS YOU CAN BE IN THE COMING PERIOD TO COMMUNICATE WITH MEMBERS OF THE COMMUNITY SHOULD SOME FURTHER WARNINGS BECOME URGENTLY NECESSARY.

OWEN

FILES

EAD.

CONS D.

CONSEMM UNIT

NEWS D.

OID.

IPD.

CCD

PS.

PS/PUS.

PS/MR ROWLANDS.

MR MANSFIELD.

MR HAWLEY

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

COPIES TO  
MR ARMSTRONG HOME OF  
DIO CABINET OFFICE

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

7123/77  
IMMEDIATE  
CYPHER CAT A  
FM FCO 022116Z  
CONFIDENTIAL

TO IMMEDIATE LAGOS TELNO 394 OF 2/6

FILE COPY

PLEASE PASS FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO GENERAL  
OBASANJO.

BEGINS:

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE

DEAR GENERAL OBASANJO,

SERIAL No. 7123/77

OUR HIGH COMMISSION HAVE REPORTED YOUR GOVERNMENT'S CONCERN ABOUT THE QUESTION OF PRESIDENT AMIN'S ATTENDANCE AT THE CHGM IN LONDON NEXT WEEK. I THOUGHT I SHOULD WRITE TO YOU PERSONALLY TO FOLLOW UP THE DISCUSSION WHICH LORD THOMSON HAD WITH YOU IN APRIL AND TO LET YOU KNOW THAT WE HAVE APPROACHED THIS PROBLEM IN A MANNER THAT WILL NOT HARM THE COMMONWEALTH OR INVOLVE ANY OTHER MEMBER. WHEN LORD THOMSON SAW YOU, HE EXPLAINED THE VERY SERIOUS EFFECT OF BRITISH PUBLIC OPINION WHICH PRESIDENT AMIN'S POSSIBLE PRESENCE IN LONDON COULD CAUSE FOR US AND FOR THE COMMONWEALTH. SUBSEQUENTLY PARLIAMENT HAS DECLARED ITSELF DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE ISSUE OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN UGANDA AND WHAT WE BELIEVE TO BE PRESIDENT AMIN'S PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THEIR GRAVE VIOLATION. LORD THOMSON MENTIONED TO YOU THAT WE MIGHT BE ABLE TO GIVE PRESIDENT AMIN A QUIET SIGNAL WHICH WOULD DISSUADE HIM FROM ATTENDING, BUT IT HAD BEEN OUR HOPE THAT PRESIDENT AMIN HIMSELF WOULD REALISE THE STRENGTH OF OPINION HERE, AND DECIDE TO STAY AWAY. WE HAVE ALWAYS MADE IT CLEAR THAT WE HAD NO QUARREL WITH THE PEOPLE OF UGANDA AND THAT WE FULLY RECOGNISED THAT UGANDA, AS A MEMBER OF THE COMMONWEALTH, HAD A RIGHT TO BE REPRESENTED AT THE COMMONWEALTH MEETING. BUT THE GOVERNMENT CANNOT DISREGARD THE UNIVERSAL STRENGTH OF FEELING IN THIS COUNTRY ABOUT PRESIDENT AMIN HIMSELF. I THEREFORE SENT HIM RECENTLY A COURTEOUS PRIVATE AND UNPUBLICISED MESSAGE IN WHICH I TOLD HIM OF THE STRONG FEELING THAT EXISTS IN BRITAIN AND EXPLAINED OUR VIEW THAT IT WOULD NOT BE APPROPRIATE FOR HIM TO VISIT LONDON. IN DOING SO, I WAS CAREFUL TO AVOID ANY SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO THE COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT. INDEED, WITH YOUR ADVICE IN MIND, I SENT THE MESSAGE THROUGH A GOVERNMENT, FRIENDLY BOTH TO BRITAIN AND TO UGANDA, AND MADE IT CLEAR THAT I WAS ACTING FOR THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND IN NO WAY SEEKING TO INVOLVE OTHER COMMONWEALTH MEMBERS. I ALSO MADE IT CLEAR THAT WE HAD NO WISH TO EXCLUDE UGANDA FROM THE MEETING IN LONDON.

| I TOOK.

I TOOK VERY STRICT PRECAUTIONS TO ENSURE THAT THE MESSAGE WAS DELIVERED TO PRESIDENT AMIN ON A CONFIDENTIAL BASIS. DESPITE A LOT OF PRESSURE IN PARLIAMENT AND THROUGH THE PRESS TO STATE OUR ATTITUDE TO PRESIDENT AMIN'S ATTENDANCE CLEARLY AND PUBLICLY, I AND THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY HAVE RESISTED DOING SO, AND HAVE AVOIDED USING ANY LANGUAGE THAT COULD BE SEEN TO BE INSULTING TO PRESIDENT AMIN. IT WAS PRESIDENT AMIN ALONE WHO DECIDED TO PUBLISH HIS VERSION OF WHAT I HAD SAID AND HIS REPLY.

I AM SURE YOU WILL UNDERSTAND THAT I HAVE BEEN MOTIVATED THROUGHOUT BY MY WISH TO AVOID AN ATMOSPHERE AROUND THE CONFERENCE WHICH WOULD DESTROY THE PROSPECT OF A CONSTRUCTIVE AND USEFUL MEETING. THAT HAS BEEN MY CONCERN AND I HAVE DONE EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO AVOID EMBARRASSING PRESIDENT AMIN. YOU WILL RECALL NO DOUBT THAT HE DID NOT ATTEND THE COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING EITHER AT JAMAICA OR CANADA. I HOPE YOU WILL UNDERSTAND THAT OUR ACTIONS HAVE BEEN TAKEN TO PROTECT THE COMMONWEALTH, AND I MOST SINCERELY HOPE THEREFORE THAT NIGERIA WILL BE ABLE TO ATTEND THE COMMONWEALTH MEETING. YOUR GOVERNMENT HAVE A MOST IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION TO MAKE TO ALL OUR DISCUSSIONS.

I AM SORRY THAT YOU YOURSELF MAY NOT BE ABLE TO LEAD YOUR DELEGATION, BUT I HOPE I MAY HAVE THE PLEASURE OF MEETING BRIGADIER YAR'ADUA AND BRIGADIER GARBA. I PARTICULARLY LOOK FORWARD TO DISCUSSING WITH BRIGADIER YAR'ADUA BILATERAL MATTERS OF JOINT INTEREST WHICH HE HAD DISCUSSED WITH OUR HIGH COMMISSIONER.

MAY I FINALLY REFER TO THE INDEFENSIBLE EVENTS OF THE LAST TWO DAYS IN MOZAMBIQUE. DR. OWEN WAS SORRY NOT TO HAVE BEEN ABLE TO HAVE A WORD WITH BRIGADIER GARBA BEFORE THE LATTER LEFT PARIS. BUT HE HAS BEEN KEEPING HIM INFORMED OF THE ACTION WHICH WE TOOK OVER THE RHODESIAN VIOLATION OF MOZAMBIQUE'S TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY. YOU WILL NOW HAVE SEEN THAT RHODESIAN TROOPS HAVE WITHDRAWN FROM MAPAI. WE HOPE THERE WILL BE NO RECURRENCE OF THIS SERIOUS THREAT TO OUR INITIATIVE FOR PEACE IN THE AREA.

WITH WARM REGARDS,

JIM CALLAGHAM.

ENDS

OWEN

FILES

EAD

WAD

CCD

PS

PS/MR JUDD.

PS/MR ROWLANDS

PS/PUS

MR GRAHAM

MR MANSFIELD

COPIES TO

PS/SIR J. HUNT, CABINET OFFICE.

MR WRIGHT, NO 10 DOWNING ST





cc CPAN (PDS)

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

2 June 1977

Prime Minister's Meeting with the Australian Prime Minister

I have already sent you a copy of the note of the Prime Minister's meeting with Mr. Fraser at Chequers yesterday afternoon, together with a separate letter about the British power plant industry and the possibility of contracts in Australia.

You may like to know that, in his private talks with Mr. Fraser before the meeting began, the Prime Minister also discussed Rhodesia, and gave Mr. Fraser a general account of the latest developments over the Rhodesia incursions into Mozambique.

There was also a discussion about President Carter, during which Mr. Fraser expressed some concern about President Carter's policies. He thought that the emphasis which President Carter was placing on Human Rights would cause the Australians some difficulties with their neighbours.

Mr. Fraser also mentioned that the Australians had undertaken a joint study of the military situation in the Pacific, and expressed concern that, if the United States had to fight a naval war in the Atlantic, they would only be able to cover the Pacific as far as Hawaii. He wondered what would happen in such a case to Japan and Australia (although the Prime Minister has commented that he is not clear what scenario Mr. Fraser was envisaging in describing his concern). The Prime Minister suggested to Mr. Fraser that he should raise his worries with President Carter himself.

There was also some general conversation about inflation and unemployment; about President Amin; and about the forthcoming Commonwealth Heads of Government Conference. The private meeting otherwise covered the ground which was later reported by both Prime Minister's to the plenary meeting.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

P. R. H. WRIGHT

J.S. Wall, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

9/7/77

File No. ....

Department 10 DOWNING STREET

Drafted by  
(Block Capitals) PATRICK WRIGHT

Tel. Extn. 01 930 4433

OUTWARD

TELEGRAM

Security Classification  
CONFIDENTIALPrecedence  
IMMEDIATE

DESKBY ..... Z

FOR  
COMMS. DEPT.  
USE

Despatched

(Date) .....

(Time) ..... Z

POSTBY ..... Z

## PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin) ..... Z(G.M.T.)

(Restrictive Prefix) .....

(Security Class.) .....

(Caveat/  
Privacy Marking) .....

(Codeword) .....

(Deskby) ..... Z

TO IMMEDIATE LAGOS Tel. No. .... of  
(precedence) (post)

AND TO (precedence/post) .....

AND SAVING TO .....

REPEATED TO (for info) .....

SAVING TO (for info) .....

Attention:-

[TEXT]

Please pass following message from the Prime Minister  
to General Obasanjo.

BEGINS:

Dear General Obasanjo,

Our High Commission have reported your Government's  
concern about the question of President Amin's attendance  
at the CHGM in London next week. I thought I should  
write to you personally to follow up the discussion which  
Lord Thomson had with you in April and to let you know  
that we have approached this problem in a manner that  
will not harm the Commonwealth or involve any other member.

When Lord Thomson saw you, he explained the very  
serious effect on British public opinion which President

/ Amin's

Des to:-

possible presence in London could cause for us and for the Commonwealth. Subsequently Parliament has declared itself deeply concerned about the issue of human rights in Uganda and what we believe to be President Amin's personal responsibility for their grave violation. Lord Thomson mentioned to you that we might be able to give President Amin a quiet signal which would dissuade him from attending, but it had been our hope that President Amin himself would realise the strength of opinion here, and decide to stay away.

We have always made it clear that we had no quarrel with the people of Uganda and that we fully recognised that Uganda, as a member of the Commonwealth, had a right to be represented at the Commonwealth Meeting. But the Government cannot disregard the universal strength of feeling in this country about President Amin himself. I therefore sent him recently a courteous private and unpublicised message in which I told him of the strong feeling that exists in Britain and explained our view that it would not be appropriate for him to visit London. In doing so, I was careful to avoid any specific reference to the Commonwealth Heads of Government. Indeed, with your advice in mind, I sent the message through a Government, friendly both to Britain and to Uganda, and made it clear that I was acting for the British Government and in no way seeking to involve other Commonwealth members. I also made it clear that we had no wish to exclude Uganda from the Meeting in London.

/ I took

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

I took very strict precautions to ensure that the message was delivered to President Amin on a confidential basis. Despite a lot of pressure in Parliament and through the press to state our attitude to President Amin's attendance clearly and publicly, I and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary have resisted doing so, and have avoided using any language that could be seen to be insulting to President Amin. It was President Amin alone who decided to publish his version of what I had said and his reply.

I am sure you will understand that I have been motivated throughout by my wish to avoid an atmosphere around the Conference which would destroy the prospect of a constructive and useful meeting. That has been my concern and I have done everything possible to avoid embarrassing President Amin. You will recall no doubt that he did not attend the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting either at Jamaica or Canada. I hope you will understand that our actions have been taken to protect the Commonwealth, and I most sincerely hope therefore that Nigeria will be able to attend the Commonwealth Meeting. Your Government have a most important contribution to make to all our discussions.

I am sorry that you yourself may not be able to lead your delegation, but I hope I may have the pleasure of meeting Brigadier Yar'adua and Brigadier Garba. I particularly look forward to discussing with Brigadier Yar'adua bilateral matters of joint interest which he had discussed

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

May I finally refer to the indefensible events of the last two days in Mozambique. Dr. Owen was sorry not to have been able to have a word with Brigadier Garba before the latter left Paris. But he has been keeping him informed of the action which we took over the Rhodesian violation of Mozambique's territorial integrity. You will now have seen that Rhodesian troops have withdrawn from Mapai. We hope there will be no recurrence of this serious threat to our initiative for peace in the area.

With warm regards,

JIM CALLAGHAN.

ENDS

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

Department ..... EAD  
Drafted by ..... M K EWANS  
(Block Capitals)  
Tel. Extn. .... 233-4549

OUTWARD  
TELEGRAM

Security Classification CONFIDENTIAL
Precedence IMMEDIATE
DESKBY ..... Q30730 ..... Z

FOR  
COMMS. DEPT.  
USE

Despatched (Date) .....  
(Time) ..... Z

POSTBY.....

PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin) ..... Z(G.M.T.) (Restrictive Prefix).....  
(Security Class.) ..... CONFIDENTIAL (Caveat/  
Privacy Marking).....  
(Codeword) ..... (Deskby)..... Q30730 ..... Z

TO ..... IMMEDIATE LAGOS Tel. No. .... of .....  
(precedence) (post)

AND TO (precedence/post).....

AND SAVING TO.....

REPEATED TO (for info).....

SAVING TO (for info).....

Distribution:-

Files  
PS  
PS/Mr Judd  
PS/Mr Rowlands  
PS/PUS  
Mr Graham  
Mr Mansfield  
Head of EAD  
" WAD  
" CCD

[E]

Copies to:-

Sir John Hunt  
Cabinet Office  
PS/No 10

*has decided to  
send the following  
message to General*

[TEXT]

YOUR TELNO 487: CHGM

1. This indication of a changed Nigerian attitude is highly disturbing. It is most important that the Nigerians should not adopt an attitude which might infect other Commonwealth Governments. Brigadier Garba told me in Paris that if anything was done to humiliate Amin, the reaction of black Africans could be very adverse. I made it clear to Garba that we were doing all in our power to avoid a situation in which Amin's presence created the need for difficult decisions. However, feeling in the UK ran very high and the difficulties could not be overlooked. ~~It may be that the concern now emanating from Dodan Barre comes from Garba.~~

2. ~~In the circumstances it seems to us important to do our utmost urgently to keep the Nigerians on the rails.~~ Please therefore seek to deliver the following message from the Prime Minister ~~personally to~~ Obasanjo, *Please deliver* as soon as possible:-

BEGI : "Our High Commission have reported your Government's concern about the question of President Amin's attendance at the CHGM in London next week.

I thought I should write to you personally to follow up the discussion which Lord Thomson had with you in April and to let you know how we have approached this problem.

3. When Lord Thomson saw you, he explained the very serious problems which President Amin's possible presence in London could cause for us. These centred on the issue of Human Rights in Uganda and what we believe to be President Amin's personal responsibility for their grave violation. Lord Thomson mentioned to you that we might be able to give President Amin a quiet signal which would dissuade him from attending but ~~without causing him to lose~~ *it had been our hope that President Amin*

~~face~~ *himself would retain the strength of opinion here, and decide to stay away.*

4. We have always made it clear that we had no quarrel with the people of Uganda and that we fully recognised that Uganda, as a member of the Commonwealth, had a right to be represented at the Commonwealth Meeting. But I could not overlook the strength of feeling in this country about President Amin himself.

I therefore thought it right to sent him a message recently in which I told him of the strong feeling <sup>our view</sup> that exists in Britain and explained that it would not be appropriate for him to come to London next week. ☒ ~~Bearing~~ your advice in mind, I sent the

In doing so, I was careful to avoid any specific reference to the Commonwealth Heads of Government. Indeed, with

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

message through a Government, friendly both to Britain and to Uganda, and made it clear that I was acting for the British Government and in no way seeking to involve other Commonwealth members. I also made it clear that we <sup>had</sup> ~~have~~ no wish to exclude Uganda from the meeting in London.

5. I took very strict precautions to ensure that the message was delivered to President Amin on a confidential basis. Despite a lot of pressure in Parliament and through the press to state our attitude to President Amin's attendance clearly and publicly, I and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary have resisted doing so and have tried to avoid using any language that could be seen to be insulting to President Amin. It was President Amin alone who decided to publish his version of what I had said and his reply.

6. I <sup>am sure you</sup> ~~hope you~~ will understand that I have been motivated throughout by my wish to create an atmosphere in London in which we can have a constructive and useful meeting. That has been my sole concern and I have done everything possible to avoid embarrassing or humiliating President Amin. I hope you will understand why I have done this and I <sup>do most sincerely</sup> hope that ~~there will be no question of Nigeria being absent from~~ <sup>there will be no question of Nigeria being absent from</sup> ~~Nigeria will be present at~~ the Commonwealth Meeting. Your Government have a most important contribution to make to all our discussions.

H.



CONFIDENTIAL

[Lagos tel no  
478]

7.

I am sorry that you <sup>yourself</sup> may not be able to lead your delegation but I hope I may have the pleasure of meeting Brigadier Yar'adua ~~and~~ Brigadier Garba. <sup>particularly</sup> I look forward to discussing with Brigadier Yar'adua ~~the~~ <sup>including Nigeria's need for skilled technicians</sup> bilateral matters which he has raised with our High Commission recently and on which we shall try to be as helpful as possible.

8.

May I finally <sup>mention</sup> ~~say a word about~~ the events of the last two days in Mozambique. Dr Owen was <sup>Sorry not to have</sup> ~~not able~~ <sup>been able</sup> to have a word with Brigadier Garba before the latter left Paris. But he has been keeping him informed of the action which we took over the Rhodesian violation of Mozambique's territorial integrity. You will now have seen that Rhodesian troops have withdrawn from Mapai. We hope there will be no recurrence of this serious threat to our initiative for peace in the area.

With warm regards,

Jim Callaghan".

ENDS.

~~9. If you are unable to deliver the message personally, in time to forestall the formulation of an unhelpful Nigerian attitude, you have discretion to draw it in your contacts with other senior Nigerians~~

1. I WAS CALLED IN TODAY TO SEE THE PERMANENT SECRETARY OF THE MEA. SANUSI TOLD ME THAT HE HAD BEEN TELEPHONED FROM DODAN BARRACKS IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE NTV NEWS LAST NIGHT AND ASKED TO SEEK CLARIFICATION FROM US OF WHAT THE PRIME MINISTER SAID IN HIS LETTER TO PRESIDENT AMIN.

2. SANUSI SAID THAT THE FMG WERE CONCERNED ABOUT A REPORT THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAD NOW TOLD AMIN THAT HE COULD NOT ATTEND THE CHGM. THE NIGERIANS TOOK THE VIEW THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT COULD NOT EXCLUDE A HEAD OF STATE FROM THE MEETING. WHATEVER HIS FAULTS, THEY SAT WITH AMIN AT THE OAU AND WERE PREPARED TO SIT WITH HIM AT THE CHGM IF HE COSE TO COME.

3. SANUSI TOLD ME THAT A DECISION HAD BEEN MADE THAT BRIG. YAR'ADUA WOULD LEAD THE NIGERIAN DELEGATION. THE ANNOUNCEMENT WAS TO HAVE BEEN MADE TODAY BUT WOULD BE HELD BACK. HE INDICATED THAT THIS WOULD NOW DEPEND ON NIGERIAN CONSIDERATION OF WHETHER THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WERE EXCLUDING AMIN.

4. I TOLD SANUSI THAT I DID NOT KNOW WHAT MESSAGE HAD BEEN SENT TO AMIN, BUT WE HOPED, IN THE INTERESTS OF THE COMMONWEALTH, THAT AMIN WOULD DECIDE TO STAY AWAY FROM THE CHGM. I UNDERTOOK TO REPORT THE NIGERIAN REQUEST.

5. DESPITE THE SYMPATHETIC REACTION WHICH LORD THOMPSON RECEIVED FROM GEN OBASANJO ON THE QUESTION OF AMIN'S ATTENDANCE AT THE CHGM, THE NIGERIANS APPEAR NOW TO BE PREPARTING TO TAKE ISSUE WITH US IF AMIN IS EXCLUDED. THE FMG HAVE CLEARLY HOPED LIKE US THAT AMIN WOULD STAY AWAY AND THAT THEY WOULD NOT HAVE TO MAKE ANY STATEMENT ABOUT HIS ATTENDANCE. BUT THERE IS A DANGER THAT THEY WILL MAKE THIS AN ISSUE OF AFRICAN SOLIDARITY.

6. I WOULD BE GRATEFUL TO KNOW WHAT I CAN TELL THE NIGERIANS ABOUT THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE. I HAVE BEEN ASKED TO SEE THE DIRECTOR OF THE EUROPEAN DEPT AT 0730Z TOMORROW.

JOHNSON.

NNNN

CYPHER CAT A

FM LAGOS 311035Z MAY

RESTRICTED

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TEL NO 478 OF 31.5.77.

INFO ROUTINE ODM, BONN, PARIS, OTTAWA AND WASHINGTON.

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO AND COOPERATION WITH NIGERIA.  
THE CHIEF OF STAFF, BRIG YAR'ADUA, SENT FOR ME TODAY. HE TOLD ME THAT THIS WAS PART OF AN APPROACH HE WAS MAKING TO "FRIENDLY ADVANCED COUNTRIES" TO ASK FOR HELP IN FILLING NIGERIA'S NEEDS FOR TECHNICIANS.

2. NIGERIA NEEDED 30,000 SKILLED TECHNICIANS IN THE CIVIL ENGINEERING FIELD ALONE AND THE TOTAL REQUIRED WAS WELL OVER 100,000. IT WAS THE FEDERAL GOVT'S INTENTION TO EMBARK ON A CRASH PROGRAMME THIS AIMED TO RECRUIT PRACTICAL TECHNICIANS, TEACHERS FROM ABROAD FOR NIGERIAN COLLEGES OF TECHNOLOGY AND TO TRAIN NIGERIANS IN LARGE NUMBERS ABROAD.

3. YAR'ADUA SAID THAT HE WAS PUTTING FORWARD THIS IDEA IN THE HOPE THAT WE WOULD AGREE TO HELP IN PRINCIPLE. WHEN WE HAD TIME TO DIGEST IT HE WOULD LIKE TO SEND A HIGH-POWERED DELEGATION TO LONDON TO DISCUSS DETAILS. IN ADDITION TO SPEAKING OF TECHNICIANS, HE ALSO MENTIONED NIGERIA'S DEFECIENCIES IN THE MEDICAL FIELD, WITH A PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON NURSES. IN REPLY TO A QUESTION, HE SAID THAT THE DELEGATION TO THE CHGM WOULD RAISE THIS MATTER.

4. THIS APPROACH FITS IN WITH THE REQUESTS I HAVE RECEIVED FROM STATE GOVTS DURING MY TOURS. THESE TEND TO BE, LIKE YAR'ADUA'S SOMEWHAT VAGUE AND UNSPECIFIC. HOWEVER THEY ALL HAVE ONE CLEAR FACTOR IN COMMON: NIGERIA IS DESPERATELY SHORT OF TEACHERS, TECHNICIANS, AND TRAINED PERSONNEL IN EVERY FIELD. THEY WANT HELP FROM THE DEVELOPED WORLD AND REGARD US AS A PROMISING SOURCE OF HELP, STRESSING CONTINUALLY OUR LONG EXPERIENCE IN NIGERIA.

RESTRICTED

/5.

RESTRICTED

5. I NOTED IN YAR'ADUA'S VISITORS' BOOK THAT I HAD BEEN PRECEDED BY MY GERMAN AND FRENCH COLLEAGUES, PRESUMABLY ON THE SAME ERRAND. MY AMERICAN AND CANADIAN COLLEAGUES ARE SEEING YAR'ADUA ON 31 MAY AND 1 JUNE. WE SHALL BE COMPARING NOTES.

6. I TOLD YAR'ADUA THAT I WAS DELIGHTED TO HEAR THIS AND WOULD IMMEDIATELY TELEGRAPH MY GOVT. I KNEW THAT THEY WOULD BE KEEN TO COOPERATE BUT I DID NOT KNOW HOW MUCH CAPACITY WE HAD. THIS WOULD BE FOR THE EXPERTS TO WORK OUT.

7. I AM MARKING THIS TELEGRAM IMMEDIATE SO THAT YOU CAN HAVE GOOD TIME TO CONSIDER IT BEFORE THE CHGM.

FALLE

FILES...  
WAD  
STD  
CRD  
ENERGY D  
CCD  
PS  
PS/MR ROWLANDS  
PS/PUS  
MR MANSFIELD  
MR LEAHY

GRS 70  
PRIORITY  
CYPHER CAT A

RESTRICTED RECEIVED IN REGISTRY NO. 29 26 MAY 1977 OWN 02/1
-------------------------------------------------------------------------

(75)

FM GEORGETOWN 241330Z

RESTRICTED

*pin High Foreign Policy  
on 25/7*

TO PRIORITY FCQ TELNO 81 OF 24 MAY 77

BRIDGETOWN TELNO 104 TO FCQ

(83)

1. FORBES BURNHAM TOLD LORD THOMSON THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THAT OBSANJO HAD DECIDED THAT NIGERIA SHOULD LEAVE THE COMMONWEALTH. LORD THOMSON EXPRESSED SURPRISE AND ASSURED BURNHAM THAT SUBJECT HAD NOT ARISEN DURING HIS TALK WITH OBSANJO WHO HAD GIVEN IMPRESSION OF STRONG BELIEF IN COMMONWEALTH.

2. PARA 3 OF TUR. I SHARE REUTER'S ASSESSMENT OF PERSAUD. THERE HAS BEEN NO LOCAL NEWS COVERAGE ON THIS.

GAUTREY

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

CCD  
M AND CD  
CSAD  
EAD  
NAD  
SAD  
SEAD  
SED  
SWPD  
WAD  
PCD  
WIAD  
N & TD  
TRED  
EESD  
RHOD DEPT  
CRD

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION:  
CHGM MEETING

RESTRICTED

PRIORITY

NYTER CAT A

FM LAGOS 231215Z  
CONFIDENTIAL

RECEIVED CONFIDENTIAL

REGISTRY No. 29

25 MAY 1977

JUN 02/1

(Nig. Foreign Policy)  
Pr 24/v

84

TO PRIORITY FCO TELNO 450 OF 23 MAY.

,INFO PRIORITY BRIDGETOWN, ROUTINE GEORGETOWN AND PORT OF SPAIN.

83

BRIDGETOWN TELNO 104 TO FCO: NIGERIA AND THE COMMONWEALTH

1. IT IS TRUE THAT THE NIGERIA MEDIA OCCASIONALLY CARRIES PIECES, LARGELY BY RADICAL ACADEMICS AND STUDENTS, QUESTIONING THE VALUE OF COMMONWEALTH MEMBERSHIP JE NIGERIA AND CALLING ON NIGERIA TO LEAVE. BUT THESE VIEWS ARE NOT (NOT) SHARED IN OFFICIAL CIRCLES.
2. THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF LORD THOMSON HAVING TO USE HIS TIME HERE TO PERSUADE NIGERIA TO STAY IN THE COMMONWEALTH. OBASANJO TOLDEQIM THAT NIGERIA HAD CONSIDERABLE FAITH IN THE COMMONWEALTH BECAUSE OF WHAT IT STOOD FOR; AND GARBA, WHILE REFERRING TO RADICAL PRESSURE AND SAYING THAT THE TASK OF THE CHGM WOULD BE TO CONVINCE MEMBER COUNTRIES THAT THE COMMONWEALTH REMAINED A WORTHWHILE ORGANISATION, SAID THAT NIGERIA CONSIDERED THE COMMONWEALTH TO BE A USEFUL ORGANISATION WHICH HAD ADAPTED ITSELF TO THE TIMES.
3. ALTHOUGH ONE CANNOT SAY CATEGORICALLY THAT, DEPENDING ON EVENTS AT AND THE OUTCOME OF THE CHGM, NIGERIA WILL NOT REAPPRAISE HER COMMONWEALTH MEMBERSHIP, AT PRESENT WE SEE NO (NO) SIGNS TO JRUTIJW NEWS REPORT QUOTED IN TUR.

FALLE

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

CCD	EESD
M & CD	RHOD DEPT
CSAD	CRD
EAD	1977 CONF UNIT
NAD	
SAD	
SEAD	
SED	
SWPD	
WAD	
PCD	
WIAD	
N & TD	
TRED	


ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION  
CHG MEETING

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER CAT A

M BRIDGETOWN 201730Z

RESTRICTED



pe. N.S. Foreign  
Pos. 4.  
J-23/1

TO PRIORITY FCO TELNO 104 OF 20 MAY

REPEATED FOR INFO ROUTINE TO GEORGETOWN, PORT OF SPAIN,  
AND LAGOS.

CBC BARBADOS YESTERDAY CARRIED REPORT FROM THEIR  
GEORGETOWN CORRESPONDENT, QUOTING "RELIABLE SOURCES  
IN TRINIDAD", TO THE EFFECT THAT NIGERIA WOULD LEAVE  
THE COMMONWEALTH AFTER THE CHGM. REPORT REFERRED TO  
LORD THOMSON HAVING FAILED DURING HIS VISIT TO LAGOS  
TO PERSUADE THE NIGERIANS TO STAY IN THE COMMONWEALTH.

2. REUTER'S REGIONAL CORRESPONDENT IN BARBADOS HAS  
SO FAR FAILED TO FIND ANY CONFIRMATION FOR STORY AND  
CHECK WITH NIGERIAN HIGH COMMISSIONER IN PORT OF SPAIN  
PRODUCED FAIRLY CONVINCING DENIAL. REUTER LONDON SAY  
THEY HAVE NO SIMILAR INDICATION.

3. CBC GEORGETOWN CORRESPONDENT IS PAUL PERSAUD  
(FREELANCE) OF WHOSE RELIABILITY REUTER ARE NOT  
CONFIDENT BUT WHOM LOCAL JOURNALISTS CREDIT WITH  
SOME GOOD CONTACTS,

ROBERTS

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

CCD

M & CD

CSAD

EAD

NAD

SAD

SEAD

SED

SWPD

WAD

PCD

WIAD

N & TD

TRED

EESD

RHOD DEPT

CRD

1944 CONF UNIT

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION  
CHG MEETING

RESTRICTED



*Algeria*

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

1 June 1977

President Amin

As you know, the Commonwealth Secretary General sent us last night a copy of a telegram which he had received from President Amin about the Prime Minister's letter of 22 May (a copy of which was annexed to the note of the Prime Minister's meeting with Prince Fahd of Saudi Arabia on that day). I enclose a copy of President Amin's message with this letter.

At the Prime Minister's request, we immediately contacted Mr. Ramphal and discussed our response to the message with him. He confirmed that he was himself proposing to take no action at all on the telegram, but commented that the message seemed to him to be out of character with President Amin's usual conduct and was phrased in a low key. He admitted that there were veiled threats in it, but thought that it was designed to maintain uncertainty as to his intentions, while preparing the ground for his not coming at all.

Since it later became clear that the text of President Amin's message was already known to the press, it was agreed that the No. 10 Press Office should confirm that the Prime Minister had written a personal and confidential letter to President Amin; that we could not discuss the contents of the letter, since it was confidential; but that the Prime Minister had advised President Amin that it would not be appropriate for him to visit this country. We would also confirm that President Amin had sent a telegram to the Commonwealth Secretary General referring to Mr. Callaghan's letter, and that Mr. Ramphal had sent this on to the Prime Minister.

I am sending a copy of this, with enclosure, to Bob Morris (Home Office), and to Martin Vile and Sir Clive Rose (Cabinet Office).

P. R. H. WRIGHT

J.S. Wall, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office,

*80*



See letter to FCO

President Amin

At approximately 8.00 p.m. last night Sir Clive Rose brought through from the Cabinet Office a copy of President Amin's telegram to the Commonwealth Secretary General about the Prime Minister's personal and confidential letter to him. I transmitted this immediately to the Prime Minister at Chequers.

The Prime minister asked me to enquire what Sonny Ramphal was proposing to do about it; and we discussed our response, which the Prime Minister thought should be to make no comment on it.

I spoke to Mr. Ramphal who confirmed that he had received the telegram himself and had instructed that the copy, as requested, be sent on to Mr. Callaghan. He was proposing to take no action at all on the telegram. He observed that the message itself was out of character with Amin's usual conduct. It was low key. It had a veiled threat in it, admittedly, but it seemed designed to maintain uncertainty as to Amin's intentions while preparing the ground for his not coming at all. (Stephen Wall of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office Private Office subsequently commented that this intention to maintain uncertainty was validated by our own intelligence reports from Africa.) Sonny Ramphal said that all he would say to the press, if asked, was that he had received President Amin's telegram; had passed it on to Mr. Callaghan as requested; and wished to make no comment on the substance of it. Mr. Ramphal said that there would be no doubt that the text of the telegram would become public very quickly because of its wide distribution and he had no doubt that Amin would release the text sooner or later from Kampala, if indeed he had not already given it to Reuters there.

Mr. McCaffrey telephoned to say that The Times had contacted him with a report that Kampala Radio had said that President Amin had received a personal and confidential letter from the Prime Minister advising him not to attend the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in London. I told Mr. McCaffrey of the receipt of the telegram and we concluded that this first report from Kampala was simple a trailer to publication of Amin's telegram to London. Subsequent newspaper calls to No.10 and the FCO indicated that this was correct and that Kampala was putting out that a message had been sent to Sonny Ramphal protesting that the Prime Minister was aiming to keep out of the CHGM those who spoke frankly about international issues. Mr. McCaffrey and I then agreed (the Prime Minister not being immediately available for consultation) that we should take the following line with the press:

- (a) We confirm that the Prime Minister had written the "personal and confidential" letter to President Amin.
- (b) We could not discuss its contents, since it was confidential, but
- (c) the Prime Minister had advised President Amin that it would not be appropriate for him to visit this country.

/(d)

- (d) We confirm that President Amin had sent a telegram to the Commonwealth Secretary General referring to Mr. Callaghan's letter and asking for a copy of his telegram to Mr. Ramphal to be sent on to Mr. Callaghan.
- (e) Mr. Rampal had sent it on and the Prime Minister had received it.

I subsequently gave this guidance to Stephen Wall at the FCO who reported it to Dr. Owen in Paris.


I subsequently reported the line to the Prime Minister, who spoke to Mr. McCaffrey and broadly endorsed the guidance that had already been given to the press.

K.R.S.  
—

1 June 1977

1220 EXTERIOR

U.H.E. SHRIDATH RUMPHAL  
SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE COMMONWEALTH  
MARLBOROUGH HOUSE  
LONDON SW1Y 5HX  
LONDON.



31/5/1977.

736. FROM A PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL LETTER ADDRESSED TO ME BY THE BRITISH PRIME MINISTER COMMA THE RIGHT HON JAMES CALLAGHAN COMMA DATED 22ND MAY 1977 THE CONTENTS WHICH I DO NOT WISH TO REVEAL AT THE TIME AT THIS MOMENT COMMA IT HAS NOW BECOME ABUNDANTLY CLEAR THAT IT IS NOT THE WISH OF THE GOVERNMENT OF HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN THAT LEADERS WHO SPEAK OUT FRANKLY ON MATTERS AFFECTING THE FUTURE OF THE COMMONWEALTH COMMA

ESPECIALLY NOW WHEN ALMOST ALL COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES ARE INDEPENDENT AND SOVEREIGN STATES COMMA SHOULD GO TO LONDON TO ATTEND THE MEETING OF THE HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT OF THE COMMONWEALTH STOP

THIS ATTITUDE CLEARLY DEMONSTRATES THAT ALTHOUGH BRITAIN HAS LONG CEASED TO BE AN EMPIRE COMMA OF WHICH SHE WAS THE MASTER AND THE COLONIES THE SLAVES COMMA SHE IS STILL CLINGING TO DAY-LIGHT DREAMS IN WHICH SHE PRETENDS TO ARROGATE TO HERSELF THE RIGHT TO EXCLUDE AN INDEPENDENT AND SOVEREIGN STATE LIKE UGANDA FROM ATTENDING THE COMMONWEALTH MEETING OF HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT S TOP

IT IS OBVIOUS THAT THIS HAS BEEN DUE TO THE FACT THAT IT IS UGANDA'S INTENTION AT THE FORTH-COMING COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCE TO POINT OUT THE TWO THOUSAND MISTAKES MADE BY BRITAIN DURING HER COLONIAL RULE STOP

I WISH TO MAKE IT ABSOLUTELY CLEAR THAT GONE ARE THE DAYS WHEN BRITAIN WIELDED THE POWERS AND AUTHORITY OF AN IMPERIAL MASTER OVER THE COMMONWEALTH STOP

IT IS ONLY THOSE TRUE NATIONALIST LEADERS LIKE MYSELF WHO REFUSE TO BE MICROPHONES OF GREAT BRITAIN OR ANY OTHER IMPERIALIST POWER AND TO SACRIBUTE TO THEIR NEO-COLONIALIST AND IMPERIALISTIC ORDERS THAT FALL THE VICTIMS OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENTS MANIPULATION OF THE COMMONWEALTH STOP

BY TELLING A MEMBER STATE OF AN INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATION WHO SHOULD REPRESENT IT AT MEETINGS OF THAT ORGANISATION COMMA THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT IS NOT ONLY INTERFERING IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE STATE BUT ALSO CREATING A BAD AND DANGEROUS PRECEDENT FOR THE FUTURE OF THE COMMONWEALTH STOP

BY BUILDING UP BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP AND UNDERSTANDING WITH

RELATIONSHIP AND MISUNDERSTANDINGS WITH  
THE CONCERNING THE ENTIRE COMMONWEALTH FAMILY BRITAIN IS YET  
ITTING ANOTHER GRAVE MISTAKE STOP

COMMA HOWEVER COMMA CONFIDENT THAT WHTEVER MANOEUVERS AND  
MACHINATIONS BRITAIN AND A FEW OTHER MEMBERS WHO ARE IN HER POCKETS  
MAY MAKE COMMA THESE DO NOT REPRESENT THE TRUE FEELINGS OF OUR ORGA-  
NISATION STOP

AS FOR YOU COMMA MY DEAR MR SECRETARY GENERAL COMMA PERHAPS I DO  
NOT NEED TO REMIND YOU THAT YOUR ELECTION TO THAT POST BY A UNANI-  
MOUS VOTE OF THE MEMBER STATES OF THE COMMONWEALTH AT THE LAST  
MEETING IN KINGSTONE COMMA JAMAICA COMMA IN 1975 COMMA WAS ONLY MADE  
POSSIBLE BY THE DIRECTIVES I GAVE TO MY DELEGATION TO THAT CONFERENCE  
TO SUPPORT YOU AS THE FIRST SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE COMMONWEALTH  
FROM A THIRD WORLD COUNTRY WHICH IS ALSO A MEMBER OF THE NON-ALIGNED  
MOVEMENT STOP

I WOULD BE FAILING IN MY DUTY OF PROMOTING THE NOBLE IDEALS FOR  
WHICH THE COMMONWEALTH STANDS IF I DID NOT CAUTION AGAINST THE DAN-  
DERS OF THE COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT BEING MANIPULATED BY A MEMBER  
OF OUR ORGANISATION STOP

I THOUGHT IT NECESSARY THAT I SHOULD INFORM YOU ABOUT THE RECENT  
COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE BRITISH PRIME MINISTER AND MYSELF SO AS TO  
LET YOU KNOW UGANDAS POSITION CONCERNING THE FORTH-COMING MEETING  
OF THE COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT JUST IN CASE UGANDA  
IS NOT REPRESENTED STOP

I WISH COMMA HOWEVER COMMA TO ASSURE YOU COMMA YOUR EXCELLENCY  
COMMA THAT UGANDA IS COMMITTED TO THE IDEALS FOR WHICH THE COMMON  
WEALTH STANDS AND APPRECIATES THE EFFORTS YOU AS ITS SECRETARY GENE  
AL IS MAKING TO WARDS THEIR REALIZATION STOP

FINALLY COMMA PLEASE COMMA ACCEPT COMMA YOUR EXCELLENCY COMMA  
THE ASSURANCE OF MY HIGHEST CONSIDERATION AND ESTEEM.

AL-HAJI FIELD MARSHAL DR IDI AMIN DADA  
VC, DSO, MC, LIFE PRESIDENT OF THE  
REPUBLIC OF UGANDA.  
-----

C. THE RT HON JAMES CALLAGHAN  
BRITISH PRIME MINISTER  
NO 10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON. (THROUGH THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE COMMONWEALTH)  
-----

H E DR ETEKI MBOUMOUA  
SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE OAU ADDIS ABABA  
(FOR THE INFORMATION OF ALL MEMBER STATES)

BY AVOIDING UP BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP AND MISUNDERSTANDINGS WITH

AL-HAJI FIELD MARSHAL DR IDI AMIN DADA  
VC, DSO, MC, LIFE PRESIDENT OF THE  
REPUBLIC OF UGANDA.  
-----

C.C. THE RT HON JAMES CALLAGHAN  
BRITISH PRIME MINISTER  
NO 10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON. (THROUGH THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE COMMONWEALTH)  
-----

" H E DR ETEKI MBOUMOUA  
SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE OAU ADDIS ABABA  
(FOR THE INFORMATION OF ALL MEMBER STATES)

" H E MAHAMOUD RIAD  
SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE ARAB LEAGUE  
CAIRO. (FOR THE INFORMATION OF ALL MEMBER STATES)

" H E DR KURT WALDHEIM  
SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS  
NEW YORK. (FOR THE INFORMATION OF ALL MEMBER STATES)

" H E MRS SIRIMAVO BANDARANAIKE  
CURRENT CHAIRMAN OF THE  
5TH CONFERENCE OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT  
COLOMBO.  
-----

" H E MARSHAL JOSIP BROZ TITO  
PRESIDENT OF THE SOCIALIST FEDERALIC REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA  
BELGRADE.  
-----

31ST MAY 1977.

.....

-----  
SH GOVERNMENT IS NOT ONLY INTERFERING IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE  
EE OF THE STATE BUT ALSO CREATING A BAD AND DANGEROUS PRECEDENT FOR  
THE FUTURE OF THE COMMONWEALTH STOP

-----  
BY PICKING UP BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP AND MISUNDERSTANDINGS WITH

PRIME MINISTER

PRESIDENT AMIN

Kampala Radio have reported that Mr. Callaghan wrote to President Amin advising him not to come to the CHGM.

This has been picked up by UK newspapers.

Sonny Ramphal confirms that he got the telegram and passed it on here as requested - it did not come direct. He assumes that Amin has given the text of the telegram to the press in Kampala or will shortly be doing so, having disclosed receipt of Mr. Callaghan's letter. Ramphal assumes that all other recipients will disclose the text anyway.

Ramphal will make no comment on the telegram: he will simply confirm that he has had the telegram and that, as requested, he has passed it on to Mr. Callaghan.

I have discussed with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Tom McCaffrey, who are already being questioned by the press. The line we have agreed is:

- (a) We confirm that a ~~personal and confidential~~ letter was sent to President Amin recently by Mr. Callaghan.
- (b) We did not disclose its terms but
- (c) we confirm that Mr. Callaghan did advise President Amin that it would not be appropriate for him to ~~attend CHGM~~ <sup>visit to Court</sup>.
- (d) We confirm that Amin telegraphed Ramphal about this and
- (e) that we have received a copy of Amin's telegram - we make no comment on Amin's telegram but ~~stand on the~~ <sup>confirm that</sup> ~~position that, as already made clear,~~ the Prime Minister does not think it appropriate for President Amin to come, and has ~~now~~ told him so.

K.R.S. (by telephone)

31 May 1977



RESTRICTED  
CYPHER CAT A

GR 600

FM FCO 312025Z

RESTRICTED

TO FLASH PARIS TELNO 358 OF 31 MAY

MIPT: PRESIDENT AMIN AND THE C H G M.

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MESSAGE:

FROM A PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL LETTER ADDRESSED TO ME BY THE BRITISH PRIME MINISTER, THE RIGHT HON JAMES CALLAGHAN, DATED 22 MAY 1977 THE CONTENTS WHICH I DO NOT WISH TO REVEAL AT THIS MOMENT, IT HAS NOW BECOME ABUNDANTLY CLEAR THAT IT IS NOT THE WISH OF THE GOVERNMENT OF HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN THAT LEADERS WHO SPEAK OUT FRANKLY ON MATTERS AFFECTING THE FUTURE OF THE COMMONWEALTH, ESPECIALLY NOW WHEN ALMOST ALL COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES ARE INDEPENDENT AND SOVEREIGN STATES, SHOULD GO TO LONDON TO ATTEND THE MEETING OF THE HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT OF THE COMMONWEALTH.

THIS ATTITUDE CLEARLY DEMONSTRATES THAT ALTHOUGH BRITAIN HAS LONG CEASED TO BE AN EMPIRE, OF WHICH SHE WAS THE MASTER AND THE COLONIES THE SLAVES, SHE IS STILL CLINGING TO DAY-LIGHT DREAMS IN WHICH SHE PRETENDS TO ARROGATE TO HERSELF THE RIGHT TO EXCLUDE AN INDEPENDENT AND SOVEREIGN STATE LIKE UGANDA FROM ATTENDING THE COMMONWEALTH MEETING OF HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT.

IT IS OBVIOUS THAT THIS HAS BEEN DUE TO THE FACT THAT IT IS UGANDA'S INTENTION AT THE FORTH-COMING COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCE TO POINT OUT THE TWO THOUSAND MISTAKES MADE BY BRITAIN DURING HER COLONIAL RULE.

I WISH TO MAKE IT ABSOLUTELY CLEAR THAT GONE ARE THE DAYS WHEN BRITAIN WIELDED THE POWERS AND AUTHORITY OF AN IMPERIAL MASTER OVER THE COMMONWEALTH.

IT IS ONLY THOSE TRUE NATIONALIST LEADERS LIKE MYSELF WHO REFUSE TO BE MICROPHONES OF GREAT BRITAIN OR ANY OTHER IMPERIALIST POWER AND TO SUCCUMB TO THEIR NEO-COLONIALIST AND IMPERIALISTIC ORDERS THAT FALL THE VICTIMS OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENTS MANIPULATION OF THE COMMONWEALTH.

RESTRICTED

/ BY TELLING

BY TELLING A MEMBER STATE OF AN INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATION WHO SHOULD REPRESENT IT AT MEETINGS OF THAT ORGANISATION, THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT IS NOT ONLY INTERFERING IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE STATE BUT ALSO CREATING A BAD AND DANGEROUS PRECEDENT FOR THE FUTURE OF THE COMMONWEALTH.

BY MIXING UP BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP AND MISUNDERSTANDINGS WITH AFFAIRS CONCERNING THE ENTIRE COMMONWEALTH FAMILY BRITAIN IS YET COMMITTING ANOTHER GRAVE MISTAKE.

I AM, HOWEVER, CONFIDENT THAT WHATEVER MANOEUVERS AND MACHINATIONS BRITAIN AND A FEW OTHER MEMBERS WHO ARE IN HER POCKETS MAY MAKE THESE DO NOT REPRESENT THE TRUE FEELINGS OF OUR ORGANISATION.

AS FOR YOU, MY DEAR MR SECRETARY GENERAL, PERHAPS I DO NOT NEED TO REMIND YOU THAT YOUR ELECTION TO THAT POST BY A UNANIMOUS VOTE OF THE MEMBER STATES OF THE COMMONWEALTH AT THE LAST MEETING IN KINGSTON JAMAICA, IN 1975 WAS ONLY MADE POSSIBLE BY THE DIRECTIVES I GAVE TO MY DELEGATION TO THAT CONFERENCE TO SUPPORT YOU AS THE FIRST SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE COMMONWEALTH FROM A THIRD WORLD COUNTRY WHICH IS ALSO A MEMBER OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT.

I WOULD BE FAILING IN MY DUTY OF PROMOTING THE NOBLE IDEALS FOR WHICH THE COMMONWEALTH STANDS IF I DID NOT CAUTION AGAINST THE DANGERS OF THE COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT BEING MANIPULATED BY A MEMBER OF OUR ORGANISATION.

I THOUGHT IT NECESSARY THAT I SHOULD INFORM YOU ABOUT THE RECENT COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE BRITISH PRIME MINISTER AND MYSELF SO AS TO LET YOU KNOW UGANDA'S POSITION CONCERNING THE FORTH-COMING MEETING OF THE COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT JUST IN CASE UGANDA IS NOT REPRESENTED.

I WISH, HOWEVER, TO ASSURE YOU, YOUR EXCELLENCY THAT UGANDA IS COMMITTED TO THE IDEALS FOR WHICH THE COMMONWEALTH STANDS AND APPRECIATES THE EFFORTS YOU AS ITS SECRETARY GENERAL IS MAKING TOWARDS THEIR REALIZATION.

FINALLY, PLEASE, ACCEPT, YOUR EXCELLENCY, THE ASSURANCE OF MY HIGHEST CONSIDERATION AND ESTEEM.



RESTRICTED

AL-HAJI FIELD MARSHAL DR IDI AMIN DADA VC, DSO, MC, LIFE  
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA.

OWEN

F I L E S:

[COPIES SENT TO NO.10 DOWNING ST]

CCD

EAD

FCD

OADS

PUSD

1977 CONF UNIT

NEWS D

PS

PS/MR JUDD

PS/LORD GORONWY ROBERTS

PS/MR ROWLANDS

PS/MR TOMLINSON

PS/MR LUARD

PS/PUS

SIR A. DUFF

MR GRAHAM

MR CORTAZZI

MR MANSFIELD

MR STANLEY

MR HENNINGS

MR MURRAY

MR LEAHY

COPIES TO:

SIR J. HUNT CABINET OFFICE

SIR C. ROSE " "


- 3 -

RESTRICTED

*R. Wright to see N.C.W.*

**THE CIVIL & PUBLIC SERVICES ASSOCIATION**

*R/W KE CPMM (P.S)*



*Original to P.O.*

215 Balham High Road  
London SW17 7BQ  
Telephone: 01-672 1299  
Telex: 946900

Our ref:  
(please quote)

GENERAL SECRETARY  
K. R. THOMAS

31st May, 1977

*R/W*

Dear Prime Minister,

I am writing to you in connection with the possible visit to this country by the President of Uganda in connection with the forthcoming Commonwealth Conference.

On 6th May, our Annual Conference at Southport gave overwhelming support to a motion referring to the news reports which have recently emanated from Uganda. President Amin was denounced as a "common criminal". The motion went on to call upon the TUC to declare the President of Uganda persona non grata should he visit this country so that all Trade Unionists should be urged to withhold their labour where such labour will give aid or comfort to the President during his stay in this country. Since Conference, of course, the International Commission of Jurists have published their report estimating at more than 100,000 the total number of murders carried out by the Amin regime since 1971 and citing evidence that President Amin himself ordered some of the killings.

I am sure that all civilised people will agree with the general sentiments behind this motion. I am aware, of course, of the discussions which are taking place with Commonwealth countries and of the constitutional difficulties, but I wanted to place the full support of my union in any action you may wish to take to debar President Amin from visiting this country.

I am also writing to the General Secretary of the TUC to inform him about, and ask for active TUC support for, the actions proposed at the end of our first paragraph should that be necessary.

The Rt Hon J. Callaghan, MP,  
Prime Minister,  
10, Downing Street,  
London, S.W.1.

Yours sincerely,

*K.R. Thomas*  
General Secretary

SECRET



*Prime Minister*

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

31 May 1977

*Re x onleaf. possibly Mr. Rostler?  
I don't if it signed for a Cabinet Minister.*

*Hand Gorman  
- Roberts then  
Dear Patrick, will be best - 2/6*

President Amin: Contingency Planning

In his letter to you of 26 May, <sup>attached.</sup> Bob Morris enclosed copies of a submission to the Home Secretary.

On the question of a public announcement by the Government that President Amin will be denied entry into the United Kingdom, the Saudis appear to hope that Amin will not now try to come here. They have recommended that we do our utmost to maintain a calm atmosphere at present. Dr Owen was able to handle the debate on Uganda last Friday without revealing the Government's decision to exclude him. If the Saudis are right, and Amin says publicly that he will not be coming, it may well be that the Government will not find it necessary to make any such announcement at all. If he does not, we will let you know if Dr Owen considers that a statement should be made.

Detailed comments which have been approved by Dr Owen on the specific provisions of the draft contingency plans are given in the enclosure to this letter.

Dr Owen thinks he should stress that, despite his objectionable character, President Amin is a Head of State and, within the limits imposed by the necessary objectives of the plan, he must be treated accordingly. If the plan has to go into operation, all action must be as unprovocative as possible. In Dr Owen's view it will be highly important that, wherever possible, we proceed in agreement with President Amin. This applies particularly to the question of acceptance of a Ugandan delegation headed by someone other than Amin, and the question of President Amin's removal from this country, both of which points are covered in the enclosure to this letter.

Dr Owen agrees with the proposal that negotiations with Amin should be conducted by a Foreign and Commonwealth official,

/assisted

Patrick Wright Esq.,  
10 Downing Street,  
London SW1.

SECRET



SECRET

x | assisted of course by a senior official from the Home Office and the other authorities concerned. Dr Owen has nominated Sir A Duff/Mr Mansfield for this purpose. In addition Jim Hennessy, who was the last Acting High Commissioner in Kampala is now in London and will be available to advise as a man who has had fairly recent direct experience of handling Amin. But Dr Owen also feels that Amin might refuse to negotiate with officials and might ask to see a Minister, or even the Prime Minister. If this happened, he suggests that the Prime Minister might wish to appoint a Minister to represent him in negotiations with Amin. This Minister would have to be available, in case of need, from soon after Amin landed.

I am copying this letter to Bob Morris and the other recipients of his letter.

*Yours ever*  
*J.S. Wall*  
(J.S. Wall)

SECRET



Foreign and Commonwealth Office views on contingency plans for  
the possible arrival of President Amin

Powers to refuse entry - paragraph 3

In the Foreign and Commonwealth Office view, even if President Amin disregards the Prime Minister's message that his presence in the UK is unacceptable, and arrives with a delegation, he must be allowed, if he wishes, to nominate a delegation to represent Uganda at the CHGM. The whole basis of the UK soundings of the Commonwealth aimed at their eventual acquiescence in Amin's personal exclusion is that Uganda should not be excluded from the CHGM. The FCO agree that there might be difficulties if President Amin were to nominate a leader or members of a delegation who were unacceptable on personal grounds. But the issue of admission should be left to final decision at the time, with the aim of securing agreement with Amin in negotiation on the nomination of a delegation acceptable to both him and the Government.

Amin's Arrival

Foreign and Commonwealth Legal advice is to the effect that Amin's personal aircraft may be regarded, for the purposes of the Chicago Convention, as a State Aircraft. It would therefore be desirable to inform its pilot that he has no clearance to enter British airspace or to land in Britain. If the aircraft carrying President Amin were then to depart, there would be the risk, referred to above, that President Amin could claim that Uganda was being excluded from representation at the CHGM altogether. In these circumstances HM Government would have to make it clear to Commonwealth Member Governments, the Commonwealth Secretary-General, and probably in a public statement as well, that HM Government have denied clearance to the aircraft carrying President Amin, but remained ready to give entry to a Ugandan delegation led by a special representative appointed by President Amin.

The FCO agrees that if possible an aircraft carrying President Amin should be directed to Brize Norton, or, failing that, to Heathrow. Full regard should be paid to all safety procedures. Any risk of placing an aircraft carrying President Amin, and his entourage, in hazard should be scrupulously avoided.

Paragraph 13

The action in a, b and c should be carried out with as much courtesy and discretion on the British side as possible. President Amin should be allowed to have one or two personal aides with him in his own company, even if separated from the rest of the party.



Contingency arrangements must be made at Stansted in case the two Uganda Airlines Boeings due on Sunday 29 May are carrying Amin or possibly an advance party. They should however be as discreet as possible. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office believe that troop reinforcements must be available if the relevant authority requires them, but everything possible should be done to minimise the risk of disclosing in advance an intention to use troops, since this could work against the Saudi recommendation that the atmosphere be kept as calm as possible at present.

#### The Departure of Amin (paragraphs 16 - 20)

The Foreign and Commonwealth Office are firmly of the view that every effort should be made to encourage President Amin to leave of his own accord in the aircraft by which he arrived. Any other alternative would present international problems for Her Majesty's Government more difficult than holding Amin and his party and their aircraft until he gives up and goes away.

##### (a) Scheduled Service

Her Majesty's Government might cause serious embarrassment to the Government of the destination of a scheduled aircraft, since we would in effect be forcibly deporting the Head of a State to that destination. In those circumstances we would be bound to consult the foreign government concerned urgently, and we would have to contemplate the possibility of a refusal. The possibility of President Amin agreeing to leave willingly to go he could go in his own aircraft. The only airlines with a scheduled service to Uganda are Sabena, Air France and Ethiopian Airways. It is highly unlikely that these airlines would agree to carry President Amin if he were travelling against his will, and at the very least they might wish to consult their governments. Her Majesty's Government would certainly have to do so in the case of friendly governments, such as the Belgian, French and German.

##### (b) Charter Aircraft

Similar problems apply as in the case of a scheduled airliner. Choice of a British charter aircraft would be undesirable, since President Amin might well make difficulties for the aircraft and crew once in Uganda, and charter companies, particularly British ones, might well be very reluctant.

##### (c) RAF Aircraft

The Foreign and Commonwealth Office see serious obstacles to the proposition that an RAF aircraft might be used to fly Amin out of the UK. This, more than anything else, would arouse Commonwealth and international concern on the grounds that we were forcibly conveying a Head of State to a destination not of his own choice. There would be grave consequences for the CHGM. Difficulties and embarrassments would also be caused to our relations with other countries if we were to seek their co-operation in obtaining overflight clearance and permission to land.

Place of Detention (Paragraph 21)

Any decision to move President Amin and his party from their place of arrival in the UK to another place of detention while negotiations proceeded should only be taken in the very last resort and only for reasons of ensuring the safety of the President and his party since Commonwealth and international opinion would find it difficult to accept our action in moving him from one place to another in the UK by force. It might, of course, be possible to gain President Amin's acceptance to his removal, on grounds of personal safety, eg from demonstrators, greater comfort and convenience. But if not, ideally President Amin and his party should continue to be accommodated at the place of their arrival, and every effort should be made to make this possible, eg by the provision of the necessary security forces.

SECRET

22

Copy No. 2... of 27 copies

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1

Telephone 01-~~XXXXXX~~ 218 2111/3



For later submission  
1-14 May

SECRET

30th May 1977

MO 6/3/7

P=

What are the  
conclusions  
from the  
discussion 3/5

~~Prime Minister~~  
Kane

Dear Bob,

My Secretary of State has considered the issues raised by your letters to Patrick Wright of 26th and 27th May, and has the following comments to offer.

He is glad that the Civil Police acknowledge the problem of receiving, disarming and keeping Amin in custody while he is in this country to be a matter essentially for them. He is of course content to provide an armoured reconnaissance force, including an armoured ambulance, in a deterrent role, and in the last resort to help the Civil Police to deal with armed resistance which goes beyond that which the Police can cope with from their own resources. He is pleased to learn that an earlier request for infantry to be available at a half to one hour's notice to help the Essex Police at Stansted has now been withdrawn.

My Secretary of State accepts that, in certain circumstances, it may be desirable to divert Amin's aircraft to RAF Brize Norton; but an airfield, of whatever sort, is not an ideal place to detail anyone who is the object of intense interest by demonstrators and the Press, still less a Head of State whom we wish to treat with kid gloves. For this reason he thinks that the Civil Departments, including the Department

/ of .....

R M Morris Esq



SECRET



Page 2 of 2 pages

of the Environment, should look as a matter of urgency for locations which can be more easily isolated and are more suitable to detain Amin, - perhaps for a number of days - in a style to which, as a Head of State, he has become accustomed. Meanwhile, we are looking at a number of Defence establishments which would be better locations, from every point of view, than RAF Brize Norton as places of detention after the first 6 to 8 hours after Amin's arrival.

When an announcement is made of our intentions to exclude Amin, my Secretary of State would hope that all possible means of transporting him out of this country will be fully explored. He appreciates that there may be difficulties in persuading a civil airline to remove Amin to an intermediate airport, from which he can return to Uganda. As against this, there would be difficulties over obtaining diplomatic overflying clearances for an RAF flight. Without such diplomatic clearances, for which we shall have to declare that Amin is a passenger, an RAF flight would be impossible; and there are wider repercussions for diplomatic clearances of all other military overflights, especially over the Middle East, if we encounter criticism for ejecting Amin. My Secretary of State thinks, therefore, that all possible civil means of removing Amin from this country should be very fully explored before a military flight is considered.

Apart from these comments my Secretary of State is content with the proposals in the submission to the Home Secretary.

I am copying this letter to Patrick Wright (No 10), Ewen Fergusson (FCO), Martyn Baker (Department of Trade) and Norman Shanks (Scottish Office)

*Yours sincerely,*

*R. T. Jackling* (R/T JACKLING)

SECRET

PRIORITY

GR 275

EN CLAIR

FM LUSAKA 301200Z

UNCLASSIFIED

TO PRIORITY FCO TELNO 393 OF 30/5/77.

COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING: AMIN

1. TODAY'S TIMES OF ZAMBIA CARRIES A STRONGLY WORDED EDITORIAL ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF AMIN ATTENDING THE CHOGM. THE EDITORIAL BEGINS "THERE IS NO WAY IN WHICH IDI AMIN'S PRESENCE AT THE COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCE IN LONDON NEXT WEEK COULD BRING GLORY TO AFRICA". IT GOES ON TO REFER TO PRESIDENT KAUNDA'S RECENT CONDEMNATION OF AMIN AND FORESEES THAT IF AMIN DOES GO TO LONDON, KAUNDA "WILL NOT MINCE HIS WORDS". THE ARTICLE CONTINUES BY QUOTING THE ESTIMATES OF PEOPLE MURDERED BY AMIN RECENTLY RELEASED BY THE ICJ. IT COMMENTS THAT ALTHOUGH AMIN GAINED SOME SUPPORT AMONG YOUNG AFRICANS FOR THE WAY IN WHICH HE DEALT WITH THE ASIANS AND ISRAELIS IN UGANDA THE HERO-WORSHIP HAS TURNED INTO REVULSION.

2. AS A RESULT OF HIS EXCESSES THE ARTICLE SUGGESTS THAT AMIN SHOULD BE "CONSIDERED TO THE SAME RUBBISH DUMP AS THE FASCIST, RACIST, HITLER-WORSHIPPING VORSTER AND HIS MINION SMITH".

3. THE EDITORIAL EXPRESSES HOPE THAT IF AMIN DOES ATTEND THE CONFERENCE THE AFRICANS WILL BE UNEQUIVOCAL IN THEIR CONDEMNATION OF HIS PRESENCE. IT SUGGESTS THAT THEY SHOULD SIMPLY WALK OUT WHEN HE STANDS TO SPEAK SO AS TO AVOID THE APPEARANCE OF CONDONING HIS PRESENCE.

/4. THE

4. THE EDITORIAL THEN GOES ON TO SUGGEST THAT BRITAIN  
WOULD LIKE TO MAKE AMIN A MAJOR SUBJECT OF DISCUSSION SO AS  
TO DISTRACT ATTENTION FROM RHODESIA. AFRO-ASIAN MEMBERS  
SHOULD PREVENT THIS HAPPENING. IT CONCLUDES BY SUGGESTING THAT  
COMMONEALTH AFRICAN COUNTRIES SHOULD TRY TO APPLY PRESSURE ON HIM  
NOT TO ATTEND THROUGH HIS ARAB ALLIES.

MILES

FILES

CCD

EAD

PCD

OADS

PUSD

1977 CONF UNIT

NEWS D

PS

PS/MR JUDD

PS/LORD GORONWY-ROBERTS

PS/MR ROWLANDS

PS/MR TOMLINSON

PS/MR LUARD

PS/PUS

SIR A DUFF

MR CORTAZZI

MR MANSFIELD

MR STANLEY

MR HENNINGS

MR MURRAY

MR LEAHY

/COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET/

COPIES TO

SIR J HUNT

SIR C ROSE

CABINET OFFICE

"

"

SECRET



FILE

UZANDA  
#81

CC FCO  
MOD  
DIT  
SO  
CO

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

30 May 1977

President Amin

Thank you for your letter of 26 May with which you enclosed a copy of a submission about contingency plans in connection with President Amin. I have also seen a copy of Stephen Wall's letter of 25 May to you.

Subject to comments by the Home Secretary and other Ministers, the Prime Minister is generally content with the recommendations in the enclosure to your letter, and in particular with the recommendations in paragraphs 3, 8, 9 and 14.

The Prime Minister has noted that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Ministry of Defence are considering the question of alternative destinations, if it proved necessary to fly President Amin out of this country by R.A.F. aircraft, and would like to see further advice on this point. On the point raised in paragraph 24, namely whether further people should be brought in to detailed planning, the Prime Minister's view is that this can and should now be done.

I am copying this letter to the other recipients of yours and to Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

P. R. H. WRIGHT

R. M. Morris, Esq.,  
Home Office.

SECRET

112

From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

SECRET



HOME OFFICE  
WHITEHALL SW1A 2AP

27 May 1977

Dear Patrick

PRESIDENT AMIN

You will remember my letter yesterday mentioned the possibility of opening the COBR to deal with the landing of two non-routine Boeing 707 flights from Uganda to Stansted on 29 May.

Further information suggests that the flights will not have any sinister significance. The aircraft are booked to fly on to the United States the next day to pick up a consignment of equipment which is thereafter to be taken to Uganda. The handling agents at Stansted are being co-operative with the police in their enquiries about the cargo for the flights. This intelligence, taken together with the FCO report of President Amin's reaction to the delivery of the Prime Minister's message, has led us to believe that the balance of probability is in favour of Sunday's flights being (for these purposes) innocent. Accordingly, it is not now proposed to open the COBR or to move infantry ground troops within half an hour's driving distance of Stansted. However, all concerned remain in a high state of alert and, if our assessment of the flights' purpose changes, the original plans can be restored at very short notice.

I am sending copies of this letter to Ewen Fergusson (FCO), Roger Facer (Defence), Martyn Baker (Trade), Norman Shanks (Scottish Office) and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever  
Bob Morris

R. M. MORRIS

Patrick Wright, Esq.

SECRET

SECRET



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

27 May 1977

*Dear Patrick,*

President Amin: Contingency Plan

In his letter to you of 26 May Bob Morris enclosed copies of a submission to the Home Secretary.

Our detailed comments have not yet been seen by Dr Owen. However, in case things should happen over the weekend, I thought I should send you (on a personal basis) a copy of the draft so that you can see the kind of thing we have in mind.

It may be fairly academic in the sense that, if President Amin does arrive on Sunday, decisions may need to be taken regardless of our well laid plans.

*Yours ever*  
*Stephen*

(J. S. Wall)

Patrick Wright Esq.,  
10 Downing Street

SECRET

SECRET

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE VIEWS ON CONTINGENCY PLANS  
FOR THE POSSIBLE ARRIVAL OF PRESIDENT AMIN

Powers to Refuse Entry - Paragraph 3

1. In the Foreign and Commonwealth Office view, even if President Amin disregards the Prime Minister's message that his presence in the UK is unacceptable, and arrives with a delegation, he must be <sup>allowed, if he wishes</sup> ~~given a clear opportunity~~ to nominate a delegation to represent Uganda at the CHGM. The whole basis of the UK soundings of the Commonwealth aimed at their eventual acquiescence in Amin's personal exclusion is that Uganda <sup>should</sup> ~~cannot~~ be excluded from the CHGM. ~~The rest of the Commonwealth would simply not understand if, after they and Amin himself have been told that there is no desire to exclude a Ugandan delegation led by someone other than Amin, Uganda were not, in the event, represented, unless it were possible to demonstrate that Uganda was absent as the result of a decision by President Amin, after having been given the clear opportunity to nominate a delegation. The FCO agree that there might be difficulties if, in negotiations, President Amin were to nominate a leader or members of a delegation who were unacceptable on personal grounds, to the Home Secretary. The FCO nonetheless take the view that while, in Commonwealth interests, the only person to be excluded should ideally be Amin himself, this question should not be prejudged at this stage. But the issue of admission should rather be left to final decision if the eventuality should arise, with the aim of securing agreement with Amin in negotiation on the nomination of a delegation acceptable to both him and HMG.~~

Amin's Arrival

2. Foreign and Commonwealth Office Legal advice is to the effect that Amin's personal aircraft may be regarded, for the purposes of the Chicago Convention, as a State Aircraft. It would therefore be desirable to inform its pilot that he has no clearance to enter British airspace or to land in Britain. If the aircraft carrying President Amin were then to depart,

/there would

SECRET

there would be the risk, referred to above, that President Amin could claim that Uganda was being excluded from representation at the CHGM altogether. In these circumstances HM Government would have to make it clear to Commonwealth Member Governments, the Commonwealth Secretary-General, and probably in a public statement as well, that HM Government had denied clearance to the aircraft carrying President Amin, but remained ready to give entry to a Ugandan delegation led by a special representative appointed by President Amin.

3. ~~The FCO~~ <sup>Decide on The FCO</sup> agree that if possible an aircraft carrying President Amin should be directed to Brize Norton, or, <sup>failing that</sup> alternatively, <sup>to</sup> Heathrow. Full regard should be paid to all safety procedures. Any risk of placing an aircraft carrying President Amin, and his entourage, in hazard should be scrupulously avoided.

Paragraph 13

4. The action in a, b and c should be carried out with as much courtesy and discretion on the British side as possible. President Amin should be allowed to have one or two personal aides with him in his own company, even if separated from the rest of the party.

/5.



5. Contingency arrangements must be made at Stansted in case the 2 Uganda Airlines Boeings due on Sunday 29 May are carrying Amin or possibly an advance party. They should however be as discreet as possible. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office believe that troop reinforcements must be available <sup>if the relevant authorities require</sup> but everything possible should be done to minimise the risk of disclosing in advance an intention to use troops, since this could work against the Saudi recommendation that the atmosphere be kept as calm as possible at present.

#### The Departure of Amin (Paras 16-20)

6. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office are firmly of the view that every effort should be made to encourage President Amin to leave of his own accord in the aircraft by which he arrived, ~~regardless of the length of time this takes.~~ Any other alternative would present international problems for Her Majesty's Government ~~of a more difficult nature~~ than holding Amin and his party and their aircraft until he gives up and goes away.

#### 7. (a) Scheduled Service

Her Majesty's Government might cause serious embarrassment to the Government of the destination of a scheduled aircraft, since we would in effect be forcibly deporting the Head of a State to that destination. In those circumstances we would be bound to consult the foreign government concerned urgently, and we would have to contemplate the possibility of a refusal. The possibility of President Amin agreeing to leave ~~unwillingly~~ on a scheduled service would presumably not arise since if he were willing to go he could go in his own aircraft. The only airlines with a scheduled service to Uganda are Sabena, Air France and Ethiopian Airways. It is highly unlikely that these airlines would agree to carry President Amin if he were travelling against his will, and at the very  
/least

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

SECRET

least they might wish to consult their governments. Her Majesty's Government would certainly have to do so in the case of friendly governments, such as the Belgian, French and German.

(b) Charter Aircraft

Similar problems apply as in the case of a scheduled airliner. Choice of a British charter aircraft would be undesirable, since President Amin might well make difficulties for the aircraft and crew once in Uganda, and charter companies, particularly British ones, might well be very reluctant.

(c) RAF Aircraft

The Foreign and Commonwealth Office see serious obstacles to the proposition that an RAF aircraft might be used to fly Amin out of the UK. This, more than anything else, would arouse Commonwealth and international concern on the grounds that we were forcibly conveying a Head of State to a destination not of his own choice. There would be grave consequences for the CHGM. Difficulties and embarrassments would also be caused to our relations with other countries if we were to seek their co-operation in obtaining overflight clearance and permission to land.

/Place of Detention

SECRET

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

SECRET

Place of Detention (para 21)

8. Any decision to move President Amin and his party from their place of arrival in the UK to another place of detention while negotiations proceeded should only be taken in the very last resort and only for reasons of ensuring the safety of the President and his party since Commonwealth and international opinion would find it difficult to accept our action in moving him from one place to another in the UK by force. It might, of course, be possible to gain President Amin's acceptance to his removal, on grounds of personal safety, eg from demonstrators, greater comfort and convenience. But <sup>if not</sup> ideally President Amin and his party should continue to be accommodated at the place of their arrival, and ~~that~~ every effort should be made to make this possible, eg by the provision of the necessary security forces.

SECRET

IMMEDIATE  
CYPHER CAT A

*Prime Minister*

*Ph*  
*7/5*

FM PARIS 271715Z

SECRET

DESKBY 280900Z

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 532 OF 27 MAY 1977  
YOUR TELNO 319 : PRESIDENT AMIN AND THE COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF  
GOVERNMENT MEETING

1. WE TOLD THE QUAI D'ORSAY THIS AFTERNOON THAT YOU WERE GRATEFUL  
FOR THEIR ADVICE. WE ALSO EXPLAINED WHY WE WERE USING THE SAUDIS  
AND THE DIFFICULTY OF USING OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COMMONWEALTH.

2. THE QUAI CONFIRMED THAT THEY HAD TELEGRAPHED TO KAMPALA AN  
ACCOUNT OF MY DISCUSSION WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, AND THAT THEY  
HAVE ALSO ASKED GLASBY TO PROVIDE DAILY SIT REPS. THEY AGREED TO  
INSTRUCT THEIR EMBASSY IN KAMPALA TO LET US KNOW IMMEDIATELY  
IF THEY HEARD ANYTHING TO SUGGEST THAT AMIN WAS ABOUT TO LEAVE  
FOR LONDON.

3. THE FRENCH EMBASSY IN KAMPALA HAVE JUST SENT THE QUAI A  
FRESH ASSESSMENT OF AMIN'S INTENTIONS. THE EMBASSY BELIEVE THAT:

- A. AMIN IS UNLIKELY TO TAKE REPRISALS AGAINST THE ENTIRE BRITISH  
COMMUNITY IN UGANDA IF HE IS REFUSED ENTRY TO BRITAIN FOR THE  
CHGM. BUT HE MIGHT TRY TO HOLD HOSTAGE A SMALL NUMBER OF  
BRITISH SUBJECTS (THREE OR FOUR).
- B. AMIN IS LIKELY TO CONTINUE HIS REGULAR ASSERTIONS THAT HE  
INTENDS TO COME TO THE CHGM. BUT, WHATEVER HIS REAL INTENTIONS,  
HE IS DOING THIS BECAUSE OF THE NUISANCE AND DIFFICULTY WHICH  
IT CAUSES HMG.
- C. TO THE BEST OF THE FRENCH EMBASSY'S KNOWLEDGE NO UGANDAN  
OFFICIAL, EVEN IN AMIN'S CLOSEST ENTOURAGE, IS AWARE OF HIS  
REAL INTENTIONS.

HENDERSON

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

F I L E S

HD/EAD

HD/WAD

HD/PUSD

HD/CCD

PS

PS/FUS

PS/MR ROWLANDS

PS/LORD CORONWY

ROBERTS

PS/MR LUARD

MR MANSFIELD

S E C R E T

SECRET

CR 100

PRIORITY

CYPHER CAT A

FM FCO 260950Z

D E D I P

SECRET

TO PRIORITY BRUSSELS TELNO 50 OF 26 MAY  
AND TO NAIROBI ADDIS ABABA ATHENS PARIS BERNE ROME BONN TRIPOLI  
KHARTOUM CAIRO KINSHASA.

PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR/HIGH COMMISSIONER.

PRESIDENT AMIN AND THE COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING.

1. WE ARE ANXIOUS TO HAVE THE MAXIMUM ADVANCE NOTICE OF ANY ATTEMPT  
BY PRESIDENT AMIN TO COME TO BRITAIN TO ATTEND THE CHGM SCHEDULED  
TO BEGIN ON 8 JUNE. IN PRACTICE, WE ARE LIKELY TO LEARN OF THIS  
THROUGH NEWS AGENCY REPORTS. AS AN ADDITIONAL PRECAUTION WE SHOULD  
HOWEVER BE GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD ADVISE US BY FLASH TELEGRAM OF ANY  
INFORMATION YOU MAY RECEIVE THAT PRESIDENT AMIN MAY BE ABOARD AN  
AIRCRAFT IN TRANSIT TO THE UK.

2. GRATEFUL IF HM AMBASSADORS IN BONN AND BERNE WOULD BRIEF  
FRANKFURT AND ZURICH ACCORDINGLY.

OWEN

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

F I L E S

HD/EAD

HD/WAD

HD/FUSD

HD/CCD

HD/NENAD

HD/MED

MR MANSFIELD

PS

PS/FUS

PS/MR ROWLANDS

PS/LORD GORONWY ROBERTS

PS/MR LUARD

SECRET

SECRET

No 10 DSV 16

250  
PRIORITY  
D E D I P

CYPHER/CAT A

FM FCO 260949Z

D E D I P  
SECRET

TO PRIORITY PARIS TEL NO 319 OF 26 MAY

PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR.

MY TELNO 309 AND YOUR TELNO 522 AMIN AND THE CHGM.

*Pinet Smith*  
(2 me)  
*Ph*  
27/5

1. PLEASE THANK THE QUAI FOR THE ADVICE IN YOUR TEL UNDER REFERENCE. IF YOU THINK IT DESIRABLE, YOU COULD EXPLAIN THAT WE CHOSE THE SAUDI IN PREFERENCE TO EG MOBUTU, BECAUSE THEY REPRESENT UGANDAN INTERESTS HERE AND WE HAVE REASON TO THINK THEY HAVE INFLUENCE WITH AMIN. A COMMONWEALTH CHANNEL IS NOT EXCLUDED, IF IT SHOULD BE NECESSARY AND POSSIBLE, BUT THE ISSUE IS A HIGHLY SENSITIVE ONE FOR THE COMMONWEALTH. AT YOUR DISCRETION YOU MIGHT LIKE TO ADD THAT WE DID NOT, OF COURSE, WISH TO INCREASE FRENCH DIFFICULTIES BY ASKING THEM TO ACT IN A MATTER WHICH IS ESSENTIALLY OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF THEIR PROTECTION OF BRITISH INTERESTS IN UGANDA.

2. CONCURRENTLY WITH ATTEMPTS TO DISSUADE AMIN, WE MUST PLAN FOR THE POSSIBILITY THAT HE WILL ATTEMPT TO COME TO THE UK. IT WILL BE IMPORTANT TO HAVE THE MAXIMUM ADVANCE NOTICE OF ANY SUCH ATTEMPT. WE SHALL THEREFORE BE GRATEFUL IF THE QUAI WOULD BE PREPARED TO INSTRUCT THEIR EMBASSY IN KAMPALA TO ADVISE US BY FLASH TELEGRAM OF ANY DEVELOPMENT WHICH MIGHT GIVE US FOREWARNING OF AMIN'S INTENTION. FOR THE PRESENT WE DO NOT REGARD AMIN'S PUBLIC STATEMENTS THAT HE WILL ATTEND THE CHGM AS NECESSARILY INDICATING HIS ULTIMATE INTENTIONS, ALTHOUGH AS TIME GOES ON THIS JUDGEMENT MAY HAVE TO BE MODIFIED.

SECRET

/3. WE ARE



3. WE ARE TELEGRAPHING SEPARATELY TO YOU AND CERTAIN OTHER WESTERN EUROPEAN AND AFRICAN POSTS ASKING THEM TO ADVISE BY FLASH TELEGRAM OF ANY INDICATION THAT PRESIDENT AMIN IS IN TRANSIT FOR THE UK.

4. ARE WE RIGHT IN ASSUMING THAT THE QUAI HAVE INFORMED THE FRENCH EMBASSY IN KAMPALA, AND GLASBY, OF THE CONTENTS OF OUR TEL UNDER REFERENCE?

OWEN

FILES

HD/EAD

HD/WAD

HD/PUSD

HD/CCD

MR MANSFIELD

PS

PS/PUS

PS/MR ROWLANDS

PS/LORD GORONWY ROBERTS

PS/MR LUARD

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

- 2 -

SECRET

Prime Minister 1.

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

26 May 1977

Dear Patrick,

President Amin and the CHGM

The Saudi Ambassador called on Dr. Owen at our request this evening.

The Ambassador gave Dr. Owen an account of the Saudi emissary's meeting with President Amin, on the lines you described in your letter to me.

The only additional point to emerge was that President Amin mentioned at one stage that he would like to visit Saudi Arabia again, although it does not seem to have been absolutely clear that this would be as an alternative to coming to London.

The Saudi Ambassador said that their Chargé in Kampala was confident that President Amin would not come to the CHGM. The Ambassador thought that we should leave President Amin room to manoeuvre by not saying anything about our message or the Saudi intervention in the debate tomorrow. President Amin apparently complained to the Saudis about the treatment given him by our press, particularly the accusation that he was responsible for the deaths of many Christians. He cited the example of various of his assistants who were both Christian and alive. U

Jaws even  
Stephen

(J. S. Wall)

P. R. H. Wright Esq.,  
10 Downing Street,  
LONDON SW1

CONFIDENTIAL





From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY  
**SECRET**

Prime Minister 1 15  
2 Submissions on President A  
HOME OFFICE *fa*  
WHITEHALL SW1A 2AP 26.5.

26 May 1977

*Dear Patricia*

*Agree,  
Don't further advise  
on Para 19 if there is shld. fly  
And if he arrives,  
As report Para. 24, because many  
more people in.*

PRESIDENT AMIN

You asked for details of contingency plans to cope with the possible arrival of President Amin. In the circumstances, it seems the best thing I can do is enclose a copy of a comprehensive submission which has come forward for the Home Secretary this evening. *27/5*

The only point I might usefully add is that we have received advance notice of two apparently non-routine Boeing 707 flights from Uganda to Stansted on Sunday, 29 May. The Essex police will make arrangements to receive these flights in accordance with the contingency plans in case they are for President Amin and his party. Unless further information justifies our treating the flights as not suspect it seems likely that the COBR will be brought into operation for their landing. The imminence of these flights gives additional urgency, of course, to the questions for Ministerial decision at the end of the submission.

I am sending copies of this letter to Ewen Fergusson (FCO), Roger Facer (Defence), Martyn Baker (Department of Trade) and Norman Shanks (Scottish Office).

*Yours ever*

*Bob Morris*

R. M. MORRIS

Patrick Wright, Esq.

**SECRET**

*[Handwritten signature]*

CONFIDENTIAL

## THE EXCLUSION OF PRESIDENT AMIN

Our instructions are:

- (1) to draw up a plan to ensure Amin's exclusion;
- (2) to cover action to be taken if Amin lands without prior authority;
- (3) to ensure that no hotel in London accepts bookings for Amin.

### Powers to refuse entry

2. We are advised that the Home Secretary has the legal right and power to refuse Amin permission to enter the United Kingdom. It is proposed that the exercise of the power would take the form of a personal decision by the Home Secretary to refuse permission on the ground that that refusal is conducive to the public good. There is no appeal against such a decision. It is desirable for this decision to be embodied in a document signed by the Home Secretary.

3. The Prime Minister has informed President Amin that, while a visit from him would not be appropriate, and his entry would not be permitted, a Ugandan delegation led by a special representative other than Amin would be accepted. None the less, there would be considerable practical difficulties about sorting out a delegation arriving with Amin, permitting some to enter but refusing Amin (and perhaps others). Ministers are therefore asked to agree that, if Amin arrives with a delegation, the whole delegation should be excluded, unless the Ugandan Government have given notice before hand to the Commonwealth Secretary General of the composition of a delegation excluding Amin or unless, while the party is here, an acceptable delegation without Amin is named. In either of those cases the proposal would be to permit the entry of persons named as members of the delegation and exclude Amin and

SECRET

the rest. If any members of the party are Ministers of the Ugandan Government, and they are to be returned, the Home Secretary will need to sign a direction removing their exemption from immigration control.

#### Amin's arrival

4. We have considered three basic scenarios:

- i) Amin's intention to come is known and his arrival is anticipated.
- ii) Amin arrives by one of the regular Uganda Airline flights to Stansted.
- iii) Amin manages to arrive unexpectedly either by a scheduled service (other than Uganda Airline flight to Stansted) or by arriving without notice in his own private aircraft.

5. All possible steps are being taken through diplomatic channels to obtain intelligence about Amin's intention and plans.

6. The National Air Traffic Services (NATS) will notify all flights originating from Uganda; any which do not conform with Uganda Airline flights notified to the handling agents at Stansted will be the subject of special attention.

7. A Uganda Airline flight duly notified in advance to Stansted in the normal way will be allowed to land at Stansted. This will apply to two Boeing 707 flights notified for arrival on Sunday, 29 May which do not appear to be routine commercial flights. Essex Police will be informed by the handling agents at Stansted of the expected arrival of all such flights and will ensure that these are suitably met by police on arrival, just in case Amin should be on board. If this were the case, the arrangements described below would then come into force.

SECRET

78 | 8. If Amin's personal aircraft - whose details and registration letters are known - is reported to NATS, it will be interrogated as soon as the aircraft approaches or is discovered in British air space. The pilot will be told that he has no clearance to enter British air space or to land in Britain and asked to declare his intentions. This accords with normal procedures for hi-jacked aircraft. Since refusal of permission to enter British air space might be regarded as a breach of the Chicago Convention, Ministers are asked to confirm their agreement to the adoption of this procedure.

78 | 9. Any other aircraft arriving unannounced from Uganda will be queried by NATS; if there is reason to believe or suspect that Amin may be a passenger, the procedure described in paragraph 8 will be applied.

10. Once this procedure is invoked, NATS will notify the Metropolitan Police at Heathrow and the Department of Trade. The Heathrow police will be responsible for informing the Essex, Sussex and Thames Valley forces (who may all become involved, depending where the aircraft lands). The Department of Trade will inform Home Office (who will confirm the fact to the police), ECO, MOD and Cabinet Office. These Whitehall Departments will then arrange for the Cabinet Office Briefing Room (COBR) to be activated as for a terrorist incident. Cabinet Office are circulating to appropriate officials telephone numbers to facilitate the immediate activation of COBR.

11. Once NATS has notified the Metropolitan Police and Department of Trade, it will seek to maximise delays by keeping the aircraft stacked and asking details about the flight. This will give the police more time to prepare themselves.

SECRET

12. If the aircraft insists on landing, NATS will, in the interests of safety, accept it and seek to control it. The police would prefer to handle a landing at a military airfield, which has a secure perimeter and where disturbance of normal traffic can be minimised. Accordingly NATS will seek to direct the aircraft to Brize Norton, where the Thames Valley Police will be responsible for reception. If the aircraft refuses to accept direction to Brize Norton, and insists on landing at one of the London airports, it will be directed to Heathrow. This is the preferred choice if a civil airfield is necessary, as it has a strong police presence (over 70 officers immediately available) and a well-tested procedure for isolating hijacked aircraft.

13. Senior officers of the Metropolitan, Thames Valley, Essex and Sussex police forces, in consultation with the Chief Inspector of the Immigration Service and the Ministry of Defence, have agreed upon contingency plans for handling the aircraft and passengers on arrival. These are described in Appendix A to this note. The salient features of these plans are:

- a) transfer of party in small groups to points where they can be interviewed as necessary and held;
- b) segregation of Amin from the rest of the party;
- c) disarming of all armed personnel in the party.

/ 14. ...

SECRET

18  
14. Scout cars and armoured ambulances will be on stand-by, to be brought in to the appropriate airport by the quickest means available, once the arrival airport is known. If the arrival is at Brize Norton, Heathrow or Gatwick, the police are confident of their ability to contain it without the help of infantry ground troops. If the arrival is at Stansted, the Essex police would prefer to have infantry ground troops available at not more than half an hour's driving distance from Stansted. If this is to be put in hand before an announcement, and the troops are called out as a result of a false alarm - the arrival of a suspect aircraft which does not in the event contain Amin - the cover will have been blown and the authorities may be thought to have over-reacted. Ministers are asked to decide whether, notwithstanding these risks, to authorise the positioning of infantry ground troops on stand-by in the Stansted area.

15. It is thought that there will not be a task for the PAGODA team; but they will be at their normal three hours' notice. This is acceptable to the police. They are in any case to be brought up to London to cover the meeting of Commonwealth Heads of Government.

#### Departure of Amin

16. The first objective would be to persuade Amin to depart as soon as practicable in the aircraft by which he arrived. Only if he refused to do so should we wish to contemplate removal by the Royal Air Force, or by scheduled service or by chartered aircraft.

17. If it were possible to put Amin on to a scheduled service, this would minimise the problems. But there are no scheduled services direct from the United Kingdom to Uganda, and it would presumably be necessary to get Amin to an airport from which a scheduled service to Uganda is available.

18. There are seven or eight airlines capable of providing a chartered aircraft for this purpose. There would, however, be problems of overflying; and presumably no airline would be willing to commit an aircraft to landing in Uganda. There must be some doubt about the willingness of any civil airline to make an aircraft available for this task. No approach could be made to potential charterers until a public statement of the decision to exclude Amin had been made.

19. The RAF would not wish to fly Amin to Uganda for the sake of the safety of the aircraft and its crew. It would be necessary to agree a destination:

~~SECRET~~

possibilities are Riyadh or Zaire, but the FCO is considering alternatives. The RAF would need to obtain advance diplomatic clearance for overflying: to operate without such clearance could put clearances for normal military flights at risk. It would not be possible to count on receiving clearance from the countries concerned. Destinations which could be reached without overflying are being considered. These matters are being studied by the FCO and the MOD.

20. With a chartered or RAF aircraft, a police escort is likely to be necessary. It is part of the police plans to disarm all members of the Ugandan party once they land in the United Kingdom; their weapons will be confiscated (using Customs' powers) and for safety reasons will not be returned to the Ugandans on their departure. They could be returned via diplomatic channels once Amin and his party were back in Uganda.

#### Place of detention

21. If Amin arrives at Heathrow or another civil airport, he could be held there for up to six hours without too much difficulty. If there were any question of holding him for appreciably longer, another place of detention would have to be found to which he could be transferred by helicopter. We and the MOD are considering a number of possible locations, both civil and military, including RAF Brize Norton. In addition MOD are examining urgently with Thames Valley police whether it would be possible to isolate Amin in a secure area of RAF Brize Norton without disrupting its normal life, or causing unmanageable security problems. Once a decision has been taken as to where Amin is to be detained, the Home Office will make an order designating the site as a place of detention under the Immigration Act 1971.

#### Unheralded arrival

22. All notified arrivals from Uganda to Stansted will be covered by precautionary arrangements made by the Essex Police, so that, if Amin is an unannounced passenger on any of them, appropriate action can be taken.

23. We have to anticipate the possibility that Amin's aircraft may land somewhere of its own choosing, in defiance of NATS, even in Scotland. To cover this possibility, or the possibility of his arriving by a scheduled service, once an announcement of the decision to exclude Amin has been made, the Immigration and Customs Service will be put on notice that the Home Secretary has decided that Amin should be refused permission to enter, and will be advised to consult their local chief officer of police as to what to do if

SECRET

he should arrive. Copies of the contingency plan prepared by the Metropolitan, Thames Valley, Essex and Sussex police forces will also be circulated to chief constables throughout Great Britain. To prepare for the possibility of Amin arriving at Prestwick, Turnhouse or Renfrew, the chief constables of Strathclyde and Lothian and the Borders are in contact on a contingency basis with G.O.C. Scotland. If the COBR had not been activated as a result of notification from NATS, it would be activated the moment news of Amin's arrival was received in Whitehall.

Timing of announcement

24. Contingency planning has so far been confined to the departments concerned and senior officers of the police forces named in the preceding paragraph. It is now being extended to the British Airports Authority. We have reached the point where detailed planning cannot be taken further without involving many more people and imminent risk of premature disclosure. We recognise that there are other political considerations to be taken into account; but, from the point of view of having all these plans completely prepared and ready for rapid and efficient activation, the sooner it can be announced that Amin will not be permitted to enter, the better.

Police : mutual support

25. The Metropolitan Police and the Sussex Police are satisfied that they could carry out an operation without calling on other forces for support. The Thames Valley Police and the Essex Police would need some support from the Metropolitan Police, in the event of an operation at Brize Norton or at Stansted. That support has been agreed and arranged. It seems probable that, if Amin landed anywhere else than Brize Norton, Heathrow, Stansted or Gatwick, the local force would need some support. Arrangements have been made to ensure that any request for such support would be dealt with immediately and the support organised with the least possible delay.

Hotel bookings

26. Inquiries that have been made disclose no indication of hotel bookings for Amin and his party in London, or in the neighbourhoods of Stansted or Gatwick. Nor is there any indication of attempts to book cars for transporting Amin from an aircraft to London. Once an announcement of the decision to exclude Amin had been made, it would be easier to keep these inquiries up to date and to make provision for finding out if any attempts to make bookings are being made.



ONS 27. Ministers are invited:

- i) to approve the contingency plans described in this note;
- ii) specifically, to agree that, if Amin arrives with a delegation, the whole party shall be refused entry, unless the Ugandan Government has given advance notice of the composition of a delegation, or unless, while the party is here, an acceptable delegation without Amin is named, in which case members of the delegation should be allowed to enter and Amin and others refused;
- iii) specifically, to agree that Amin's personal aircraft or any suspicious flight from Uganda should be refused clearance to enter British air space or to land in Britain by NATS, notwithstanding anything in the Chicago Convention to the contrary;
- iv) to decide whether personnel and vehicles of the armed services should be on call within half an hour's driving time of Stansted by 5.00 pm on Sunday 29 May;
- v) to note the desirability, on planning grounds, of an early announcement of the decision to exclude Amin.

Home Office SW1  
26 May 1977

SECRET

Our ref: CR 221/77/16

23rd May, 1977

OPERATION "BOTTLE"

It is suggested that this plan form the basis of contingency planning in the event of President AMIN of Uganda and a party of up to 250, of whom 40 could be armed, attempting to enter the country to attend the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference which will be held between 8th and 16th June, 1977, at Lancaster House, London. H.M.G. will be asked to make a clear and unequivocal statement to President AMIN that he and his party are not welcome and will not be allowed to land.

1. In order to obtain as much co-ordinated intelligence as possible, all Police Forces are asked to inform the Metropolitan Police Special Branch, who have agreed to act as a central collecting and disseminating point, of any information.
2. Air Traffic Control will be asked to co-operate by causing the maximum delay whilst the aircraft is in the air and an indication will be given by them to the President and his party that they are not welcome. An attempt should be made by A.T.C. to divert the aircraft to a military airfield, probably R.A.F. Brize Norton, Oxfordshire. (Immigration Officers from Heathrow will be escorted by Police if necessary to Brize Norton.) Force contingency plan for informing Deputy Assistant Commissioner 'A' Department (Operations) and other senior officers will be put into operation.
3. Maximum delay should be exercised once the aircraft is on the ground in order to enable the ground contingency plan to be put into operation and Immigration and Air Traffic Control will be asked to co-operate to delay any attempt by AMIN and the party to disembark at this stage.

SECRET

4. The aircraft will be directed to a specified designated holding point in order that secure communication by an adapted inter-face land-line may be effected.
5. Any plan should contain a degree of flexibility in the event that President AMIN refuses to go to a designated block.
6. Air Traffic Control will remain in contact with the aircraft at this stage and in accordance with normal emergency procedures a Police Liaison Officer will be with Air Traffic Control.
7. The initial contact would be by the Duty Uniform Inspector and any conversation by telephone or radio must be secure. It would be important at this stage that as much information relating to President AMIN's reaction to this initial negotiation, and his intentions, be obtained.
8. Inner and outer cordons would need to be placed in position with Police marksmen at a distance (snipers) and uniformed officers employed as a close inner cordon. Any arms carried must be concealed. Officers in an exposed position will be equipped with protective clothing.
9. The following will be deployed:-
  - a) 70 Airport Division uniformed officers for initial response;
  - b) anti-terrorist dog section;
  - c) three units of Special Patrol Group (to be used for disarming procedures);
  - d) D.11 firearms squad (sniper positions);
  - e) C.7 (Technical Support) including Explosives' Officers;
  - f) C.13 Anti-Terrorist Squad.

Command and Control will be exercised from Operations Room of Airport Division, and mobile Incident Van.
10. If a stand off situation developed, C.O.B.R., which would be activated, would take any political decisions necessary. Police would maintain a holding operation.
11. An Immigration Officer or Foreign and Commonwealth official should explain the legal position to the Captain of the aircraft.

12. DISEMBARKATION

Small airport coaches to be used where possible; police vehicles not to be used. If civilian drivers refuse to drive coaches, consideration be given to police drivers driving the coaches to V.I.P. and non-V.I.P. areas. President AMIN and his immediate party should, if possible, be separated from the main body of the party.

13. Military assistance in the form of ~~armoured~~<sup>scout</sup> cars and an armoured ambulance to be on stand by, at a discreet rendezvous point in the vicinity.

14. Disarming of the party should be carried out in secure surroundings by experienced officers once President AMIN and his party have left the aircraft and before entering any lounges. President AMIN should be disarmed last.

15. Political discussions and negotiations should be carried out by Foreign and Commonwealth Office officials and Immigration Officers whose negotiators should be available at the Reception Lounges.

16. Consideration should be given at an early stage, particularly if more than an 8-hours wait is involved, to transferring the whole party to a ~~military airport~~<sup>more appropriate</sup> location. (By this time it can be anticipated that press and public demonstrations at a civil airport would be extensive. A press conference should not be permitted without Government authority.)

17. If it is agreed to transfer the party to Brize Norton three units of Special Patrol Group will be made available to Chief Constable Thames Valley for initial security as agreed.

18. Weapons will not be passed back to Ugandans at any stage whilst they are in this country.

SECRET

~~Subject~~

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T113/77

CONFIDENTIAL



*W. G. A. G.*

cc to Saudi Arab  
Prince Fahd Visit. Pt

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

26 May 1977

*His Royal Highness*

I have today heard from your Ambassador, following the return from Uganda of your emissary, and I would like to thank Your Royal Highness again for your agreement to help in this matter, and for the speed with which the mission was carried out.

I hope very much, as I know you do, that the mission will prove to have been successful. We shall, for our part, do everything to ensure, in so far as we can, that the atmosphere is favourable for the right decision to be taken.

May I also take this opportunity of telling Your Royal Highness how much I enjoyed our conversations last Sunday and I hope we can repeat them before too long. I hope that your visit to Washington, and your talks with President Carter, went well.

*With warm regards*

*James Callaghan*

*Jim Callaghan*

His Royal Highness Prince Fahd bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud

CONFIDENTIAL



*Hyderabad*

10 DOWNING STREET


Pinner Minto

I attach a copy of  
a letter I have just  
written to the FCO  
reporting on the Saudi  
visit to Kampala.

*Ph*  
26/5

(A copy of your letter to  
Amir is behind)

CONFIDENTIAL



FILE

cc CO

10 DOWNING STREET

cc Home Office

From the Private Secretary

26 May 1977

President Amin and the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting

The Saudi Arabian Ambassador telephoned me at 1300 today to say that the Saudi emissary who had been to Kampala to deliver the Prime Minister's message to President Amin had just returned to London.

The Prime Minister's letter had been delivered to President Amin at 1700 yesterday, in the course of celebrations to mark Africa Day. In response to my question, the Ambassador told me that the message had been delivered after the speech by President Amin during which he had reiterated his intention to come to London "accompanied by some members of the British reserve forces" as his bodyguards.

The Ambassador told me that the meeting had gone well, and that President Amin had apparently liked the Prime Minister's letter, though for some reason he had taken exception to the phrase: "if you can see your way" in the last paragraph. President Amin had told the Saudi emissary more than once that the Saudis "should not get worried about the situation". He had said that he would not make any declaration now, but would make one before the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting. I asked the Ambassador how he interpreted this. He replied that he interpreted it "in the right way".

/ The Ambassador

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

The Ambassador said that he believed everything would be all right, but expressed the strong hope that we would do everything possible to keep the atmosphere cordial and to give President Amin room to back down.

The Ambassador told me that the conversation with President Amin had lasted for about half an hour, but had covered other subjects and there was nothing further of interest for him to report. He said that if we wished to contact him further about it, he would be available in London until tomorrow afternoon, when he flies to Geneva to join Prince Fahd. I said that the Prime Minister would certainly wish me to pass on to him and Prince Fahd his thanks for the role which the Saudis had played in this affair.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

PRHW

J. S. Wall, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

26 May 1977



Dear Patrick,

President Amin and the CHGM

The Saudi Ambassador called on Dr. Owen at our request this evening.

The Ambassador gave Dr. Owen an account of the Saudi emissary's meeting with President Amin, on the lines you described in your letter to me.

The only additional point to emerge was that President Amin mentioned at one stage that he would like to visit Saudi Arabia again, although it does not seem to have been absolutely clear that this would be as an alternative to coming to London.

The Saudi Ambassador said that their Chargé in Kampala was confident that President Amin would not come to the CHGM. The Ambassador thought that we should leave President Amin room to manoeuvre by not saying anything about our message or the Saudi intervention in the debate tomorrow. President Amin apparently complained to the Saudis about the treatment given him by our press, particularly the accusation that he was responsible for the deaths of many Christians. He cited the example of various of his assistants who were both Christian and alive.

Yours ever,  
Stephen

(J. S. Wall)

P. R. H. Wright Esq.,  
10 Downing Street,  
LONDON SW1

CONFIDENTIAL

1957

Prime Minister

Mr. Wright thinks you may be interested  
in the attached report of developments in  
Uganda.

John P. Wesley

Duty Clerk

25/5

BRITISH UGANDANS TO GET AMIN LECTURE

NAIROBI, WEDNESDAY - ALL UGANDAN CITIZENS OF BRITISH ORIGIN WERE TODAY INSTRUCTED TO ASSEMBLE AT THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE CENTRE IN KAMPALA ON FRIDAY FOR A LECTURE CONNECTED WITH PRESIDENT AMIN'S PLANNED TRIP TO LONDON FOR THE COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCE. UGANDA RADIO REPORTED.


THEY ARE TO BE LECTURED BY THE CHIEF OF PROTOCOL ON 'PRESIDENTIAL PROTOCOL AND SECURITY' IN CONNECTION WITH PRESIDENT AMIN'S PLANNED ATTENDANCE AT THE CONFERENCE OF COMMONWEALTH LEADERS IN LONDON. THE RADIO ADDED.

REFERRING TO 'ALL BRITISH UGANDANS WHO ARE NOW UGANDAN CITIZENS,' UGANDA RADIO SAID THEY SHOULD REPORT TO THE CONFERENCE CENTRE BY 11 AM ON FRIDAY.

AFTER THE MEETING, FINAL ARRANGEMENTS WOULD BE MADE FOR MEMBERS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL PARTY GOING TO LONDON. THE RADIO SAID, CONFIRMING THAT FIELD MARSHAL AMIN INTENDS TO ATTEND THE COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCE DESPITE BRITISH OBJECTIONS.

1958

PRIME MINISTER



Cabinet : Foreign Affairs

*Confidential Plans.*  
*Warning.*  
*to ~~Employees~~ and*  
*Citizens*

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary proposes to say a word at Cabinet tomorrow about President Amin, unless you would prefer him not to. The present position (at 1800 on 25 May) is that we still await a report from the Saudis on whether their emissary, who arrived in Kampala today, was able to see President Amin in order to deliver your message. A copy of your message is attached to this note.

25 May 1977

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. 7/11/77  
10 DOWNING STREET

cc' General Arabian  
pt 3  
(Fahd Vint)

22 May 1977

THE PRIME MINISTER

You will be aware of the public concern that has been expressed in Parliament and more generally in Britain about reports suggesting that you may be planning to come to this country next month. This concern which is shared by Her Majesty's Government would undoubtedly grow if it seemed likely that these reports might be proved correct.

Accordingly, I have decided to address this personal letter to your Excellency.

In consideration of what has followed since diplomatic relations between Britain and Uganda were severed in July 1976, a personal visit from you would set back even further any future developments between our two countries. As it is the desire of Her Majesty's Government that relations between Uganda and Britain should not be unnecessarily harmed, I must inform your Excellency that a visit from you would not be appropriate, and that Her Majesty's Government would be obliged therefore not to permit your entry to the country.

Her Majesty's Government would be ready to accept a delegation from Uganda if you can see your way to appointing a special representative to lead it. Such a delegation would receive all the normal courtesies and attentions accorded to delegations which visit this country.

His Excellency Al-Hajji,

Field Marshal, Dr. Idi Amin Dada, VC, DSO, MC.

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

17



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

25 May 1977

*Thw*  
*24/5*

*ps*

President Amin and the CHGM

I understand from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office representatives at the meeting in the Home Office on 24 May to discuss the preparation of a plan of action within this country should President Amin attempt to come here, that a submission is to be made to your Ministers to the effect that further detailed planning cannot be carried forward without spreading knowledge of the contingency planning more widely, which carried the danger that there may be some leakage to the press.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary will in due course have views on the substance of the planning arrangements which are now being contemplated, and I understand that he will have an opportunity to comment when an outline plan is circulated by the Home Secretary. However, in advance of that, Dr. Owen would like the Home Secretary to be aware of his view that we should do nothing at this juncture which increases the risk of a leakage of the fact that we are drawing up these plans. The Saudi Arabian Government will very shortly deliver a message from the Prime Minister to President Amin, and in doing so have undertaken to try to persuade him not to come here. The Saudis have said that their action would be greatly helped by a generally quiet atmosphere, unaccompanied by any press campaign against President Amin. Leakage of our contingency arrangements, or merely the fact that we were embarking upon them, would be sure to raise the temperature and thus make the Saudi task more difficult.

Dr. Owen would therefore be grateful if discussion of these arrangements could continue to be kept within the narrowest circle possible at this stage. We should know the outcome of the Saudis' mission within the next few days, which should give time for further action.

I am copying this letter to Patrick Wright at No. 10.

(J. S. Wall)

R. M. Morris Esq.,  
Home Office,  
Whitehall,  
LONDON SW1

SECRET

2  
OPS 230

SECRET

IMMEDIATE  
CYPHER CAT A

FM PARIS 241707Z

SECRET

DESKBY 241800Z

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 522 OF 24 MAY 1977  
INFO IMMEDIATE NAIROBI (PERSONAL FOR HIGH COMMISSIONER)

YOUR TELNO 309: PRESIDENT AMIN AND THE CHGM

I HAVE DISCUSSED THIS WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL AT THE FOREIGN  
MINISTRY AND THE DIRECTOR FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS, M GEORGY.

2. THE STARTING POINT FOR THEIR ADVICE IS THAT AMIN IS QUITE UN-  
PREDICTABLE. THEY SUPPOSE THAT WE MUST HAVE GOOD REASONS FOR USING  
THE SAUDIS AS A MEANS OF DISSUADING AMIN FROM GOING TO LONDON. THE  
VIEW OF THE QUAI IS THAT WE STILL HAVE A NUMBER OF MEANS OF  
DISSUASION AND THAT MORE USE MIGHT BE MADE OF THEM. IN PARTICULAR  
THEY REFERRED TO OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COMMONWEALTH AND TO MOBUTU  
WHOM THEY THINK HAS SOME INFLUENCE WITH AMIN.

3. AS REGARDS THE IDEA OF A WARNING TO THE REMAINING MEMBERS OF THE  
BRITISH COMMUNITY IN UGANDA THE QUAI TAKE THE LINE THAT THEY HAVE  
ALREADY HAD PLENTY OF WARNINGS OF THE RISKS THEY RUN. THEY ARE THERE-  
FORE GOING TO BE VERY DIFFICULT TO PERSUADE TO LEAVE. WHILE ALLOWING  
FOR AMIN'S UNPREDICTABILITY THE FRENCH DO NOT THINK THAT HE WILL  
NECESSARILY GO IN FOR SAVAGE REPRISALS AGAINST BRITISH PEOPLE AS A  
RESULT OF BEING DENIED ATTENDANCE AT THE CHGM. THEY TEND TO THE VIEW  
THAT HE IS MORE LIKELY TO GO IN FOR THE CREATION OF SOME NEW FABLE  
CONCERNING HIMSELF. THE FRENCH SEE A WARNING, WHICH THEY BELIEVE  
WOULD BECOME KNOWN THROUGHOUT UGANDA ALMOST INSTANTANEOUSLY, AS  
BEING A LAST-DITCH MEANS OF DISSUASION ON AMIN. IT MIGHT THEY THINK  
CAUSE HIM TO LOSE FACE LESS THAN AN OPEN REFUSAL ADDRESSED TO HIM  
DIRECT.

SECRET

/ 4. THE

SECRET

4. THE QUAI D'ORSAY WILL ASK GLASBY TO PROVIDE BRIEF SITREPS DAILY AS YOU REQUEST,

HENDERSON

[COPIES SENT TO NO.10 DOWNING STREET]

F I L E S:

HEAD EAD

HEAD WED

HEAD CONSULAR DEPT

HEAD CCD

HEAD PUSD

PS

PS/PUS

PS/MR ROWLANDS

PS/LORD GORONWY ROBERTS

PS/MR LUARD

SIR A. DUFF

MR STANLEY

MR MANSFIELD

MR HAWLEY

- 2 -

SECRET



10 DOWNING STREET

*has seen*  
PRIME MINISTER

*FSK PM  
22-5-77*

You will recall that the Foreign Secretary recommended to you in paragraph 9 of the attached minute that there would be an advantage in your making it clear in Question Time today that we are prepared to welcome a Ugandan delegation to the CHGM, while expressing the hope that in the interests of the Commonwealth President Amin would himself decide not to attend.

*Pw.*

24 May 1977



13  
SECRET

FLASH

GRPS 350

CYPHER CAT A

FM F C O 231945Z

DEDIP

SECRET

DESKBY 240600Z (NAIROBI)

TO FLASH PARIS TELEGRAM NO 309 OF 23 MAY  
INFO IMMEDIATE NAIROBI (PERSONAL FOR HIGH COMMISSIONER).

PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR

PRESIDENT AMIN AND THE CHGM

1. I WARNED M. DE GUIRINGAUD AT LEEDS CASTLE OF THE STRONG POSSIBILITY, INDEED PROBABILITY, THAT WE WILL HAVE TO DENY ENTRY TO PRESIDENT AMIN, AND SPOKE TO HIM ABOUT THE QUESTION OF WARNING THE BRITISH COMMUNITY IN UGANDA OF THE HEIGHTENED RISKS TO WHICH THEY MAY NOW BE EXPOSED. I ADDED THAT WE ARE STILL HOPING TO DISSUADE PRESIDENT AMIN FROM ATTENDING AND WE WISHED TO AVOID ANY POSSIBILITY OF PROVOKING HIM DURING THE PERIOD OF DISSUASION.

2. PLEASE NOW FOLLOW UP MY CONVERSATION BY SPEAKING TO M. DE GUIRINGAUD OR, IF THIS IS NOT POSSIBLE, AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL IN THE QUAI WHICH YOU CONSIDER APPROPRIATE, ON THE LINES OF THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS.

3. WE WILL NOT ALLOW AMIN TO COME TO BRITAIN BUT WE ARE DOING EVERYTHING WE CAN VIA THE SAUDIS TO DISSUADE AMIN FROM COMING: THIS INFORMATION MUST BE KEPT VERY CONFIDENTIAL.

SECRET

/4. IN

4. IN CONSIDERING THE PROBLEM, WE HAVE PROVISIONALLY CONCLUDED THAT A WARNING EXERCISE AMONG THE BRITISH COMMUNITY AT THIS STAGE WOULD SOON COME TO THE NOTICE OF AMIN AND RUN A REAL RISK OF PROVOKING A CRISIS OF THE KIND WE HOPE TO AVOID. WE ALSO RECOGNISE THAT THE BRITISH COMMUNITY HAVE CHOSEN TO STAY IN UGANDA DESPITE THE CONTINUING RISKS AND UNCERTAINTIES INVOLVED IN LIVING THERE. FURTHERMORE, IN VIEW OF THE PUBLICITY THROUGH THE BBC AND IN THE PRESS ABOUT AMIN AND THE CHGM, AND THE WARNINGS ALREADY GIVEN ON A CONTINUING BASIS, BRITISH PEOPLE IN UGANDA SHOULD BE GENERALLY AWARE THAT THE COMING PERIOD MAY BE A PARTICULARLY DIFFICULT ONE.

5. WE MAY HAVE TO ASK THE FRENCH TO INSTRUCT THEIR EMBASSY IN KAMPALA, AND THE BRITISH INTERESTS SECTION, TO MOUNT AN URGENT WARNING EXERCISE, BUT IN THE MEANTIME WE SHOULD BE MOST GRATEFUL TO HAVE ANY VIEWS WHICH THE QUAI CAN URGENTLY PASS ON TO US ABOUT THE ATMOSPHERE IN UGANDA; WHETHER ANY WARNING COULD BE KEPT QUIET; AND THE LIKELY OUTCOME OF ANY SUCH WARNING.

6. WE WOULD LIKE THE BEST ASSESSMENT WHICH THE FRENCH CAN MAKE BY TOMORROW EVENING. IN ADDITION COULD THEY PLEASE ASK GLASBY TO LET US HAVE A BRIEF SITREP DAILY UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE.

OWEN

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

**F I L E S**

HD/EAD  
HD/WED  
HD/CONS D  
HD/CCD  
HD/PUSD  
PS  
PS/PUS  
PS/MR ROWLANDS

PS/LORD GORONWY  
ROBERTS

PS/MR LUARD  
SIR A DUFF  
MR STANLEY  
MR MANSFIELD  
MR HAWLEY

*Uganda*




MOTION TO BE DEBATED FRIDAY 27 MAY 1977

Mr. Michael Brotherton

To call attention to the need  
to exclude the President of Uganda  
from the United Kingdom; and to move  
a resolution.

22 May 1977

CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

22 May 1977

Dear Stephen.

President Amin and the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting

The Prime Minister has seen the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's minute of today's date about President Amin and the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting.

The Prime Minister agreed with Dr. Owen's view that there would be advantage in asking the Saudis to deliver a message to President Amin this week, and I enclose the relevant extract of the note of the Prime Minister's meeting this afternoon with Prince Fahd of Saudi Arabia, during which, as you will see, the Prime Minister handed over to the Saudi Ambassador the original of his letter. This was itself an amended version of the draft enclosed with your letter of 20 May to me.

The Prime Minister has noted the line which the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary has recommended in paragraph 8 of his minute for the debate on Friday 27 May, but has commented that we will need to consider this further in the light of developments this week.

I am sending a copy of this letter, together with a copy of the enclosure, to John Stevens (Lord President's Office), Bob Morris (Home Office) and to Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

Yours  
David High

J.S. Wall, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT

PRIME MINISTER



cc Home Office

cc Saudi Arabian  
PT 3  
(Fahel Vinti)

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. 7/11/77  
10. DOWNING STREET

22 May 1977

THE PRIME MINISTER

You will be aware of the public concern that has been expressed in Parliament and more generally in Britain about reports suggesting that you may be planning to come to this country next month. This concern which is shared by Her Majesty's Government would undoubtedly grow if it seemed likely that these reports might be proved correct.

Accordingly, I have decided to address this personal letter to your Excellency.

In consideration of what has followed since diplomatic relations between Britain and Uganda were severed in July 1976, a personal visit from you would set back even further any future developments between our two countries. As it is the desire of Her Majesty's Government that relations between Uganda and Britain should not be unnecessarily harmed, I must inform your Excellency that a visit from you would not be appropriate, and that Her Majesty's Government would be obliged therefore not to permit your entry to the country.

Her Majesty's Government would be ready to accept a delegation from Uganda if you can see your way to appointing a special representative to lead it. Such a delegation would receive all the normal courtesies and attentions accorded to delegations which visit this country.

His Excellency Al-Hajji,

Field Marshal, Dr. Idi Amin Dada, VC, DSO, MC.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Top Copy on Saudi Arabia &  
(Fahd Visits)

NOTE OF A DISCUSSION AFTER THE PRIME MINISTER'S LUNCH FOR THE  
FIRST DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER OF SAUDI ARABIA AT CHEQUERS ON  
SUNDAY, 22 MAY 1977

---

Present:-

The Prime Minister	H.R.H. Prince Fahd bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud
Mr. Frank Judd, MP	H.R.H. Prince Saud bin Faisal Al Saud
Mr. P.R.H. Wright	H.E. Sheikh Faisal Alhegelan
	Mr. Mahmud Malhas

Uganda

After some introductory remarks, the Prime Minister said that he would like first to discuss the question of President Amin, which the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary had discussed with Prince Fahd on 20 May.

The Prime Minister said that the British Government wished to do nothing which would harm the unity of the Commonwealth, since we regarded the Commonwealth as a force for good in the world. He therefore believed that any decision to be taken about President Amin's attendance at the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting must be a British decision, and we did not wish to associate any other Commonwealth Government with it, although he was aware from the tour of the Commonwealth by his representative (Lord Thomson) that nearly all Commonwealth leaders, if not all, would be relieved if President Amin decided not to attend the Commonwealth Meeting. He did not wish to cause difficulties for other Commonwealth Governments, particularly since some African leaders might construe this as unwelcome white pressure on a black President. The Government was being pressed both by the Opposition and by their own Party in Parliament to make a public statement confirming that we would not receive President Amin here.

The Prime Minister said that, if Prince Fahd would assist him, he would like to give President Amin the opportunity to state publicly that he would not come to London. He therefore proposed

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

to send President Amin a personal letter. After describing the content of the letter, the Prime Minister said that he did not propose to publicise it, and added that the invitation to the Ugandans to send a delegation headed by a representative, rather than by President Amin himself, would be in accordance with Ugandan practice at previous Commonwealth Heads of Government Meetings.

Prince Fahd said that he believed that, so long as President Amin was not welcome, it would not be in his interest to attend the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting. It would be quite possible for the Saudis, since they were in charge of United Kingdom relations with Uganda, to convey this information to him and at the same time to try to convince him that it was not in his interest to attend. The Prime Minister expressed his gratitude, and asked Prince Fahd to add that it was not his desire to expose President Amin to public embarrassment or ridicule. If President Amin was ready to deal with the question quietly and privately, he would himself respond in the same way. Prince Fahd expressed appreciation.

The Prime Minister said that there was to be a debate in the House of Commons on 27 May which was likely to be very difficult for the Government. It would therefore be very helpful if his letter could be conveyed to President Amin by then, and also if a reply, or at least some intimation of his response, could have been received by then. Prince Fahd said that he thought the Saudis should be able to convey the letter within the next day or two and would certainly try to obtain a speedy reply on whether President Amin would attend the Meeting or not. The Saudis might arrange for the letter to be conveyed by a representative of their Embassy in London, and could immediately send a telegram to their Embassy in Kampala asking for an appointment for their representative to deliver the message this week.

/ Prince Saud

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 3 -

Prince Saud said that it would make the Saudi mission easier if, in the interim period, the press campaign were to subside a little. The Prime Minister said that he appreciated this, and that this was indeed one of the reasons why he thought it important to take speedy action, since the press were likely to take an increasing interest in the question as the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting approached. He could not undertake that the press campaign would subside, but we would certainly do our best. Prince Fahd said that he hoped that something could be done, since a continuation of the press campaign would only serve as an incitement and challenge for President Amin. The Prime Minister agreed. He added that his Commonwealth colleagues were apprehensive that if President Amin attended the Meeting all attention would be diverted towards him.

The Prime Minister said that he wanted Prince Fahd to be in no doubt that if President Amin were to come to Britain, he would not be allowed to land. If his aircraft arrived, it would be diverted to some isolated airfield and returned to Uganda. We were determined to keep him out. Prince Fahd said that he thought that this point should be made clear to President Amin himself. The Prime Minister said that he wished to make it clear to Prince Fahd and was happy to leave it to him to decide how the point could be clarified for President Amin.

Concluding this part of the discussion, Prince Fahd said that the Saudis would do their best to make the position clear. They would certainly convey the Prime Minister's message and would "insist" that President Amin should not come here. They would exert every effort to explain the facts simply and clearly to him, making the point that they would not have done so if they had not been convinced that it would not be in President Amin's own interest to come. With Prince Fahd's agreement, the Prime Minister handed the Saudi Ambassador the original of his letter to President Amin (copy attached).

CONFIDENTIAL





CONFIDENTIAL

Prime Minister  
wish with to see before Prime  
Fidel and Prime Sand come  
to Chicago today (exp. 57)

PRIME MINISTER

President Amin and the Commonwealth Heads of  
Government Meeting

*[Signature]*  
23/5

1. We agreed at our meeting on Thursday that I would consider appropriate action to warn British subjects in Uganda about the increased risk they are likely to run at the time of the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting.
2. There are at present about 600 British subjects in Uganda of whom just over half live in the Kampala area, while the remainder are up-country. In addition, there are about 180 Canadian, other Commonwealth and Irish citizens in Uganda, the majority of whom live in the countryside.
3. As you discovered when you visited Uganda, most of those who now remain are a hard core of businessmen and missionaries who have made their life in Uganda and have not paid much heed to our earlier warnings to them. These warnings, which have been made regularly since we broke off relations with Uganda in July of last year, have taken the following form:
  - (i) Ted Rowlands spoke to representatives of the missionary societies working in Uganda in March, drawing their attention to the possible risks to which they are exposed and our limited ability to assist them;
  - (ii) the FCO, the Department of Trade and the British High Commission in Nairobi continue to warn people proposing to travel to Uganda of the risks; and

/(iii)

CONFIDENTIAL



(iii) the Head of the British Interests Section in Kampala, Mr Glasby, has for some time drawn the attention of the British community to the risks.

4. These warnings are of course supplemented by the implicit warning contained in news coverage of events in Uganda as well as by the BBC's coverage of Ugandan news and of statements by British Ministers in Parliament and elsewhere. Although we drew the BBC's attention to the last Written Answer on the risks to British subjects, which was made on 16 May, the BBC gave it no coverage. However, your own answer to Mrs Thatcher in the House last Thursday was fully reported by the Overseas Service and included the BBC's own commentary to the effect that there seemed little doubt that the Government would in fact ban President Amin from attending the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting.

5. The French Ambassador estimated recently that any warning exercises would be likely to induce only three or four British families to leave Uganda. However, there are already signs that President Amin is beginning to react to the reports that he may be excluded from the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting. On Thursday, Uganda Radio carried verbal attacks on the British, accusations about spying by foreigners, a suggestion that the Uganda Government could not be held responsible for what happens to such people and the announcement that President Amin had personally assumed responsibility for British affairs. Under these circumstances, I believe that we should take what action

/we

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL



we safely can to reiterate our warnings to the British community provided the French agree. I propose to be in touch with the French Government on Monday, to take<sup>them</sup> into our confidence about the decision we have taken to exclude President Amin and to ask them to authorise their Embassy in Kampala, in conjunction with the Head of the British Interests Section, to speak discreetly to members of the British community in Uganda. The French Ambassador and Mr Glasby might remind members of the community of our limited ability to assist them in the event of difficulty. They would draw attention to the growing controversy over the question of President Amin's proposed attendance at the CHGM and point out that, as the date of the meeting approaches, public outcry in Britain is likely to become still stronger and that the Government is likely to be forced to act in a way which could provoke President Amin. If members of the British community were thinking of precautionary steps such as arranging to be out of Uganda temporarily, they should act as unobtrusively as possible.

6. A meeting of East African businessmen is due to take place in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office on Thursday, 26 May. This is one of the regular meetings of British firms operating in East Africa and I believe we should let it take place as planned: to bring forward the date might only cause unnecessary speculations as to the reason. We would use this meeting as an opportunity to speak to the firms concerned in similar terms to those I have outlined above.

7. The timing of anything we do will inevitably depend on our handling of our own message to President Amin. You will have seen that Crown Prince Fahd was most helpful when I spoke to him

/at

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL



at London Airport on Friday night. He undertook to arrange for our message to be delivered to President Amin and promised that the Saudis would do their best to persuade Amin that it was not in his interests, or those of the Commonwealth, to attend the Heads of Government Meeting. There is some advantage in asking the Saudis to deliver the message to President Amin on Wednesday which would probably mean flying out from London one of his diplomats on Tuesday evening. A message delivered to Amin by the Saudis, accompanied by a message from Prince Fahd, could help to calm him down and give him more time to find some face-saving formula for declining to attend the Commonwealth Meeting. President Amin is planning to visit Kinshasa on 5 June. The Zaire Government have helped us before and we could possibly seek their help again.

8. A further reason why early delivery of our message by the Saudis could be helpful is that they could warn President Amin of the debate in the House of Commons on Friday and of the strength of feeling that is likely to be shown during it. There is just a chance that President Amin will announce a decision not to come to London before the debate takes place or alternatively to issue a definite statement of an intention to come and reveal the contents of your letter. If he has said nothing by Friday, I see no need for us to reveal the decision we have taken. We should allow Mr Brotherton's motion to pass and confirm that President Amin would not be welcome and we should reveal during the debate that you have sent a message to Amin, but only in very general terms

/such as

CONFIDENTIAL



such as: "The Prime Minister has sent a message to President Amin which must at this stage remain private. President Amin can now be in no doubt about the Government's wishes and intentions. It is still the Government's hope that, in the interests of the Commonwealth, President Amin will decide not to attend, though the Government would welcome a delegation at appropriate level from Uganda".

9. Merlyn Rees has pointed out that any Uganda delegation, even if President Amin is not at the head of it, is likely to give rise to demonstrations. From the security point of view, the Home Office believe that it would be better if no delegation came from Uganda at all. I fully understand Merlyn's anxieties. However, whereas I think the Commonwealth will just about put up with our excluding Amin on the grounds of his personal unacceptability, I believe that they will only do so if we make it clear that we have nothing against Uganda and that we are prepared to welcome a Uganda delegation to the CHGM. There would be some advantage in your making this point in answer to any Supplementaries at Question Time, preferably on Tuesday this week.

10. I am sending copies of this minute to the Home Secretary and to the Lord President.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'D. Owen'.

(DAVID OWEN)

22 May 1977

CONFIDENTIAL

DRAFT LETTER TO PRESIDENT AMIN FROM THE PRIME MINISTER

You will be aware of the public concern that has been expressed in Parliament and more generally in Britain about reports suggesting that you may be planning to come to this country next month. This concern which is shared by Her Majesty's Government would undoubtedly grow if it seemed likely that these reports might be proved correct.

Accordingly, I have decided to address this personal letter to your Excellency.

In consideration of <sup>the fact that</sup> ~~the fact that~~ Britain and Uganda <sup>between Britain and Uganda were severed</sup> ~~covered~~ diplomatic relations <sup>in July 1976</sup>, a personal visit from you would set back even further any future developments between our two countries. As it is <sup>the</sup> desire of Her Majesty's Government that relations between Uganda and Britain should not be unnecessarily harmed, I must inform your Excellency that a visit from you would not be appropriate, and that Her Majesty's Government would be obliged therefore not to <sup>permit</sup> ~~allow~~ <sup>your entry to</sup> ~~you to enter~~ the country.

<sup>AM ?</sup>  
The British Government would be ready to accept a delegation from Uganda if you can see your way to appointing a special representative to lead it. Such a delegation would receive all the normal courtesies and attentions accorded to delegations which visit this country.

CONFIDENTIAL

Since July 1976 when diplomatic relations between Britain and Uganda were severed, it has been the desire of Her Majesty's Government that relations between Britain and Uganda should not be unnecessarily harmed. I believe that/<sup>a</sup>personal visit from your Excellency would set back even further any future developments between our two countries, and I must therefore inform you that a visit from you would not be appropriate, - - -

**CONFIDENTIAL**

DRAFT LETTER TO PRESIDENT AMIN FROM THE PRIME MINISTER

You will be aware of the public concern that has been expressed in Parliament and more generally in Britain about reports suggesting that you may be planning to come to this country next month. This concern which is shared by Her Majesty's Government would undoubtedly grow if it seemed likely that these reports might be proved correct.

Accordingly I have decided to address this personal letter to Your Excellency.

In consideration of the fact that Britain and Uganda severed Diplomatic relations in . . . . , a personal visit from you would set back even further any future developments between our two countries. As it is, the desire of Her Majesty's Government that relations between Uganda and Britain should not be unnecessarily harmed, I must inform Your Excellency that a visit from you would not be appropriate, and that Her Majesty's Government would be obliged therefore not to permit your entry to the country.

The British Government would be ready to accept a delegation from Uganda if you can see your way to appointing a special representative to lead it. Such a delegation would receive all the normal courtesies and attentions accorded to delegations which visit this country.

**CONFIDENTIAL**



**CONFIDENTIAL**

DRAFT LETTER TO PRESIDENT AMIN FROM THE PRIME MINISTER

You will be aware of the public concern that has been expressed in Parliament and more generally in Britain about reports suggesting that you may be planning to come to this country next month. This concern which is shared by Her Majesty's Government would undoubtedly grow if it seemed likely that these reports might be proved correct.

Accordingly I have decided to address this personal letter to Your Excellency.

7.12.1976  
X In consideration of the fact that Britain and Uganda severed Diplomatic relations in . . . . , a personal visit from you would set back even further any future developments between our two countries. As it is, the desire of Her Majesty's Government that relations between Uganda and Britain should not be unnecessarily harmed, I must inform Your Excellency that a visit from you would not be appropriate, and that Her Majesty's Government would be obliged therefore not to permit your entry to the country.

The British Government would be ready to accept a delegation from Uganda if you can see your way to appointing a special representative to lead it. Such a delegation would receive all the normal courtesies and attentions accorded to delegations which visit this country.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

20 May 1977

*Prince Fahd*  
*You will wish to consider the*  
*recommended timing. But are you content*  
*with the attached draft?*

*Dear Patrick,*

*Dr Owen*  
*20/5*

President Amin and the Commonwealth Heads  
of Government Meeting

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary met Crown Prince Fahd at Heathrow on his arrival this evening. Prince Saud did not accompany the Crown Prince, but will arrive tomorrow.

Dr Owen told Prince Fahd that the strength of feeling about President Amin was so strong that the Government had decided that they could not agree to his coming to Britain. They needed to get a message to President Amin and were asking for Saudi help because the Saudi Ambassador represented Uganda's interests in London, because of the close friendship between Britain and Saudi Arabia, and because the Saudis could be trusted to keep our confidence.

Prince Fahd said that he would have no problem in arranging for a message to be delivered. The Saudis believed that it was not in President Amin's interest to attend the Commonwealth meeting. They would deliver our message and suggest to President Amin that it would not be useful for him to come to London. As Dr Owen well knew, President Amin had ideas which were "not suitable". He should be told that, even if he regarded himself as being invited to the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting, he should none the less not come.

Dr Owen said that the mechanics of how to deliver the message could be discussed with the Saudi Ambassador (who was present during the talk). Crown Prince Fahd suggested that they might ask their Ambassador in Uganda to return to London to take delivery of the message. Dr Owen said that it might be a better idea for the Saudis to send somebody out from London. This ran less risk of drawing attention to the operation. He would let the Saudi Ambassador know what flights were available, although he thought that commercial flights were infrequent. Prince Fahd said that the Saudis would tackle the matter so that it resulted in President Amin extending an apology for being unable to come to London.

/Dr Owen

P. R. H. Wright Esq.,  
10 Downing Street,  
LONDON SW1



CONFIDENTIAL

Dr Owen told Prince Fahd that the Prime Minister would be very grateful for his help and would wish to discuss the matter with him when they met on Sunday. You may wish to tell the Prime Minister that Dr Owen's view is that the message to President Amin should be sent during the coming week, so as to reach him not later than Wednesday, 25 May. We might ask the Saudis to tell President Amin that there was a debate in the House of Commons at the end of the week and so give him the opportunity to stand down before then if he wanted. If there had been no response by Friday, Dr Owen would be prepared to stone-wall during the debate. If, on the other hand, President Amin revealed the contents of our message then our position would anyway be clear by the time the debate took place.

If you get into a discussion of timing on Sunday, you may wish to tell the Saudi Ambassador that, as far as I have been able to establish, there are only two flights a week from London to Kampala (Entebbe). The most suitable would be a flight which leaves London on Tuesday evening at 1900 hours and arrives at Entebbe (following a change to Sabena Airlines at Brussels) at 0720 hours on the Wednesday morning. The second flight (also indirect) leaves London on Saturday night and arrives at Entebbe on Sunday afternoon.

At the meeting of Ministers which took place yesterday, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary was asked to draft the text of the message which the Prime Minister might send to President Amin. I enclose such a draft which has been cleared with the Home Secretary.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries of the other Ministers who attended yesterday's meeting and to Martin Vile in the Cabinet Office.

*Yours ever,  
Stephen*

(J. S. Wall)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Re try  
No.**DRAFT** LETTER

Type 1 +

## SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret.  
Secret.  
Confidential.  
Restricted.  
Unclassified.

To:-

His Excellency Al-Hajji Field Marshal  
Dr Idi Amin Dada VC DSO MC  
President of the Republic of Uganda

FROM

Prime Minister

Telephone No. Ext.

Department

## PRIVACY MARKING

In Confidence

You will be aware that there has been a great deal of ~~the~~ <sup>that has been expressed in Parliament and more generally</sup> public concern in Britain about reports suggesting that you may be planning to come to this country ~~to attend the~~ <sup>which is shared by H.N. Gort</sup> Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting next month. This concern would undoubtedly grow if it seemed likely that these reports might be proved correct. Accordingly, I have <sup>decided</sup> ~~decided~~ to address this personal letter to you <sup>to let you</sup> ~~to let you~~ know that a visit from you would not be welcome in Britain, ~~would have been further the relations between our countries~~ and that the British Government would be obliged not to allow you to enter the country. <sup>We should be ready to accept</sup> A delegation from Uganda will of course be welcome to come to London. ~~In the wider interests of the Commonwealth~~ which I am sure you recognise, I hope you can see your way to appointing a special representative to lead <sup>such a</sup> ~~the~~ Ugandan delegation to the Commonwealth Meeting in London in June. ~~Uganda would not be the only country to be represented in~~ this way and in these circumstances, ~~the Ugandan delegation~~ <sup>at such a Delegation</sup> would receive all the <sup>usual</sup> courtesies and attentions accorded to <sup>visiting this country</sup> other delegations attending the Meeting.

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

20 May 1977

*Dear Patrick,*

*on 19/5*

*AS 22/5*

President Amin and the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting

It was agreed at the meeting at No. 10 yesterday, 19 May, that the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, in consultation with the Home Secretary, would prepare a draft message from the Prime Minister to President Amin.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary proposes the enclosed draft which has been agreed with the Home Secretary.

*Yours ever,*  
*Stephen*

(J. S. Wall)

Patrick Wright Esq.,  
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Registry  
No.

DRAFT Letter

Type 1 +

## SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret.  
Secret.  
Confidential.  
Restricted.  
Unclassified.

To:-

His Excellency Al-Hajji Field Marshal  
Dr. Idi Amin Dada VC DSO MC  
President of the Republic of Uganda

From

Prime Minister

Telephone No. Ext.

Department

## PRIVACY MARKING

.....In Confidence

You will be aware that there has been a great deal of public concern in Britain about reports suggesting that you may be planning to come to this country to attend the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting next month. This concern would undoubtedly grow if it seemed likely that these reports might be proved correct. Accordingly, I have decided to address this personal letter to you to let you know that the British Government would be unable to agree that you should visit this country next month.

A delegation from Uganda will of course be welcome to come to London. In the wider interests of the Commonwealth which I am sure you recognise, I hope you can see your way to appointing a special representative to lead the Ugandan delegation to the Commonwealth Meeting in London in June. Uganda would not be the only country to be represented in this way and, in these circumstances, the Ugandan delegation would receive all the courtesies and attentions accorded to other delegations attending the Meeting.

Copy Top Secret

10 1


PRIME MINISTER

President Amin

We have, as you requested, arranged a meeting for 0930 tomorrow with the Lord President Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, Home Secretary and Lord Thomson to consider the problem of President Amin in connection with the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting.

Sir John Hunt has today held a meeting of officials to consider this question, and he is submitting separately a brief for your use, if required, at tomorrow's meeting. Sir John Hunt's advice is that the Attorney General and Sir John Hunt himself might also be present, and I should be grateful for your confirmation that you agree to this. Would you also like Tom McCaffrey and Tom McNally to be there?

I have included in the folder below the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's Top Secret minute but you will wish to bear in mind that this will not have been seen by anyone other than Dr. Owen and yourself (and Sir John Hunt).



18 May 1977



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

12 May 1977

Dear Patrick,

President Amin and the CHGM

I enclose a note, prepared by Commonwealth Co-ordination Department, which summarises Lord Thomson's findings about President Amin's attendance at the CHGM. It has been approved by Lord Thomson.

Yours ever  
Stephen  
(J. S. Wall)

cc. Mr. McNally

Patrick Wright Esq.,  
10 Downing Street

Peter Minto  
I have asked the FCO to let us have considered advice early next week, in the light of Lord Thomson's views, or preparation for a meeting later in the week.

CONFIDENTIAL

*[Signature]* 13/5



8

*He had better  
fix a meeting to discuss  
this (ask Lord Thomson  
to be present)*

*Alamy B*

CONFIDENTIAL

LORD THOMSON'S VIEWS ON PRESIDENT AMIN'S POSSIBLE ATTENDANCE AT THE COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING (CHGM)

1. After visiting 15 Commonwealth countries, Lord Thomson reports general detestation of Amin and hope that he will not attend the CHGM. The majority, however, consider that as a Head of Government Amin has a right to attend. Virtually all are anxious that opposition to Amin should not affect Uganda's position as a member of the Commonwealth, and would like Uganda to be represented by a low-key delegation. Most hope that Britain, as host, will take steps to ensure that he does not attend; but they have little or no idea how this should be done, apart from the thought that pressure from Qadaffi or the Saudis might help. Some suggested that we should warn Amin about dangers to his security if he came, but one questioned whether the UK could really claim not to be able to guarantee his safety here when the Americans had coped with Castro and Arafat at the UN in New York; Lord Thomson is not in favour of relying on warnings over security to try to deter Amin, since it would be unconvincing and, politically, unnecessarily humiliating to claim incapacity in such a matter.
2. If Amin were to attend it is unlikely that anyone would walk out, although the Australians are inclined not to sit at the same table as Amin.
3. If we could persuade Amin beforehand not to come, all would be happy.
4. If nevertheless he arrived and we excluded him from the UK, there might well be legalistic objections to the UK, as one among 36 equal member countries, deciding who should and who should not be present at Commonwealth meetings. This view was unanimously expressed by the Caribbean leaders, perhaps as a result of inter-governmental consultation and/or briefing by the Commonwealth Secretary-General. Much would depend on how we presented our actions and the timing of them, how we prepared opinion here and in the Commonwealth and how the Africans reacted. To act too early could allow Amin to mobilise OAU opinion against us. Many countries would fall in with any consensus. There is some danger of a bandwagon of criticism developing, should anyone speak out strongly against us. The Nigerians may be the most difficult. Lord Thomson's view is that it is unlikely that the reaction would be so serious as to lead to anyone walking out of the Meeting - but probably only the Australians would speak out in our support.
5. Lord Thomson's judgement is that Amin should be kept away, by carefully timed prior action if possible, but by physical turning back at the airport at the last minute if necessary.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

11 May 1977

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

LORD THOMSON'S VIEWS ON PRESIDENT AMIN'S POSSIBLE ATTENDANCE AT THE COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING (CHGM)

1. After visiting 15 Commonwealth countries, Lord Thomson reports general detestation of Amin and hope that he will not attend the CHGM. The majority, however, consider that as a Head of Government Amin has a right to attend. Virtually all are anxious that opposition to Amin should not affect Uganda's position as a member of the Commonwealth, and would like Uganda to be represented by a low-key delegation. Most hope that Britain, as host, will take steps to ensure that he does not attend; but they have little or no idea how this should be done, apart from the thought that pressure from Qadaffi or the Saudis might help. Some suggested that we should warn Amin about dangers to his security if he came, but one questioned whether the UK could really claim not to be able to guarantee his safety here when the Americans had coped with Castro and Arafat at the UN in New York; Lord Thomson is not in favour of relying on warnings over security to try to deter Amin, since it would be unconvincing and, politically, unnecessarily humiliating to claim incapacity in such a matter.
2. If Amin were to attend it is unlikely that anyone would walk out, although the Australians are inclined not to sit at the same table as Amin.
3. If we could persuade Amin beforehand not to come, all would be happy.
4. If nevertheless he arrived and we excluded him from the UK, there might well be legalistic objections to the UK, as one among 36 equal member countries, deciding who should and who should not be present at Commonwealth meetings. This view was unanimously expressed by the Caribbean leaders, perhaps as a result of inter-governmental consultation and/or briefing by the Commonwealth Secretary-General. Much would depend on how we presented our actions and the timing of them, how we prepared opinion here and in the Commonwealth and how the Africans reacted. To act too early could allow Amin to mobilise OAU opinion against us. Many countries would fall in with any consensus. There is some danger of a bandwagon of criticism developing, should anyone speak out strongly against us. The Nigerians may be the most difficult. Lord Thomson's view is that it is unlikely that the reaction would be so serious as to lead to anyone walking out of the Meeting - but probably only the Australians would speak out in our support.
5. Lord Thomson's judgement is that Amin should be kept away, by carefully timed prior action if possible, but by physical turning back at the airport at the last minute if necessary.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

11 May 1977

CONFIDENTIAL

### Visit of President Amin's Children

Uganda

- April  
~~May~~ 1977

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	D
26. 4. 77							



PRIME MINISTER

You asked to be kept informed about President Amin's family. The Home Office tell me that his two children left the United Kingdom for Uganda last night.

A handwritten signature, possibly 'R', in dark ink.

22 April 1977



no  
4

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

21 April 1977

✓  
Thank you for your letter of 20 April in which you conveyed the Home Secretary's view on the Prime Minister's suggestion that President Amin's children might be returned to Uganda.

The Prime Minister has noted the Home Secretary's views on this matter, and has asked that he should be informed of any future movement of President Amin's family in this country. As I told you on 18 April, he has particularly asked that a careful watch should be kept for any signs that President Amin himself might pay an unexpected private visit to London.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Ewen Fergusson (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and to Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

P. R. H. WRIGHT

R.M. Morris, Esq.,  
Home Office.

1000

SECRET

3



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

21 April 1977

Dear ~~Robert~~,

President Amin's Children

In your letter of 19 April to Bob Morris, you sought advice for the Prime Minister about the possibility of returning President Amin's children to Uganda.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary agrees entirely with the Home Secretary's view, as set out in Bob Morris's letter of 20 April.

Dr Owen believes that we have succeeded in establishing a clear distinction between our abhorrence of General Amin and of his actions and our desire for friendship with the people of Uganda. To act against Amin's children could seriously weaken that argument.

I am copying this letter to Bob Morris at the Home Office.

Yours ever  
Stephen  
(J S Wall)

P R H Wright Esq  
No 10 Downing Street  
LONDON SW1

Prime Minister

to Mr. I have copied  
your report to the Home Office  
to be kept informed of  
family movements.

Ph  
2/4

SECRET



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

19 April 1977

President Amin's Children

Your office informed us today that President Amin's two children, aged 3 and 6, arrived at Stansted Airport late last week with a doctor and two secretaries, and were staying at the Uganda High Commission for a holiday in the UK. I understand that they have permits to remain here for two months.

I reported this to the Prime Minister this afternoon, who has asked that the Home Secretary, in consultation with the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, should give urgent consideration to the possibility of returning the two children to Uganda. In suggesting this, the Prime Minister has particularly in mind the risk that, if the children are allowed to remain here, President Amin might subsequently claim their stay here as a reason for him to visit the UK himself, and might interpret the permission given to them as an indication that we were not prepared to take any firm action to exclude the President himself from entering the UK.

Consideration would of course have to be given to the grounds for returning the children to Uganda in this way, if that were done. One possibility, which the Prime Minister would like examined is that an explanation might be given to President Amin that we could not guarantee the children's security in this country, thereby giving him some advance warning of our likely reaction to any attempt by himself to visit London for the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting. The Prime Minister has however emphasised that he attaches great importance to avoiding any publicity about the return of the children until they were out of the country, and has asked whether, in the Home Secretary's view, it would be possible to undertake an operation of this sort without any publicity.

I should be grateful if you could let me have the Home Secretary's views on this as soon as possible, and at the latest by close of play on Wednesday 20 April.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Ewen Fergusson (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

P. R. H. WRIGHT

R.M. Morris, Esq.,  
Home Office.

SECRET



FILE 9

**CLOSED**

# OFFICE 1980

33/18

EGINS 9.3.77

ENDS 24 4 78

FILE No. 363718

Machinery of Government 6.2.8.1.10	(Machinery of Government)
---------------------------------------	---------------------------

REFERRED TO	DATE	REFERRED TO	DATE	REFERRED TO	DATE
Mr. Goulet	24 4 78				
PA	26 5 78				
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]				
CLOSED					
1980					



CONFIDENTIAL

37



Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
London SW1A 2AH

Telephone 01-

P Fowler Esq  
Cabinet Office  
70 Whitehall  
London SW1

Your reference

Our reference

Date

27 September 1978

27.9

Dear Fowler,

Copy to Mr. A. Ashton  
Mr. G. E. Angel H.O.  
Mr. A. G. Smith Jones P.O. Box 500  
Mr. A. D. Gilder D.G.F.  
H. S. 25.9

PRESIDENT AMIN: UK CONTINGENCY PLANS

1. We spoke earlier today.

2. Further to Peter Rosling's letter to you of 24 April 1978, I should give you the revised telephone numbers of members of East African Department responsible for Uganda:

(a) Working Hours

Mr A G Munro, Head of EAD

233 - 4549

Alternatives

Mr P E Rosling Assistant Head

233 - 3198

Mr A J Longrigg (wef 2 October 1978) EAD

233 - 3607

(b) Silent Hours

Mr A G Munro

994 - 5022

Mr P E Rosling

399 - 4432

Mr A J Longrigg

Burnham (06286)  
4014

Yours sincerely  
David Carter

D Carter  
East African Department

CONFIDENTIAL



**Foreign and Commonwealth Office**  
London SW1A 2AH

Telephone 01-

file

FOLK  
36  
ENC

Mr P Fowler  
Cabinet Office  
70 Whitehall  
LONDON SW1

Your reference

Our reference

Date 233-4150

5430  
24  
363/18

Dear Fowler,

PRESIDENT AMIN: UK CONTINGENCY PLANS

1. I am copying to you my letter of today to Squire in Washington, drawing their attention to a Daily Telegraph article, dated 14 March, suggesting Amin might visit New York next month for the opening of the new Uganda Government building there. As I indicated in my letter, we have no provenance for the report.

2. If Amin does travel to the United States, clearly there is a risk he would seek to transit here, in which case we have the contingency plans drawn up at the meeting held in the Home Office on 19 September 1977 and the related procedures laid down in your letter N 01995 of 23 September to Angel in the Home Office.

3. In this context, I should give you the telephone numbers of the members of East African Department now responsible for Uganda:

(a) Working Hours

Mr A G Munro, Head of EAD, 233-4549

Alternatives:

Mr P E Rosling, Asst Head 233-4150

Mr D Carter, EAD 233-3381

(b) Silent Hours

Mr A G Munro 994-5022

Mr P E Rosling 399-4432

Mr D Carter Haslemere (0428) 51297

Yours ever  
Peter Rosling

P E Rosling  
East African Department



Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
London SW1A 2AH

Telephone 01- 233-4150

C W Squire Esq

WASHINGTON DC

Your reference

Our reference

Date 24 April 1978

5431  
24  
363/18  
  
Dear Bill,

PRESIDENT AMIN: POSSIBLE VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES

1. I wrote to you on this subject last year (my letter of 5 September, 1977, and Richard Muir's reply of 16 September).
- ... 2. You will have seen the article, of which I attach a copy, in the Daily Telegraph dated 14 March reporting that Amin allegedly plans to fly to New York next month to be present at the opening of the Uganda Government building in Manhattan. It seems from the report Amin might also attend the 'May Special session of the General Assembly' (presumably this refers to the meeting on Disarmament).
3. We have no corroboration of the report, nor does it indicate Amin would seek to transit Britain, but clearly we should be alert to the possibility. If, therefore, you or UKNIS New York, to whom I am copying this letter, learn anything of Amin's intentions, we should be grateful if you would let us know by telegram.
4. As in September, it would also be helpful, if you see no objection, if you would approach the Americans in confidence to ask whether they would be prepared to warn us if they receive a visa application from the Ugandans as notification of the visit. We should welcome their present assessment if the likelihood of such a visit and any information which they could subsequently pass on about it.
5. We should ofcourse be careful to see that our current interest in this matter does not become public knowledge.

Yours ever

Peter

cc: Mr Pyatt, UKNIS NEW YORK  
Mr Chilcott, Home Office  
Mr Beattie, UND  
Mr Cullimore, TUSD  
Mr ~~Wiley~~, Cabinet Off.

P E Rosling  
East African Dept



## Amin to open prestige HQ in New York

By IAN BALL  
in New York

PRESIDENT AMIN plans to fly to New York in May to lend his personal touch to the opening ceremonies for the Ugandan government's imposing building opposite the United Nations' headquarters in Manhattan.

Sheathed in fashionable brown-tinted glass, the building—a monument both to Amin's vanity and last year's record world coffee prices—will outshine the UN delegation buildings of the superpowers as well as the New York missions of such financially-secure nations as West Germany and Japan.

The upper of two luxury penthouses, the residence designed by an American architect to Field-Marshal Amin's specifications, will look down on the headquarters of the United States' delegation to the UN.

This building, Uganda House's neighbour, now looks positively strabby in comparison with Amin's new diplomatic palace.

### Special session

When I inspected the Uganda headquarters yesterday, workmen said they were speeding up the job so the building would be ready for an opening ceremony in two months' time.

A senior member of the Ugandan delegation told me President Amin planned to travel to New York to declare Uganda House open and also to attend the "May special session of the General Assembly."

Two special assembly sessions are to be held this spring, one in April and May on Namibia, the other in May and June, on disarmament.

It is not known whether the Ugandan dictator plans to attend one or both.

### Threadbare economy

Amin has gone ahead with his grandiose plan in the face of mild criticism by Western diplomats, as well as by a few Third World delegates, that the money might have been spent more effectively at home.

The building and land is said to be worth at least £5 million. Uganda's per capita annual income is among the lowest in the world.

Because of its threadbare national economy, it is assessed at the lowest possible level in the dues member countries pay to the United Nations—0.01 per cent. of the total budget.

There is some mystery as to how the Ugandan Government will use the building's eight floors. Kampala has only a handful of permanent officials in New York.

X  
UCANPA  
USA

Keep

Na  
00/15/3



Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
London SW1A 2AH

Telephone 01- 233

35		
JGU 022/3		
RECEIVED IN REGISTRY NO. 23		
- 4 APR 1978		
DESK OFFICER		REGISTRY
INDEX	PA	Action Taken
1150	✓	✓

J Chilcott Esq  
Immigration & Nationality Dept  
Home Office  
40 Wellesley Road  
CROYDON  
Surrey CR9 2BY

Your reference

Our reference

Date

4 April 1978

CABINET OFFICE

N S.S.O.9...

12 APR 1978

FILING INSTRUCTIONS

FILE No. ....

7


1/15-4

PRESIDENT AMIN

1. A Commonwealth Ministerial meeting is to be held in London from 13-14 April to discuss the Common Fund. The Commonwealth Secretary-General has written to Heads of Government urging them to be represented 'at highest ministerial level'. We do not yet know whether a Ugandan delegation will wish to attend but at departmental level we are recommending that (Amin himself apart, of course) we should not object to Ugandan participation. We will keep you informed both of the decision taken and of any further information which might become available.

2. The meeting is a technical one and it is expected that most delegations will be headed by a Finance or Trade Minister. There should, therefore, be no question of Amin attempting to come himself, and we have no reason at all to think that he might try to do so. However, I suppose that any occasion of this kind should cause us to have our defensive mechanisms in order, just in case.

P E Rosling  
East African Department

**SECRET**

File 34

HOME OFFICE

QUEEN ANNE'S GATE LONDON SW1H 9AT

CABINET OFFICE

A 1478

November 1977

D-14/11/77

FILING INSTRUCTIONS

FILE No. 565/18

PRESIDENT AMIN

7/11

32

You copied to Bob Morris your letter of 31st October about the arrangements made against the possible arrival in the United Kingdom of President Amin. The Home Secretary agrees that the revised arrangements summarised in your letter constitute an adequate level of preparedness against such an eventuality.

I am sending copies of this letter to Bryan Cartledge (10 Downing Street), Roger Facer (MOD), Martyn Baker (Department of Trade) and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

J. A. INGMAN

Stephen Wall, Esq.

**SECRET**

3

2 Sirc Rose

Troy  
41

DEPARTMENT OF TRADE 1 VICTORIA STREET LONDON SW1H 0ET Telephone 01-215 7877

SECRET



*From the Secretary of State*

J S Wall Esq  
Private Secretary  
Foreign & Commonwealth Office  
London SW1A 2AH

4 November 1977

1930

Dear Stephen

363/18

30

Thank you for your letter of 26 October proposing some relaxation in our level of preparedness for any attempt by President Amin to enter the United Kingdom.

I am writing to say that Mr Dell is content with your proposals.

I am copying this letter to the recipients of yours.

Yours sincerely  
Jeanette Darrell

JEANETTE DARRELL  
Private Secretary

SECRET



10 DOWNING STREET

CABINET OFFICE

From the Private Secretary

A 1739.....

31 October 1977

FILING INSTRUCTIONS

30 3/18  
President Amin

A1594



Thank you for your letter of 26 October about the level of preparedness which is needed against the continuing possibility of a surprise visit to the UK by President Amin.

Subject to the views of his colleagues, the Prime Minister agrees with the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's view that some degree of relaxation in our precautions could prudently be initiated; and he would be content with the revised arrangements summarised in your letter.

I am sending copies of this letter to Bob Morris (Home Office), Roger Facer (MOD), Martyn Baker (Department of Trade) and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

B. G. CARTLEDGE

Stephen Wall, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET

(39)  
2 Sir Rose  
3 Mr Wilson  
for  
3/1x



N 02011

SIR CLIVE ROSE

M. Vile

363/18

Mr Wilson

I have told Mr Gurney

accordingly.

M.V. 24.2

File for 31/10



The Exclusion of President Amin

I have spoken to the Home Office (Mr Andrew), the Department of Trade (Mr Gildea) and the Ministry of Defence (Mr Holton), and all are content with the new arrangements suggested in Mr Wall's letter for handling the possible arrival of President Amin. In view of our pre-planning and the police contingency arrangements, the Immigration Services and the National Air Traffic Services will provide an adequate trip-wire for a reasonably speedy reaction to an incident.

C WILSON

27 October 1977

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL



**Foreign and Commonwealth Office**  
London SW1A 2AH

Telephone 01- 233-4564

Mr J Hardwick Home Office F4 Division Whitehall London SW1	CABINET OFFICE	Your reference
	N 4994.....	Our reference JEU 010/1
	4 OCT 1977	Date 4 October 1977
	ROUTING INSTRUCTIONS FILE NO. 36318	

*Mr Hardwick,*

**PRESIDENT AMIN CONTINGENCY PLANNING**

1. Because of the high demand for speaking time the general debate in the current session of the UN General Assembly has been extended and will probably now continue until Friday, 14 October. The Ugandans have reserved the afternoon of Tuesday, 11 October for their representative to speak.

2. I am afraid that this means that we must keep our guard well up for at least another 10 clear days.

*John Hunt*  
*A C Hunt*

A C Hunt  
East African Department

cc: J A Chilcot Esq, Home Office  
J R D Gildea Esq, Department of Trade  
C Wilson Esq, Cabinet Office  
M Holton, Ministry of Defence

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
London SW1A 2AH

Telephone 01- 233-4564

27

CABINET OFFICE	
N	4989
3 OCT 1977	
FILING INSTRUCTIONS	
FILE NO.	323118

J Hardwick Esq  
Home Office  
F4 Division  
Whitehall  
London SW1

Your reference

Our reference

Date 30 September 1977

*File* *fw. 12/11*

PRESIDENT AMIN CONTINGENCY PLANNING

... 1. I enclose the text of a Broadcast on Kampala Radio at 1000 GMT on 29 September. You will see from the final paragraph that for what it is worth Amin has again stated his intention of attending the General Assembly.

A C Hunt  
East African Department

Enc

cc: Mr J Chilcot  
Home Office

Mr Gildea  
Department of Trade

Mr M Holton  
DS8,  
Ministry of Defence

Mr C Wilson  
Cabinet Office ✓

CONFIDENTIAL

From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

**SECRET**

2 M. W. [initials]  
3 Sir C Rose (26)



HOME OFFICE  
QUEEN ANNE'S GATE LONDON SW1H 9AT

633

23 September 1977

363/18

Log  
25/9

PRESIDENT AMIN

Since the Home Secretary's minute of 12 September to the Prime Minister about the possibility that President Amin might travel via the United Kingdom on his way to the UN General Assembly in New York, officials have met and revised the contingency plans made for last June.

Plans have been made to prevent President Amin's formal admission to the United Kingdom, and to ensure that if he does arrive he is sent on his way as quickly as possible and kept away from the Press and public during any time in transit. Arrangements are being made for suitable inter-airport transport and overnight accommodation, should these prove necessary. Apart from transport, there are no plans to deploy units of the armed services.

I am sending copies of this letter to Stephen Wall (FCO), Roger Facer (MOD), Martyn Baker (D/Trade) and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).


R. M. MORRIS

B. G. Cartlidge, Esq.,

**SECRET**

SECRET

Sir C. R. R.



CABINET OFFICE  
70 WHITEHALL  
LONDON SW1A 2AS

25

233 5838

23 September 1977

N 01995 -

*file copy 3412*  
*to Mac Millan 4.6.79*  
*K.L. Pawley*

*2 x Duplicates*  
*John 9.11.77*  
*Endall 9.11.77*

C L Angel Esq  
Home Office  
Queen Anne's Gate

*Mr. Angel,*

The Exclusion of President Amin

At the meeting in the Home Office on 19 September contingency plans were agreed for dealing with President Amin, should he land in the United Kingdom en route to the United Nations General Assembly in New York. In the event of President Amin landing in this country, the Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms would be available for use to co-ordinate the Government's response. The alert procedures set out in Annex A will come into effect from the receipt of this letter until 10 October.

2. Lists of officials to be contacted in working hours (Annex B), of Duty Officers (Annex C) and officials to be consulted out of hours (Annex D) are attached. I should be grateful if you and the copy addressees of this letter would ensure that these instructions are brought to the attention of Duty Officers and other officials who might be involved in the operation of the COBR.

3. I am sending copies of my letter to Holman (MOD), Rosling (FCO), Russell-Jones (Security Service) and Gildea (Department of Trade).

*C Wilson*  
*for letter*  
C WILSON

Enc.

SECRET



*Mr C Wiles*  
with the compliments of  
**MINISTRY OF DEFENCE**

---

*Mr Bolton*  
*Head of PSS* *Ft. Belvoir*

CONFIDENTIAL



Hidden copies to: 23  
 AUS(D Staff)  
 AUS(AS)  
 A/ACAS(Ops)  
 D Sy PM(RAF)  
 D of Ops O & AP(RAF)  
 DS 10 (Mr Rotherham)

**MINISTRY OF DEFENCE**  
 Main Building, Whitehall, London SW1A 2HB  
 Telephone (Direct Dialling) 01-218-6592  
 (Switchboard) 01-218 9000

D/DS8/27/112/2/402

21st September 1977

R J Andrew Esq  
 Deputy Under-Secretary of State  
 Home Office  
 Queen Anne's Gate  
 London SW1

CABINET OFFICE	
N	4962
21 SEP 1977	
FILING INSTRUCTIONS	
FILE No.	363/18

PDG  
 14/10/77

*Dear Robert*  
PRESIDENT AMIN

Further to your meeting on Monday, 19 September I write to confirm that arrangements have been made to have a Puma helicopter on standby at short notice at RAF Odiham from this morning. It will be in a VIP fit and capable of carrying seven passengers. I have asked DCNATS and Mr Brown if their respective Services could pass any early warning of impending arrival to the Air Force Duty Officer (AFDO) (218 6501/2) so that we could have the longest possible notice. We would then expect a formal request for assistance to be made subsequently by the Home Office, or through COBR if activated, also to AFDO who has been fully briefed on the action to be taken.

While on standby the aircraft will be used for squadron training, but you will appreciate that maintenance of such a tight state of readiness is an undue strain, and I would be glad if we could keep this commitment under review during the warning period, as any degree of relief would be welcome.

We are making no arrangements for security of passengers on the understanding that these will be looked after by the Immigration Service and the Constabulary concerned. It will of course be essential to ensure that passengers are unarmed before embarking.

You also asked me to look at the possibility of using RAF Northolt for overnight accommodation. I find that though the runway is at present closed for repair, the small Officers' Mess is in fact full, with no spare accommodation. It is not a very lush building, is open on one side facing the airfield, and built up closely on the other three sides. Also the airfield itself is in a very conspicuous position on Western Avenue, and I would not have thought it was a suitable choice for your purposes.

A copy of this letter goes to Wilson in the Cabinet Office.

*Yours ever*

*Richard Alderson*

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
London SW1A 2AH

Telephone 01-233-4564

N Nagler Esq (Home Office)  
Immigration & Nationality Dept  
Lunar House  
Wellesley Road  
CROYDON

Your reference

Our reference

Date 21 September 1977

*Dear New Mr,*

PRESIDENT AMIN: CONTINGENCY PLANNING

1. You will wish to be aware, for what it is worth, of the following announcement made on Kampala radio on 19 September:-

"UGANDAN AND ETHIOPIAN DELEGATIONS TO UNGA Kampala radio on 19 September said: (Text) 'A 30-man Uganda delegation to the UN General Assembly has left for New York aboard a Uganda Airlines Boeing-707. The delegation, led by Uganda's permanent representative at the UN, Mr Khalid Kinene, was briefed by Life President Amin at State House, Entebbe. The delegation also comprised Uganda's Ambassador to Gabon, Mr Idi Osman.' "

*Yours sincerely,  
A C Hunt*

A C Hunt  
East African Department

cc: J A Chilcot Esq Home Office  
J R D Gildea Esq Department of Trade  
C Wilson Esq Cabinet Office

CONFIDENTIAL



SECRET



HOME OFFICE

Queen Anne's Gate London SW1H 9AT

Direct line 01-213 7157  
Switchboard 01-213 3000

21

C Wilson Esq  
Cabinet Office  
Whitehall  
LONDON SW1

Your reference

Our reference

Date

21 September 1977

*Dear Sir*

PRESIDENT AMIN

As you requested at <sup>Monday's</sup> ~~yesterday's~~ meeting I have looked at the Home Office entries in the annexes to your letter of 9 June (NO 1960). 7

Annex <sup>B</sup> should now read:

Mr A S Baker

213 7217

Mr G L Angel

213 6207

Mr D J Hardwick

213 7157

Annex <sup>C</sup> is correct.

Annex <sup>D</sup> should have my name added:

Mr D J Hardwick

Ashtead (27)

74069

*Yours sincerely*  
*D J Hardwick*

D J HARDWICK

SECRET



CONFIDENTIAL

## MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

Main Building, Whitehall, London SW1A 2HB

Telephone (Direct Dialling) 01-218-6592

(Switchboard) 01-218 9000

D/DS8/27/112/2/398

19th September 1977

C Wilson Esq  
Cabinet Office  
London SW1

*Dea Wilson*

PRESIDENT AMIN

There follows a note of contacts in the Ministry of Defence for the next round. Although there seems to be no Army involvement this time, I have included suitable telephone numbers where shown. Adopting your letter of 27 May to Gildea, in Annex B, delete and insert:

Mr M Holton	218-6592
<u>Alternate:</u>	
<u>Air Force Duty Officer</u>	218-6501/2
Mr P Rotherham (for General Staff aspects)	218-2237
<u>Alternate</u>	
<u>Col H A G Brooke</u>	218-7104
<u>Defence Situation Centre</u>	218-6081.

In Annex C, delete and insert:

Air Force Duty Officer	218-6501/2
Defence Situation Centre	218-6081
Resident Clerk	218-6002.

In Annex D

	<u>During week</u>	<u>Weekend (if different)</u>
Mr M Holton	01-455-5421	-
Mr P Rotherham	0273-556900	-

*Yours sincerely,*

*Michael Ubbie*



**Foreign and Commonwealth Office**  
London SW1A 2AH

Telephone 01-233-4150

C Wilson, Esq  
Cabinet Office  
70 Whitehall  
London  
SW1A 2AS

Your reference

Our reference

Date 19 September 1977

*Dear Colin,*

**PRESIDENT AMIN CONTINGENCY PLANNING**

1. The names and telephone numbers you require for the FCO are:-

<u>(Alternates)</u>	<u>Office hours</u>	<u>Silent hours and weekends</u>
M K Ewans	233-4549	582-8905 ✓
P E Rosling	233-4150	399- <del>4150</del> 4432 ✓
A C Hunt	233-4564	650-1312 ✓
Resident Clerk	-----	{ 233-3000 { 233-8272

*Yours ew*

*Petu*

P E ROSLING  
EAST AFRICAN DEPARTMENT


CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

15 September 1977



1091665

Dear Stephen,

President Amin

Since I wrote to Kieran Prendergast on 30 August recording the Prime Minister's agreement with the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's minute (PM 77/84) about the possibility that President Amin might transit through Heathrow on his way to the UNGA in New York, the Prime Minister has also seen the Home Secretary's minute of 12 September on the same subject. The Prime Minister agrees with Mr. Rees' view that the revised arrangements set out in his minute should be adequate to meet the new contingency and that the wider arrangements which were made in June should not be necessary on this occasion.

I am sending copies of this letter to Bob Morris (Home Office), Roger Facer (Ministry of Defence), Martyn Baker (Department of Trade) and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,  
Roger Carridge

J.S. Wall, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL



CABINET OFFICE

A 319.....

13 SEP 1977

FILING INSTRUCTIONS

FILE No. 363/18

PRIME MINISTER

PRESIDENT AMIN

file 17  
~~c Sir Chase~~  
13/9

I have seen a copy of the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's minute of 24th August to you (PM/77/84) about arrangements to deal with the possibility that President Amin may pass through London in transit to New York to attend the U.N. General Assembly later this month and your Private Secretary's letter of 30th August in response to this. I agree that even a brief stop while in transit could arouse protest and affront Parliamentary and public feeling, though not on anything like the scale which would have met his coming to the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting and the Silver Jubilee celebrations. My personal direction under the Immigration Act 1971, that he should be excluded from the United Kingdom, remains in force.

The elaborate contingency plans we made to counter his coming in June were aimed at countering a deliberate attempt to force or bluff his way into the country to attend the C.H.G.M., and to resist departure. I doubt whether the present contingency requires measures on that scale; some of those measures would in any event be irrelevant to it. But I agree that adequate precautions should be taken to prevent, so far as possible, his landing and to control him until he leaves on his onward (or return) flight.

I suggest, therefore, that officials in the Departments concerned should be instructed to prepare revised arrangements. Two practical problems have been identified in this situation if the media

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

are not to be manipulated by him while in transit: the possible need for secure inter-airport transport and escort; and the possible need for secure overnight accommodation (e.g. if he arrives on a commercial flight too late in the day for any onward or return flight). Apart from those aspects, the existing instructions to the National Air Traffic Services that his aircraft be denied permission to enter our airspace or to land, and to the Immigration Service to refuse him leave to enter and detain him pending removal (copied to Chief Officers of Police whose force areas cover Heathrow, Stansted and Gatwick) should in my judgment be sufficient. The wider arrangements, including deployment of units of the Armed Services in various parts of the country, which were made in June, do not appear to me to be necessary.

I am copying this minute to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, the Secretary of State for Defence, the Secretary of State for Trade and the Secretary of the Cabinet.

WR

12 September 1977



With the Compliments

of

MR R J ANDREW

*File*  
*6/12/10*

Home Office  
Queen Anne's Gate  
LONDON SW1H 9AT



QPE/77 3/4/3

HOME OFFICE  
QUEEN ANNE'S GATE LONDON SW1H 9AT

8th September 1977

C. A. Whitmore, Esq.,  
Assistant Under-Secretary of State  
(Defence Staff),  
Ministry of Defence,  
Whitehall,  
LONDON  
SW1A 2HB

CABINET OFFICE	
N	4936.....
- 9 SEP 1977	
FILING INSTRUCTIONS	
FILE NO.	363/18

*Dear Clive,*President Amin

The Foreign Secretary has drawn attention to reports that President Amin intends to attend the United Nations General Assembly in New York and will pass through Heathrow en route. (The General Assembly opens on 20th September and I understand that the sessions of general debate, when Heads of Government are thought most likely to attend, last from 26th September until 10th October.)

Whilst the probability that Amin will pass through this country is judged to be very low, even a brief stop while in transit could arouse protest and disorder and affront Parliamentary and public feeling (though not on anything like the scale anticipated had he come in June to the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting and Silver Jubilee celebrations). Ministers have therefore concluded that Amin's presence in this country would be undesirable and that the exclusion direction made by the Home Secretary in June, which has not been rescinded, should continue in being.

We need therefore to consider what arrangements should be made in order to prevent, if possible, Amin's landing in the United Kingdom, or to control him until he leaves on his onward (or return) flight. We do not believe that it is necessary to reactivate fully the elaborate contingency plans which were adopted to counter his coming in June. In particular, the deployment of units of the armed services and the activation of the Cabinet Office Briefing Room would not appear necessary on this occasion. But it would seem prudent to review the measures which need to be put in hand to ensure Amin's exclusion and to examine any practical problems which may arise. To this end I believe it would be useful if you and those to whom I am copying this letter could attend, or be represented at, a meeting at 11.00 a.m. on 19th September in Room 858 of this building.

If Amin lands we shall need to ensure that the media are not manipulated by him while in transit, and in this connection two particular problems have been identified: the possible need for secure transport and escort if he has to transfer from one airport to another in this country; and the possible need for secure overnight accommodation. The first might be met by the armed services providing a helicopter at reasonable notice to transfer Amin and one or two members of his entourage, together with an Immigration Service escort, and I should be grateful if you could examine this possibility before the meeting.


CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

The second is more difficult: there are no suitable facilities at Heathrow and, as we found in June, neither Home Office nor Ministry of Defence establishments readily lend themselves to the dual requirements of privacy and suitability for a Head of State. I hope that the PSA may be able to come to the meeting armed with one or two possibilities which we can have in reserve in case the need arises.

Yours ever,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'Robert J. Andrew', with a stylized flourish at the end.


(R. J. ANDREW)

CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary



30 August 1977

363/18

PRESIDENT AMIN

A9439

The Prime Minister has seen the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's minute (PM 77/84) of 24 August about the action which should be taken if President Amin does, in the event, seek to attend the United Nations General Assembly in New York and to pass through Heathrow in transit.

The Prime Minister agrees with Dr. Owen's recommendations both on the action which should be taken in this event and with regard to our public position.

I am sending copies of this letter to Bob Morris (Home Office), Martyn Baker (Department of Trade) and to Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

B. G. CARTLEDGE

W. K. Prendergast, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

File  
- Sir C Rose  
- Mr Bryars

12/9



24/4


CONFIDENTIAL

FOL 14



PRIME MINISTER

PM/77/84



C Mr Briggs

President Amin

1. You will have seen the press reports that President Amin has announced his intention of attending the United Nations General Assembly in New York and of transiting Heathrow en route.
2. This may be another of Amin's extravagant jokes and the chance of him attending the General Assembly are probably not very great. Even if he does come via Heathrow he may well simply pass straight through in the normal way (although there will undoubtedly be problems with the press if he does). I do not think however we can afford to take the risk of being caught napping if he does turn up and seek to enter the UK. He has a former wife here and there has been a suggestion that he has a child or children at school here under assumed names (although we have been unable to confirm this); he might use their presence as a pretext for a visit. I am quite sure that if Amin were to seek admission to the United Kingdom we should exclude him. We agreed in the context of his proposed attendance at the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting that his presence here would be totally unacceptable to public and

/Parliamentary

CONFIDENTIAL



Parliamentary opinion. Furthermore he could be subjected to hostile demonstrations which could result in insult or injury which might in turn provoke retaliation against the British community in Uganda.

3. I also consider that if he should try to come here in his personal aircraft, this should be denied permission to enter British air space or to land; and that if he does land or arrives in a commercial aircraft, while we cannot prevent him from transitting in the normal way, we should do everything possible to keep him away from the press. (We should face a particularly tricky problem if he were to turn up at Stansted and wish to travel by road to Heathrow for his onward flight; but this is unlikely.) This means that as the General Assembly approaches we should reactivate the Comprehensive Contingency plans which we drew up at the time of the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting.

4. As to our public position my recommendation is that we should avoid making any statement unless and until it is absolutely necessary (we have no wish to provoke Amin unnecessarily or invite retaliation against the British community in Uganda); but that if the issue were to become live we should be prepared if necessary to make clear that Amin would not be allowed entry into the United Kingdom.

5. I am copying this letter to the Home Secretary, the Secretary of State for Trade and the Secretary of the Cabinet.



CABINET OFFICE
N 4908.....
22 AUG 1977
FILING INSTRUCTIONS
FILE No. 36.3/18

Civil Aviation Policy Division  
DEPARTMENT OF TRADE  
1 VICTORIA STREET  
LONDON SW1H 0ET  
TELEPHONE DIRECT LINE 01 215 3831  
SWITCHBOARD 01 215 7877

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr C Wilson  
Cabinet Office  
Whitehall SW1A 2AS

*Yes I will attend this meeting  
would you please inform the State  
for 31*  
*Angela*  
*22 August 1977*

*Dear Wilson*

*Reginald*

EVENTS DURING THE COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCE, JUNE 1977

I have arranged a meeting on Thursday, 8th September 1977, at 10.00 am in Room 231, Shell Mex House to carry out a debriefing on matters affecting civil aviation in connection with the emergency which arose during the Commonwealth Conference in June 1977. Mr G C Dick, Department of Trade, will be in the chair.

You are invited to attend or to be represented. I shall be grateful if you will let me know your intentions by 1st September 1977. A list of those invited is attached.

*Yours sincerely*  
*G M Stark*  
G M STARK



Air Vice Marshal I M Pedder  
Mr S G Fitch

Sir John Nightingale  
Mr G W R Terry  
Mr G W Rushbrook

Mr N A Nagler

Mr C Wilson

Mr M K Ewans  
Mr D A MacLeod

Mr J R D Gildea  
Mr H R Farmery

National Air Traffic Services  
National Air Traffic Services

Chief Constable of Essex  
Chief Constable of Sussex  
Metropolitan Police

Home Office

Cabinet Office

East African Department ) Foreign &  
Maritime and General Department ) Commonwealth  
Office

Department of Trade  
Department of Trade

HOME OFFICE  
Lancaster House, Whitehall Road, London SW1A 2AA  
Telephone: 01-635 6333, ext. 2739

Mr. Sefton  
Mr. Mollan  
Mr. Lillson  
12  
WJL

Our reference  
Your reference: JEU 010/1

8 August 1977

CABINET OFFICE
N 4895
10 AUG 1977
FILE NO. 363/18

Mr K Ewans Esq  
East African Department  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
Great George Street  
SW1A 2AM

Dear Mr Ewans

PRESIDENT AMIN

10

We spoke on the telephone about your letter of 27 July, concerning the possibility of President Amin attempting to stage through London en route to Cuba some time this month. We also had a word about the more recent, and somewhat less improbable, reports that he might attend the General Assembly of the UN in New York, late in September, again travelling via London. I have also spoken to Gildea in the Department of Trade.

The Immigration Service, and the relevant Chief Officers of Police, have been informed. Subject to confirmation from the Home Secretary, (which I hope to have very shortly) his direction that President Amin should not be given entry to the United Kingdom continues in operation.

Moreover, there is power under immigration law to instruct Captains of aircraft that passengers shall not be allowed to disembark prior to examination by an immigration officer on board the aircraft. We would propose to exercise this power as necessary so that Amin is kept incommunicado until formally given notice that he is to be refused entry.

So far as advanced information is concerned (paragraph 6 of your letter) I have, like you, arranged for the relevant services who might come to know of any advance intention to notify us at once if they learn anything. I should expect the Home Secretary (and I dare say the Foreign Secretary as well) would want to review the position if we receive any more definite news that President Amin seriously contemplates going to New York towards the end of next month.

Copies of this letter go to the recipients of yours, and to HM Chief Inspector of Immigration.

Yours sincerely

*S. Maitland*

pp J A CHILCOT

cc C Wilson Esq  
Cabinet Office  
J R Gildea Esq  
DOT  
Mr Harvey  
FUED  
FUC

Mr Littlefield  
FUED  
FCO  
Mr Parkinson  
Home Office  
Mr Richards  
Home Office



SECRET  
SHELL 11

Mr C Wilson  
Mr. Byrnes  
Mr. Mott  
9/8

M K Evans Esq  
East African Department  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
Great George Street  
SW1A 2AM

GABINET OFFICE
N 4887.....
2 AUG 1977
FILE INSTRUCTIONS
FILE NO. 363/18

1 August 1977

PRESIDENT AMIN

10

Thank you for sending me a copy of your letter of 27 July to Chilcott, which we discussed on the telephone.


I regard President Amin's proposed refuelling stop in London as highly unlikely, not only because I think he is likely to express an intention of coming to London every time he meets an Englishman but also because his personal aircraft has not been given a certificate of airworthiness since the last one expired on 5 June, and it could not fly from London to Havana direct, nor will it be safe to do so even if it refuelled in the Azores. As one can see on the map, London does not lie on anything like the shortest route from Uganda to Cuba.

I am therefore most reluctant to take any action which will cause much inconvenience. But I have arranged with the London Air Traffic Control Centre that they will report immediately to the Department of Trade, until further notice, either

- a. if President Amin's personal aircraft approaches this country, in which case the pilot will be told that he has no clearance to enter British airspace or to land in Britain; or
- b. if they are told that President Amin is on board any other aircraft.

They will not however take any steps to challenge aircraft to try to find out whether President Amin is aboard.





M K Ewart Esq  
FCO

1 AUG 1977

I trust that this standing instruction will be enough to carry us through the several searches which we can expect in the next few months, and that we do not have to give NATO more numerous instructions unless there is a very much more specific and probable threat.

I am copying this letter to Air Vice Marshal Bodder in NATO and to the recipients of your letter.

J R D Gildea



CABINET OFFICE
N 48.7.77...
28 JUL 1977
FILE INSTRUCTIONS
FILE No. 493/1

Foreign and Commonwealth Office *1 Encl.*

London SW1A 2AH

J Chilcott Esq  
Home Office  
Lunar House  
Wellesley Road  
Croydon  
Surrey

JEU 010/1

*You should be aware of this cloud on  
the horizon but more collated information is  
required before we take contingency planning on*

27 July, 1977

*Further*  
Dear Chilcott,

PRESIDENT AMIN

*Mr Rogers*  
*Mr Bolton*

*3 Brigadier Bishop*  
*4 File.*

*RJB*  
*4/8*

1. The Canadian High Commission here have given us a copy of their debriefing report of a Canadian journalist, Gerrald Utting, following his recent stay in Uganda. Utting was detained for a while in Makindye Prison and spent some time in the company of President Amin, before being sent out on a Ugandan Airlines' flight to Stansted. The Canadians passed us a copy of their report partly for general information and partly in case it might throw light upon the fate of people in Uganda for whom we have some responsibility.

2. In the event the report does not help us over our consular cases, but, as you will see from the enclosed extracts, Amin told Utting that he planned to go to Cuba "some time in the next month" refuelling in London en route.

3. However unlikely we may think this prospect is, my Secretary of State considers that we should take note of this report and make dispositions accordingly. Amin would be perfectly capable of putting on an act at the airport, possibly in front of a press audience. It is less likely that he would try to enter the country, but it would seem to be necessary to make what arrangements we can to prevent this.

4. The first step to take would appear to be to instruct the National Air Traffic Services that if President Amin's personal aircraft, whose details and registration number are known, is reported to them, they will interrogate it as soon as it approaches or is discovered in British air space. The pilot should be told that he has no clearance to enter British air space or to land in Britain.

5. Secondly, since we cannot be sure that Amin will travel in his personal jet or that he would not persist in landing, it would also appear to be desirable for the appropriate authorities to be warned so that steps could be taken at short notice to ensure that his aircraft, if it lands here, is kept incommunicado and departs as quickly as possible after any necessary refuelling.

CONFIDENTIAL



6. We are alerting our Embassy in Havana, asking them to report any indication that Amin might be going there, although if it is to happen previous experience suggests that there might not in fact be any prior notice. As you know, we no longer have any people of our own in Kampala and cannot expect any help from that quarter, although we will alert those channels which might be available to us, and I assume that you will do the same as regards, e.g. the security services.

7. We do not suggest, on the basis of this single report, that we should engage in the detailed and demanding contingency planning and alert procedures which were mounted before the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting, but the Secretary of State is clear that we ought to make the dispositions I have set out above to ensure that we are not caught napping.

*Yours sincerely,*

*M. K. Ewans*

M K Ewans  
East African Department

cc C Wilson Esq  
~~Cabinet Office~~

J R Gildea Esq  
DOT

Mr Hervey  
PUSD  
FCO

Mr Littlefield  
PUSD  
FCO

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

EXTRACT FROM CANADIAN EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

REPORT, OF 14 JULY, 1977 No.878

"UGANDA: TORONTO STAR JOURNALIST

"9. Mr Utting's overall impression of President Amin was that of a slightly-demented tyrant with a great sense of humour. During the massage, Mr Utting saw no signs of recent injuries on President Amin's body. The only scars appeared to be caused by old football injuries.

"10. Amin made a number of points to Utting. He indicated that he planned to visit Castro some time in the next month, that he might go on to visit a few other Latin American countries, although he did not specify which ones. He said he would plan to refuel in London en route to Cuba."

CONFIDENTIAL





MR R W SMITH

METROPOLITAN POLICE CATERING <sup>168</sup> COBR

Further to my minute dated 8 June, to my surprise I have received the attached bill for catering in the COBR 8-13 June.

I do not contest the number of meals served but on a previous operational (not exercise) manning, that is to say 10 September 1976, similar catering was provided without charge. You may agree it is not for me to contest this account with the Metropolitan Police Catering Finance Department but you may wish to do so on grounds of precedence. You will of course appreciate the need to retain their goodwill for future occasions and the better course may be to pay up without question. It is already rather late to attempt to secure repayment from those who benefited from the excellent service.

R J BISHOP

27 June 1977

End

95

233 8378

13th June 1977

As you know, the Cabinet Office Briefing Room was manned on Jubilee Day which meant that your television centre had to be activated. I am sure this seriously inconvenienced the technicians who were called in but I would like them to know that the Home Secretary and all others involved were very glad to be able to receive news bulletins and up to date reports as the situation developed.

Perhaps you would pass on a message of appreciation to Chief Technician Briggs, Sergeant Weller, Corporals Wright and Sleath and Junior Technician Ferris for their help, and our regrets that their Jubilee plans should have been so disturbed.

CLIVE ROSE

CLIVE ROSE

Commander R H Jackson, RN,  
Controller,  
Defence Situation Centre,  
Ministry of Defence,  
Main Building,  
Whitehall SW1.



233 8378

13th June 1977

I am writing to thank you for volunteering for duty in the Cabinet Office Briefing Room during the weekend 11th/12th June, which I am sure interfered with plans you had already made. However I would like you to know that this enabled us to provide the state of readiness required to prepare for a possible emergency. Thank you very much for agreeing to carry out this extra duty at short notice.

CLIVE ROSE

CLIVE ROSE

J. Robertson Esq.

Similar letters to

Mr Borthwick  
Col. Cock



233 8378

13th June 1977

I am writing to thank you very much for turning out at short notice on Jubilee Day and again during the weekend 11th/12th June, to help man the Cabinet Office Briefing Room. I am sure that your plans for the day were ruined but the Home Secretary very much appreciated the support he received over this tiresome affair. I too was grateful for your help.

CLIVE ROSE

CLIVE ROSE

J L Wright Esq.





233 8378

13th June 1977

I am writing to thank you very much for turning out at short notice on Jubilee Day and again during the weekend 11th/12th June to help man the Cabinet Office Briefing Room. I am sure that your plans for the day were ruined but I would like you to know that your ready response enabled the Home Secretary and others concerned to have the essential operational support which is required on these occasions. I was grateful for your help.

OLIVE ROSE

OLIVE ROSE

~~OLIVE ROSE~~

Similar letters sent to

Mr R Hulme  
Mr M D Lewis



233 8378

13th June 1977

I am writing to thank you very much for turning out at short notice on Jubilee Day to help man the Cabinet Office Briefing Room. I am sure that your plans for the day were ruined but I would like you to know that your ready response enabled the Home Secretary and others concerned to have the essential operational support which is required on these occasions. I was grateful for your help.

CLIVE ROSE

CLIVE ROSE

G. Philcox Esq.,

Similar letters sent to

Mr P S Jenkins

Mr J G Anderson



SIR CLIVE ROSE

I would like to suggest that it would be well received if a senior official could circulate a personal note of appreciation to members of the Cabinet Office who were asked to report for communication and clerical duty in the COBR on Jubilee Day and the weekend 11-12 June.

I speak not for the Defence Secretariat, naturally, but for those who voluntarily, and for a pittance, support that staff in an emergency, whose personal plans on those days must have been thrown awry but who did not hesitate to come when called.

The ones concerned are shown below. I have added the names of RAF Technicians from MOD who were also called out, but hardly as volunteers. A note to their OC, Commander R H Jackson RN, Controller of the Defence Situation Centre, would be appreciated, I am sure.

7 June

11-12 June

Cabinet Office

Miss B Wallen

Miss H Smith

Mr R Hulme

Mr C Philcox

Mr M D Lewis

Mr J Weller

Mr J Rider

Mr P S Jenkins

Mr J G Anderson

Mr J L Wright

Mr R Hulme

Mr M D Lewis

Mr J Robertson

Mr B Borthwick

Mr J L Wright

Col W W Cock — ?

MOD

Chief Technician Briggs

Sgt Weller

Cpl Wright

Cpl Sleath

J/Tech Ferris

(attach possible drafts for consideration.  
R. J. Bishop

R J BISHOP

13 June 1977

DRAFT LETTER TO

Commander R H Jackson RN  
Controller of the Defence Situation Centre  
Ministry of Defence  
Main Building  
Room 5270

As you know, the Cabinet Office Briefing Room was manned on Jubilee Day which meant that your television centre had to be activated. I am sure this seriously inconvenienced the technicians who were called in but I would like them to know that the Home Secretary and all others involved were very glad to be able to receive news bulletins and up-to-date reports as the situation developed.

would  
Perhaps you/pass on a message of appreciation to Chief Technician Briggs, Sergeant Weller, Corporals Wright and Sleath and Junion Technician Ferris for their ~~good work~~ <sup>lyc</sup> and our regrets that their Jubilee plans should have been so disturbed.

CLIVE ROSE

June 1977

Letters to

[ Miss B Wallen ]

[ Miss H Smith ]

Mr C Philcox

[ Mr J Weller ]

[ Mr J Ryder ]

Mr P S Jenkins

Mr J G Anderson

I am writing to thank you <sup>very much</sup> ~~most sincerely~~ for turning out at short notice on Jubilee Day to help man the Cabinet Office Briefing Room. I am sure that your plans for the day were ruined but I would like you to know that your ready response enabled the Home Secretary and others concerned to have the essential operational support which is required on these occasions. <sup>1 day</sup> ~~Thank~~   
 ~~grateful for your help~~   
 ~~you very much for your good work.~~

Mr Crudge will be able to advise you on allowances which you are authorised to claim.

CLIVE ROSE

June 1977

Letters to

Mr R Hume  
Mr M D Lewis  
Mr J L Wright

I am writing to thank you <sup>very much</sup> ~~most sincerely~~ for turning out at short notice on Jubilee Day and again during the weekend 11/12 June to help man the Cabinet Office Briefing Room. I am sure that your plans for the day were ruined but I would like you to know that your ready response enabled the Home Secretary and others concerned to have the essential operational support which is required on these occasions. <sup>I was grateful for your help.</sup> ~~Thank you very much for your good work.~~

Mr Crudge will be able to advise you on allowances which you are authorised to claim.

CLIVE ROSE

June 1977

Letters to

Mr J Robertson

Mr B Borthwick

Colonel W W Cock

I am writing to thank you for volunteering for duty in the Cabinet Office Briefing Room during the weekend 11/12 June which I am sure interfered with plans you had already made. However I would like you to know that this enabled us to provide the state of readiness required to prepare for a possible emergency. Thank you very much for agreeing to carry out this extra duty at short notice.

Mr Crudge will be able to advise you on allowances which you are authorised to claim.

✓  
13/6

CLIVE ROSE

June 1977

CONFIDENTIAL

SIR CLIVE ROSE

I would like to suggest that it would be well received if a senior official could circulate a personal note of appreciation to members of the Cabinet Office who were asked to report for communication and clerical duty in the COBR on Jubilee Day and the weekend 11-12 June.

I speak not for the Defence Secretariat, naturally, but for those who voluntarily, and for a pittance, support that staff in an emergency, whose personal plans on those days must have been thrown awry but who did not hesitate to come when called.

The ones concerned are shown below. I have added the names of RAF Technicians from MOD who were also called out, but hardly as volunteers. A note to their OC, Commander R H Jackson RN, Controller of the Defence Situation Centre, would be appreciated, I am sure.

7 June

Cabinet Office

Miss B Wallen  
Miss H Smith  
Mr R Hulme  
Mr C Philcox  
Mr M D Lewis  
Mr J Weller  
Mr J Rider  
Mr P S Jenkins  
Mr J G Anderson  
Mr J L Wright

11-12 June

Mr R Hulme  
Mr M D Lewis  
Mr J Robertson  
Mr B Borthwick  
Mr J L Wright  
Col W W Cook

MOD

Chief Technician Briggs  
Sgt Weller  
Cpl Wright  
Cpl Sleath  
J/Tech Ferris

R W BISHOP

13 June 1977

MANAGEMENT-IN-CONFIDENCE



Letters to

Miss B Wallen

Miss H Smith

Mr C Philcox

Mr J Weller

Mr J Ryder

Mr P S Jenkins

Mr J G Anderson

I am writing to thank you most sincerely for turning out at short notice on Jubilee Day to help man the Cabinet Office Briefing Room. I am sure that your plans for the day were ruined but I would like you to know that your ready response enabled the Home Secretary and others concerned to have the essential operational support which is required on these occasions. Thank you very much for your good work.

Mr Crudge will be able to advise you on allowances which you are authorised to claim.

CLIVE ROSE

June 1977

Letters to

Mr R Hume

Mr M D Lewis

Mr J L Wright

I am writing to thank you most sincerely for turning out at short notice on Jubilee Day and again during the weekend 11/12 June to help man the Cabinet Office Briefing Room. I am sure that your plans for the day were ruined but I would like you to know that your ready response enabled the Home Secretary and others concerned to have the essential operational support which is required on these occasions. Thank you very much for your good work.

Mr Crudge will be able to advise you on allowances which you are authorised to claim.

CLIVE ROSE

June 1977

Letters to

Mr J Robertson

Mr B Borthwick

Colonel W W Cock

I am writing to thank you for volunteering for duty in the Cabinet Office Briefing Room during the weekend 11/12 June which I am sure interfered with plans you had already made. However I would like you to know that this enabled us to provide the state of readiness required to prepare for a possible emergency. Thank you very much for agreeing to carry out this extra duty at short notice.

Mr Crudge will be able to advise you on allowances which you are authorised to claim.

CLIVE ROSE

June 1977

DRAFT LETTER TO

Commander R H Jackson RN  
Controller of the Defence Situation Centre  
Ministry of Defence  
Main Building  
Room 5270

As you know, the Cabinet Office Briefing Room was manned on Jubilee Day which meant that your television centre had to be activated. I am sure this seriously inconvenienced the technicians who were called in but I would like them to know that the Home Secretary and all others involved were very glad to be able to receive news bulletins and up-to-date reports as the situation developed.

would  
Perhaps you/pass on a message of appreciation to Chief Technician Briggs, Sergeant Weller, Corporals Wright and Sleath and Junion Technician Ferris for their good work and our regrets that their Jubilee plans should have been so disturbed.

CLIVE ROSE

June 1977

CONFIDENTIAL



ASH

CYPHER CAT A

FM KAMPALA 091615Z

CONFIDENTIAL

TO FLASH FCO TEL NO 131 OF 9 JUNE AND TO IMMEDIATE  
PARIS WASHINGTON NAIROBI AND KINSHASA.

MY TELEGRAM NO 130 TO FCO.

THIS EVENINGS 1700 HOURS RADIO UGANDA NEWS ANNOUNCED THAT:

A) AMIN HAD RETURNED FROM THE RWANDAN/TANZANIAN/UGANDAN  
BORDERS WHERE HE HAD HAD USEFUL TALKS WITH REVOLUTIONARY  
LEADERS FROM TANZANIA AND ZAMBIA. THE COMMONWEALTH WAS NOT  
AS IMPORTANT AS OAU, UNITED NATIONS,  
NON ALIGNED ORGANISATION AND WAS FULL OF IMPERIALIST MINDED  
MEMBERS.

B) A BRITON HAD BEEN ARRESTED FOR SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES,  
HAVING BEEN DENOUNCED TO UGANDAN AUTHORITIES BY A BELGIAN.  
PRISONER WAS BEING HELD IN A REMOTE PART OF UGANDA, WOULD BE  
TRIED BY A MILITARY TRIBUNAL AND EXECUTED BY FIRING SQUAD IF  
FOUND GUILTY.

C) ANYONE BUYING BRITISH PROPERTY IN UGANDA DID SO AT THEIR  
OWN RISK.

D) FRENCH/UGANDAN RELATIONS WERE GOOD AND FORMER SHOULD NOT  
BE INVOLVED IN BRITISH AFFAIRS. THEREFORE FRENCH EMBASSY  
SHOULD CEASE TO BE RESPONSIBLE FOR BRITISH INTERESTS AND  
HMG SHOULD FIND A REPLACEMENT, UNDER WHICH WELBORN AND  
MYSELF COULD REMAIN IN UGANDA.

2. THE ANNOUNCEMENT THEREFORE CONSTITUTES THE NEXT  
ESCALATORY STEP. IT ADMITS THAT AMIN IS BACK IN UGANDA,  
WITHOUT CONCEDEING THAT HE HAS NEVER ATTENDED CHGM.  
THE CRITICISM OF COMMONWEALTH IS NO DOUBT INTENDED TO EXPLAIN  
THIS.

/3.PREDICTAB

CONFIDENTIAL

3. PREDICTABLY THE ARREST OF A UKC HERALDS THE EARLY STAGES OF ANOTHER HILLS AFFAIR. PRISONER COULD BE ELIAS OR QUOTE PAUL UNQUOTE, I KNOW OF NO OTHER POSSIBILITIES.

4. THE ORDER TO SWITCH PROTECTING POWERS IN EFFECT AIMS TO NEGATE UGANDAN GOVERNMENT AGREEMENT TO ESTABLISHMENT OF BRITISH INTERESTS SECTION UNDER FRENCH PROTECTION.

YOU WILL NO DOUBT WISH TO CONSULT QUAI AND SPEAK TO SAUDI AMBASSADOR ON THIS, BUT IN MEANTIME H.E. IS REPLYING TO FOREIGN MINISTER MAKING FOLLOWING POINTS:

A) ASKING FOR DETAILS OF SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES BY UKCS IN WHICH ALLEGEDLY FRENCH FACILITIES HAVE BEEN USED.

B) DETAILS OF ARRESTED BRITON, REASONS ETC..

C) INFORMING FOREIGN MINISTER THAT, PENDING RECEIPT OF INSTRUCTIONS, HE CANNOT REGARD HIMSELF AS BEING UNILATERALLY DISCHARGED OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES FOR BRITISH AFFAIRS.

GLASBY

[RECEIVED VIA FRENCH EMBASSY]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

EAD  
CONS D  
CONS EM UNIT  
NEWS D  
CCD  
WED

COPIES TO:

PS/NO.10 DOWNING STREET  
DIO CABINET OFFICE

- 2 -

CONFIDENTIAL

1/10/68 10/10/68 11/10/68 12/10/68 1/11/68 2/11/68 3/11/68 4/11/68 5/11/68 6/11/68 7/11/68 8/11/68 9/11/68 10/11/68 11/11/68 12/11/68 1/12/68 2/12/68 3/12/68 4/12/68 5/12/68 6/12/68 7/12/68 8/12/68 9/12/68 10/12/68 11/12/68 12/12/68 1/1/69 2/1/69 3/1/69 4/1/69 5/1/69 6/1/69 7/1/69 8/1/69 9/1/69 10/1/69 11/1/69 12/1/69 1/2/69 2/2/69 3/2/69 4/2/69 5/2/69 6/2/69 7/2/69 8/2/69 9/2/69 10/2/69 11/2/69 12/2/69 1/3/69 2/3/69 3/3/69 4/3/69 5/3/69 6/3/69 7/3/69 8/3/69 9/3/69 10/3/69 11/3/69 12/3/69 1/4/69 2/4/69 3/4/69 4/4/69 5/4/69 6/4/69 7/4/69 8/4/69 9/4/69 10/4/69 11/4/69 12/4/69 1/5/69 2/5/69 3/5/69 4/5/69 5/5/69 6/5/69 7/5/69 8/5/69 9/5/69 10/5/69 11/5/69 12/5/69 1/6/69 2/6/69 3/6/69 4/6/69 5/6/69 6/6/69 7/6/69 8/6/69 9/6/69 10/6/69 11/6/69 12/6/69 1/7/69 2/7/69 3/7/69 4/7/69 5/7/69 6/7/69 7/7/69 8/7/69 9/7/69 10/7/69 11/7/69 12/7/69 1/8/69 2/8/69 3/8/69 4/8/69 5/8/69 6/8/69 7/8/69 8/8/69 9/8/69 10/8/69 11/8/69 12/8/69 1/9/69 2/9/69 3/9/69 4/9/69 5/9/69 6/9/69 7/9/69 8/9/69 9/9/69 10/9/69 11/9/69 12/9/69 1/10/69 2/10/69 3/10/69 4/10/69 5/10/69 6/10/69 7/10/69 8/10/69 9/10/69 10/10/69 11/10/69 12/10/69 1/11/69 2/11/69 3/11/69 4/11/69 5/11/69 6/11/69 7/11/69 8/11/69 9/11/69 10/11/69 11/11/69 12/11/69 1/12/69 2/12/69 3/12/69 4/12/69 5/12/69 6/12/69 7/12/69 8/12/69 9/12/69 10/12/69 11/12/69 12/12/69 1/1/70 2/1/70 3/1/70 4/1/70 5/1/70 6/1/70 7/1/70 8/1/70 9/1/70 10/1/70 11/1/70 12/1/70 1/2/70 2/2/70 3/2/70 4/2/70 5/2/70 6/2/70 7/2/70 8/2/70 9/2/70 10/2/70 11/2/70 12/2/70 1/3/70 2/3/70 3/3/70 4/3/70 5/3/70 6/3/70 7/3/70 8/3/70 9/3/70 10/3/70 11/3/70 12/3/70 1/4/70 2/4/70 3/4/70 4/4/70 5/4/70 6/4/70 7/4/70 8/4/70 9/4/70 10/4/70 11/4/70 12/4/70 1/5/70 2/5/70 3/5/70 4/5/70 5/5/70 6/5/70 7/5/70 8/5/70 9/5/70 10/5/70 11/5/70 12/5/70 1/6/70 2/6/70 3/6/70 4/6/70 5/6/70 6/6/70 7/6/70 8/6/70 9/6/70 10/6/70 11/6/70 12/6/70 1/7/70 2/7/70 3/7/70 4/7/70 5/7/70 6/7/70 7/7/70 8/7/70 9/7/70 10/7/70 11/7/70 12/7/70 1/8/70 2/8/70 3/8/70 4/8/70 5/8/70 6/8/70 7/8/70 8/8/70 9/8/70 10/8/70 11/8/70 12/8/70 1/9/70 2/9/70 3/9/70 4/9/70 5/9/70 6/9/70 7/9/70 8/9/70 9/9/70 10/9/70 11/9/70 12/9/70 1/10/70 2/10/70 3/10/70 4/10/70 5/10/70 6/10/70 7/10/70 8/10/70 9/10/70 10/10/70 11/10/70 12/10/70 1/11/70 2/11/70 3/11/70 4/11/70 5/11/70 6/11/70 7/11/70 8/11/70 9/11/70 10/11/70 11/11/70 12/11/70 1/12/70 2/12/70 3/12/70 4/12/70 5/12/70 6/12/70 7/12/70 8/12/70 9/12/70 10/12/70 11/12/70 12/12/70 1/1/71 2/1/71 3/1/71 4/1/71 5/1/71 6/1/71 7/1/71 8/1/71 9/1/71 10/1/71 11/1/71 12/1/71 1/2/71 2/2/71 3/2/71 4/2/71 5/2/71 6/2/71 7/2/71 8/2/71 9/2/71 10/2/71 11/2/71 12/2/71 1/3/71 2/3/71 3/3/71 4/3/71 5/3/71 6/3/71 7/3/71 8/3/71 9/3/71 10/3/71 11/3/71 12/3/71 1/4/71 2/4/71 3/4/71 4/4/71 5/4/71 6/4/71 7/4/71 8/4/71 9/4/71 10/4/71 11/4/71 12/4/71 1/5/71 2/5/71 3/5/71 4/5/71 5/5/71 6/5/71 7/5/71 8/5/71 9/5/71 10/5/71 11/5/71 12/5/71 1/6/71 2/6/71 3/6/71 4/6/71 5/6/71 6/6/71 7/6/71 8/6/71 9/6/71 10/6/71 11/6/71 12/6/71 1/7/71 2/7/71 3/7/71 4/7/71 5/7/71 6/7/71 7/7/71 8/7/71 9/7/71 10/7/71 11/7/71 12/7/71 1/8/71 2/8/71 3/8/71 4/8/71 5/8/71 6/8/71 7/8/71 8/8/71 9/8/71 10/8/71 11/8/71 12/8/71 1/9/71 2/9/71 3/9/71 4/9/71 5/9/71 6/9/71 7/9/71 8/9/71 9/9/71 10/9/71 11/9/71 12/9/71 1/10/71 2/10/71 3/10/71 4/10/71 5/10/71 6/10/71 7/10/71 8/10/71 9/10/71 10/10/71 11/10/71 12/10/71 1/11/71 2/11/71 3/11/71 4/11/71 5/11/71 6/11/71 7/11/71 8/11/71 9/11/71 10/11/71 11/11/71 12/11/71 1/12/71 2/12/71 3/12/71 4/12/71 5/12/71 6/12/71 7/12/71 8/12/71 9/12/71 10/12/71 11/12/71 12/12/71 1/1/72 2/1/72 3/1/72 4/1/72 5/1/72 6/1/72 7/1/72 8/1/72 9/1/72 10/1/72 11/1/72 12/1/72 1/2/72 2/2/72 3/2/72 4/2/72 5/2/72 6/2/72 7/2/72 8/2/72 9/2/72 10/2/72 11/2/72 12/2/72 1/3/72 2/3/72 3/3/72 4/3/72 5/3/72 6/3/72 7/3/72 8/3/72 9/3/72 10/3/72 11/3/72 12/3/72 1/4/72 2/4/72 3/4/72 4/4/72 5/4/72 6/4/72 7/4/72 8/4/72 9/4/72 10/4/72 11/4/72 12/4/72 1/5/72 2/5/72 3/5/72 4/5/72 5/5/72 6/5/72 7/5/72 8/5/72 9/5/72 10/5/72 11/5/72 12/5/72 1/6/72 2/6/72 3/6/72 4/6/72 5/6/72 6/6/72 7/6/72 8/6/72 9/6/72 10/6/72 11/6/72 12/6/72 1/7/72 2/7/72 3/7/72 4/7/72 5/7/72 6/7/72 7/7/72 8/7/72 9/7/72 10/7/72 11/7/72 12/7/72 1/8/72 2/8/72 3/8/72 4/8/72 5/8/72 6/8/72 7/8/72 8/8/72 9/8/72 10/8/72 11/8/72 12/8/72 1/9/72 2/9/72 3/9/72 4/9/72 5/9/72 6/9/72 7/9/72 8/9/72 9/9/72 10/9/72 11/9/72 12/9/72 1/10/72 2/10/72 3/10/72 4/10/72 5/10/72 6/10/72 7/10/72 8/10/72 9/10/72 10/10/72 11/10/72 12/10/72 1/11/72 2/11/72 3/11/72 4/11/72 5/11/72 6/11/72 7/11/72 8/11/72 9/11/72 10/11/72 11/11/72 12/11/72 1/12/72 2/12/72 3/12/72 4/12/72 5/12/72 6/12/72 7/12/72 8/12/72 9/12/72 10/12/72 11/12/72 12/12/72 1/1/73 2/1/73 3/1/73 4/1/73 5/1/73 6/1/73 7/1/73 8/1/73 9/1/73 10/1/73 11/1/73 12/1/73 1/2/73 2/2/73 3/2/73 4/2/73 5/2/73 6/2/73 7/2/73 8/2/73 9/2/73 10/2/73 11/2/73 12/2/73 1/3/73 2/3/73 3/3/73 4/3/73 5/3/73 6/3/73 7/3/73 8/3/73 9/3/73 10/3/73 11/3/73 12/3/73 1/4/73 2/4/73 3/4/73 4/4/73 5/4/73 6/4/73 7/4/73 8/4/73 9/4/73 10/4/73 11/4/73 12/4/73 1/5/73 2/5/73 3/5/73 4/5/73 5/5/73 6/5/73 7/5/73 8/5/73 9/5/73 10/5/73 11/5/73 12/5/73 1/6/73 2/6/73 3/6/73 4/6/73 5/6/73 6/6/73 7/6/73 8/6/73 9/6/73 10/6/73 11/6/73 12/6/73 1/7/73 2/7/73 3/7/73 4/7/73 5/7/73 6/7/73 7/7/73 8/7/73 9/7/73 10/7/73 11/7/73 12/7/73 1/8/73 2/8/73 3/8/73 4/8/73 5/8/73 6/8/73 7/8/73 8/8/73 9/8/73 10/8/73 11/8/73 12/8/73 1/9/73 2/9/73 3/9/73 4/9/73 5/9/73 6/9/73 7/9/73 8/9/73 9/9/73 10/9/73 11/9/73 12/9/73 1/10/73 2/10/73 3/10/73 4/10/73 5/10/73 6/10/73 7/10/73 8/10/73 9/10/73 10/10/73 11/10/73 12/10/73 1/11/73 2/11/73 3/11/73 4/11/73 5/11/73 6/11/73 7/11/73 8/11/73 9/11/73 10/11/73 11/11/73 12/11/73 1/12/73 2/12/73 3/12/73 4/12/73 5/12/73 6/12/73 7/12/73 8/12/73 9/12/73 10/12/73 11/12/73 12/12/73 1/1/74 2/1/74 3/1/74 4/1/74 5/1/74 6/1/74 7/1/74 8/1/74 9/1/74 10/1/74 11/1/74 12/1/74 1/2/74 2/2/74 3/2/74 4/2/74 5/2/74 6/2/74 7/2/74 8/2/74 9/2/74 10/2/74 11/2/74 12/2/74 1/3/74 2/3/74 3/3/74 4/3/74 5/3/74 6/3/74 7/3/74 8/3/74 9/3/74 10/3/74 11/3/74 12/3/74 1/4/74 2/4/74 3/4/74 4/4/74 5/4/74 6/4/74 7/4/74 8/4/74 9/4/74 10/4/74 11/4/74 12/4/74 1/5/74 2/5/74 3/5/74 4/5/74 5/5/74 6/5/74 7/5/74 8/5/74 9/5/74 10/5/74 11/5/74 12/5/74 1/6/74 2/6/74 3/6/74 4/6/74 5/6/74 6/6/74 7/6/74 8/6/74 9/6/74 10/6/74 11/6/74 12/6/74 1/7/74 2/7/74 3/7/74 4/7/74 5/7/74 6/7/74 7/7/74 8/7/74 9/7/74 10/7/74 11/7/74 12/7/74 1/8/74 2/8/74 3/8/74 4/8/74 5/8/74 6/8/74 7/8/74 8/8/74 9/8/74 10/8/74 11/8/74 12/8/74 1/9/74 2/9/74 3/9/74 4/9/74 5/9/74 6/9/74 7/9/74 8/9/74 9/9/74 10/9/74 11/9/74 12/9/74 1/10/74 2/10/74 3/10/74 4/10/74 5/10/74 6/10/74 7/10/74 8/10/74 9/10/74 10/10/74 11/10/74 12/10/74 1/11/74 2/11/74 3/11/74 4/11/74 5/11/74 6/11/74 7/11/74 8/11/74 9/11/74 10/11/74 11/11/74 12/11/74 1/12/74 2/12/74 3/12/74 4/12/74 5/12/74 6/12/74 7/12/74 8/12/74 9/12/74 10/12/74 11/12/74 12/12/74 1/1/75 2/1/75 3/1/75 4/1/75 5/1/75 6/1/75 7/1/75 8/1/75 9/1/75 10/1/75 11/1/75 12/1/75 1/2/75 2/2/75 3/2/75 4/2/75 5/2/75 6/2/75 7/2/75 8/2/75 9/2/75 10/2/75 11/2/75 12/2/75 1/3/75 2/3/75 3/3/75 4/3/75 5/3/75 6/3/75 7/3/75 8/3/75 9/3/75 10/3/75 11/3/75 12/3/75 1/4/75 2/4/75 3/4/75 4/4/75 5/4/75 6/4/75 7/4/75 8/4/75 9/4/75 10/4/75 11/4/75 12/4/75 1/5/75 2/5/75 3/5/75 4/5/75 5/5/75 6/5/75 7/5/75 8/5/75 9/5/75 10/5/75 11/5/75 12/5/75 1/6/75 2/6/75 3/6/75 4/6/75 5/6/75 6/6/75 7/6/75 8/6/75 9/6/75 10/6/75 11/6/75 12/6/75 1/7/75 2/7/75 3/7/75 4/7/75 5/7/75 6/7/75 7/7/75 8/7/75 9/7/75 10/7/75 11/7/75 12/7/75 1/8/75 2/8/75 3/8/75 4/8/75 5/8/75 6/8/75 7/8/75 8/8/75 9/8/75 10/8/75 11/8/75 12/8/75 1/9/75 2/9/75 3/9/75 4/9/75 5/9/75 6/9/75 7/9/75 8/9/75 9/9/75 10/9/75 11/9/75 12/9/75 1/10/75 2/10/75 3/10/75 4/10/75 5/10/75 6/10/75 7/10/75 8/10/75 9/10/75 10/10/75 11/10/75 12/10/75 1/11/75 2/11/75 3/11/75 4/11/75 5/11/75 6/11/75 7/11/75 8/11/75 9/11/75 10/11/75 11/11/75 12/11/75 1/12/75 2/12/75 3/12/75 4/12/75 5/12/75 6/12/75 7/12/75 8/12/75 9/12/75 10/12/75 11/12/75 12/12/75 1/1/76 2/1/76 3/1/76 4/1/76 5/1/76 6/1/76 7/1/76 8/1/76 9/1/76 10/1/76 11/1/76 12/1/76 1/2/76 2/2/76 3/2/76 4/2/76 5/2/76 6/2/76 7/2/76 8/2/76 9/2/76 10/2/76 11/2/76 12/2/76 1/3/76 2/3/76 3/3/76 4/3/76 5/3/76 6/3/76 7/3/76 8/3/76 9/3/76 10/3/76 11/3/76 12/3/76 1/4/76 2/4/76 3/4/76 4/4/76 5/4/76 6/4/76 7/4/76 8/4/76 9/4/76 10/4/76 11/4/76 12/4/76 1/5/76 2/5/76 3/5/76 4/5/76 5/5/76 6/5/76 7/5/76 8/5/76 9/5/76 10/5/76 11/5/76 12/5/76 1/6/76 2/6/76 3/6/76 4/6/76 5/6/76 6/6/76 7/6/76 8/6/76 9/6/76 10/6/76 11/6/76 12/6/76 1/7/76 2/7/76 3/7/76 4/7/76 5/7/76 6/7/76 7/7/76 8/7/76 9/7/76 10/7/76 11/7/76 12/7/76 1/8/76 2/8/76 3/8/76 4/8/76 5/8/76 6/8/76 7/8/76 8/8/76 9/8/76 10/8/76 11/8/76 12/8/76 1/9/76 2/9/76 3/9/76 4/9/76 5/9/76 6/9/76 7/9/76 8/9/76 9/9/76 10/9/76 11/9/76 12/9/76 1/10/76 2/10/76 3/10/76 4/10/76 5/10/76 6/10/76 7/10/76 8/10/76 9/10/76 10/10/76 11/10/76 12/10/76 1/11/76 2/11/76 3/11/76 4/11/76 5/11/76 6/11/76 7/11/76 8/11/76 9/11/76 10/11/76 11/11/76 12/11/76 1/12/76 2/12/76 3/12/76 4/12/76 5/12/76 6/12/76 7/12/76 8/12/76 9/12/76 10/12/76 11/12/76 12/12/76 1/1/77 2/1/77 3/1/77 4/1/77 5/1/77 6/1/77 7/1/77 8/1/77 9/1/77 10/1/77 11/1/77 12/1/77 1/2/77 2/2/77 3/2/77 4/2/77 5/2/77 6/2/77 7/2/77 8/2/77 9/2/77 10/2/77 11/2/77 12/2/77 1/3/77 2/3/77 3/3/77 4/3/77 5/3/77 6/3/77 7/3/77 8/3/77 9/3/77 10/3/77 11/3/77 12/3/77 1/4/77 2/4/77 3/4/77 4/4/77 5/4/77 6/4/77 7/4/77 8/4/77 9/4/77 10/4/77 11/4/77 12/4/77 1/5/77 2/5/77 3/5/77 4/5/77 5/5/77 6/5/77 7/5/77 8/5/77 9/5/77 10/5/77 11/5/77 12/5/77 1/6/77 2/6/77 3/6/77 4/6/77 5/6/77 6/6/77 7/6/77 8/6/77 9/6/77 10/6/77 11/6/77 12/6/77 1/7/77 2/7/77 3/7/77 4/7/77 5/7/77 6/7/77 7/7/77 8/7/77 9/7/77 10/7/77 11/7/77 12/7/77 1/8/77 2/8/77 3/8/77 4/8/77 5/8/77 6/8/77 7/8/77 8/8/77 9/8/77 10/8/77 11/8/77 12/8/77 1/9/77 2/9/77 3/9/77 4/9/77 5/9/77 6/9/77 7/9/77 8/9/77 9/9/77 10/9/77 11/9/77 12/9/77 1/10/77 2/10/77 3/10/77 4/10/77 5/10/77 6/10/77 7/10/77 8/10/77 9/10/77 10/10/77 11/10/77 12/10/77 1/11/77 2/11/77 3/11/77 4/11/77 5/11/77 6/11/77 7/11/77 8/11/77 9/11/77 10/11/77 11/11/77 12/11/77 1/12/77 2/12/77 3/12/77 4/12/77 5/12/77 6/12/77 7/12/77 8/12/77 9/12/77 10/12/77 11/12/77 12/12/77 1/1/78 2/1/78 3/1/78 4/1/78 5/1/78 6/1/78 7/1/78 8/1/78 9/1/78 10/1/78 11/1/78 12/1/78 1/2/78 2/2/78 3/2/78 4/2/78 5/2/78 6/2/78 7/2/78 8/2/78 9/2/78 10/2/78 11/2/78 12/2/78 1/3/78 2/3/78 3/3/78 4/3/78 5/3/78 6/3/78 7/3/78 8/3/78 9/3/78 10/3/78 11/3/78 12/3/78 1/4/78 2/4/78 3/4/78 4/4/78 5/4/78 6/4/78 7/4/78 8/4/78 9/4/78 10/4/78 11/4/78 12/4/78 1/5/78 2/5/78 3/5/78 4/5/78 5/5/78 6/5/78 7/5/78 8/5/78 9/5/78 10/5/78 11/5/78 12/5/78 1/6/78 2/6/78 3/6/78 4/6/78 5/6/78 6/6/78 7/6/78 8/6/78 9/6/78 10/6/78 11/6/78 12/6/78 1/7/78 2/7/78 3/7/78 4/7/78 5/7/78 6/7/78 7/7/78 8/7/78 9/7/78 10/7/78 11/7/78 12/7/78 1/8/78 2/8/78 3/8/78 4/8/78 5/8/78 6/8/78 7/8/78 8/8/78 9/8/78 10/8/78 11/8/78 12/8/78 1/9/78 2/9/78 3/9/78 4/9/78 5/9/78 6/9/78 7/9/78 8/9/78 9/9/78 10/9/78 11/9/78 12/9/78 1/10/78 2/10/78 3/10/78 4/10/78 5/10/78 6/10/78 7/10/78 8/10/78 9/10/78 10/10/78 11/10/78 12/10/78 1/11/78 2/11/78 3/11/78 4/11/78 5/11/78 6/11/78 7/11/78 8/11/78 9/11/78 10/11/78 11/11/78 12/11/78 1/12/78 2/12/78 3/12/78 4/12/78 5/12/78 6/12/78 7/12/78 8/12/78 9/12/78 10/12/78 11/12/78 12/12/78 1/1/79 2/1/79 3/1/79 4/1/79 5/1/79 6/1/79 7/1/79 8/1/79 9/1/79 10/1/79 11/1/79 12/1/79 1/2/79 2/2/79 3/2/79 4/2/79 5/2/79 6/2/79 7/2/79 8/2/79 9/2/79 10/2/79 11/2/79 12/2/79 1/3/79 2/3/79 3/3/79 4/3/79 5/3/79 6/3/79 7/3/79 8/3/79 9/3/79 10/3/79 11/3/79 12/3/79 1/4/79 2/4/79 3/4/79 4/4/79 5/4/79 6/4/79 7/4/79 8/4/79 9/4/79 10/4/79 11/4/79 12/4/79 1/5/79 2/5/79 3/5/79 4/5/79 5/5/79 6/5/79 7/5/79 8/5/79 9/5/79 10/5/79 11/5/79 12/5/79 1/6/79 2/6/79 3/6/79 4/6/79 5/6/79 6/6/79 7/6/79 8/6/79 9/6/79 10/6/79 11/6/79 12/6/79 1/7/79 2/7/79 3/7/79 4/7/79 5/7/79 6/7/

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI  
89  
9

CYPHER CAT A

FLASH

FM KAMPALA 091515Z

CONFIDENTIAL.

TO FLASH FCO TELNO 130 OF 9 JUNE

AND TO IMMEDIATE PARIS, WASHINGTON, NAIROBI, KINSHASA.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF NOTE TO FRENCH AMBASSADOR OF TODAY'S DATE  
DELIVERED THIS EVENING.

QUOTE

BEGINS. I AM DIRECTED BY HIS EXCELLENCY THE LIFE PRESIDENT TO  
INFORM YOU THAT HIS EXCELLENCY HAS RECEIVED INFORMATION AND  
CONCRETE EVIDENCE FROM THE SECURITY FORCES TO THE EFFECT THAT SOME  
BRITISH NATIONALS ARE USING FACILITIES GIVEN BY THE FRENCH EMBASSY  
FOR SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES AGAINST UGANDA.

HIS EXCELLENCY HAS FURTHER ASKED ME TO INFORM YOU THAT THE GOVERNMENT  
AND THE PEOPLE OF FRANCE, UNDER THE WISE LEADERSHIP OF HIS EXCELLENCY  
PRESIDENT VALERY GISCARD D'ESTAING OF FRANCE, ENJOY EXCELLENT  
RELATIONS WITH THE GOVERNMENT AND THE PEOPLE OF UGANDA, AND ALSO THE  
FRENCH GOVERNMENT HAS VERY GOOD RELATIONS WITH MANY AFRICAN COUNTRIES  
AS WELL AS THE ARAB WORLD.

IN VIEW OF THESE EXCELLENT RELATIONS, HIS EXCELLENCY THE LIFE  
PRESIDENT DOES NOT WISH THE BRITISH NATIONALS OR THE BRITISH  
GOVERNMENT TO INVOLVE FRANCE IN MATTERS CONCERNING BRITAIN AND  
UGANDA.

FOR THIS REASON, HIS EXCELLENCY THE LIFE PRESIDENT HAS ASKED ME  
TO INFORM YOU, AND THROUGH YOU, THE GOVERNMENT OF FRANCE, THAT  
THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT SHOULD CEASE TO LOOK AFTER THE INTERESTS OF  
BRITAIN IN UGANDA. HIS EXCELLENCY'S DECISION DOES NOT MEAN THAT  
THE TWO BRITONS NOW WORKING IN YOUR EMBASSY AND LOOKING AFTER THE  
BRITISH INTERESTS SHOULD LEAVE UGANDA. THESE TWO BRITONS, HIS

/EXCELLENCY STATED

CONFIDENTIAL

EXCELLENCY STATED, MAY REMAIN IN UGANDA BUT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT SHOULD APPOINT ANOTHER EMBASSY TO LOOK AFTER HER INTERESTS IN UGANDA.

PLEASE ACCEPT YOUR EXCELLENCY THE ASSURANCES OF MY HIGHEST CONSIDERATION.

J.E. EKOCHU

PRINCIPAL PRIVATE SECRETARY TO THE PRESIDENT

ENDS

UNQUOTE

2. FURTHER FLASH TELEGRAM FOLLOWS.

GLASBY

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

EAD

CONSULAR D

CONS FM UNIT

WED

ECD

CABINET OFFICE

COPIES TO

DIO

CABINET OFFICE

[COPIES SENT TO  
NO 10 DOWNING ST]

2

CONFIDENTIAL



2010  
8/1

BRIGADIER BISHOP

2010  
6/5

In reply to your note of 8 June 1977 addressed to Mr Smith, I have been asked to let you know that you may use the £10 float authorised after WINTEX to buy in stock.

The Accountant will replace the amount.

*R J Mayne*

R J MAYNE

9 June 1977



Colonel R R Owens OBE  
Director of Catering, D Dept  
**METROPOLITAN POLICE**  
Tintagel House  
Albert Embankment  
London SE1 7TT



01-230-5236

✓  
1/6 9<sup>th</sup> June 1977

Reg. Owens

*Dear Sir Clive,*



Thank you very much for your nice letter of 8 June regarding the catering arrangements for last Tuesday. I am delighted that we were able to help on this occasion and that all went off well. I will pass on your appreciation to the staff concerned.

Scotland Yard is now geared to meet any emergency from the Cabinet Office and we are only too pleased to be of assistance.

*Yours sincerely,*

*Reg Owens*

Sir Clive Rose  
Cabinet Office  
London SW1A 2AS

	9	10	FRI	FRI/SAT	SAT	SAT/SUN	SUN	SUN/MON	MON
CX	1800 - 0900	0900 - 1800	1800 - 0900	0900 - 1800	0900 - 2000	1930 - 0930	0900 - 2000	1930 - 0930	0900 - 1800
Bishop ✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓				✓
HUTCHINSON ✓	✓						✓		
VOTRAM ✓						✓			
VRIGHT ✓						✓			
COCK ✓								✓	
NELLER ✓									✓
RIDER ✓			✓						
MILLIS ✓			✓	✓	✓				
DEBRIER ✓					✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
VEITTETON ✓					✓	✓	✓		
HILTON ✓				✓	✓	✓			
LEWIS ✓					✓				
MORRIS ✓					✓		✓		
ROBERTSON ✓									
HULME ✓									
lane 0730			2		2		2	2	
Uncle 1300			-		2		2		-
After 1900			2		2		2		2



MR R W SMITH

COBR

I expect you know the COBR has been manned since 9.30 am 7 June and the Metropolitan Police caterers provided lunch and tea for about 36 and supper for 10. I have spoken to their Finance Officer who expects to get authority to make this an operational charge on the Police Vote and will not be seeking recovery from Departments concerned which, in any event, would be a lengthy clerical process. He will let you know.

You won't be surprised to hear a quantity of the COBR bar stock was consumed and I shall have to replace this as soon as possible. Customers included the Home Secretary, Metropolitan Police Officers and other non-civil servants and I would prefer not to have to raise individual bills for "one beer", "one gin and tonic" etc. May I therefore use the £10 float which you authorised after WINTEX to buy in stock and have the £10 cash replaced?

J R BISHOP

8 June 1977

233 8378

*Brig. Bishop*  
*FILE*

8th June 1977

As you know, the Cabinet Office called on your organisation again on 7th June to support an operational commitment and I am writing at the Home Secretary's request and on my own behalf to thank you for the excellent service your staff provided at very short notice. That our request should have been made on a day when your people were heavily engaged on Jubilee tasks must have been very unwelcome, but the response was immediate and cheerfully given - and, if I may say so, reflects most creditably on all who were involved. We were particularly grateful to Mr Cameron and Mrs Clay for all they did. Brigadier Bishop is ready to discuss payment of the account with your finance officer when you wish.

CLIVE ROSE

Colonel R R Owens,  
Metropolitan Police,  
Tintagel House,  
Albert Embankment,  
SE1

6Q

2 June 1977



With reference to Colin Wilson's letter N 01957 of 27 May 1977, please attach the enclosed Annex D (Revise) to cover the Jubilee weekend 2-8 June.

Copies go to Baker, Evans, Russell-Jones, Evans and the Duty Officer here.

R J BISHOP

J R D Gildea Esq  
Department of Trade  
Shell Mex House



U046

DIO

cc Mr Wilson  
→ Brigadier Bishop

**EXCLUSION OF PRESIDENT AMIN: ALERT LIST**

1. I have checked the movements over The Jubilee weekend of the typing and note-taking staff on paragraphs 2 d. and e. of the alert list.
2. For the typists, I suggest that in the first instance you should contact:

Miss H W Smith

and Miss B F Wallen (who can be contacted via Wing Cdr Hutchinson's bleep)

3. For the note takers, the following will be in London:  
Mr Anderson (telephone number is now 946 2601)  
Mr Jenkins  
Mr Plowman  
Mr Roberts

**R C MOTTRAM**

2 June 1977



10 DOWNING STREET

WL  
1/6

With the compliments of

P. R. H. WRIGHT




CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

1 June 1977



President Amin

As you know, the Commonwealth Secretary General sent us last night a copy of a telegram which he had received from President Amin about the Prime Minister's letter of 22 May (a copy of which was annexed to the note of the Prime Minister's meeting with Prince Fahd of Saudi Arabia on that day). I enclose a copy of President Amin's message with this letter.

At the Prime Minister's request, we immediately contacted Mr. Ramphal and discussed our response to the message with him. He confirmed that he was himself proposing to take no action at all on the telegram, but commented that the message seemed to him to be out of character with President Amin's usual conduct and was phrased in a low key. He admitted that there were veiled threats in it, but thought that it was designed to maintain uncertainty as to his intentions, while preparing the ground for his not coming at all.

Since it later became clear that the text of President Amin's message was already known to the press, it was agreed that the No. 10 Press Office should confirm that the Prime Minister had written a personal and confidential letter to President Amin; that we could not discuss the contents of the letter, since it was confidential; but that the Prime Minister had advised President Amin that it would not be appropriate for him to visit this country. We would also confirm that President Amin had sent a telegram to the Commonwealth Secretary General referring to Mr. Callaghan's letter, and that Mr. Ramphal had sent this on to the Prime Minister.

I am sending a copy of this, with enclosure, to Bob Morris (Home Office), and to Martin Vile and Sir Clive Rose (Cabinet Office)


P. R. H. WRIGHT

J.S. Wall, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office,

STATE EXTERIOR

SHRIDATH RUMPHAL  
SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE COMMONWEALTH  
MARLBOROUGH HOUSE  
LONDON SW1Y 5HX  
LONDON.

31/5/1977.



736. FROM A PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL LETTER ADDRESSED TO ME BY THE BRITISH PRIME MINISTER COMMA THE RIGHT HON JAMES CALLAGHAN COMMA DATED 22ND MAY 1977 THE CONTENTS WHICH I DO NOT WISH TO REVEAL AT THE EEE AT THIS MOMENT COMMA IT HAS NOW BECOME ABANDANTLY CLEAR THAT IT IS NOT THE WISH OF THE GOVERNMENT OF HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN THAT LEADERS WHO SPEAK OUT FRANKLY ON MATTERS AFFECTING THE FUTURE OF THE COMMONWEALTH COMMA

ESPECIALLY NOW WHEN ALMOST ALL COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES ARE INDEPENDENT AND SOVEREIGN STATES COMMA SHOULD GO TO LONDON TO ATTEND THE MEETING OF THE HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT OF THE COMMONWEALTH STOP

THIS ATTITUDE CLEARLY DEMONSTRATES THAT ALTHOUGH BRITAIN HAS LONG CEASED TO BE AN EMPIRE COMMA OF WHICH SHE WAS THE MASTER AND THE COLONIES THE SLAVES COMMA SHE IS STILL CLINGING TO DAY-LIGHT DREAMS IN WHICH SHE PRETENDS TO ARROGATE TO HERSELF THE RIGHT TO EXCLUDE AN INDEPENDENT AND SOVEREIGN STATE LIKE UGANDA FROM ATTENDING THE COMMONWEALTH MEETING OF HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT S TOP

IT IS OBVIOUS THAT THIS HAS BEEN DUE TO THE FACT THAT IT IS UGANDA'S INTENTION AT THE FORTH-COMING COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCE TO POINT OUT THE TWO THOUSAND MISTAKES MADE BY BRITAIN DURING HER COLONIAL RUL STOP

I WISH TO MAKE IT ABSOLUTELY CLEAR THAT GONE ARE THE DAYS WHEN BRITAIN WIELDED THE POWERS AND AUTHORITY OF AN IMPERIAL MASTER OVER THE COMMONWEALTH STOP

IT IS ONLY THOSE TRUE NATIONALIST LEADERS LIKE MYSELF WHO REFUSE TO BE MICROPHONES OF GREAT BRITAIN OR ANY OTHER IMPERIALIST POWER AND TO SACRIFICE TO THEIR NEO-COLONIALIST AND IMPERIALISTIC ORDERS THAT FALL THE VICTIMS OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENTS MANIPULATION OF THE COMMONWEALTH STOP

BY TELLING A MEMBER STATE OF AN INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATION WHO SHOULD REPRESENT IT AT MEETINGS OF THAT ORGANISATION COMMA THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT IS NOT ONLY INTERFERING IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE EEE OF THE STATE BUT ALSO CREATING A BAD AND DANGEROUS PRECEDENT FOR THE FUTURE OF THE COMMONWEALTH STOP

BY RISING UP BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP AND MISUNDERSTANDINGS WITH

... CONCERNING THE ENTIRE COMMONWEALTH FAMILY BRITAIN IS YET  
MISSING ANOTHER GRAVE MISTAKE STOP

I AM COMMA HOWEVER COMMA CONFIDENT THAT WHTEVER MANOEUVERS AND  
MACHINATIONS BRITAIN AND A FEW OTHER MEMBERS WHO ARE IN HER POCKETS  
MAY MAKE COMMA THESE DO NOT REPRESENT THE TRUE FEELINGS OF OUR ORGA-  
NISATION STOP

AS FOR YOU COMMA MY DEAR MR SECRETARY GENERAL COMMA PERHAPS I DO  
NOT NEED TO REMIND YOU THAT YOUR ELECTION TO THAT POST BY A UNANI-  
MOUS VOTE OF THE MEMBER STATES OF THE COMMONWEALTH AT THE LAST  
MEETING IN KINGSTONE COMMA JAMAICA COMMA IN 1975 COMMA WAS ONLY MADE  
POSSIBLE BY THE DIRECTIVES I GAVE TO MY DELEGATION TO THAT CONFERENCE  
TO SUPPORT YOU AS THE FIRST SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE COMMONWEALTH  
FROM A THIRD WORLD COUNTRY WHICH IS ALSO A MEMBER OF THE NON-ALIGNED  
MOVEMENT STOP

I WOULD BE FAILING IN MY DUTY OF PROMOTING THE NOBLE IDEALS FOR  
WHICH THE COMMONWEALTH STANDS IF I DID NOT CAUTION AGAINST THE DAN-  
GERS OF THE COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT BEING MANIPULATED BY A MEMBER  
OF OUR ORGANISATION STOP

I THOUGHT IT NECESSARY THAT I SHOULD INFORM YOU ABOUT THE RECENT  
COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE BRITISH PRIME MINISTER AND MYSELF SO AS TO  
LET YOU KNOW UGANDAS POSITION CONCERNING THE FORTH-COMING MEETING  
OF THE COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT JUST IN CASE UGANDA  
IS NOT REPRESENTED STOP

I WISH COMMA HOWEVER COMMA TO ASSURE YOU COMMA YOUR EXCELLENCY  
COMMA THAT UGANDA IS COMMITTED TO THE IDEALS FOR WHICH THE COMMON  
WEALTH STANDS AND APPRECIATES THE EFFORTS YOU AS ITS SECRETARY GENE-  
RAL IS MAKING TO WARDS THEIR REALIZATION STOP

FINALLY COMMA PLEASE COMMA ACCEPT COMMA YOUR EXCELLENCY COMMA  
THE ASSURANCE OF MY HIGHEST CONSIDERATION AND ESTEEM.

AL-HAJI FIELD MARSHAL DR IDI AMIN DADA  
VC, DSO, MC, LIFE PRESIDENT OF THE  
REPUBLIC OF UGANDA.  
-----

C. THE RT HON JAMES CALLAGHAN  
BRITISH PRIME MINISTER  
NO 10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON. (THROUGH THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE COMMONWEALTH)  
-----

H E DR ETEKI MBOUMOUA  
SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE OAU ADDIS ABABA  
(FOR THE INFORMATION OF ALL MEMBER STATES)

BY AVOIDING A BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP ANY MISUNDERSTANDINGS WITH

AL-HAJI FIELD MARSHAL DR IDI AMIN DADA  
VC, DSO, MC, LIFE PRESIDENT OF THE  
REPUBLIC OF UGANDA.  
-----

C.C. THE RT HON JAMES CALLAGHAN  
BRITISH PRIME MINISTER  
NO 10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON. (THROUGH THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE COMMONWEALTH)  
-----

" H E DR ETEKI MBOUMOUA  
SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE OAU ADDIS ABABA  
(FOR THE INFORMATION OF ALL MEMBER STATES)

" H E MAHAMOUD RIAD  
SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE ARAB LEAGUE  
CAIRO. (FOR THE INFORMATION OF ALL MEMBER STATES)

" H E DR KURT WALDHEIM  
SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS  
NEW YORK. (FOR THE INFORMATION OF ALL MEMBER STATES)

" H E MRS SIRIMAVO BANDARANAIKE  
CURRENT CHAIRMAN OF THE  
5TH CONFERENCE OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT  
COLOMBO.  
-----

" H E MARSHAL JOSIP BROZ TITO  
PRESIDENT OF THE SOCIALIST FEDERALIC REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA  
BELGRADE.  
-----

31ST MAY 1977.

.....

-----  
THAT AT MEETINGS OF THAT ORGANISATION COMMA THE BRITI-  
SH GOVERNMENT IS NOT ONLY INTERFERRING IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE  
EEE OF THE STATE BUT ALSO CREATING A BAD AND DANGEROUS PRECEDENT FOR  
THE FUTURE OF THE COMMONWEALTHSTOP

-----  
BY AVOIDING UP BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP AND MISUNDERSTANDINGS WITH



*Handwritten: Please see (in memo) the last 7 lines.*

SIR CLIVE ROSE

cc Mr Bryars  
Mr Wilson  
Mr Mottram

*Handwritten: 6902*

# EXCLUSION OF PRESIDENT AMIN

Another meeting was held at the Home Office on 1 June under Mr Armstrong's chairmanship to take stock of contingency plans to ensure the exclusion of President Amin should he arrive between now and 15 June. The following were the main conclusions -

- i. Ministers have approved recommendations in the submission made to the Home Secretary on 26 May (copy attached).
- ii. The states of readiness of all contingency plans are to remain as laid down on 27 May.
- iii. All United Kingdom Chief Constables, Immigration Officers and Airport Directors are now to be informed of the Government's intentions regarding Amin.
- iv. The FCO will notify all concerned if there are any developments regarding Amin's declared intentions which would enable the present state of readiness to be relaxed during the Jubilee weekend. Conversely if reliable information about his arrival becomes available, a decision to deploy security forces and man the COBR by a given time will be taken by the Home Office, in consultation, in accordance with alert procedures.

I attach a revised Annex D to Mr Wilson's letter <sup>N 01957</sup>~~5038~~ dated 27 May containing silent hours telephone numbers of officials for the period 2 June - 8 June.

The consensus of well informed opinion about Amin's intentions was that it is now slightly less likely that he intended to arrive than before. However, Mr Hennessy (who of course knew him personally) described his message to the Secretary General of the Commonwealth as uncharacteristic and possibly deliberately misleading.

*Handwritten signature: R J Bishop*

R J BISHOP

1 June 1977

SECRET

*Recommendations to Ministers*

26. Ministers are invited:

- i) to approve the contingency plans described in this note;
- ii) specifically, to agree that, if Amin arrives with a delegation, the whole party shall be refused entry, unless the Ugandan Government has given advance notice of the composition of a delegation, or unless, while the party is here, an acceptable delegation without Amin is named, in which case members of the delegation should be allowed to enter and Amin and others refused;
- iii) specifically, to agree that Amin's personal aircraft or any suspicious flight from Uganda should be refused clearance to enter British air space or to land in Britain by NATS, notwithstanding anything in the Chicago Convention to the contrary;
- iv) to decide whether personnel and vehicles of the armed services should be on call within half an hour's driving time of Stansted by 5.00 pm on Sunday 29 May;
- v) to note the desirability, on planning grounds, of an early announcement of the decision to exclude Amin.

SECRET

Mr Wilson



- This is BBC  
Monitoring  
(Caversham)

\$10

MIINN ZCZ  
BBC B

\*\*\*\*\* U R G E N T \*\*\*\*\*

B56 AMIN DISPLEASED AFTER CALLAGHAN LETTER - HINTS AT MISSING  
COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCE

(UGANDA BROADCASTING CORPORATION) PRESIDENT AMIN HAS TOLD THE  
SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE COMMONWEALTH THAT, BASING ON THE LETTER  
WRITTEN TO HIM BY THE BRITISH PRIME MINISTER RECENTLY, IT IS  
NOW CLEAR THAT THE QUEEN'S GOVERNMENT DOES NOT WISH LEADERS WHO  
SPEAK FRANKLY TO ATTEND THE FORTHCOMING COMMONWEALTH MEETING DUE  
IN LONDON NEXT MONTH.

MF BBC MON 2127 LSE 31/5

B56 AMIN DISPLEASED 2: OUTSPOKEN LEADERS NOT WELCOME

THE TELEGRAM READS (ED: IN PART):

YOUR EXCELLENCY, FROM A PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL LETTER  
ADDRESSED TO ME BY THE BRITISH PRIME MINISTER, THE RIGHT  
HONOURABLE JAMES CALLAGHAN, DATED 22ND MAY 1977, THE CONTENTS  
OF WHICH I DO NOT WISH TO REVEAL AT THIS MOMENT, IT HAS NOW  
BECOME ABUNDANTLY CLEAR THAT IT IS NOT THE WISH OF THE GOVERNMENT  
OF HER MAJESTY THAT LEADERS WHO SPEAK OUT FRANKLY ON MATTERS  
AFFECTING THE FUTURE OF THE COMMONWEALTH, ESPECIALLY (2 NOW  
THAT ALL THE SAID) COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES ARE INDEPENDENT AND  
SOVEREIGN STATES, SHOULD GO TO LONDON TO ATTEND THE MEETING OF  
THE HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT OF THE COMMONWEALTH.

MF BBC MON 2129 LSE 31/5

B56 AMIN DISPLEASED 3: BRITAIN CLAIMS RIGHT TO EXCLUDE MEMBER STATE

THIS ATTITUDE CLEARLY DEMONSTRATES THAT ALTHOUGH BRITAIN HAS LONG CEASED TO BE AN EMPIRE OF WHICH SHE WAS THE MASTER SHE STILL CLAIMS (SEVERAL WORDS INDISTINCT) THE RIGHT TO EXCLUDE AN INDEPENDENT AND SOVEREIGN STATE LIKE UGANDA FROM ATTENDING THE COMMONWEALTH MEETING OF HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT.

IT IS OBVIOUS THAT THIS WAS DUE TO THE FACT IT IS UGANDA'S INTENTION AT THE FORTHCOMING COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCE TO POINT OUT THE 2,000 MISTAKES MADE BY BRITAIN DURING HER COLONIAL RULE. IS WISH TO MAKE IT ABSOLUTELY CLEAR THAT GONE ARE THE DAYS WHEN BRITAIN WIELDED THE POWER OF AN AUTHORITY OF AN IMPERIAL MASTER OVER THE COMMONWEALTH.

MF BBC MON 2111 LSE 31/5

B56 AMIN DISPLEASED 4: BAD AND DANGEROUS PRECEDENT

BY TELLING A MEMBER STATE OF AN INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATION, WHO IS TO BE REPRESENTED AT THE MEETING OF THAT ORGANISATION, THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT IS NOT ONLY INTERFERING IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THAT STATE BUT ALSO CREATING A BAD AND DANGEROUS PRECEDENT FOR THE FUTURE OF THE COMMONWEALTH.

BY MIXING UP BILATERAL RELATIONSHIPS AND MISUNDERSTANDINGS WITH AFFAIRS CONCERNING THE ENTIRE COMMONWALTH FAMILY, BRITAIN IS YET COMMITTING ANOTHER GRAVE MISTAKE.

I AM, HOWEVER, CONFIDENT THAT WHATEVER MANOEUVRES AND MACHINATIONS BRITAIN AND A FEW OTHER MEMBERS WHO ARE IN HER POCKET MAY MAKE, THESE DO NOT REPRESENT THE TRUE FEELINGS OF OUR ORGANISATION.

MF BBC MON 2113 LSE 31/5 (REUTERS) (TVN)



2  
B56 AMIN DISPLEASED 5 +JUST IN CASE UGANDA IS NOT REPRESENTED.

I WOULD BE FAILING IN MY DUTY OF PROMOTING THE NOBLEST IDEAS FOR WHICH THE COMMONWEALTH STANDS IF I DO NOT CAUTION AGAINST THE DANGERS OF THE COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT BEING MANIPULATED BY A MEMBER OF OUR ORGANISATION.

I FELT IT NECESSARY I SHOULD INFORM YOU ABOUT THE RECENT COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE BRITISH PRIME MINISTER AND MYSELF SO AS TO LET YOU KNOW UGANDA'S POSITION CONCERNING THE FORTHCOMING MEETING OF THE COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT, JUST IN CASE UGANDA IS NOT REPRESENTED. I WISH, HOWEVER, TO ASSURE YOU, YOUR EXCELLENCY, THAT UGANDA IS COMMITTED TO THE IDEALS FOR WHICH THE COMMONWEALTH STANDS AND APPRECIATES THE EFFORTS YOU, AS ITS SECRETARY-GENERAL, ARE MAKING TOWARDS THEIR REALISATION.

A COPY OF THE TELEGRAM HAS BEEN SENT TO MR. CALLAGHAN.

END BBC MON 2115 31/5 ZA

SECRET



10 DOWNING STREET

a Sir d Rife 6  
log 30.

From the Private Secretary

7192

30 May 1977

7/26 pt

President Amin



Thank you for your letter of 26 May with which you enclosed a copy of a submission about contingency plans in connection with President Amin. I have also seen a copy of Stephen Wall's letter of 25 May to you.

Subject to comments by the Home Secretary and other Ministers, the Prime Minister is generally content with the recommendations in the enclosure to your letter, and in particular with the recommendations in paragraphs 3, 8, 9 and 14.

The Prime Minister has noted that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Ministry of Defence are considering the question of alternative destinations, if it proved necessary to fly President Amin out of this country by R.A.F. aircraft, and would like to see further advice on this point. On the point raised in paragraph 24, namely whether further people should be brought in to detailed planning, the Prime Minister's view is that this can and should now be done.

I am copying this letter to the other recipients of yours and to Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

P. R. H. WRIGHT

R. M. Morris, Esq.,  
Home Office.

SECRET

MR WILSON

cc Mr Mottram  
Mr Crudge

COBR

You may care to have a note about arrangements which have been made to support the COBR, if and when activated, in case I am not available at the time they are required.

<u>Facility</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
MOD TV Centre	- Will be manned unless ordered to the contrary from 3.00 pm 29 May. Instructions to vary this order should be sent, in working hours, to 218 6587 or in silent hours to 218 6501.
COBR technician	- As above.
Government cars	- Three cars will be on call from noon 29 May and can report to 70 Whitehall within 15 minutes. Contact 212 5451 for action. <i>After 29 May contact 212 8127</i>
<i>Mrs Widdington</i> <i>" Knichcliffe</i>	
Police escort vehicle	- On permanent standby. Contact Metropolitan Police Information Room 230 1212 or Superintendent Fountain 230 3889 <i>or Traffic Office 230 2331</i>
Maps and Airport diagrams	- Cover for Stansted, Heathrow, Brize Norton, Lyneham and Gatwick is in rolls on top of map cupboard.
Meals	- Available at 1½ hours' notice from Metropolitan Police caterers. Contact 230 <del>3606/2669</del> <i>4581</i> by day or 230 3827 by night. <i>2989</i>
Dormitories <i>040</i> <i>044</i> <i>050</i> <i>052</i>	- 20 beds in empty offices on Ground Floor front. Extra beds in store beneath Private Office; key no. 73 from Security Guard Room.
<i>Typist 042</i>	

Facility

Security

Bar

Remarks

- Mr Underwood warned of possible activation - will require Front Door list in due course.

- Stocked! Security cupboard in annex to Conference Room.

*Combination 21/64/56/00*

*R J Bishop*

R J BISHOP

27 May 1977

Sir C. Rose's Copy - D - J. H. H. 5  
31/8/77 Mrs. H. H. H. 4 En

5838

27 May 1977

N 01957

J R D Gildes Esq  
Department of Trade  
Shell Mex House

363/18/18  
copy on 363/7

#### THE EXCLUSION OF PRESIDENT AMIN

As you know, contingency plans have been prepared to ensure the exclusion of President Amin from the United Kingdom should he arrive to attend the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHGM) from 8-15 June. In the event of President Amin attempting to land in this country, the Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms would be brought into operation to co-ordinate the Government's response. As it is possible that President Amin might seek to come before the Meeting begins, the COBR will be on the alert from 28 May to the end of the Meeting.

2. It has been agreed that the alert procedures for activating the COBR should be based generally upon those used in terrorist incidents and set out in IRO(77) 11 of 18 April 1977. A summary of the arrangements, modified to take account of the different circumstances surrounding the possible arrival of Amin, is attached at Annex A. Lists of officials to be contacted in working hours (Annex B), of Duty Officers (Annex C), and of officials to be consulted out of hours on whether the COBR should be opened (Annex D) are also attached. These annexes should be kept ready to hand and not filed with Departmental papers until the period of alert is over.

3. I should be grateful if you and the copy addressees of this letter would ensure that these instructions are brought to the attention of duty officers and other officials who might be involved in the operation of the COBR. It should be remembered that the COBR is required to be activated within one hour of a decision to open it and that it is the responsibility of Departments to ensure that they can meet this requirement.

4. I am sending copies of my letter to Baker (Home Office, Evans (FCO), Russell-Jones (Security Service) and Bevan (MOD).

C WILSON

Summary of Alert ProceduresDuring Office Hours

It is likely that the Department of Trade will be the first to receive information about the possible arrival of President Amin. They should alert <sup>Duty Officer in the</sup> the Cabinet Office <sup>Briefing Room</sup> Home Office, ECO, MOD and the Security Service. The decision to ~~open~~ the COBR should be taken as soon as possible after consultations between these Departments. The officials listed at Annex B are responsible for co-ordinating information and will ensure that officials in their own Departments are alerted and directed to the briefing rooms as soon as the decision has been taken.

Call Ministers  
Officials inco

Out of Office Hours call Ministers / Officials to

- A. When the need to ~~open~~ the COBR at a certain time has not already been anticipated, the sequence of events will be:

a. The Duty Officer who receives the first warning will pass it to one of his own officials;

b. On instructions from this official the Duty Officer will immediately inform the Duty Officers concerned in the other Departments listed at Annex C;

c. If he is unable to contact an official in his own Department, he should inform the Duty Officer in the Cabinet Office <sup>Briefing Room</sup>.

d. Once contacted, Departments concerned will consult and reach a decision on whether to ~~open~~ the Briefing Rooms (in a situation of urgency the Cabinet Office might take this decision alone);

Call  
Ministers / Officials  
inco

e. Once it has been decided to ~~open~~ <sup>man</sup> the COBR, the Duty Officers in each of the Departments concerned will be told to -

- i. arrange for an official to go to the COBR;
- ii. inform the responsible Departmental Minister;
- iii. inform the Cabinet Office of the names of officials and Ministers expected to arrive at the Briefing Rooms.

- B. When it has been decided in advance that the COBR will be activated at a certain time to deal with the arrival of a suspect plane, the sequence of events will be:

a. Cabinet Office will ensure that all Departments are aware of the time at which the CORR is to be activated.

b. Departmental officials will ensure that their Duty Officer knows which officials from his Department intend to be present at the CORR at the specified time.

c. If, for any reason, the time at which the CORR is to be activated is changed, the Cabinet Office Duty Officer will inform each of the other Duty Officers.

d. Departmental Duty Officers will be responsible for informing officials in their own Department of the change in arrangements.

**SECRET**HOME OFFICE  
WHITEHALL SW1A 2AP

27 May 1977

COPY - D.

28/6/77  
milkPRESIDENT AMIN

You will remember my letter yesterday mentioned the possibility of opening the COBR to deal with the landing of two non-routine Boeing 707 flights from Uganda to Stansted on 29 May.

Further information suggests that the flights will not have any sinister significance. The aircraft are booked to fly on to the United States the next day to pick up a consignment of equipment which is thereafter to be taken to Uganda. The handling agents at Stansted are being co-operative with the police in their enquiries about the cargo for the flights. This intelligence, taken together with the FCO report of President Amin's reaction to the delivery of the Prime Minister's message, has led us to believe that the balance of probability is in favour of Sunday's flights being (for these purposes) innocent. Accordingly, it is not now proposed to open the COBR or to move infantry ground troops within half an hour's driving distance of Stansted. However, all concerned remain in a high state of alert and, if our assessment of the flights' purpose changes, the original plans can be restored at very short notice.

I am sending copies of this letter to Ewen Fergusson (FCO), Roger Facer (Defence), Martyn Baker (Trade), Norman Shanks (Scottish Office) and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

R. M. MORRIS

Patrick Wright, Esq.

**SECRET**



N 01956

- For information or the same.*  
*2/5*
1. SIR CLIVE ROSE
  2. SIR JOHN HUNT

President Amin

You are aware that the meeting of Ministers on 19 May instructed the Home Secretary to undertake the preparation of a plan to ensure the exclusion of President Amin from the United Kingdom, if he should try to attend the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting, and to cover action to be taken if Amin landed without prior authority. A number of meetings of officials have been held under Home Office chairmanship to consider the problems involved, and a note is to be submitted today to Home Office Ministers detailing contingency arrangements for meeting the Ministerial remit and seeking decisions from Ministers which would permit further planning to go forward. The Home Secretary will wish to discuss these proposals with the Prime Minister and other Ministers concerned at the earliest possible date.

2. Officials have agreed that as the arrangements to exclude President Amin will require a co-ordinated Whitehall response, the Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms (COBR) should be used for this purpose. The COBR will be on alert from this weekend until the end of the CHGM.

3. We have very little indication of Amin's intentions and plans and there are a number of possible ways in which he might try to enter the country. Officials have considered three basic scenarios:

- i. Amin's intention to come is known and his arrival is anticipated.
- ii. Amin arrives by one of the regular Uganda Airline flights to Stansted.
- iii. Amin manages to arrive unexpectedly either by a scheduled service (other than Uganda Airline flight to Stansted) or by arriving without notice in his own private aircraft.

As regards (ii) we have been given notice of two non-routine Boeing 707 flights from Uganda to Stansted on Sunday, 29 May, arriving about 5 pm. As these do not conform with their normal practice and in case Amin is on board, the flights will be given special attention and received in accordance with contingency plans. They will be met by the police on arrival and as a precaution we shall be activating the COBR in advance to handle any possible incident.

4. Amin's personal aircraft or any suspicious flight from Uganda will be refused clearance to enter British airspace, and permission to land by Air Traffic Control; but if an aircraft carrying Amin insists on landing, we shall have to accept it, but will attempt to divert it to Brize Norton. The police would prefer to handle a landing at a military airfield with a secure perimeter. If the pilot refuses these directions, he will be allowed to land at Heathrow. Senior police officers of the Metropolitan and Regional Police Forces, in consultation with the Immigration Service and the Ministry of Defence, have agreed upon contingency plans for handling an aircraft and passengers on arrival. The first objective would be to persuade Amin to depart in the aircraft in which he arrived, but Departments are also considering the problems of a place of detention if Amin should stay for a long period and the means by which he could be removed, by scheduled airline or by a Royal Air Force plane.

5. Further detailed planning is hampered by the risk of premature disclosure of our intentions. An early announcement of the Government's decision to exclude Amin is clearly desirable from the point of view of having these plans properly prepared and ready for activation. The Home Office paper will be seeking Ministerial decisions on this and other points.



C WILSON

26 May 1977

Mr Wilson

1. You may like to know, following your briefing of Sir C Rose yesterday pm, I have briefed Richard Mottram Les Longhi & Mr Crudge.

Without disclosing reasons why, Watchkeepers, note-takers & shorthand typing staff for COBR duties will be warned to be at a higher-than-normal state of readiness 27 May - 15 June. Certain preliminary arrangements will also be made in the COBR to quicken response.

I have alerted the

CONFIDENTIAL

12N

25 May 1977

I am writing to let you know that those who are required to man the COBR in an emergency have been warned to be at a higher-than-normal state of readiness to be alerted during the period 27 May - 15 June.

I would be grateful if the same message could be given in confidence to technicians on the 'Callout' roster for Cabinet Office duties during the same period.

R J BISHOP

Squadron Leader H H Roffey RAF  
Room 8244  
Main Building  
Ministry of Defence

*flc Sgt  
Wardhouse*

CONFIDENTIAL

25 May 1977

7570

I thought I should write to let you know in confidence that those who are required to be on duty here in an emergency have been warned to be at a higher-than-normal state of readiness for the period 27 May - 15 June.

In the event of an emergency I hope we may again look to your organisation to provide meals for about 30 as part of our operational support. In these circumstances we get no more than 1 hour's notice to man-up and so can give your staff only short warning of an actual requirement. This advance notice may therefore be prudent, but may I ask that the possible commitment be kept on a strictly need-to-know basis.

Unless I hear to the contrary, may I assume that the telephone numbers to contact are 230 2669 by day and 230 3827 by night?

I am sorry our last exercise had to be cancelled at short notice.

R J BISHOP

Colonel R R Owens OBE  
Director of Catering  
D Department  
Metropolitan Police  
Tintagel House  
Albert Embankment  
SE1

DIO

c. Mr Crudge

You will wish to know in confidence that those who are required to be on duty in the COBR in an emergency have been warned to be at a higher-than-normal state of readiness for the period 27 May - 15 June.

The Defence Secretariat will be providing you with a note to supplement your standing instructions on action in the event of a terrorist incident (J435 of 15 September 1976) but this is unlikely to be available until 27 May.

In checking your orders, I note the following amendments should be made notwithstanding supplementary instructions to follow.

Annex C

Home Office (Duty Officer)

wef 8 June delete: 839 4463

insert: 213 3611

Annex D

Delete all reference to Mr C J Aldridge

Insert: Mr F R Campbell  
46 Ruskin Drive  
Orpington  
Kent

Orpington (66) 29751

R J BISHOP

25 May 1977

MR BOEREBOOM

c. Mr Underwood

Those who are required to man the COBR in an emergency have been warned to be at a higher-than-normal state of readiness to be called in during the period 27 May - 15 June.

Please arrange for 20 beds and bedding to be available for issue in 70 Whitehall during this period. I would like to know where they are kept and which rooms you can allocate as dormitories.

In the event, we would wish to use Conference Room D as a dining room. Please arrange for the screed (which I required for the last abortive exercise) to be placed in 'D' by 27 May.

This information and reason for the action requested is to be kept on a strictly need-to-know basis.

R J BISHOP

25 May 1977


CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

20 May 1977



*2 Single 13/5*  
*M. Wilson*  
*107231*

*Dear Patrick,* *File for 12*

President Amin and the Commonwealth Heads  
of Government Meeting

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary met Crown Prince Fahd at Heathrow on his arrival this evening. Prince Saud did not accompany the Crown Prince, but will arrive tomorrow.

Dr Owen told Prince Fahd that the strength of feeling about President Amin was so strong that the Government had decided that they could not agree to his coming to Britain. They needed to get a message to President Amin and were asking for Saudi help because the Saudi Ambassador represented Uganda's interests in London, because of the close friendship between Britain and Saudi Arabia, and because the Saudis could be trusted to keep our confidence.

Prince Fahd said that he would have no problem in arranging for a message to be delivered. The Saudis believed that it was not in President Amin's interest to attend the Commonwealth meeting. They would deliver our message and suggest to President Amin that it would not be useful for him to come to London. As Dr Owen well knew, President Amin had ideas which were "not suitable". He should be told that, even if he regarded himself as being invited to the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting, he should none the less not come.

Dr Owen said that the mechanics of how to deliver the message could be discussed with the Saudi Ambassador (who was present during the talk). Crown Prince Fahd suggested that they might ask their Ambassador in Uganda to return to London to take delivery of the message. Dr Owen said that it might be a better idea for the Saudis to send somebody out from London. This ran less risk of drawing attention to the operation. He would let the Saudi Ambassador know what flights were available, although he thought that commercial flights were infrequent. Prince Fahd said that the Saudis would tackle the matter so that it resulted in President Amin extending an apology for being unable to come to London.

/Dr Owen

P. R. H. Wright Esq.,  
10 Downing Street,  
LONDON SW1

CONFIDENTIAL





CONFIDENTIAL

Dr Owen told Prince Fahd that the Prime Minister would be very grateful for his help and would wish to discuss the matter with him when they met on Sunday. You may wish to tell the Prime Minister that Dr Owen's view is that the message to President Amin should be sent during the coming week, so as to reach him not later than Wednesday, 25 May. We might ask the Saudis to tell President Amin that there was a debate in the House of Commons at the end of the week and so give him the opportunity to stand down before then if he wanted. If there had been no response by Friday, Dr Owen would be prepared to stone-wall during the debate. If, on the other hand, President Amin revealed the contents of our message then our position would anyway be clear by the time the debate took place.

If you get into a discussion of timing on Sunday, you may wish to tell the Saudi Ambassador that, as far as I have been able to establish, there are only two flights a week from London to Kampala (Entebbe). The most suitable would be a flight which leaves London on Tuesday evening at 1900 hours and arrives at Entebbe (following a change to Sabena Airlines at Brussels) at 0720 hours on the Wednesday morning. The second flight (also indirect) leaves London on Saturday night and arrives at Entebbe on Sunday afternoon.

At the meeting of Ministers which took place yesterday, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary was asked to draft the text of the message which the Prime Minister might send to President Amin. I enclose such a draft which has been cleared with the Home Secretary.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries of the other Ministers who attended yesterday's meeting and to Martin Vile in the Cabinet Office.

*Yours ever,*  
*Stephen*

(J. S. Wall)

CONFIDENTIAL

SECOND DRAFT

*See Clerk Rose.*

*Draw for PM's*

*Supplementary 16-  
afternoon.*

FOI  
1W

I share the sentiments expressed by the Rt. Hon. Lady.  
The Government will take full note of them, and of the sense  
of outrage which everyone in this House and in the country will  
feel at the further evidence of atrocities in Uganda revealed  
by the recent report of the International Commission of Jurists.  
The House will wish to know that my Rt. Hon. Friend the Foreign  
and Commonwealth Secretary is calling in the United Kingdom  
delegate to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights for  
consultation.

The Government has already made its attitude towards  
President Amin quite clear, and the House will recall that we  
decided to break diplomatic relations with his regime in July  
last year. On the question of his stated intention to visit this  
country at the time of the Commonwealth Heads of Government  
Meeting, ~~and~~ I now have an indication of the views of other  
Commonwealth Heads of Government from Lord Thomson, but I should  
prefer, as I indicated to the House on 15 March, that President Amin  
himself should be left in some uncertainty about what the position  
will be if he decides to go ahead with that intention. A further  
statement will be made at the appropriate time.

CONFIDENTIAL

FOLIO  
IV  
1 Encl.

PS/Mr Luard

LORD THOMSON'S TOUR - AMIN

1. I attach a summary of the views on President Amin's possible attendance at the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHGM) which Lord Thomson's Private Secretary has prepared, and Lord Thomson has approved, after the first part of his tour.
2. In general it confirms our views. But while I agree with paragraph 1(vii) that it is unlikely that any African leader would refuse to attend the CHGM, if Amin were excluded, I think that there would be a danger of considerable criticism of the British Government, as indeed paragraph 1(vi) implies on the grounds that we had arbitrarily dictated the composition of a member country's delegation, and that we had insulted an African Head of State.
3. We have sent an advance copy of this to EAD who are submitting on the subject.

*M B Chitty*

M B Chitty  
Commonwealth Coordination Department

28 April 1977

cc: Private Secretary  
PS/Mr Judd  
PS/Mr Rowlands  
PS/Lord Goronwy-Roberts  
PS/PUS  
Mr Ewans, EAD

Sir C Rose, Cabinet Office

Att

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCE: REACTION OF THE AFRICAN COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES  
TO THE QUESTION OF AMIN

1. Between 13-22 April Lord Thomson visited six African Commonwealth countries: Kenya, Tanzania, Botswana, Zambia, Ghana and Nigeria. The following points emerged from his discussions with African leaders about Amin:

(i) There is general and intense dislike of Amin. Commonwealth Africa avoids contact with him as far as possible. (Ghana is in the process of withdrawing all diplomatic personnel from Kampala).

(ii) There is a general desire to distinguish between Uganda and Amin. Everyone hopes Amin will stay away from London but that Uganda will be represented at the same level as in Ottawa and Kingston. Kaunda said he would be ready to vote for Uganda's suspension of membership from the Commonwealth (and the UN and OAU) as long as Amin was in charge; but he was not willing to take the lead in this.

(iii) There is a widespread belief that Amin will keep everyone guessing until the last moment but a feeling, which may be wishful thinking, that in the end he will stay away. If he does come to London, most people think his presence will wreck the Conference.

(iv) There is general agreement that publicity is counter-productive in dealing with Amin and that we should use discreet diplomatic channels to try to dissuade him from coming. The Africans think the Arabs would be the best intermediaries, particularly the Libyans and Saudis. Colonel Qaddafi is thought to be the one person who has some real influence with Amin.

(v) Nearly all think Amin may be discouraged from attending if we play discreetly on the threat to his safety of coming to London.

(vi) Whilst there is general agreement that Amin's behaviour is so deplorable that he is in a class by himself, there is also anxiety that by excluding him we shall breach the unwritten convention of non-interference in the internal affairs of another Commonwealth country. This fear led General Obasanjo to suggest that Amin should be treated as the British Government's problem and that other Commonwealth countries should not be involved.

(vii) Despite the fear outlined in (vi) above, it is highly unlikely that any African leader would refuse to attend the CHGM if Amin were excluded. However, timing will probably be important. The OAU should not be given any opportunity to try to arouse or coordinate African opinion on this issue and Amin's exclusion should not, therefore, be announced until the last possible moment. If that were done, there is no evidence that the African countries would make a major issue of Amin's exclusion, nor that any of them would walk out.

/2.

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

2. An annex is attached giving the individual comments made about Amin by the leaders Lord Thomson met during the first leg of his tour, including those in Australia and Asia.

G.T.

28 April 1977

CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

5964

21 April 1977

22/4



Thank you for your letter of 20 April in which you conveyed the Home Secretary's view on the Prime Minister's suggestion that President Amin's children might be returned to Uganda.

The Prime Minister has noted the Home Secretary's views on this matter, and has asked that he should be informed of any future movement of President Amin's family in this country. As I told you on 18 April, he has particularly asked that a careful watch should be kept for any signs that President Amin himself might pay an unexpected private visit to London.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Ewen Fergusson (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and to Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

P. R. H. WRIGHT

R.M. Morris, Esq.,  
Home Office.



SECRET

HOME OFFICE  
WHITEHALL SW1A 2AP

20 April 1977

2 Sinc Rose

107 21/4

CABINET CASE
A. 5926...
2 APR 1977
FILED IN
FILE NO.

A 5890

You asked in your letter of 19 April 1977 for the views of the Home Secretary, in consultation with the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, on whether an attempt should be made to bring about the removal to Uganda of President Amin's two young children who came here for a fortnight's holiday in the care of a doctor and two staff members on 12 April (they were given two months' leave as is customary for short visits). The Home Secretary's view is that no such attempt should be made, on the expectation that the party will depart normally in a few days' time and well before any action of ours could bring about their departure. At least one child of the President has come and gone uneventfully before.

There would be no basis for President Amin to use the presence here of his young children as a ground to assist his own entry in June. A parallel case is that of Colonel Ojukwu, the former Biafran leader, who has for some years been excluded from this country but whose family are permitted to enter the UK (his son is at school in Ireland - in which case the Common Travel Area arrangements apply).

The Amin children could only have been kept out by a personal direction of the Home Secretary, on the grounds that their presence would not be conducive to the public good. Now they are here, they could be removed compulsorily only if the Home Secretary orders their deportation. That could only be done in practice on conducive to the public good grounds that did not deprive the children of their ordinary rights of appeal. It is the Home Secretary's strong view that there would be no case for considering deportation on conducive grounds in the interests of national security etc. so as to deprive the children (like Agee and Hosenball) of statutory appeal rights. The exercise of any deportation powers could hardly be justified in the case of two children aged 6 and 3, whoever their father is. There is no precedent for deporting in their own right very young children for any reason at all.

Nor would the Home Secretary and the Foreign Secretary recommend at present an attempt to persuade President Amin to remove the children, for example by a warning that their security could not be guaranteed while they were here. There is no means by which this could be done without the risk of President Amin giving it wide publicity. The Home Secretary understands the Foreign Secretary's view is that both deportation and pressure to remove the children would risk retaliation against the British community in Uganda. It might well be read by President Amin (as well as the public) as indicating a decision by HMG to keep him away from the CHQM in June (for which he would then have several weeks to form his intentions and tactics).

SECRET

SECRET

- 2 -

A bluff based on his children's security might, however it was worded, be taken or misrepresented as a threat to them, or to himself personally, by HMG.

The Home Secretary (and he understands this view is shared by the Foreign Secretary) has also concluded that any attempt by compulsion or persuasion to remove the two children now would inevitably attract publicity in advance of removal, would be counter-productive and would hand President Amin the initiative for propaganda and for action. Since their presence does not help him to come here, the attempt would serve no purpose.

In all the circumstances, therefore, the Home Secretary considers that, based on past experience, it is likely the children will leave of their own volition. Of course, he will meantime continue to keep the position under review. In addition, he has arranged that the standing instruction to ports to notify to headquarters the arrival of prominent Ugandans will be extended to ensure that no members of President Amin's family should in future be admitted for any purpose without prior reference to the Home Secretary personally.

Copies go to the Private Secretaries to the Foreign Secretary and the Secretary to the Cabinet.

R. M. MORRIS

Patrick Wright, Esq.

SECRET



SECRET



*See Clive Rose*

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

19 April 1977

5890

*Two  
19/1*

President Amin's Children

Your office informed us today that President Amin's two children, aged 3 and 6, arrived at Stansted Airport late last week with a doctor and two secretaries, and were staying at the Uganda High Commission for a holiday in the UK. I understand that they have permits to remain here for two months.

I reported this to the Prime Minister this afternoon, who has asked that the Home Secretary, in consultation with the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, should give urgent consideration to the possibility of returning the two children to Uganda. In suggesting this, the Prime Minister has particularly in mind the risk that, if the children are allowed to remain here, President Amin might subsequently claim their stay here as a reason for him to visit the UK himself, and might interpret the permission given to them as an indication that we were not prepared to take any firm action to exclude the President himself from entering the UK.

Consideration would of course have to be given to the grounds for returning the children to Uganda in this way, if that were done. One possibility, which the Prime Minister would like examine is that an explanation might be given to President Amin that we could not guarantee the children's security in this country, thereby giving him some advance warning of our likely reaction to any attempt by himself to visit London for the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting. The Prime Minister has however emphasised that he attaches great importance to avoiding any publicity about the return of the children until they were out of the country, and has asked whether, in the Home Secretary's view, it would be possible to undertake an operation of this sort without any publicity.

I should be grateful if you could let me have the Home Secretary views on this as soon as possible, and at the latest by close of play on Wednesday 20 April.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Ewen Fergusson (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

P. R. H. WRIGHT

R.M. Morris, Esq.,  
Home Office.

SECRET



Mr G Rose

Mr Bryars

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

CABINET OFFICE

A 5492....

4 APR 1977

PLACING INSTRUCTIONS

FILE NO.

4 April, 1977.

A 5102 -

IN

You wrote to Patrick Wright on 21 March about the possibility of excluding President Amin from the United Kingdom.

The Prime Minister has seen and noted this advice, and also the revised stock letter on the subject in Richard Dales' letter to you of the same date.

I am sending copies of this letter to Richard Dales and Martin Vile.

R. J. MEADWAY

R.M. Morris, Esq.,  
Home Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

*secret*

FOL  
1P.

Mr Luard

PRESIDENT AMIN AND THE CHGM

- C
1. You will recall (see the attached copy of Miss Sinclair's minute of 17 March) that Mr Judd asked for a paper to be prepared on the basis of which FCO Ministers might discuss this issue again.
  2. I attach a paper. You will see that it does not in fact reach the conclusion suggested by Mr Judd. But I would hope that it does set the issues out clearly enough to form a basis for discussion by Ministers.
  3. I thought it preferable not to send copies of this paper to other Ministers and the Political Adviser until after you and Mr Judd had considered it. I attach a spare copy for you to retain if you send the paper to Mr Judd.

*Antony Duff*  
Antony Duff

25 March 1977

*Strictly Personal*

copied to:

PUS

Mr Mansfield

Mrs Chitty (COD) —

Mr Ewans (EAD)

*Li C Rose*

*This version / replaces the  
sent in.  
emphasises  
is strictly  
to you*

*NB Chitty  
28 March*

SECRET

*secret*

MEMORANDUM

COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING: PRESIDENT AMIN'S ATTENDANCE

1. Should we permit President Amin to enter Britain and attend the CHGM? What would be the consequences of letting him in? If we were to decide that he should in no circumstance attend, how best can we assure this?

Will he come?

2. President Amin already knows that he will not be welcome in London, and the Prime Minister has given a clear public signal that he will not be invited to the Jubilee celebrations. So far as his attendance at the CHGM is concerned, the Prime Minister and other Ministers have in public remained non-committal, emphasising the difficulties and complexity of the issue; the Prime Minister has said in Parliament that it is probably best to keep President Amin off balance about the position "when he arrives".

3. There is no sign that these statements have had a deterrent effect. Amin's most recent public statement (on 10 March) was "I am going to London for the Commonwealth Meeting whether Britain likes it or not" and, indeed, our assessment is that the chances of his coming have recently somewhat increased. The Australians have told us privately that their intelligence is the same. Some Commonwealth Governments (eg Tanzania, Gambia, Trinidad, Jamaica) think that he will not. But the original prospect remains, that he will keep us guessing up to the last moment, perhaps even into the time of the Meeting itself. We certainly cannot rely on his not coming.

The Results of Soundings So Far

4. To help us to assess the degree to which other Governments would support us if we sought to exclude President Amin, British High Commissioners have privately discussed the problem with Commonwealth Heads of Government, or with other Ministers or influential officials. The Prime Minister has discussed it with Mr Trudeau. High Commissioners have also given their views on the reactions of Commonwealth Governments if we were (a) to state nearer the time of the Meeting that we would not let President Amin attend; and (b) to prevent him leaving the airport if he did arrive. High Commissioners in twenty-seven countries have reported, in the light of discussions with the Head of Government or another influential person. (Reports are awaited from India, Nigeria, Cyprus, Granada, Kenya and Western Samoa.)

5. The reports are wide-ranging, and subject to the personal interpretation of the High Commissioner concerned. A summary can, however, be attempted, as follows.

- (a) There is virtual unanimity that President Amin is not wanted at the Meeting. (Mr Pindling of Bahamas is the odd man out; he has emphasised President Amin's right to attend.)

/(b)

SECRET

- (b) Our High Commissioners think that Australia and New Zealand, perhaps Sierra Leone, Fiji, Tonga and Papua New Guinea, would support us publicly in our attempts to prevent President Amin's attendance, including the refusal of entry to the country, and that some ten others would probably tacitly support us, provided no opposing band wagon developed.
- (c) No major African, Asian or Caribbean Government is ready to take a public lead against President Amin; nearly all would follow an Afro-Asian consensus. This is thought to apply to Canada also.
- (d) No Head of Government thinks there is anything he could do personally to influence President Amin.
- (e) Zambia thinks the best deterrent would be to say that we could not guarantee his safety. (This, however, might be regarded by him as a threat and his reaction (eg in treating the British community as hostages) could be dangerous.)

#### The Consequences of Attendance

A 6. The consequences of our allowing President Amin to attend have been set out in the Private Secretary's letter to No 10 dated 4 February. Briefly, they are that public and Parliamentary opposition to his attendance would be intense; there could well be demonstrations and disorders, and perhaps even attempts on his person; he would command the attention of the media, and the issues raised by his presence could cause disruption of the CHGM itself. In the CHGM, he would be likely to distract attention from serious issues; and if he were to be seriously embarrassed or attacked, there could be unfortunate repercussions for the British community in Uganda.

#### The Present Situation

7. The present situation can thus be summarised as follows.
- (a) We have so far been careful not to commit ourselves in public, except insofar as we have explained the normal custom in regard to attendance at Meetings.
- (b) The hostility expressed in Parliament and the press does not seem to have had any deterrent effect. Indeed, it may even have been counter-productive, and have increased, rather than diminished, Amin's determination to attend the CHGM.
- (c) Much as they dislike the prospect of Amin attending the Meeting, the rest of the Commonwealth are not disposed to help us out.
- (d) The prospect of Amin's possible attendance remains grim.

## Possible Methods of Securing Non-Attendance

### A. Exclusion or Suspension of Uganda from the Commonwealth

8. So long as Uganda is a member country of the Commonwealth, its President is entitled to attend the CHGM. Uganda was a party to the general agreement reached at Kingston in 1975 that London should be the venue for the next Meeting. There is not a separate invitation to be extended or withheld by the British Government.

9. All decisions affecting membership of the Commonwealth are taken by consensus. There are no rules of procedure, but any such controversial measure as exclusion, or suspension, would have to be considered by Heads of Government in person at a Meeting and not by correspondence. It is impracticable to deal with Uganda's membership in advance of the Meeting. If it were made an issue at the Meeting (as for South Africa in 1961) it is unlikely that there would be a consensus in favour of exclusion, or suspension pending the return of an acceptable government in Uganda.

10. In any case, the hostility of Britain and of other Commonwealth Governments is directed towards President Amin personally; a Ugandan delegation to the CHGM led by an uncontroversial figure would be acceptable to most participants. Other Commonwealth Heads of Government have already been informed that we are not embarking on a course of exclusion or suspension from the Commonwealth.

### B. Unilateral Exclusion

11. We might either:-

- i. wait until the Meeting and then prevent him from attending if he were to attempt to do so;
- ii. announce at an earlier stage that we would not permit him to enter Britain.

The advantage of the first course is that he may not in the event come and we would thus be absolved from taking action which might both seriously disrupt the CHGM and have repercussions for our community in Uganda. But as the Meeting approached, public opinion here would increasingly demand to know what our policy was, and it would be unlikely to be acceptable that the Government should have to admit that it was doing nothing in the hope of Amin's non-attendance.

12. Either course, however, would carry the risk that Amin would nevertheless persist in trying to attend. Home Office and FCO Legal Advisers are agreed that we have the power to deny him admission to the UK. Enforcing that power might, however, cause us problems. We could perhaps deny landing rights to his aircraft (but he could transfer to a regular airline). Equally, the avoidance of physical force if he actually landed might be difficult to achieve.

13. A decision to exclude President Amin would moreover have to be

~~SECRET~~

taken in the knowledge that on the day we might be largely on our own, supported overtly probably only by Australia and New Zealand. We might also be putting a rod in pickle for ourselves, or for any other government whose policies did not suit the host government (cf. New Zealand over sport) at a future CHGM. In spite of their private dislike of President Amin, some African Heads of Government would find difficulty in accepting a public insult to an African Head of State and, particularly if Amin had to be physically excluded from the UK, might boycott the Meeting. Many Governments would be embarrassed. Considerable harm might be done to the Commonwealth; it is easy to leave it.

C. Deterrence

A 14. As indicated above, it is unfortunately only too likely that expressions of dislike, and the hope that he will not attend the meeting, will positively encourage Amin in his determination to come. We have been unable to think of any way of overtly deterring him which might have some chance of success, but we might consider again the suggestions referred to at the end of the letter of 4 February to No. 10 (which the Prime Minister clearly did not much favour) that ways could be found of making Amin fear either for his safety if he visited the UK, or that a coup might be mounted in his absence.

D. Further Action within the Commonwealth

15. East African Department have suggested that we could perhaps follow up our confidential soundings, and the further ones which Lord Thomson is likely to make, with a second round of Commonwealth consultation. In this second round we could point to the near unanimity which our soundings had revealed that Amin's presence would not be welcome. We could also be more explicit about

- a) the damage to the CHGM which Amin's presence would cause;
- b) the profound opposition to his presence which exists in this country, and the consequent risk of disorders if he were to come.

We might then go on to seek agreement to an effort being made, with general Commonwealth support, to persuade Amin to agree that he should not attend. Mr Ramphal would be the obvious person to undertake such a mission. However, he can only act on the instructions of all Commonwealth Governments, and he has made it plain that he is not prepared to embark on a formal exercise of consultation with Governments on the subject, and that he could not achieve the desired result.

16. Notwithstanding the general view that Amin's presence at the CHGM would not be welcome, it is likely that such a mandate would in any case not be obtainable. It is also possible that even if it were

SECRET

/obtained

*secret*

obtained, he would nevertheless decide to ignore it and come. In the latter event we would be on that much stronger ground if we were then unilaterally to prevent his attendance; but in the former event, we should have weakened our case for such action.

17. My own view is that there is not only no purpose in further Commonwealth consultations (except that the subject will come up naturally with Lord Thomson); but that we will do ourselves harm if we go round again. I think we now have to make up our own minds what to do without further advice.

### Conclusions

18. a) If we were to announce that we would not let President Amin attend the Meeting, we should have to be prepared to act on this and refuse him entry if he did nevertheless arrive. If we refused him entry, or otherwise forcibly excluded him from the Meeting, it would damage the Commonwealth, it might incite Amin to take action against the British community, and we would be increasing the risk of similar action being taken against ourselves or others on some future occasion.
- b) There is, on present showing, no point in further consultation with members of the Commonwealth. We are on our own, although we should keep in touch with Mr Ramphal.
- c) As things stand at present, it looks as if the least damaging course will be to allow Amin to come if he wishes, and to treat him with cold correctness and as much indifference as possible.
- d) However, we should take no decision either way until Lord Thomson returns from his tour. Meanwhile, our public line about attendance at the CHGM should continue to be ambiguous. If hard pressed, we might make it quite clear (cf the second part of the draft statement enclosed with the letter of 4 February to No 10) that Amin will not be welcome here for the CHGM but we should add that the decision is one for the Commonwealth as a whole.
- e) We should avoid saying directly what the soundings of Commonwealth Governments have revealed, since these governments would then be questioned and might publicly disown us.
- f) Nearer the time of the meeting, we must tell Commonwealth Governments what we have decided to do; and we should seek their agreement to a form of words which would indicate that our policy had been formulated in the light of our assessment of what the Commonwealth consensus was.

SECRET

/(g)




g) Meanwhile we should

- i. consider covert means of deterrence;
- ii. study the practical measures that might be necessary to prevent Amin attending if he decided to try to do so.

19. I should emphasise that these conclusions, especially (c) above, do not represent an agreed view within the FCO. Opinions amongst officials differ. I would add that, if between now and the Meeting there were further ugly incidents in Uganda, we ought in my view to react at once with an announcement that we would not have Amin in the country. If, however, nothing further happens between now and the Meeting to increase public concern, I think we should act as recommended above.

20. I have also considered whether, without consulting other Commonwealth Governments, we should formally ask Amin not to attend the Meeting. This might be a card to play nearer the time of the Meeting, if we have finally decided by then that he must be allowed to come if he so wishes. The advantage of doing this would be that we could claim that we had tried to dissuade him from coming; but there would be a clear disadvantage in our putting ourselves in his hands in that way.

25 March 1977

  
Antony Duff

From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY



CONFIDENTIAL
CABINET OFFICE
A 5102....
21/3/77
FILED
363/118

HOME OFFICE  
WHITEHALL S.W.1

21 March 1977

File ( 16m  
c Sir C Rose  
6M  
Mr Byars

21/3

PRESIDENT AMIN

You will remember that we promised to let you have further and more final advice about the powers to exclude President Amin from the United Kingdom.

I enclose a note that has been jointly prepared by ourselves and the Foreign & Commonwealth Office. As you will see, it concludes that, although President Amin if he were admitted would enjoy sovereign immunity, there is in fact no substantial reason to believe that the Home Secretary would have to admit him in the first place under the 1971 Act. On the other hand, there are some practical difficulties that have to be considered. Careful contingency plans would have to be made for handling him and his entourage if he tried to enter and the Home Secretary will want shortly to discuss planning with the police. President Amin is understood to carry firearms (and did so at Cairo at the recent Afro-Asian talks) and his enjoyment of sovereign immunity could be thought to severely limit, in principle at least, the scope for physical restraint. Accordingly, if a decision were taken to refuse him, it would be essential for it to be taken sufficiently in advance (some days at least) of his possible arrival to allow effective plans to be drawn up. Further, it would obviously be helpful that any such decision should be made known to him before he left Uganda, even if it is decided to keep him guessing over the next month or so.

I am copying this letter to Ewen Fergusson and Martin Vile.

R. M. MORRIS

Patrick Wright, Esq.

CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE

CYPHER/CAT A AND BY BAG

*Sm. C. Rose*  
*Cabinet Office*

FM F C O 091300Z

D E D I P

CONFIDENTIAL.

TO IMMEDIATE CANBERRA TELNO 133 OF 9 MARCH 1977  
AND TO IMMEDIATE NASSAU AND CERTAIN OTHER POSTS.  
AND SAVING TO VICTORIA.

FOLLOWING SENT TO WELLINGTON AS TELNO 55 OF 9 MARCH:  
PERSONAL FOR HEAD OF POST.

COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING AND PRESIDENT AMIN.

IN RESPONSE TO STRONG EXPRESSIONS OF REPUGNANCE IN PARLIAMENT THAT AMIN SHOULD BE INVITED TO BRITAIN FOR THIS MEETING, THE PRIME MINISTER SAID IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON 22 FEBRUARY THAT HE WOULD BE WILLING TO TAKE SOUNDINGS ON THE MATTER. AS A FIRST STEP I HAVE DISCUSSED THE WHOLE PROBLEM OF AMIN'S ATTENDANCE AT THE CHGM WITH THE COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY GENERAL.

2. I WOULD NOW LIKE YOU TO SPEAK IN THE MOST INFORMAL MANNER POSSIBLE TO THE PRIME MINISTER/PRESIDENT/HEAD OF GOVERNMENT TO FIND OUT THEIR PRIVATE VIEWS ON THE PROBLEM. I DO NOT WANT YOU TO HAND OVER A MESSAGE OR TAKE ANY OTHER FORMAL STEP. THE POINTS I WANT YOU TO INTRODUCE ARE AS FOLLOWS:

(A) YOU SHOULD EXPLAIN THE BACKGROUND IN BRITAIN. THE RECENT KILLINGS IN UGANDA ARE THE CULMINATION OF A PERIOD OF OPPRESSION THE UGANDAN PEOPLE HAVE SUFFERED UNDER AMIN, AND HAVE PROVOKED STRONG REACTIONS AMONGST A WIDE CIRCLE OF THE GENERAL PUBLIC, INCLUDING RELIGIOUS LEADERS, AND THOSE CONCERNED WITH HUMAN RIGHTS ACROSS THE WHOLE POLITICAL SPECTRUM. THIS STRONG AND WIDESPREAD FEELING IS NOT REFLECTED THROUGHOUT THE COMMONWEALTH AND I WANT YOU TO BRING IT HOME TO HEADS OF GOVERNMENT THAT IT IS SIMPLY NOT POSSIBLE FOR THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO REMAIN NEGATIVE ON THE ISSUE. THE WHOLE SUBJECT OF HUMAN RIGHTS IS NOW COMMANDING GREATER PUBLIC ATTENTION HERE, AND ALSO IN OTHER COUNTRIES SUCH AS THE UNITED STATES, AND IT IS NEITHER RIGHT NOR POSSIBLE TO EXCLUDE UGANDA FROM SCRUTINY JUST BECAUSE SHE IS A MEMBER OF THE COMMONWEALTH. MOREOVER, THE IMAGE OF THE COMMONWEALTH ITSELF (IN THIS COUNTRY) IS GOING TO SUFFER IF IT IS SEEN TO IGNORE OR CONDONE INFRINGEMENTS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN A MEMBER COUNTRY.

CONFIDENTIAL

/(B) YOU

(B) YOU SHOULD ALSO MAKE IT CLEAR AT THE OUTSET THAT I AM NOT PROPOSING A PARTICULAR COURSE OF ACTION NOR ASKING HEADS OF GOVERNMENT TO COMMIT THEMSELVES IN ANY WAY. ALL I HAVE IN MIND IS A SHARING OF VIEWS SO THAT I CAN GET SOME FEELING ABOUT OPINION THROUGHOUT THE COMMONWEALTH.

(C) I AM NOT SUGGESTING FORMAL ACTION SUCH AS EXCLUSION OR SUSPENSION OF UGANDA FROM THE COMMONWEALTH. I FULLY REALISE THE COMPLEXITIES AND PITFALLS OF THAT COURSE AND THAT GOVERNMENT IS NOT EMBARKING ON IT. I DO NOT WANT THERE TO BE ANY MISUNDERSTANDING ON THIS. I AM HOWEVER CONSIDERING WHETHER THERE MIGHT BE ANY WAY OF MAKING AN ARRANGEMENT WHEREBY AMIN DID NOT ATTEND THE MEETING PERSONALLY. A UGANDAN DELEGATION WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE AND A LOW KEY FIGURE SUCH AS KINEME WHO LED THEIR DELEGATION TO THE KINGSTON MEETING IN 1975 WOULD NOT CAUSE US DIFFICULTIES.

(D) I THINK IT UNLIKELY THAT AMIN WILL COME, BUT WE CANNOT BANK ON THIS. HIS ATTITUDE TO BRITAIN AND THE QUEEN IS COMPLEX AND HIS ACTIONS ARE UNPREDICTABLE. WE HAVE TO BE PREPARED FOR HIS ARRIVAL. IF HE DOES COME, WE WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY EXCLUDE HIM FROM OUR DOMESTIC JUBILEE CELEBRATIONS, SUCH AS THE ST PAUL'S THANKSGIVING SERVICE ON 7 JUNE, TO WHICH OTHER COMMONWEALTH LEADERS WILL BE INVITED. WE SHALL BE GIVING CONSTANT THOUGHT TO POSSIBLE DETERRENTS AND DISCOURAGEMENTS TO HIS COMING. BUT WE ARE WELL AWARE THAT PUBLIC STATEMENTS TO THIS EFFECT MAY ONLY INTENSIFY HIS DETERMINATION TO COME.

(E) IF HE DOES COME WE COULD NOT EXCLUDE HIM FROM ANY OF THE BUSINESS SESSIONS OF THE MEETING NOR FROM THOSE SOCIAL OCCASIONS WHICH ARE AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE PROGRAMME. BUT THE MEDIA WILL CONCENTRATE ON HIM, AND HE WILL NO DOUBT PLAY UP, AND THE EFFECT ON THE MEETING ITSELF WILL BE DISASTROUS. IT WILL BE DIFFICULT TO CONDUCT THE FRANK AND FRIENDLY DEBATE WE ARE HOPING FOR ON CURRENT POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS OR TO CONCENTRATE ON SERIOUS BUSINESS.

3. YOU CAN SAY THAT I HAVE DISCUSSED THIS PROBLEM WITH MR RAMPHAL AND THAT HE IS AWARE OF THE ACTION I AM TAKING. IT MAY BE USEFUL TO REFER TO A PRESS STATEMENT HE ISSUED ON 23 FEBRUARY, WHICH STATED THAT HE WAS QUOTE GREATLY TROUBLED BY REPORTS OF THE RECENT EVENTS IN UGANDA.... UNQUOTE AND THAT QUOTE THE QUESTION WHETHER PRESIDENT AMIN OR ANY OTHER HEAD OF GOVERNMENT IS TO COME TO THE NEXT MEETING IN LONDON MUST NOW BE FOR EACH HEAD OF GOVERNMENT TO DECIDE TAKING INTO ACCOUNT ALL RELEVANT FACTORS UNQUOTE.

/4. IF

CONFIDENTIAL

4. IF YOU SHOULD BE REMINDED THAT BRITAIN WAS THE FIRST GOVERNMENT TO RECOGNISE AMIN IN 1971 DESPITE THE APPEALS OF PRESIDENTS NYERERE AND KAUNDA NOT TO DO SO, YOU COULD SAY THAT MUCH HAS HAPPENED SINCE THAT TIME AND WE HAVE TO CONCENTRATE ON CURRENT PROBLEMS, NOT RAKE OVER THE PAST. IN FACT WE WERE NOT ALONE IN RECOGNISING AMIN SOME TEN DAYS AFTER HIS COUP AND WHEN OUR CRITERIA FOR RECOGNITION HAD CLEARLY BEEN SATISFIED.
5. IF FOR ANY REASON YOU CANNOT SEE THE HEAD OF GOVERNMENT PERSONALLY WITHIN ABOUT A WEEK, YOU HAVE DISCRETION TO SPEAK TO ANOTHER LEADING GOVERNMENT MEMBER IF YOU THINK IT WOULD BE PRODUCTIVE
6. YOU SHOULD NOT OF COURSE HINT IN ANY WAY THAT HMG MIGHT DECIDE TO EXCLUDE AMIN FROM THE MEETING, AND INDEED NO SUCH DECISION HAS BEEN TAKEN. BUT I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR YOUR ASSESSMENT OF HOW THE GOVERNMENT TO WHICH YOU ARE ACCREDITED WOULD REACT IF WE  
(A) ANNOUNCED NEAR THE TIME OF THE CONFERENCE THAT WE WOULD NOT LET HIM ATTEND;  
(B) PREVENTED HIM LEAVING THE AIRPORT IF HE DID ARRIVE.  
PLEASE LET ME HAVE THIS ASSESSMENT WITHIN THE NEXT SEVEN DAYS, IF NECESSARY BEFORE YOU HAVE BEEN ABLE TO TALK TO THE GOVERNMENT.
7. OTTAWA AND WELLINGTON ONLY. YOU SHOULD SAY TO MR TRUDEAU/MR MULDOON THAT THE PRIME MINISTER AND I HOPE TO BE ABLE TO TALK THIS OVER WITH THEM WHEN WE MEET IN OTTAWA/LONDON AND THAT YOUR CONVERSATION WILL GIVE THEM AN INDICATION OF OUR THINKING. I HAVE SEEN AND APPRECIATE MR MULDOON'S STATEMENT IN WELLINGTON TELNO 81 (NOT TO ALL).

OWEN

FILES

HD/CCD

HD/EAD

PS

PS/MR JUDD

PS/MR ROWLANDS

PS/LORD GORONWY

ROBERTS

PS/MR LUARD

PS/MR TOMLINSON

PS/PUS

SIR A DUFF

MR CORTAZZI

MR MANSFIELD

MR STANLEY

COPIES TO

MR WRIGHT

NO 10 DOWNING STREET

SIR J HUNT

SIR C ROSE

CABINET OFFICE



# CABINET OFFICE

THIS FILE MUST NOT GO OUTSIDE THE CABINET OFFICE

Uganda Situation

**CLOSED**  
**1979**

FILE BEGINS 16~~th~~ 6.77

ENDS 26.3.79

FILE No. 493/1 Pt 2

## INDEX HEADINGS

Uganda

(Tanzania) (ECGD)

REFERRED TO	DATE	REFERRED TO	DATE	REFERRED TO	DATE
Mr. Whitmore	9.11.78				
PA	13.11.78				
Miss B. Waller					
PA	27/11/78				
Miss H. SMITH					
PA	11/1/79				
	22/1/79				

**CLOSED**  
**1979**



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

26 March 1979

CABINET OFFICE  
A 9058  
26 MAR  
FILING INSTE  
FILE No. 49311

Si C. Rose  
Mr. Whitmore

Uganda/Tanzania 57

Thank you for your letter of 16 March about the question of possible assistance to the Tanzanians, in response to their requests for help both over defence supplies and over the role of Kenya in Tanzania's current dispute with Uganda.

The Prime Minister has now seen your letter, together with its enclosures, and has taken note of the position.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

B. G. Cantledge

J.S. Wall, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

The FCO are  
sending us copies of  
the earlier telegrams &  
I have also said that  
they will send us copies  
of any future ones

BW

24/3/77

Now attached

Mr. Forster

This is an interesting  
bundle of papers; most of  
which have not been copied to  
us earlier by the FCO.

W  
24/3



CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Dear Bryan,

Uganda/Tanzania

CABINET 16 March 1979  
A .....  
19 MAR 1979  
FILING INSTRUCTIONS  
FILE No. 493/1

cc Sir C Rose  
Mr Whitmore

Thank you for your letter of today's date recording that the Prime Minister hoped that we could be as helpful as possible in response to the Tanzanian request that we should try to persuade the Kenyans to reduce or cut off supplies through Kenya to Uganda.

Dr Owen agrees that we should do what we can, without becoming directly and openly involved in an inter-African dispute, to help the Tanzanians, both politically and with defence supplies. Although we cannot meet their request for Blowpipe on security grounds, we are supplying a good deal of defence equipment and are urgently examining whether we can hasten orders now in the pipeline. Politically the immediate need is for President Nyerere to improve his relations with President Moi; the Kenyans regard themselves as the aggrieved party and the Tanzanians must take the initiative here.

The Tanzanian High Commissioner called on Dr Owen today to raise arms supplies and Dr Owen took the opportunity to try to steer the Tanzanians towards improved relations with Kenya. I attach two telegrams which have been sent to our High Commission in Dar-es-Salaam recording the conversations.

The line which Dr Owen took on the possibility of Kenya reducing supplies to Uganda reflects what we know of Kenyan views (see Nairobi telno 122 enclosed). I am also arranging for you to see some other reports which make it very clear that President Moi would refuse to help President Nyerere in this way should a request be made.

I am copying this letter and enclosures to Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

J. S. Wall

(J S Wall)  
Private Secretary

Bryan Cartledge Esq  
10 Downing Street  
LONDON

CONFIDENTIAL


CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

16 March 1979



*Handwritten signature/initials*

UGANDA/TANZANIA

The Prime Minister has now seen Dar es Salaam telegrams Nos. 190, 191, 192 and 197 about the requests made to us and to the Americans for assistance in enlisting the aid of the Kenyans during the continuing hostilities between Tanzania and Uganda.

The Prime Minister has commented on these telegrams: "We should give Nyerere what help we can that will be effective".

The Prime Minister would like to know as soon as possible how the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary proposes to respond to the Tanzanian approach. I should be grateful for advice by 1800 today.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Martin Vile in the Cabinet Office.

B. G. CARTLEDGE

J.S. Wall, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

GR 7

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY FCO 120900Z

DESKBY NAIROBI 120800Z

DESKBY TRIPOLI 120800Z

FM DAR ES SALAAM 120545Z MAR 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 192 OF 12 MARCH

INFO IMMEDIATE NAIROBI, TRIPOLI

INFO PRIORITY BONN PARIS

560 020/2	
RECEIVED IN REGISTRY NO. 28	
13 MAR 1979	
DATA DEPT	REGISTRY
INDEX	PA
FILE	TELETYPE

109

107

108

MY TELS 190 AND 191 UGANDA/TANZANIA

1. MISS WICKEN CALLED AGAIN LATE ON 11 MARCH TO SAY THAT SHE HAS UNINTENTIONALLY MISLED ME ABOUT THE LOCATION OF THE PRESENT FIGHTING. HAVING TALKED TO THE PRESIDENT SHE HAD NOW ESTABLISHED THAT REPORTS OF FIGHTING INVOLVING TANZANIAN TROOPS NEAR KAMPALA AT MPIGI WERE NOT ACCURATE: THE TANZANIANS HAD NOT REACHED THAT FAR. THE BATTLE TO WHICH SHE WAS REFERRING HAD TAKEN PLACE "JUST BEYOND" MASAKA AND SHE HAD JUST HEARD THAT IT HAD BEEN A "SUCCESSFUL ENGAGEMENT". THE TANZANIANS AND SUPPORTERS WERE NOW MOVING SLOWLY UP THE LINE OF THE MASAKA KAMPALA ROAD. SHE CONFIRMED THAT THEY HAD NOT YET COME ACROSS LIBYANS BUT EXPECTED THEM TO BE DUG IN IN THE MPIGI AREA WHERE SHE IMPLIED THE DECISIVE ENGAGEMENT WOULD PROBABLY TAKE PLACE.

2. MISS WICKEN ALSO CONFIRMED THAT THIS LATEST MILITARY SUCCESS IN NO WAY AFFECTED THE URGENCY OF THE REQUEST SHE HAD PREVIOUSLY MADE AS REPORTED IN MY TELNO 190.

MINGHCLIFFE [ALSO SENT BY BAG TO BONN AND PARIS]

FILES

EAD	DEF D
CADS	PUSD
IPD	PS
EID	PS/MR ROWLANDS
ES & SD	PS/MR JUDD
OID	PS/PUS
NEWS D	SIR A DUFF
CGD	SIR A PARSONS
HAD	MR BULLARD
	MR DAY

CONFIDENTIAL

58/3

901  
1001

IF TANZANIANS HAD NOW TO LEAVE UGANDA THERE WOULD BE A  
LARGE REFUGEE PROBLEM AS THOUSANDS OF UGANDANS FLED A VENGEFUL  
AMIN DOUBTLY FURIOUS AT THE WAY HIS SUBJECTS HAD HELPED THE  
INVADERS MANY WOULD NOT MAKE IT AND WOULD BE MASSACRED. THE  
TANZANIANS FELT THAT THEY HAD AN OVERRIDING MORAL RESPONSIBILITY  
TO TRY AND ENSURE THAT THIS DID NOT HAPPEN: HERE AGAIN ONLY THE  
OVERTHROW OF AMIN COULD AVERT THIS POSSIBILITY.

4. MISS WICKEN SAID THAT THE RESPONSIBILITY WAS NOT TANZANIA'S  
ALONE. SURELY NOONE COULD STAND ASIDE AND CONTEMPLATE LARGE  
SCALE MASSACRES AND MASS EXODUS OF TERRIFIED PEOPLE. AMIN  
MUST GO AND QUICKLY. TANZANIA MIGHT NOT ACHIEVE THIS EVEN  
WITH THE HELP OF EXILES AND DISSIDENTS AGAINST A UGANDA  
REINFORCED WITH LIBYAN ARMS AND TROOPS. BUT THEY WOULD STRUGGLE  
ON AS BEST THEY COULD.

5. SHE THEN CAME TO THE MAIN POINT. KENYA COULD MAKE THE  
DECISIVE CONTRIBUTION. TANZANIA DID NOT WANT STATEMENTS OF  
SUPPORT FROM PRESIDENT MOI OR THE TAKING UP OF ANY PUBLIC ANTI  
AMIN POSITION BY THE KENYANS. SHE WANTED THEM TO REALISE  
THAT IT WAS IN THEIR OWN INTERESTS TO DO WHAT THEY COULD TO  
HELP BRING HIM DOWN. SURELY KENYA DID NOT WANT TO LIVE WITH  
AMIN'S REVENGE ON HIS COUNTRYMEN: SURELY KENYA MUST REALISE  
THAT A UGANDA DOMINATED BY LIBYA WOULD BE BAD FOR EAST  
AFRICA: MIGHT IT NOT BE POSSIBLE THAT AN IRRATIONAL AND  
REARMED AMIN WOULD TURN ON KENYA IN PURSUIT OF REAL OR  
IMAGINARY TERRITORIAL CLAIMS? IF KENYA ACCEPTED THIS ANALYSIS  
THEN SHE COULD HELP HERSELF BY SLOWING UP OR BETTER STILL CUTTING  
OFF ESSENTIAL SUPPLIES PARTICULARLY POL. SHE COULD DO SO  
UNOBTRUSIVELY: ROADS COULD "BECOME" IMPASSABLE, RAILWAYS  
BREAK DOWN, DOCUMENTATION BE "LOST", A WEEK WITHOUT SUPPLIES  
IRRESPECTIVE OF WHAT THE LIBYANS COULD DO WOULD "FINISH AMIN".

6. WHEN I ASKED THE OBVIOUS QUESTION WHY TANZANIA COULD NOT  
PUT ALL THIS TO THE KENYANS THEMSELVES MISS WICKEN REPLIED  
THAT THEIR RELATIONSHIP MADE THIS IMPOSSIBLE. THE TWO  
PRESIDENTS HAD ESTABLISHED A DIRECT TELEPHONE LINK AND NYERERE  
CONSIDERED MOI TO BE A MAN WITH WHOM HE COULD DO SOME BUSINESS.  
BUT THERE WAS STILL DEEP SUSPICION OF TANZANIA IN KENYAN  
GOVERNMENT CIRCLES - THERE WAS 'TOO MUCH HISTORY BETWEEN THEM'.  
A DIRECT APPROACH WOULD SIMPLY BE SEEN BY THE KENYANS AS AN  
ATTEMPT BY THE TANZANIANS TO HAVE KENYA PULL HER CHESTNUTS  
OUT OF THE FIRE ("THE KENYANS STILL DID NOT TRUST TANZANIA")  
WHILE AN OBJECTIVE ANALYSIS OF THE SITUATION COMING FROM US

# CONFIDENTIAL

COULD CARRY SUFFICIENT WEIGHT TO PERSUADE THE KENYANS TO ACT IN THEIR OWN BEST INTERESTS. MISS WICKEN SAID THAT SHE KNEW THAT THE KENYANS WERE WORRIED THAT NYERERE WANTED TO FOIST OBOTE ONTO UGANDA. THIS WAS NOT SO. TANZANIA WOULD HELP ALL ANTI AMIN GROUPS WHETHER BASED HERE OR IN KENYA. OBOTE WAS THE LEADER OF THE GROUP THAT THEY KNEW BEST. ANY UGANDAN GOVERNMENT AFTER AMIN WHOMSOEVER LED IT WOULD BE GOOD FOR KENYA AND FOR EAST AFRICA.

7. I TOLD MISS WICKEN THAT I WOULD REPORT HER APPROACH TO YOU. SPEAKING PERSONALLY I COULD SEE SOME DIFFICULTIES. HOWEVER MUCH SYMPATHY THERE MIGHT BE IN THE UK FOR AN END TO AMIN'S RULE A BRITISH GOVERNMENT COULD WELL BE RELUCTANT TO PUT ITSELF IN A POSITION WHERE BY ACTING IN THE WAY SUGGESTED BY MISS WICKEN IT RAN THE DANGER OF BEING ACCUSED OF ENCOURAGING ONE AFRICAN GOVERNMENT AT THE BEHEST OF ANOTHER TO HELP OVERTHROW A THIRD. MISS WICKEN SAID THAT SHE SAW THIS BUT ALL SHE WAS ASKING WAS FOR US TO CONSIDER THE TANZANIAN ANALYSIS AND IF WE AGREED WITH IT TO PUT IT TO THE KENYANS AS OUR OWN (AND NOT REPEAT NOT AS A TANZANIAN ONE) AND THEY SHOULD THEN DRAW THEIR OWN CONCLUSIONS IN THE LIGHT OF THEIR INTERESTS AND ACT ACCORDINGLY. THE KENYANS MAY WELL HAVE REACHED THE SAME CONCLUSIONS THEMSELVES (SHE WAS ENCOURAGED BY RECENT REPORTS OF KENYAN MPS CALLING FOR SUPPORT FOR TANZANIA ) BUT SHE VERY MUCH HOPED THAT WE COULD HELP IN THE WAY SHE HAD DESCRIBED.

8. PLEASE SEE MIFT.

HINCHCLIFFE

[SENT ALSO BY BAG TO BONN AND PARIS]

FILES

EAD

DADS

IPD

EID

ESSD

OID

NEWS-D

CCD

NAD

DEF-D

PUSD

PS

PS | MIKROWELANDS

PS | MR JUDD

PS | PVS

SIR A. DUFF

SIR A. PARSONS

MR BULLARD

MR DAY

(108)

JCU 020/2  
 20.20  
 f n 1 n

FM DAR ES SALAAM 110737 Z MAR 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO (DESKBY 111000Z) TELN 191 OF 11 MARCH

INFO IMMEDIATE TRIPOLI (POSTBY 120500Z) NAIROBI (POSTBY 120500Z)

PRIORITY BONN AND PARIS

MLPT TANZANIA/UGANDA

1. AT THE BEGINNING OF HER CALL MISS WICKEN SAID THAT I MIGHT LIKE TO KNOW THAT THE TANZANIANS AND THEIR ALLIES (EXILES AND DISSIDENTS) WERE NOW ENGAGED IN A "MAJOR BATTLE" WITH THE UGANDANS NEAR TO KAMPALA. SHE CLAIMED TO HAVE FEW DETAILS BUT SHE DID NOT THINK THAT RADIO KAMPALA (AS REPORTED BY THE BBC) CLAIMS THAT THE TANZANIANS WERE BEING PUSHED BACK WERE CORRECT. THE TANZANIANS KNEW THAT LARGE NUMBERS OF LIBYAN TROOPS WERE NOW IN UGANDA BUT THEY HAD NO EVIDENCE THAT THEY HAD JOINED IN THE FIGHTING. IT DID SEEM HOWEVER THAT THE LIBYANS HAD REPLACED THE UGANDAN PLANES DESTROYED BY THE TANZANIANS - PREVIOUSLY TANZANIA HAD "WIPE OUT" THE ENTIRE UGANDAN AIRFORCE. MISS WICKEN WAS GLOOMY WITH LITTLE OF THE EBULLIANCE AND CONFIDENCE SHE HAD SHOWN ON HER PREVIOUS CALL ON 27 FEBRUARY. SHE MADE NO ATTEMPT TO

1963-1971

SECRET

THE CURRENT FIGHTING AS BEING PRIMARILY DONE BY EXILES

DISSENTS NOR DID SHE SEEK TO CAMAFLAGE TANZANIAN INTENTIONS TO DRIVE HOME A DIRECT MILITARY ASSAULT ON AMIN IF THEY COULD AS OPPOSED TO LEAVING THE INITIATIVE TO EXILE GROUPS. SHE SPOKE FROM PREPARED NOTES AND I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT SHE WAS ONCE AGAIN ACTING ON PRESIDENT NYERERES INSTRUCTIONS AND REFLECTING HIS CURRENT MOOD.

2. WE HAVE NO INDEPENDANT INFORMATION ON THE STATE OF THE WAR:

I SUSPECT HOWEVER THAT THE TANZANIANS NOW REALISE THAT TOPPLING AMIN WILL NOT BE THE QUICK AND EASY TASK IT MAY HAVE SEEMED A WEEK AGO AND IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THEY HAVE HAD BAD NEWS FROM THE BATTLEFIELD POSSIBLY ABOUT LIBYAN INVOLVEMENT. IT MAY ALSO BE ( AND THIS IS EVEN MORE SPECULATORY ) THAT THEY HAVE ER APPROACHED THE KENYANS ALREADY AND HAVE BEEN REBUFFED AND ARE ~~HOPING~~ IN DESPERATION TO MAKE USE OF WHAT THEY REGARD AS OUR SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH NAIROBI.

3. HOW CAN WE HELP? I CAN SEE THAT THERE ARE OBJECTIONS TO MEETING THE TANZANIAN REQUEST. IN ANY CASE I WONDER HOW MUCH WEIGHT THE TANZANIAN ANALYSIS WOULD CARRY WITH THE KENYANS- EVEN PRESEJOED AS OUR THOUGHTS A STRONG SMELL OF BURNING TANZANIAN CHESTNUTS MIGHT STILL COME THROUGH. I ALSO WONDER IF INFAC

<sup>2</sup>  
CONFIDENTIAL

/THE

CONFIDENTIAL

THE CUTTING OFF OF SUPPLIES THROUGH KENYAN WOULD BE AS DECISIVE AS THE TANZANIANS THINK GIVEN LIBYAN SUPPORT FOR UGANDA. ONE POSSIBILITY COULD BE FOR OUR HIGH COMMISSIONER IN NAIROBI TO ASK THE KENYANS FOR THEIR ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION IN UGANDA PARTICULARLY ON WHAT MIGHT HAPPEN IF AMIN SURVIVES. IF IT TRANSPIRES THAT, AFTER ALL, TANZANIAN AND KENYAN PROGNOSTICATIONS ARE ROUGHLY SIMILAR YOU MAY WISH TO AUTHORISE ME DISCREETLY TO INDICATE THIS TO MISS WICKEN THUS ENCOURAGING THE TANZANIANS TO TACKLE THE KENYANS DIRECT WITH SOME HOPE THAT THERE IS SOME COMMON GROUND WORTH BUILDING ON. THIS WOULD AT LEAST AVOID RETURNING TO THE TANZANIANS WITH A BLANK REFUSAL TO HELP AND WOULD ALSO HAVE THE ADVANTAGE OF PUTTING THE ONUS ON THE TANZANIANS (RATHER THAN INDIRECTLY THROUGH US) OF PERSUADING THE KENYANS TO TAKE THE KIND OF ACTION WHICH TANZANIA PROFFERS TO CONSIDER IT IS IN KENYA'S INTEREST TO DO SO.

4. IT SEEMS TO US THAT IN ANY CONVERSATIONS WITH THE KENYANS WE COULD IF ASKED ASSURE THEM THAT IT IS OUR ASSESSMENT THAT THE TANZANIANS HAVE NO LONG TERM TERRITORIAL AMBITIONS IN UGANDA NOR DO THEY WISH TO UPSET THE "BALANCE OF POWER" IN EAST AFRICA. AS SEEN FROM HERE THEY ARE SOLELY BENT IN REMOVING AMIN WHICH THEY SEE AS A NECESSARY DEFENSIVE PLOY. AS FOR A SUCCESSOR



# CONFIDENTIAL

WE THINK IT LIKELY THAT THE TANZZANIANS ARE GENUINE WHEN THEY SAY THAT THEY ARE NOT AT THIS POINT WEDDED TO OBOTE OR TO ANYONE ELSE AND THEY WILL SUPPORT TO THE BEST OF THEIR ABILITY ANY (AND EVERY) GROUP OPPOSED TO AMIN. AS FOR THE FACTORS DETERMINING CURRENT TANZANIAN POLICIES - (A AND B IN PARA 3 OF MIPT) - WE HAVE NO REASON TO DOUBT THE ACCURACY OF 'A'. 'B' IS DEBATABLE. IT IS OF COURSE CONVENIENT FOR THE TANZANIANS TO JUSTIFY THEIR CONTINUED INVASION AS BEING PRIMARILY MOTIVATED BY HUMANITARIAN CONSIDERATIONS BUT IF IT IS TRUE THAT THERE HAS BEEN A LARGE MEASURE OF COLLABORATION BETWEEN THE UGANDANS IN THE "LIBERATED AREAS" AND THE ADVANCING TANZANIANS THEN WHO CAN DOUBT FROM HIS PAST RECORD THAT IF AMIN GETS THE CHANCE TO EXACT HIS REVENGE ON HIS OWN PEOPLE HE WILL DO SO WITH COMPLETE RUTHLESSNESS.

[SENT ALSO BY BAG TO Bonn, PARIS]

HINCHCLIFFEE

FILES  
EAD  
OAGS  
IPD  
EID  
ESYSD  
OID  
NEWS.S  
CCD  
HAB  
DEF.D

POSD  
PS  
PS/HA ROWLANDS  
PS/HA JUDG  
PS/POUS  
SIR A DUFF  
SIR A PARSONS  
MR BULLARD  
MR DAY  
MR P.M. ROBERTS

CONFIDENTIAL

860 020/2		
RECEIVED IN REGISTRY NO. 28		
13 MAR 1979		
INDEX	FILE	REPLY
✓	✓	✓

CONFIDENTIAL

SKBY FCO 120900Z

DESKBY NAIROBI 120800Z

DESKBY TRIPOLI 120800Z

FM DAR ES SALAAM 120545Z MAR 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 192 OF 12 MARCH

INFO IMMEDIATE NAIROBI, TRIPOLI

INFO PRIORITY BONN PARIS

109

107

108

MY TELS 190 AND 191 UGANDA/TANZANIA

1. MISS WICKEN CALLED AGAIN LATE ON 11 MARCH TO SAY THAT SHE HAS UNINTENTIONALLY MISLED ME ABOUT THE LOCATION OF THE PRESENT FIGHTING. HAVING TALKED TO THE PRESIDENT SHE HAD NOW ESTABLISHED THAT REPORTS OF FIGHTING INVOLVING TANZANIAN TROOPS NEAR KAMPALA AT MPIGI WERE NOT ACCURATE: THE TANZANIANS HAD NOT REACHED THAT FAR. THE BATTLE TO WHICH SHE WAS REFERRING HAD TAKEN PLACE "JUST BEYOND" MASAKA AND SHE HAD JUST HEARD THAT IT HAD BEEN A "SUCCESSFUL ENGAGEMENT". THE TANZANIANS AND SUPPORTERS WERE NOW MOVING SLOWLY UP THE LINE OF THE MASAKA KAMPALA ROAD. SHE CONFIRMED THAT THEY HAD NOT YET COME ACROSS LIBYANS BUT EXPECTED THEM TO BE DUG IN IN THE MPIGI AREA WHERE SHE IMPLIED THE DECISIVE ENGAGEMENT WOULD PROBABLY TAKE PLACE.

2. MISS WICKEN ALSO CONFIRMED THAT THIS LATEST MILITARY SUCCESS IN NO WAY AFFECTED THE URGENCY OF THE REQUEST SHE HAD PREVIOUSLY MADE AS REPORTED IN MY TELNO 190.

MENCKELIFFE [ALSO SENT BY BAG TO BONN AND PARIS]

FILES

EAD	DEF D
OADS	PUSD
IPD	PS
EID	PS/MR ROWLANDS
ES & SD	PS/MR JUDD
OID	PS/PUS
NEWS D	SIR A DUFF
OGD	SIR A PARSONS
NAD	MR BULLARD
	MR DAY

CONFIDENTIAL

58/3

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

BY FCO AND NAIROBI 151030Z  
FI DAR ES SALAAM 150930Z MAR 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 197 OF 15 MARCH

INFO IMMEDIATE NAIROBI

INFO PRIORITY TRIPOLI, BONN, PARIS

JEC 020/2		
RECEIVED IN REGISTRY NO. 25		
15 MAR 1979		
DESK OFFICER	PA	RECEIVED BY
INDEX	PA	RECEIVED BY
4	1	Jr

116

MY TELS NOS 190-192: UGANDA/TANZANIA

1. WE HAVE JUST LEARNT FROM THE AMERICANS THAT AT THE SAME TIME THAT MISS WICKEN WAS CALLING ON ME, AMBASSADOR SPAIN WAS SUMMONED BY PRESIDENT NYERERE. PRESIDENT NYERERE WHO WAS ALONE PUT TO SPAIN THE SAME ANALYSIS AS THAT DESCRIBED BY MISS WICKEN AND WITH THE SAME REQUEST THAT THE KENYANS SHOULD BE APPROACHED. NYERERE ALSO SPOKE ABOUT A SUCCESSOR TO AMIN IN SIMILAR TERMS TO THOSE USED BY MISS WICKEN (PARA 6 OF MY TEL 190) AND SAID THAT HE WOULD BE HAPPY TO CONSULT THE KENYANS ABOUT THIS KNOWING THEIR SUSPICIONS OF OBOTE. PRESIDENT NYERERE TOLD SPAIN THAT HE COULD NOT APPROACH PRESIDENT MOI DIRECT FOR FEAR OF A REBUFF.

2. SPAIN TOLD ME THAT HIS RECOMMENDATION TO WASHINGTON WAS THAT THEY SHOULD ACT ON THE TANZANIAN REQUEST. ALTHOUGH HE SAW THE DANGERS OF BECOMING INDIRECTLY INVOLVED IN AN AFRICAN QUARREL, HE FELT STRONGLY THAT THE US SHOULD DO ALL THEY COULD TO HELP TANZANIA IN VIEW OF HIS GOVERNMENT'S CLOSE TIES OF FRIENDSHIP WITH THE TANZANIANS AS AGAINST THE FRIGIDITY OF RELATIONS WITH UGANDA. AFTER ALL, ALL THE TANZANIANS WERE ASKING THE KENYANS TO DO BY PARTICULARLY CUTTING OFF OIL SUPPLIES TO UGANDA WAS NO MORE THAN THE US HAD DONE ALREADY. IN THE EVENT HOWEVER, ON THE ADVICE OF (I GATHER) THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR IN NAIROBI, THE INSTRUCTION FROM WASHINGTON WAS THAT THE MOST THEY COULD DO WOULD BE TO OFFER TO NYERERE TO INFORM PRESIDENT MOI THAT NYERERE WOULD LIKE TO TALK WITH HIM ABOUT UGANDA - SOMETHING WHICH SPAIN HAD MADE CLEAR WAS PRECISELY WHAT NYERERE DID NOT WANT TO DO. EXCLAM WHEN SPAIN DELIVERED THIS MESSAGE TO NYERERE ON 12 MARCH, THE PRESIDENT, PREDICTABLY DECLINED THE OFFER. SPAIN SAID THAT ALTHOUGH NYERERE HAD ACCEPTED THE AMERICAN DECISION WITH "CALM RESERVATION" HE WAS OBVIOUSLY DISAPPOINTED BY IT.

CONFIDENTIAL

/3. FROM

58/4

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM THE NARROW VIEWPOINT OF ANGLO/TANZANIAN RELATIONS I OBVIOUSLY HOPE THAT WE CAN BE MORE FORTHCOMING THAN THE AMERICANS IN OUR RESPONSE. IF WE CAN NOT GO AS FAR AS THE TANZANIANS WOULD LIKE US TO (AND ANYHOW JUDGING FROM NAIROBI TELNO 122 THE TANZANIAN ANALYSIS WILL NOT CARRY THAT MUCH WEIGHT WITH THE KENYANS) I WOULD LIKE TO HELP THE TANZANIANS BY BEING ABLE TO GIVE MISS WICKEN SOME INDICATION OF HOW THE KENYANS VIEW THE SITUATION, DRAWING SELECTIVELY AND WITH DISCRETION ON THE NAIROBI TUR AND ON ANY ADDITIONAL SALIENT POINTS YOU COULD LET ME HAVE FROM SIR STANLEY FINGLAND'S LETTER TO ROBSON OF 7 MARCH. MISS WICKEN WOULD BE PARTICULARLY INTERESTED TO LEARN THAT SUPPLIES TO UGANDA THROUGH KENYA HAVE FOR SOME TIME PAST FALLEN TO A TRICKLE AND THIS POINT ALONE MIGHT PERSUADE HER AND THEREFORE THE PRESIDENT TO REALISE THAT THEIR IDEA THAT KENYA COULD HAVE DECISIVE EFFECT ON THE COURSE OF THE WAR MAY WELL BE AS WATTS POINTS OUT AN EXAGGERATED ONE. THIS REALISATION ALONE (PLUS IDEALLY A SANITIZED ASSESSMENT OF KENYAN ATTITUDES AS WE SEE THEM) COULD BE ENOUGH TO CONVINCE THE TANZANIANS THAT KENYA FOR ALL PRACTICAL PURPOSES IS THE WRONG TARGET. THIS WILL TAKE THE PRESSURE OFF US.

4. A FURTHER POINT YOU MAY WISH TO CONSIDER IS THAT OUR EXPERIENCE HERE, WHICH IS SHARED BY THE AMERICANS IS THAT INFORMATION PASSED IN CONFIDENCE TO STATE HOUSE IS WELL SAFEGUARDED. SPAIN IN HIS THREE AND A HALF YEARS HERE HAS NEVER KNOWN A LEAK. ACCORDINGLY WE CAN BE REASONABLY CONFIDENT THAT ANYTHING WE SAY TO NYERERE OR TO MISS WICKEN ABOUT KENYAN ATTITUDES WILL GO NO FURTHER.

HINCHCLIFFE

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

F I L E S		COPIES TO
EAD	N AM D	ORE5 DOT
CADS	DEFENCE D	
CONS D	PUSD	
CONS EM UNIT	PS	DIO CABINET OFFICE
IPD	PS/MR ROWLANDS	ASSESSMENTS STAFF CABINET OFFICE
EID (E)	PS/MR JUDD	TREASURY
ES & SO	PS/PUE	ODM
OTD	SIR A DUFF	
NEWS D	SIR A PARSONS	
CCE	MR DILLARD	
FINANCE D	MR DAY	

[SENT ALSO BY BAG TO BONN AND PARIS]

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF TRADE

1 VICTORIA STREET LONDON SW1H 0ET


Telephone 01-215 18



From the Secretary of State

PS/PASS CAS  
MR. STEELE  
MR. SALMON  
MR. GREGG  
MR. BRYANT

Bryan Cartledge Esq  
10 Downing Street  
London SW1



28 February 1979

copy of R. 7/3/79  
cc Sir C. Ross  
Mr. Williams

Mr. Williams  
-6 Max Mullen 21.3.79  
A. L. P. 1979

Dear Bryan,

#### UGANDA AIRLINE FLIGHTS TO STANSTED

The Secretary of State has seen a copy of the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's minute of 27 February to the Prime Minister about Uganda Airlines' flights to Stansted.

He agrees that, in the light of the DOP discussion on 22 January, it would now be appropriate to suspend Uganda Airlines' flights. Because this decision will raise a number of technical difficulties, and will be to some extent unprecedented in civil aviation relations, he would prefer, on balance, that the announcement should be made in a fairly low-key manner and should stress that the decision has been taken on political grounds. He is content for the timing of any announcement to be left to the judgement of the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary but he has asked me to draw to the attention of his colleagues the attached article in today's "Daily Telegraph". You will see that Uganda Airlines allege that most of the supplies flown out from Stansted are medical equipment. Mr Smith would not, however, wish this consideration to stand in the way of a suspension of flights.

Officials from this Department are already in touch with those in the other Departments concerned about the mechanics of a suspension. I understand that there are two flight permits which have been issued to Uganda Airlines which we have been told will not be used for an indefinite period (presumably because of the current situation in Uganda). It is our intention to suspend these but this will, of course, make it necessary to inform Uganda Airlines in London at the same time that any announcement from this Department is made.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Private Secretaries of members of the DOP Committee (with a reminder that the Secretary of State is not a member of that Committee) and to Martin Vile in the Cabinet Office.

Yours Sincerely,  
Tom Harris

T. G. HARRIS  
Private Secretary

SECRET

## 'Whisky run' airline shows real cargo

By Christopher Bramwell

**D**ESPAIRING over the frequency with which its London-Kampala service is labelled "the whisky run," Uganda Airlines yesterday opened its files and freight sheds for an unhindered inspection of the type of goods it is flying back to Africa.

Apart from the odd case or two of beer "shipped by crew members," no whiskey, or other alcohol, has been flown out to Kampala, the airline's officials maintain, since three large consignments were photographed being put aboard a plane at Stansted, Essex over 18 months ago.

After unloading a cargo of coffee beans yesterday, a Uganda Airlines Boeing 707 aircraft is due to return to Kampala today with a 33-ton load which includes 17½ tons of bandages, two tons of medicines and 6½ tons of unspecified "Church Mission goods" from the International Dispensary Association of Amsterdam.

Other items in the cargo include construction and sanitary equipment, electrical appliances, foodstuffs and a "bicycle."

### Fear for vital supplies

Uganda Airlines officials in London fear that unless the airline's image is corrected, support will grow for those demanding that trade links with Uganda should be severed. And this, they add, could mean that hundreds of tons of vitally needed medical supplies would be stranded.

Already waiting at Stansted airport for shipment are nine huge containers of hospital beds, hundreds of blankets, a gift from the British Red Cross to the Uganda Red Cross Society.

Medical supplies are a regular item on the airline's cargo manifests, copies of which I was allowed to inspect in the offices of their Stansted agents, Servisair, yesterday.

A random scrutiny showed recent cargo loads had included "sausage ingredients," mailbags, postage stamps, 15 amp. plug tops, clothing, typewriters, pens, pencils, examination papers, text books, electric lamps and tubes, multiphase motors, electric ovens, refrigerators and freezers.

In addition, there had been loads of raw cotton, clothes, sewing machines and building materials.

An airport official said: "If anything, this service should be known as 'the truck run,' as a considerable amount of powdered milk is regularly shipped out."

SECRET



*cc Sir Oliver Rose*  
*M. Whitmore*

*Mr. Hansm*  
*6/3/79*  
*copy d. K. Lawley*  
*to Mac Millan*

FOLIO  
53

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

CABINET OFFICE
A 7951.....
28 FEB 1979
RECEIVED
FILE NO. 403117

28 February 1979

*Ag*

*Li*

*Dear Sir,*

Uganda Airlines and Stanstead Airport

FOLIO  
52

The Prime Minister has seen the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's minute (PM/79/24) of 27 February about the suspension of Uganda Airlines' flights to Stanstead Airport.

Subject to the views of his colleagues in DOP, and to those of the Attorney General, to whom you are sending a copy of Dr. Owen's minute, the Prime Minister is content that the Secretary of State for Trade - who, the Prime Minister understands, does not dissent from Dr. Owen's recommendation - should now act under the Air Navigation Order of 1976 to suspend the Ugandan flights.

So far as a public announcement of this action is concerned, the Prime Minister is content that the form and timing of such an announcement should be agreed between Dr. Owen and Mr. Smith.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Private Secretaries to other members of DOP, to Bill Beckett (Law Officers' Department) and to Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

*Yours ever,*  
*J. S. Wall*

J. S. Wall, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



CABINET OFFICE  
LONDON SW1A 2AS

FOI  
524

SECRET

Mr. ~~Forster~~ Whitby <sup>28/11</sup>

493/1

Stratford : London Air Lines

Mr. Vile tells me that Mr. Smith is  
wiped to agree. Mr. Cawthorne would like  
to seek the P.M.'s approval on this basis.  
Did he have any comments?

2. I said no. If our interests were  
in agreement, for he it for us to  
consider otherwise? - But the Attorney-  
General should be kept informed.

3. Mr. Vile will tell Mr. Cawthorne and  
arrange for correspondence to be given to Mr.  
Lilkin.

W/...





PM/79/24

PRIME MINISTER

**SECRET**

CABINET OFFICE
A 7922....
27 FEB 1979
FILING INSTRUCTIONS
FILE No. 443/1

cc Sir Oliver Rose  
Mr Whitmore

1. We agreed in DOP on 22 January that I should seek the Committee's agreement when I judged the time was appropriate to suspend the Uganda Airlines flights to Stansted.
2. President Amin is now in more serious trouble than at any time since he seized power. The Tanzanians seem determined to keep up military pressure in the hope that Amin will crack. African governments who are aware that the Tanzanians are conducting a creeping military incursion into Uganda, have not criticised the Tanzanians. I judge this is the best opportunity since the Uganda invasion of Tanzania last November to suspend the outward Stansted flights and I recommend that this now be done.
3. I have taken into account two possibilities. First, that we might be accused by our African friends of colluding with the Tanzanians. The very cautious line towards Tanzania taken by the Organisation of African Unity suggests that such a charge would not be levelled at us. Secondly, there could be some risk of retaliation against the small number of British citizens (about 300) still in Uganda. President Amin did not retaliate against the small American community when the United States imposed a full trade embargo last October.
4. I therefore propose that the Secretary of State for Trade should now act under the Air Navigation Order, 1976.
5. I am copying this minute to our colleagues in DOP, and to Sir John Hunt.

(DAVID OWEN)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

27 February 1979

SECRET



*From the Secretary of State*

B G Cartledge Esq  
Prime Minister's Office  
10 Downing Street  
London SW1

20 December 1978

CABINET OFFICE
A 5787
212
FILED
493/1

*a Sp. C. Rore  
M. G. Clement  
M. Whitmore*

*Dear Bryan,*

#### ECGD CREDIT COVER FOR TANZANIA

Thank you for your letter of 11 December reporting the Prime Minister's comment on the question of whether ECGD Section 2 cover would be available to support the sale of military equipment to Tanzania. In the light of the comment from the Chief Secretary, (and as I understand that no further Ministerial comments are expected), I can now confirm that we do not envisage any problems in the provision of ECGD cover on the scale proposed.

It is possible, of course, that ECGD will receive some complaints from other exporters unable to obtain cover for their particular orders. However, such criticism can be weathered.


I am sending copies of this letter to Kingsley Jones (HM Treasury), Stephen Wall (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), Roger Facer (Ministry of Defence), Andrew Duguid (Department of Industry) and to Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

*Yours Sincerely,*

*T G Harris*

T G HARRIS  
Private Secretary

CONFIDENTIAL



cc Sir Clive Rose  
M. Winmore

FOLIO  
49


Treasury Chambers, Parliament Street, SW1P 3AG

W

109  
31.12

The Rt. Hon David Owen MP  
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs  
Foreign & Commonwealth Office  
Downing Street  
London

12 December 1978



ECGD CREDIT COVER FOR TANZANIA

48  
You sent the Chancellor of the Exchequer a copy of your minute of 4 December 1978 to the Secretary of State for Trade, about ECGD Section 2 cover for arms sales to Tanzania, on which the Secretary of State for Trade has commented in his reply of 8 December. I entirely agree with John Smith that on economic grounds cover is not justified: I have no doubt that all the reasons he gives are valid. Indeed, in economic terms I believe that we shall be doing both ourselves and Tanzania a disservice if we encourage her to acquire large additional amounts of military equipment.

2. However, given the strong political case which you urge, and the comparatively small additional amount involved, I am prepared to accept that the national interest justifies our making cover available for the arms sales immediately in question, provided that the amount does not exceed £4 million and that normal credit terms for such sales are applied.

3. I am sending copies of this letter to the Prime Minister, the Secretaries of State for Defence, Industry and Trade and Sir John Hunt.

JOEL BARNETT



SECRETARY OF STATE FOR TRADE

FCS/78/206

7/3

CABINET OFFICE
A 5086.....
- 5 DEC 1978
FILING INSTRUCTIONS
FILE No. ....

cc Sir Clegg Rose  
Mr. Brimmore  
Mr. Fowler

FOLIO  
48

My  
G.12

ECGD CREDIT COVER FOR TANZANIA

As a result of the Ugandan invasion of Tanzanian territory, President Nyerere has made an urgent appeal to us for assistance over the supply of considerable quantities of defence equipment. A copy of the latest Tanzanian list is enclosed. The cost is some £20 m. In making their requests the Tanzanians indicated that they would like help over credit terms as well as in expediting delivery.

2. We have so far confined our response to the Tanzanian Government to providing them with a small number of mine detectors, plus the cost of airfreighting a commercially purchased girder bridge, borne by FCO funds. We have also made an offer of funds for relief and rehabilitation for the area invaded by Uganda and expressed readiness to do all we can to expedite orders for equipment placed by the Tanzanian Government with United Kingdom suppliers. In this connection I should point out that Tanzania's existing commercial orders for military equipment from UK suppliers are substantial and worth fostering. For example we are about to deliver 36 Scorpion tanks.
3. A member of the Defence Sales Organisation will be visiting Tanzania next week to discuss the supply position on both current and new orders. Some of the items on the Tanzanian list of requirements, eg Viper mine removing equipment, and Blowpipe anti-tank missiles, cannot be supplied now on security or delivery grounds. The balance of their list comes to some £7.5 m.
4. We had earlier understood that there was a small margin in the credit cover which ECGD had available for Tanzania under Section 2 of the Exports Guarantees Act. This could have allowed

/us



us to offer credit to provide for modest purchases of military equipment by the Tanzanian Government. I now understand that ECGD take the view that their present volume of outstanding commitments under both sections 1 and 2 is such that they would not propose to accept any further credit cover. I believe that they have been reinforced in this view by a recent deterioration in Tanzania's external financial position, a situation which the Tanzanians have now taken steps to remedy.

5. In our recent Ministerial discussion about the effects of the Ugandan attack on Tanzania it was agreed that we should provide modest help to Tanzania. In the event our contribution to date in the form of military equipment has been extremely modest, at around £90,000. We need President Nyerere's goodwill over various southern African problems not least Rhodesia and Namibia. On the whole he has played a constructive role on these issues. However, he is disappointed at our inability to supply equipment in any quantity on a government-to-government basis. If we now have to indicate to him that we are unable to provide the small amount of additional credit cover needed to meet relatively modest supplies of commercially ordered, non-lethal, equipment I fear that he will be reinforced in his suspicions of us as a friend. This will make it all the harder to maintain his cooperation and goodwill. It is just possible that the Tanzanian Government will be prepared to pay in cash for the equipment we may now be in a position to offer. But if this is not so, I earnestly hope you can agree to some flexibility in the present ECGD Section 2 ceiling. By excluding Blowpipe and Viper and taking into account the apparent Tanzanian intention to pay cash for one of the major items on their list (a floating bridge), my officials think that the maximum amount of additional cover required would not exceed £4 million.

6. Our national interest in being prepared to help Tanzania to the extent I am now proposing is clear. Tanzania has

/moreover



moreover a good reputation for meeting her liabilities and attracts considerable sums in foreign aid, including our own. The Tanzanians have been careful to preserve their good international payments record, and are taking steps to remedy their present problems.

7. If you can agree to an extension of the ECGD Section 2 commitment, I hope very much it may be possible to do so in time to enable the Defence Sales Organisation representative to be armed with this knowledge when he is in Dar-es-Salaam next week.

8. I am copying this minute to the Prime Minister, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Secretary of State for Defence, the Secretary of State for Industry and Sir John Hunt.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'D. Owen', with a long horizontal stroke extending to the right.

(DAVID OWEN)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

4 December 1978

CONFIDENTIAL

GR 80

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 201200 Z

FM DAR ES SALAAM 201140Z NOV 78

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 855 OF 20 NOVEMBER

AND TO IMMEDIATE MODUK

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON

MIPT

TANZANIA/UGANDA: MILITARY SUPPLIES  
COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT:

270 PTR 349B

179 TRA 921

122 RF301A

VEHICLES:

36 FFR LANDROVERS

6 3 TON BEDFORD TRUCKS

36 3 TON PRIME MOVERS

BRIDGING:

2 MGB BRIDGES

1 FLOATING BRIDGE IN TWO UNITS EACH 60 METRES LONG CAPABLE  
OF CARRYING 50 TONS EACH

MINE DETECTORS:

50 BABY VIPERS

50 GIANT VIPERS

CONFIDENTIAL

/AMMUNITION

CONFIDENTIAL

AMMUNITION (SCORPION)

690 76MM HE/TL 24A4  
620 76MM HESH/L29A3  
90 76MM SMOKE BEL 32A5  
540 76MM PRACTICE L25A4  
215 76MM SMOKE SCREENING L8A1  
75 76MM CANISTER L33AL

ANTIAIRCRAFT MISSILES:

100 BLOWPIPE ANTIAIRCRAFT PLUS 500 MISSILES

MOON



LORD PRESIDENT'S CASE

*Ryn*

For Action to:

For information or comments, if any:

MR D E R FAULKNER ✓

---

FOR PRIVATE OFFICE USE ONLY

Further action:

B/F with Back Papers:

B/F with advice:

Copy also to:

PA


Initialled:

---

CONFIDENTIAL



MINISTRY OF OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT  
BLAND HOUSE  
STAG PLACE LONDON SW1E 5DH



*FJ*  
c L K Bennell 4  
c L C Rose  
c M A Charnitt  
c Mr Houlfield  
c Mr Whitmore

From the Minister

22 November 1978

*Dear Stephen*

UGANDA/TANZANIA

Thank you for sending me a copy of your letter of 17 November to Bryan Cartledge.

Mrs Hart agrees that there may well be a case for some urgent humanitarian assistance north of the Kagera river. What we should do depends on the needs and requests of the Tanzanian Government. The situation in the Kagera salient is not of the kind where our Disaster Unit would ordinarily get involved : but if there is a clear need, particularly for drugs or medical supplies, we can consider urgently what we can do to help. Perhaps your Department would have a word with the Disaster Unit.

If the Tanzanians put forward relief requirements which go beyond immediate needs, we should be prepared to consider this. But I should add that we would have difficulty in accepting any role in reconstruct since this is an area of Tanzania where we have no administrative capacity and where other donors are better placed to implement capital projects.

It may also be useful to add that Mrs Hart has just approved a new programme aid grant of £2.5 million for Tanzania. This will be available for imports from the UK for developmental purposes in the sectors of natural resources, transport, electricity and health. While this offer has no direct bearing on the hostilities in North West Tanzania and has indeed been under consideration for some time, we hope that the timing of this offer will be helpful in relation to current exchanges with the Tanzanians.

I am copying this letter to Bryan Cartledge (No 10), the Private Secretaries to the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Secretary of State for Defence, and to Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

*John Nicholas*  
*Robert Graham Harrison*  
(R M Graham-Harrison)  
Private Secretary

J S Wall Esq  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

CABINET OFFICE

21 November 1978

A 4501.....

21 NOV 1978

ROUTING INSTRUCTIONS

FILE No. 493/1

Uganda/Tanzania

cc Sir Clive Rose  
Mr. Cartledge

WJ 2.1.11

FOLIO  
43

Thank you for your letter of 17 November about the approach which the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary now proposes to adopt towards requests from the Tanzanian Government for military assistance.

The Prime Minister has seen your letter and agrees with the action which Dr. Owen is taking.

I am sending copies of this letter to Kingsley Jones (H.M. Treasury), Roger Facer (M.O.D.), Robert Graham-Harrison (O.D.M.) and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

B. G. CARTLEDGE

J. S. Wall, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL




Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

17 November 1978

Dear Bryan,

Uganda-Tanzaniaa. Sir Oliver  
Mr. ShirmoreD. JM  
27/11/78

19 20/11

Consideration of a response to President Nyerere's appeal to us for government-to-government military assistance, to which you referred in your letter to me of 10 November, was suspended in the light of the Ugandan announcement of an unconditional withdrawal from Tanzanian territory.

The Tanzanians continue to deny a withdrawal is taking place although we believe that Ugandan troops are in fact withdrawing to barracks.

In the circumstances, Dr Owen believes that we should now switch our attention to our offer of humanitarian relief and rehabilitation in the area which came under attack. We would also continue to ensure expeditious handling of orders for defence equipment already placed by the Tanzanian Government with United Kingdom companies, in particular bridging equipment. We shall also need to discuss with the Tanzanians a request now put to us that ammunition for the Scorpion tanks being delivered by sea should be sent by air. The Tanzanians would be expected to pay for the extra cost of air freight.

Our High Commissioner in Dar-es-Salaam is being instructed to speak accordingly to the Tanzanian Government. The High Commissioner is being asked whether it would be a useful gesture if we were also to offer the Tanzanians 10 Plessey mine detectors, which are immediately available here, to be air-freighted out at our expense to help them in clearing the area for civilian rehabilitation. The equipment would cost only about £8,500, and air freight would not be expensive. The cost could be borne within the FCO Votes. In the event of such an offer being accepted an announcement would probably have to be made in Parliament; the equipment would be presented as being supplied in the task of making the area concerned fit for civilian resettlement.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Private Secretaries to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Minister of Defence and the Minister of Overseas Development, and to Martin Vile (Cabinet Office)

*John S. Wall*  
(J S Wall)

Bryan Cartledge Seq  
No 10 Downing Street



FOLIO  
41

John

15 November 1978

Dear Homer,

CABINET OFFICE  
4285  
10 1973  
FILING INSTRUCTIONS  
FILE No. 493/1

Ugandan Airlines Flights from Stansted

The Prime Minister has seen the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's minute (PM/78/119) about the use of Stansted Airport by Ugandan Airlines.

Subject to the views of his colleagues in DOP and to those of the Secretary of State for Trade, the Prime Minister agrees with Dr. Owen's view that means should now be found to suspend Ugandan flights from Stansted. The Prime Minister suggests that the suspension should be explained on "technical" grounds.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Private Secretaries to the other members of DOP, to Tom Harris (Department of Trade) and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

Bryan Caldwell.

J.S. Wall, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

~~SECRET~~

CONFIDENTIAL



File. 40

Treasury Chambers, Parliament Street, SW1P 3AG  
01-233 3000

14th November, 1978

CABINET OFFICE  
A ..... 4213  
15 NOV 1978  
FILING INSTRUCTIONS  
FILE No. ....

cc Sir G. ...  
D. J. M. 27/11/78  
15/11/78  
FOLIO 35

Dear Bryan.

UGANDAN ATTACK ON TANZANIA

Please refer to Stephen Wall's letter of 9th November to Bryan Cartledge on the above.

In the light of the discussion in Cabinet yesterday I am writing to inform you that the Chancellor of the Exchequer would have no objection in principle to the supply of a really modest amount of military equipment to Tanzania. He has noted that identified savings in the FCO Vote in the current financial year should be sufficient to more than cover additional expenditure (including the costs of military assistance to Zambia). In the light of all the circumstances, the Chancellor takes the view that the 'modest supplies' to President Nyerere should be covered by residual savings on the vote for the current financial year.

I have copies this letter to the Private Secretaries to the Secretary of State for Defence, the Foreign Secretary and Sir John Hunt.

Yours sincerely

Kingley Jones

(F.K. JONES)  
Private Secretary

B.G. Cartledge, Esq.,  
Private Secretary,  
10, Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

14 November 1978

CABINET OFFICE
A 4206
15 NOV 1978
FILE No. 4931

Dear Private Secretary,

Ugandan Flights from Stansted

Will Rose

Re. John - you have  
these papers in

The Attorney-General should have had a copy of the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's minute to the Prime Minister of 13 November on Stansted flights. I am sorry his name was inadvertently left off the list of recipients and I now enclose a copy of the minute.

I am sending copies of this letter to Private Secretaries to members of DOP, the Secretary of State for Trade and Sir John Hunt.

Yours sincerely,  
Stephen Wall

J S Wall  
Private Secretary

PS/Attorney-General  
Royal Courts of Justice  
Strand WC2



PRIME MINISTER

PM/78/119

SECRET

Dep A. J. 27/11/78

CABINET OFF  
A 4133  
13 NOV 1978  
FILING INSTRUCTION  
FILE No. 4931

*K. Pawley*  
*Draft advice from Sir J. Hunt*  
*the news that the PM has nothing in support*  
*of the not official statement, there was no hope*  
*of a technical difficulty*  
*Mr. Fowler*  
*Mr. Whitmore*

38

1. At the meeting of the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee on 30 October I said I would consider whether there was a case for taking action now to suspend the Ugandan Airlines flights from Stansted to Entebbe in the light of the US trade ban and the difficulties President Amin now finds himself in.
2. President Amin has seized the Kagera salient, a part of Tanzania and declared its annexation to Uganda. President Nyerere has declared his intention to fight to regain this territory but although hostilities are continuing, a military stalemate now exists.
3. It seems likely that the Ugandan attack on Tanzania is related to the fact that Amin is in some trouble at home although it is difficult to assess its extent. Since the windfall of the coffee boom in 1977 Uganda's foreign exchange reserves have again run right down and the economy appears to be back to its earlier hand-to-mouth position. Following the US ban on trade with Uganda, US oil companies have suspended oil supplies to Uganda, where they are responsible for 40% of the market. Shell/BP, with our encouragement and the two other European oil companies involved in supply to Uganda are restricting their supplies to the reduced levels they have for technical reasons been maintaining for some months. There are already reports of serious shortages and severe rationing of fuel in Uganda.
4. It would be contrary both to our policy of adopting sanctions only on the basis of internationally agreed action and to our international obligations, including the EEC Common Commercial Policy and the Lome Convention, to follow the US in a trade embargo. There remains the question of the Ugandan Airline flights to and from Stansted Airport, which are used mostly to carry Ugandan commercial exports, largely coffee, and, on the return flight miscellaneous goods purchased in the UK, including luxury items, such as whisky and clothes, for supply to Ugandan military shops, amounting to 20 - 25% of the total load.

SECRET





SECRET

5. The Law Officers have advised that a respectable argument could be advanced for the view that a total ban on non-scheduled carriage of cargo for hire or reward by Ugandan Airlines from Stansted to Uganda would be consistent with Article 77 of the Airline Navigation Order, even though it was imposed for reasons unconnected with air navigation. The Law Officers warned however that in any legal proceedings challenging such action there could be no guarantee of success, though they believed that a court might be expected to strain to find in favour of the Executive. It has been my view that the Law Officers' opinion gives adequate grounds for placing a ban on the uplift and discharge of Ugandan traffic at Stansted. Edmund Dell has hitherto expressed doubt both as to his powers to ban the flights and as to the wisdom of doing so.

6. I believe that Amin's attack on a friendly Commonwealth country, and the internal situation in Uganda, have produced a new situation in which the question of action against the flights should be reconsidered. We now have reason to believe that stopping these flights from Stansted, and with them the flow of luxury items to Amin's military supporters, will weaken his authority over his soldiers. They could indeed be tempted to turn against him. According to secret sources shortages of luxury goods were among the grievances aired by the soldiers who mutinied recently. It may be significant that after a temporary cessation of the flights in late October the first flight in November (3 November) carried a large consignment of whisky and household luxuries, as well as blood transfusion equipment which could be needed for battle casualties.

7. I believe we should not let slip an opportunity to take action which might tip the scales against Amin and that there is a strong case for finding means to suspend the flights from Stansted. If action against the flights is to have the impact we want, it is important to move swiftly to take advantage of the present unrest. If we remain uncertain over our powers to place a definitive ban on the flights, I suggest that ! Edmund Dell should in the first instance consider instructing his officials to find suitable technical reasons on the basis of which the flights could

SECRET



SECRET

be held up for a period of a few weeks, for example by rigorous application of the rules regarding the submission of applications for flight permits or other technical measures. Meanwhile, we can give further consideration to action to stop the outward flights completely under the Air Navigation Order. In the probable event of our action to suspend the flights on technical grounds becoming public knowledge, we should confirm this was the case without going into our reasons.

8. I do not think that we should be deterred from taking action on the Stansted flights for fear of retaliation against the British community in Uganda, which still numbers some 400-500 despite the many warnings they have been given that they remain there at their own risk. I am concerned about them but although President Amin has made some generalised threats, he has not so far acted against the American Community following the imposition of the US trade ban. The American Government do not believe he will do so. Nevertheless, we might as a precaution want to suggest to parent bodies that they warn their people in Uganda to be alert for signs of trouble.

9. I am sending copies of this minute to our DOP colleagues, to the Secretary of State for Trade and to Sir John Hunt.

(DAVID OWEN)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

13 November 1978

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL




FOLIO  
37

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

10 November 1978

4110



cc Sir Clive Rose

Mr Wharmore D. J. M.  
27/11/78.

Dear Stephen,

Uganda and Tanzania

FOLIO  
35

Thank you for your letter of 9 November in which you conveyed the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's proposals for a UK response to President Nyerere's request for the supply of military equipment.

The Prime Minister has seen your letter and has commented:

"If this is to be supplied free, what are we to get in return - politically or in some other way? We must not be bullied by them".

I should be grateful for advice on the advantage, politically or otherwise, which we could expect to win from supplying the Tanzanians with the items detailed in your letter free of charge. The Prime Minister will wish to consider this advice, and any other comments which his colleagues may have, before authorising instructions to be sent to our High Commissioner in Dar-es-Salaam in the terms proposed.

I am sending copies of this letter to Kingsley Jones (HM Treasury), Roger Facer (Ministry of Defence) and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,  
Roger Carrington.

J. S. Wall, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FOLIO  
36



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1

Telephone 01702 70222 218 2111/3

CONFIDENTIAL

MO 11/10/23

CABINET OFFICE
A 4084...
1 NOV 1978
493/1

10th November 1978

*cc Sir Clive Rose*  
*Mr. Whitmore* D. J.M.  
*27/11/78*  
*W 13/11*

*Dear Rafter.*

UGANDAN ATTACK ON TANZANIA

FOLIO  
35

The Defence Secretary has seen your letter of 9th November to Bryan Cartledge at No 10 in which the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary makes proposals concerning the provision of military assistance to Tanzania.

Mr Mulley would be content, if his other colleagues are, for the equipment discussed in paragraph 3 of your letter to be provided to the Tanzanian Government at Foreign and Commonwealth Office expense. I understand that no detriment from the provision would arise to the British Forces, but Ministry of Defence officials are making a final check on this and will advise the FCO accordingly. There would, however, in Mr Mulley's opinion be clear advantages in the airlift being made by civil charter particularly in the light of President Nyerere's views reported in Dar es Salaam. He is not, therefore, prepared to consider any commitment of the RAF Transport Force unless it has been established that civil charter cannot be arranged. He would be very ready for MOD to assist your officials with making suitable charter arrangements.

/ Tel No  
793

Mr Mulley hopes that our High Commissioner in Dar es Salaam can be given the clearest possible advice about the extent of the assistance which it is agreed can be offered, so that there is no risk of false hopes being raised (he noted with some surprise the suggestion about

/ RAF ...

Stephen Wall Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL



2

RAF transport made by the High Commissioner to President Nyerere earlier this week, and reported in his Telegram 793 of 9th November).

I am sending copies of this to Bryan Cartledge (No 10), Kingsley Jones (Treasury) and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).


*Yours sincerely  
Peter Jackling*

(R T JACKLING)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

9 November 1978

*Dear Bryan*

FOLIO  
34

Ugandan Attack on Tanzania

In my letter of 8 November I referred to the requests for the supply of a very wide range of military equipment received from the Tanzanians and said that the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary believed we should concentrate on trying to hasten delivery of the items which the Tanzanians already had on order from UK suppliers. Appropriate instructions were sent to our High Commissioner in Dar-es-Salaam who has now spoken to the Tanzanian Prime Minister, who in turn consulted President Nyerere. (Dar-es-Salaam telnos 802 and 803 enclosed). President Nyerere and his Prime Minister are very disappointed at what they regarded as an inadequate response on our part. They made it clear that they had been expecting offers of assistance on a government-to-government basis, in the belief that that will make delivery easier and quicker.

Dr Owen agrees with our High Commissioner that in the circumstances we should try to respond to the Tanzanians in as forthcoming a way as is possible. In the light of discussion in Cabinet this morning he believes we should do so, without commitment to consider the supply of the highly sophisticated and very expensive items of equipment on the Tanzanian list, such as anti-aircraft and anti-tank missiles. Quite apart from cost and other considerations, the fact is that the delivery lead times of such equipment are very long, and therefore nothing of this kind could be supplied to Tanzania within a sensible time scale.

Dr Owen therefore thinks that we should concentrate on supplying those items of equipment which are readily available; and that we should be prepared to do so without charge to Tanzania, within a moderate ceiling. In practice the kind of package that we envisage putting together would be to offer to supply: a small quantity (I understand 6 are available) of Carl Gustav anti-tank guns from Defence Supply stock here, together with suitable quantities of ammunition; radio equipment; a small number of mine detectors (all that are available after the supply to Zambia); and, if available, a number of assault boats (which the Tanzanians need to cross the Kagera river).

/ Dr Owen

Bryan Cartledge Esq  
No 10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL



Dr Owen recommends, provided that the Prime Minister, Defence Secretary and the Chancellor agree, that we should offer to fly all this equipment to Tanzania by RAF aircraft unless suitable civil aircraft can be chartered, at our expense. It has not been possible in the time available to arrive at a precise costing of a package of this kind but it might involve expenditure of approximately £2 million. Savings totalling £9 million have been identified in the FCO Vote in the current financial year. We expect that about £8 million of these savings will be spent on our programme of military assistance to Zambia during the current financial year. The balance would be available for assistance to Tanzania but if that balance proved insufficient we should have to look to the Contingency Reserve.

It is clearly important that we make an early response to President Nyerere and Dr Owen would be grateful to know whether the Prime Minister and his colleagues agree to the above as soon as possible to enable urgent instructions to go to our High Commissioner in Dar-es-Salaam.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to the Secretary of State for Defence, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and Sir John Hunt.

*Yours ever,*

*Stephen*

(J S Wall)

PS/MR JUDD  
PS/MR FOWLANDS  
PS/MRS  
SIF. DUFF  
MR. RAHAM  
MR REID

2 NO 10 DOWNING ST  
DIO. CABINET OFFICE

ASSESSMENT STAFF CAB. OFF.

MR PETTIER DOT

HD/EAD  
HD/DEF DEPT  
PUSD (2)  
NEWS DEPT

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 091300Z/P091500Z

FM DAR ES SALAAM 091133Z NOV 78

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 802 OF 9 NOVEMBER

AND TO IMMEDIATE MODUK, WASHINGTON, OTTAWA.

YOUR TELNOS 451 AND 452 : TANZANIA/UGANDA : MILITARY EQUIPMENT.

1. I SAW PRIME MINISTER SOKOINE AT 1130 LOCAL TIME TODAY 9 NOV. HE HAD THE MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR AND HIS PRINCIPAL SECRETARY WITH HIM. I MADE THE BEST USE I COULD OF THE MATERIAL IN YOUR TWO TURS. I ALSO RAISED THE QUESTION ABOUT A PRESS LINE (YOUR TELNO 450).

2. THE PRIME MINISTER TOOK CAREFUL NOTE OF WHAT I WAS ABLE TO TELL HIM ABOUT DELIVERY DATES AND THE SITUATION WITH REGARD TO THE VARIOUS OUTSTANDING COMMERCIAL ORDERS E.G. ON LETTERS OF CREDIT. I STRESSED OUR READINESS TO GIVE ALL POSSIBLE HELP WITH SPEEDING DELIVERIES AND TOOK UP IN THIS CONTEXT THE QUESTION OF PAYMENT (PARA 3 OF YOUR FIRST TUR). I MADE CLEAR THAT WHAT I HAD COME TO TELL HIM WAS ONLY A PRELIMINARY RESPONSE AND THAT WE WERE STILL LOOKING AT THE OTHER REQUESTS ON THE TANZANIAN LIST.

3. THE PRIME MINISTER EXPRESSED GREAT DISAPPOINTMENT. HE SAID THAT THERE SEEMED TO BE A COMPLETE MISUNDERSTANDING ABOUT THE NATURE OF THEIR APPROACH TO US. THEY WERE NOT ASKING FOR ASSISTANCE WITH THEIR COMMERCIAL ARRANGEMENTS THEY WERE MAKING A GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT APPROACH. THE SUPPLIES THEY NEEDED COULD NEVER BE OBTAINED IN TIME IF IT WAS ALL DONE COMMERCIALY. THEY HAD HOPED THAT WE COULD PROVIDE THEM WITH AT LEAST SOME OF THE

35/1



THAT WE WOULD BE READY TO OBTAIN THE EQUIPMENT ON THEIR BEHALF. LEAVING REPAYMENT TO BE NEGOTIATED LATER DBI POINTED OUT THAT THE COST OF THE EQUIPMENT IN THEIR LIST RAN TO MANY MILLIONS OF POUNDS).

4. WITH REGARD TO THE PRESS LINE THE PRIME MINISTER SAID THAT THEY DID NOT REGARD ASSISTANCE WITH THEIR COMMERCIAL ARRANGEMENTS AS "HELP" IN THE REAL SENSE OF THAT TERM. IF THEREFORE THIS WAS ALL WE COULD DO THEY WOULD NOT WISH IT TO BECOME KNOWN THAT THEY HAD MADE A REQUEST TO US SINCE THEY WOULD THEN BE IN THE POSITION OF HAVING TO EXPLAIN TO THEIR OWN PEOPLE HOW THEY HAD ASKED FOR HELP AND THIS HAD NOT BEEN FORTHCOMING.

5. THE PRIME MINISTER THEN ASKED TO BE EXCUSED WHILE HE WENT TO DISCUSS THE POSITION WITH THE PRESIDENT (I AM NOT SURE IF HE SPOKE ON THE TELEPHONE OR WENT ACROSS TO STATE HOUSE WHICH IS NEXT DOOR TO HIS OFFICE). ON HIS RETURN HE SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD BEEN "SHOCKED" BY OUR RESPONSE SINCE HE HAD THOUGHT WHEN HE HAD SEEN ME YESTERDAY 8 NOVEMBER THAT THE NATURE OF HIS REQUEST HAD BEEN CLEAR AS THE PRIME MINISTER HAD JUST EXPLAINED IT. THEY WISHED THE SUPPLY OF THE EQUIPMENT TO BE ARRANGED BY US ON A GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT BASIS. THEY HOPED THAT WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO HELP WITH THE COST. IF HOWEVER WE WERE UNWILLING TO DO THIS THEN "IT WOULD BE NECESSARY FOR THE TANZANIANS TO MEET THE COST THEMSELVES". (BUT THEY STILL WANTED US TO ARRANGE ALL THE SUPPLY). WITH REGARD TO THE PRESS LINE THE PRESIDENT FELT MOST STRONGLY THAT NOTHING SHOULD BE SAID PUBLICLY BECAUSE HE FEARED THAT IF IT WAS ANNOUNCED THAT TANZANIA WAS SEEKING HELP FROM US THIS WOULD GIVE AMIN A CHANCE TO CALL FOR HELP. THE PRESIDENT WISHED THEIR REQUEST TO BE KEPT "DISCREET".

6. I SAID WE HAD FULLY UNDERSTOOD THE CONFIDENTIAL NATURE OF THE APPROACH AND THAT WAS WHY WE WERE CONSULTING THEM BEFORE MAKING ANY STATEMENT. I WOULD REPORT BACK THE PRESIDENT'S STRONG OBJECTION TO ANYTHING BEING REVEALED BUT WE WERE OF COURSE IN A DIFFICULTY IN DEALING WITH PRESS ENQUIRIES. I ALSO REPEATED THAT THE INFORMATION I HAD PROVIDED ABOUT THE KIND OF ASSISTANCE WE COULD GIVE WAS AN IMMEDIATE RESPONSE TO THEIR REQUEST DESIGNED TO ASSIST THEM OBTAIN AT LEAST SOME OF THE ITEMS ALREADY ON ORDER VERY QUICKLY. I SAID WE WERE STILL WORKING URGENTLY ON THEIR REQUEST AND I EXPECTED TO HAVE MORE INFORMATION IN THE NEAR FUTURE. I MADE NO REFERENCE TO ANY SPECIFIC ITEMS.

7. PRIME MINISTER SOKOINE ENDED BY SAYING THAT THEY HAD COME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THE BEST WAY TO GET THE EQUIPMENT WAS TO ASK FOR IT.

7. PRIME MINISTER SOKOINE ENDED BY SAYING THAT THEY HAD COME TO US BECAUSE MOST OF THE ITEMS ON THEIR LIST WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR THEM TO OBTAIN ELSEWHERE WITHOUT DELAY. HE PARTICULARLY ASKED ME WHETHER I COULD TELL HIM ANYTHING MORE ABOUT SUPPLY OF FLOATING BRIDGES BEYOND WHAT IS IN PARA 3 OF YOUR TELN 452. (I HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT THIS IS ANOTHER ITEM VERY HIGH ON THEIR LIST). HE ALSO REFERRED SEVERAL TIMES TO THEIR NEED FOR THE ANTI-AIRCRAFT AND ANTI-TANK WEAPONS. //

MOON

BT

IMMEDIATE

Karl Gutar

NNNN

DESKBY 091300Z/PO91500Z

FM DAR ES SALAAM 091130Z NOV 78

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 802 OF 9 NOVEMBER

AND TO IMMEDIATE MODUK, WASHINGTON, OTTAWA.

MIPT TANZANIA/UGANDA : MILITARY EQUIPMENT

1. I AM AFRAID THAT WE CANNOT STAND STILL ON THIS REQUEST. IF WE RESPOND REASONABLY GENEROUSLY WE CAN WIN SOME POLITICAL CREDIT, WHICH MAY BE WORTH HAVING FOR THE FUTURE. IF WE DO NOT, WE SHALL LOSE GROUND POLITICALLY, EVEN ALLOWING FOR A CERTAIN INEVITABLE ELEMENT OF BLACKMAIL IN THE INITIAL REACTION OF THE PRIME MINISTER AND PRESIDENT.
2. I AGREE ENTIRELY WITH THE LINE IN SECOND SENTENCE OF PARA 2 OF YOUR TELNO 451 SO LONG AS OUR WILLINGNESS TO OFFER ADDITIONAL ITEMS RAPIDLY MEANS, AT LEAST IN A NUMBER OF CASES, ARRANGING OURSELVES FOR THE SUPPLY OF THESE ITEMS DIRECTLY TO THE TANZANIANS AT NO IMMEDIATE COST TO THEM, AND NOT MERELY TELLING THE TANZANIANS THAT THIS OR THAT BRITISH COMMERCIAL COMPANY CAN SUPPLY AT SUCH AND SUCH A DATE AND PRICE.
3. COULD WE POSSIBLY OFFER TO FLY OUT AT ONCE MEETING ALL CHARGES (IF NECESSARY SAYING THAT WE WILL DISCUSS THE SHARING OF COSTS LATER) THE FOLLOWING:
  - I. THE AVAILABLE WIRELESS SETS;
  - II. SOME ASSAULT BOATS WITH OUTBOARD MOTORS AND LIFE JACKETS (AND/OR A FLOATING BRIDGE);
  - III. SOME MINE DETECTING/REMOVING EQUIPMENT;
  - IV. IF AT ALL POSSIBLE, SOME ANTI-TANK MISSILES (WE CAN EXPLAIN LACK OF ANTI-AIRCRAFT WEAPONS BY REFERENCE TO ZAMBIA).
4. I REALISE THAT THIS IS A VERY TALL ORDER. BUT MUCH LESS WILL I THINK BE SEEN AS A REBUFF.
5. IF AMIN WITHDRAWS HIS FORCES, AS NOW SEEMS JUST POSSIBLE, IT MAY NOT BE NECESSARY TO FOLLOW UP THE INITIAL SUPPLY OF EQUIPMENT WITH ANY MORE.
6. ON THE PRESS LINE MY STRONG PREFERENCE, IN VIEW OF THE PRESIDENT'S REACTION, IS FOR THE FCO SPOKESMAN TO DECLINE TO SAY ANYTHING AT ALL UNTIL THE REQUEST HAS LEAKED OUT ELSEWHERE. (FENDS)


CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

8 November 1978



*Dear Bryan,*

Ugandan Attack on Tanzania

In your letter of 31 October you said that the Prime Minister considered that before deciding on defence aid to Tanzania we should wait to see how the Uganda-Tanzania military situation developed and whether President Nyerere made any specific requests.

Our High Commissioner at Dar-es-Salaam has now received personal requests from both President Nyerere and the Prime Minister, Mr Sokoine, for our help with the supply of a very wide range of equipment, including military vehicles, radio, bridging equipment, amphibious craft and armaments (Dar-es-Salaam telnos 793 and 795-7, copies enclosed). They have put their request in parallel to the Canadians. They are vague on payment terms, but the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary believes that any supplies should be on a commercial basis.

It is clearly impossible, even if we wished, to meet more than a small part of the Tanzanian requirements. Dr Owen therefore believes that we should concentrate on trying to hasten delivery of the considerable existing Tanzanian orders. We could also try to ensure rapid provision of certain further equipment in limited fields, such as assault craft. If the Tanzanians have serious problems over payment, Dr Owen believes we might at that stage consider the possibility of meeting the cost of air-freighting certain items of key equipment, with Tanzania paying for the equipment. Such deliveries should be undertaken by commercial airlines.

Our latest reports indicate that President Amin may now be considering a withdrawal. However we have no hard information, and Dr Owen believes that we should give the Tanzanians an initial response quickly. Meanwhile Mr Moon has been instructed to say that we are doing what we can to hasten delivery of existing orders and are examining the rest of the list urgently.

I am copying this letter to Roger Jackling (MOD), Kingsley Jones (HM Treasury) and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

*Yours ever,  
Stephen*

J S Wall  
Private Secretary

Bryan Cartledge Esq  
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CR 420

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 081130Z/081500Z

FM DAR ES SALAAM 081030Z NOV 78

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 793 OF 8 NOVEMBER

AND TO IMMEDIATE MODUK, WASHINGTON AND OTTAWA

NY TELN 777: TANZANIA/UGANDA: REQUEST FOR SUPPLIES

1. PRESIDENT NYERERE SUMMONED ME AT 1045 LOCAL TIME TODAY 8 NOVEMBER. HE WISHED TO ASK FOR BRITISH ASSISTANCE WITH THE SUPPLY OF CERTAIN EQUIPMENT WHICH THEY NEEDED TO DEAL WITH THE UGANDAN INTRUSION. HE TOLD ME THAT HE WOULD BE PUTTING THE SAME REQUESTS TO THE CANADIAN HIGH COMMISSIONER BUT NOT TO ANYONE ELSE. HE SAID THAT HE HAD NOT MADE ANY REQUESTS WHEN HE HAD FIRST SEEN ME (ON 31 OCTOBER) BECAUSE HE HAD NOT THEN KNOWN WHAT THEIR REQUIREMENTS WOULD BE. THESE HAD HOWEVER NOW BEEN WORKED OUT BY HIS OFFICIALS.

2. HE THEN WENT ON TO ASK FOR THE FOLLOWING:-

I. FACILITIES FOR RIVER CROSSING (HE SAID THAT THE UGANDANS HAD DESTROYED THE KIVAKA BRIDGE THOUGH IT COULD BE REPAIRED):

II. EQUIPMENT FOR DETECTING AND REMOVING MINES: THEY EXPECTED THE UGANDANS TO MINE THE ROADS:

III. COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT:

IV. HAND PORTABLE ANTI-AIRCRAFT WEAPONS: THE UGANDANS HAD NOT MADE MUCH USE OF THEIR AIR FORCE SINCE THE KANZANIS HAD DESTROYED FIVE OF THEIR PLANES BUT HE FEARED THAT THEY MIGHT STILL DO SO:

V. ANTI-TANK WEAPONS: NYERERE SAID THAT THESE HAD NOT BEEN INCLUDED IN THE LIST PROVIDED BY HIS OFFICIALS BUT HE HIMSELF WISHED TO ADD THEM AS IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO DEAL WITH AMIN'S TANKS.

CONFIDENTIAL

FOLIO  
1234

3. NYERERE SAID THAT HE HAD ASKED PRIME MINISTER SOKOINE TO ARRANGE FOR ALL NECESSARY DETAILS OF THEIR REQUIREMENTS TO BE GIVEN TO ME. I REFERRED TO MR SENBUCHE'S LETTER OF 6 NOVEMBER AND NYERERE CONFIRMED THAT THIS OVERLAPPED WITH THE ITEMS HE HAD MENTIONED TO MEM WITHOUT MAKING ANY COMMITMENT ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF SUPPLY, I SAID THAT I ASSUMED THE PRESIDENT WOULD WANT THE EQUIPMENT FLOWN OUT AS IT WAS URGENTLY NEEDED: WOULD RAF TRANSPORT BE ACCEPTABLE? HE SAID IT WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE THOUGH HE WOULD PREFER CIVIL TRANSPORT FOR OBVIOUS REASONS, AND WOULD LIKE AS LITTLE PUBLICITY AS POSSIBLE.

4. I WILL COMPARE NOTES WITH MY CANADIAN COLLEAGUE WHO IS BEING SUMMONED LATER THIS MORNING AND REPORT FURTHER WHEN I HAVE DONE SO.

5. THE QUESTION OF OIL SUPPLIES TO UGANDA WAS NOT RAISED, THE CANADIAN HIGH COMMISSIONER, WHO SAW NYERERE YESTERDAY TO DELIVER A MESSAGE FROM MR TRUDEAU, HAS TOLD ME THAT NYERERE SAID THAT HE HAD SPOKEN TO PRESIDENT MOI ABOUT OIL SUPPLIES AND HE GAVE MR BERGUSCH TO UNDERSTAND THAT THE KENYANS WERE CO-OPERATING.

NOON

# FILES

EAD  
CONS D  
CONS EM UNIT  
IPD  
EID (E)  
ES & SD  
OID  
WED  
NENAD  
OADS  
FINANCE D  
NEWS D  
N AM D

DEFENCE D  
PUSD  
CCD  
PS  
PS/MR JUDD  
PS/MR ROWLANDS  
PS/PUS  
SIR A DUFF  
MR GRAHAM  
MR WILLSON  
MR REID  
MR HIBBERT

# COPIES TO

CRE5 DOT  
CIP DEPT OF ENERGY  
DIO CABINET OFFICE  
ASSESSMENTS STAFF CABINET OFFICE  
TREASURY  
ODM

COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST/

2

CONFIDENTIAL

BICKBY 081030Z/081500Z

FM DAR ES SALAAM 031200Z NOV 73

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 795 OF 8 NOVEMBER

AND TO IMMEDIATE MOBUK, WASHINGTON, OTTAWA.

MY TELNO 793 : TANZANIA/UGANDA : SUPPLIES FOR TANZANIA

*check  
no*  
1. SINCE SENDING MY TUR I HAVE BEEN SUMMONED TO SEE PRIME MINISTER SOKOINE, HE GAVE ME THE LIST OF EQUIPMENT WHICH THEY URGENTLY REQUIRE WHICH IS CONTAINED IN MY LET. THIS OVERTAKES THE LIST IN SEMBUCHE'S LETTER OF 6 NOVEMBER. I UNDERTOOK TO PASS ON THE LIST BUT MADE NO COMMITMENT. I POINTED OUT THAT THE QUANTITIES WERE VERY LARGE. SOKOINE SAID THAT THEY SHOULD BE RECORDED AS MAXIMUM AND THEY WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR ANY QUANTITIES. ALL THE ITEMS WERE URGENTLY NEEDED BUT HE GAVE PARTICULAR EMPHASIS TO THE ASSAULT BOATS, AND THE COMMUNICATIONS AND MINE DETECTING/REMOVING EQUIPMENT.

2. SOKOINE SAID IN VIEW OF THE URGENCY THEY WANTED AIR DELIVERY. THEY WOULD PREFER COMMERCIAL FLIGHTS. HE ASKED, IN THE CASE OF THE RAF BEING USED, IF IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR THE PLANES TO BE UNMARKED. THEY WOULD LIKE DELIVERY TO MWAIZA OR FAILING THAT KILIMANJARO AIRPORT.

3. I ASKED WHETHER THEY HAD GIVEN THOUGHT TO THE TERMS OF SUPPLY, PAYMENT ETC. IT WAS CLEAR THAT THEY HAD NOT. SOKOINE SAID THAT IF WE COULD HELP HE WOULD THAT DISCUSSION OF TERMS



3. I ASKED WHETHER THEY HAD GIVEN THOUGHT TO THE TERMS OF SUPPLY, PAYMENT ETC. IT WAS CLEAR THAT THEY HAD NOT. SOMOINE SAID THAT IF WE COULD HELP HE HOPED THAT DISCUSSION OF TERMS COULD NOT HOLD UP SUPPLY. THEY WOULD OF COURSE BE VERY READY TO DISCUSS AFTERWARDS.

4. AT THE END OF THE MEETING I ASKED IF THE REQUEST THEY WOULD BE PUTTING TO THE CANADIAN HIGH COMMISSIONER WOULD BE EXACTLY THE SAME. SOMOINE SAID IT WOULD, AND THEN ASKED IF I WOULD CONVEY A COPY OF THE LIST OF EQUIPMENT AND ALL THAT HE HAD SAID TO ME TO MY CANADIAN COLLEAGUE. I HAVE DONE THIS.

MOON

NHNN



CONFIDENTIAL

5. US AMBASSADOR SPAIN, WHO HAD ASKED FOR A MEETING TO DELIVER PRESIDENT CARTER'S MESSAGE, WAS SUMMONED IMMEDIATELY AFTERWARDS AT 4PM LOCAL TIME. NYERERE EXPRESSED GRATITUDE (SPAIN DESCRIBED IT AS POLITE BUT NOT PARTICULARLY WARM) FOR THE MESSAGE. ON HUMANITARIAN AID, NYERERE SAID, IF ANY WAS NEEDED, HE WOULD GET IN TOUCH. HE THEN WENT ON TO SPEAK OF HIS MEETING WITH ME, AND SAID THAT THE SINGLE THING HE WANTED MOST OF ALL WAS FOR THE BRITISH TO CUT OFF OIL. HE REFERRED TO MY HAVING SAID THAT BRITISH COMPANIES WERE NOT MAKING UP THE DIFFERENCE RESULTING FROM THE SUSPENSION OF US SUPPLIES AND THAT "THEIR CURRENT SUPPLY FROM KENYA IS AT A REDUCED LEVEL", AND SPECULATED WHAT WAS MEANT BY "REDUCED LEVEL". SPAIN OFFERED NO COMMENT. NYERERE MENTIONED TO SPAIN THAT ONE OF HIS DIFFICULTIES WAS AMIN'S TANKS (HE HAD NONE). CLEARLY, IN WORRYING ABOUT UGANDAN FUEL SUPPLIES, HE IS THINKING OF THE TANKS AS WELL AS THE UGANDAN AIRCRAFT.

6. NYERERE DESCRIBED TO SPAIN HOW THE UGANDANS HAD TAKEN THE BRIDGE OVER THE KAGERA EARLY IN THEIR INCURSION, BUT HAD THEN WITHDRAWN WITHOUT HOWEVER DESTROYING IT. IT WAS NOW HELD BY TANZANIAN TROOPS WHO WERE BEING SHELLED BY THE UGANDANS.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING LUANDA

MOON

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

FILES

EAD	DEF D
CONS D	PUSD
CONG EM UNIT	CCD
IPD	PS
EID (E)	PS/MR ROWLANDS
ES & SD	PS/MR JUDD
OID	PS/PUS
WED	SIR A DUFF
NEWAD	MR GRAHAM
OADS	MR WILLSON
FIN D	MR REID
NEWS D	MR HIBBERT
NAD	

COPIES TO

CRE5 DOT  
CIP DEPT OF ENERGY  
DIO CABINET OFFICE  
ASSESSMENTS STAFF  
CABINET OFFICE  
TREASURY  
ODM

CONFIDENTIAL



*on Sir Cline Rose  
in. Ashimone*

10, DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

CABINET OFFICE  
3763  
3 NOV 1978  
FILING INSTRUCTIONS  
FILE NO. ....

3 November 1978

*107 31..*

Uganda/Tanzania

26

Thank you for your letter of 30 October, with which you enclosed an assessment of present relations between Uganda and Tanzania.

The Prime Minister was glad to have this paper and has taken note of the position.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

B. G. CARTLEDGE

J.S. Wall, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

FOLIO  
29




MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1  
Telephone 01-250-732x 218 2111/3

*copy d. K Pawley 6/11/78  
J. B. Mossman*

SECRET

MO 11/10/23

1st November 1978



*cc Sir Oliver Rose*

*M. Ashmore 27/11  
J. B. Mossman  
V. L. Hillier*

*107 24x1*

*Dear Stephen,*

UGANDAN ATTACK ON TANZANIA

FOLIO  
28

The Defence Secretary has seen your letter of 31st October to Bryan Cartledge at No. 10.

Mr Mulley takes the view that it would be impractical to provide the Tanzanians with anti aircraft or anti tank equipment (there just is none available) or indeed, much other equipment within a short time-scale. In these circumstances he would be grateful, therefore, if the draft telegram of instructions to our High Commissioner in Dar-es-Salaam could be amended as suggested in the attached Annex. These amendments are designed to make clear the limitations on our ability to help in the short term, and to put the possible visit by General Fursdon into the proper context. There is the danger that the Tanzanian Government would read more into such a visit than our ability to help them would justify.

The suggested amendments to paragraph 5 of the draft telegram seem to us to flow naturally from the redrafted paragraph 3, and Dr Owen may feel that paragraph 6 is redundant given our present assessment of the extent to which we are likely to be able to help the Tanzanians with military equipment. Mr Mulley could not, of course, accept that any of the cost of military assistance to Tanzania should be met from defence votes, in the event that such assistance should prove possible.

Copies go to recipients of yours.

*Yours sincerely*

(R T JACKLING)

Stephen Wall Esq  
Foreign & Commonwealth Office

**SECRET**

ANNEX TO MO 11/10/23

1st November 1973

SECRET

Paragraph 2

In lines 14 and 15 delete the clause ", for example over essential defence supplies," and insert new clause "and it would be practicable for us to do so".

Delete last four sentences of paragraph.

New Paragraph 3

Insert new paragraph reading:

"It could be very difficult indeed for us to provide assistance in the form of the immediate despatch of arms and equipment and it is unlikely that we could in this way assist the Tanzanians to deal with the situation they now face. If, however, you would find it helpful Major General Fursdon, who is due very shortly to visit Lusaka, could call at Dar to brief you on the military aspects of any possible help to Tanzania, and he could also, if you judged it helpful, and the Tanzanians so wished, talk to them. But if you wish to propose such a visit to the President you should make it clear that it carries no implications that we could necessarily provide any particular assistance. General Fursdon is the Director, Military Assistance Office; the service his office offers is of a consultancy and advisory nature across the whole army spectrum of activity, which includes advice to overseas countries on management, roles and organisation, training and equipment."

Paragraph 5

In line 4 delete the words "of similar kind".

In lines 5 - 7 omit last two sentences.

SECRET

**SECRET**

SECRET

COLIO  
27



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

31 October 1978

CABINET OFFICE  
A 3604  
- 1 NOV 1978  
FILING INSTRUCTIONS  
FILE NO. 144/31  
493A

cc Sir Cline Rose

cc. Whitmore

K. Pawley  
27/11/78

copy d. K. Pawley 6/11/78  
J. M. Whitman

Dean Bryan,

Ugandan Attack on Tanzania

Dar-es-Salaam telegram numbers 744 and 745 (copies enclosed) report a meeting between President Nyerere, our High Commissioner and the United States Ambassador in Dar-es-Salaam at which President Nyerere revealed that Uganda had launched an attack into his territory.

Up-to-date secret material presents a confused picture but it does appear that the Ugandans have launched an attack perhaps of brigade strength with tanks. We do not know President Amin's motive but this could be a desperate throw in an effort to rally his increasingly disloyal troops with allegations of Tanzanian aggression.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary believes that President Nyerere must regard the situation as grave to turn to us and the United States for help. He believes that it is in our political interests to respond to President Nyerere's approach by indicating our willingness to help within practical limits. Dr Owen would like to send instructions to Peter Moon as soon as possible on the lines of the enclosed draft telegram.

You will see that there is only a little that we could possibly offer given the equipment which we have already committed to Zambia. There is the further point, which the Defence Secretary has made in conversation with Dr Owen, that Tanzania has received much of her training and supplies hitherto from China and this must place a practical limit on our ability to help. The draft telegram is, therefore, careful to make no specific offer of equipment. Dr Owen would be grateful for the Prime Minister's agreement to its despatch.

The Prime Minister may also wish to know that some days ago we were in touch with Shell/BP, who supply 30% of Uganda's oil requirements, following the Congressional embargo on trade with Uganda. We established that Shell/BP were taking steps to avoid meeting the shortfall caused by the fact that US companies have now ceased all supply to Uganda. This was made easier for them by the fact that the Ugandans were seriously in arrears in their payments for earlier supplies.

SECRET



In the light of the Ugandan attacks, we have again been in touch with Shell/BP and pointed out that their international position could be seriously prejudiced if they were to supply Amin when he has committed an aggression against a neighbour. Shell/BP will, as a result, try to keep their supply as low as possible. They are helped in this by the fact that the Kenyans have anyway instructed them to stop railing POL to Uganda, on the pretext of non availability of rail stock.

I am copying this letter to Roger Jackling (Ministry of Defence), Kingsley Jones (HM Treasury) and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

*James  
Sephe*

J S Wall  
Private Secretary

SECRET

DWF G 183/31

FLASH

Flight

LTX382/31

Z FCO

ZZ WASHINGTON

OO TRIPOLI

OO NAIROBI

OO BONN

OO PARIS

OO UKMIS NEW YORK

PP LUSAKA

PP MAPUTO

PP GABORONE

PP PRETORIA

CR 650

ADVANCE COPY

DESKBY 311600Z TRIPOLI NAIROBI

CYPHER CAT A

FM DAR ES SALAAM 311440Z

CONFIDENTIAL

PS  
PS/MR JUDD  
PS/MR ROWLAND  
SIR ADYFF  
MR GRANT  
MR REID  
Hd/LEAD  
Hd/NEWS D.  
Hd/CONS. D.  
Hd/CONS EM. NOT  
DIO Cabinet Office  
Assessment Staff  
Cabinet Office  
NO 10 D/St. (2)

DESKBY 311600Z TRIPOLI, NAIROBI

TO FLASH FCO TELNO 744 OF 31 OCTOBER 1978

RFI FLASH WASHINGTON

IMMEDIATE TRIPOLI, NAIROBI, BONN, PARIS, UKMIS NEW YORK,  
PRIORITY LUSAKA, MAPUTO, GABORONE, PRETORIA  
SAVING LUANDA

MYTELNO 739 (NOT TO ALL): TANZANIA/UGANDA BORDER:

1. US AMBASSADOR SPAIN AND I WERE SUMMONED TO SEE THE PRESIDENT AT 3 PM LOCAL TIME TODAY 31 OCT, MR MKAPA WAS WITH THE PRESIDENT.
2. THE PRESIDENT'S PURPOSE WAS TO INFORM US OF THE SITUATION ON THE TANZANIAN/UGANDAN BORDER. HE BEGAN BY REFERRING TO EARLIER ACCUSATIONS BY AMIN THAT TANZANIA HAD INVADDED UGANDA. AMIN HAD SAID THAT TANZANIA HAD SENT IN A BATTALION. TWO DAYS AGO HE HAD SAID THAT ANOTHER BATTALION HAD BEEN SENT WITH CUBANS ATTACHED TO IT, AND ONE UGANDAN TOWN HAD BEEN OCCUPIED AND ANOTHER WAS THREATENED. ALL THIS NYERERE SAID. WAS LIES.

3. ON THURSDAY OR FRIDAY (DATE) THE UGANDANS HAD SENT AN AIRCRAFT OVER BUKOBA. LATER THEY HAD SENT THREE AIRCRAFT OF WHICH THE TANZANIANS HAD SHOT DOWN ONE WITH ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRE. ON THE FOLLOWING DAY THE UGANDANS HAD SENT AIRCRAFT ROUND KYAKA AND THE TANZANIANS HAD SHOT DOWN TWO. AMIN HAD ADMITTED TO THE SHOOTING DOWN OF ONE AIRCRAFT.

4. YESTERDAY, UGANDAN GROUND FORCES HAD INVADED TANZANIA. THEY WERE NOW IN THE WEST LAKE REGION WITH QUITE A LOT OF TANKS (NYERERE WAS NOT ABLE TO GIVE ANY DETAIL OF THE SIZE OF THE FORCE) THEY HAD REACHED AN IMPORTANT BRIDGE ON THE KAGERA RIVER. NYERERE THOUGHT THE DEPTH OF PENETRATION WAS ABOUT 15 MILES SEMICLN MKAPA THOUGHT IT MIGHT BE AS MUCH AS 20 TO 25 MILES. THE TANZANIAN INFORMATION WAS THAT AMIN WAS CONTINUING TO MASS HIS FORCES ON THE BORDER AND CIVILIAN TRANSPORT WAS BEING MOBILISED. THEY HAD ALSO BROUGHT AIRCRAFT FROM THE NORTH TO ENTEBBE. NYERERE UNDERSTOOD THAT THEY WERE SHORT OF PILOTS BUT WERE HOPING TO OBTAIN THEM FROM LIBYA.

4. ASKED ABOUT WHAT TANZANIA WAS DOING TO DEAL WITH THE SITUATION NYERERE SAID THAT THEY WERE TRYING TO ORGANISE THEIR WIDELY DISPERSED ARMY TO PUSH THE UGANDANS OUT. SPAIN ASKED IF THEY WERE THINKING OF ANY KIND OF RETALIATORY ATTACK EG AN AIRSTRIKE ON A UGANDAN TARGET AND NYERERE REPLIED THAT FOR THE MOMENT THEIR PLAN WAS SIMPLY TO DEAL WITH THE INVASION WHERE IT WAS ON THE GROUND.

5. WITH REGARD TO AMIN'S AIMS, NYERERE SAID THAT HE HAD NO IDEA BEYOND THEIR WISHING TO CAUSE TANZANIA AS MUCH TROUBLE AS POSSIBLE. THERE WERE WIDESPREAD REPORTS OF DISTURBANCES INSIDE UGANDA. AMIN WAS DEEPLY SUSPICIOUS OF THE TANZANIANS AND HE MAY HAVE SEEN THIS ATTACK AS A MEANS OF IMMOBILISING THEM. SPAIN ASKED IF, IN THE EVENT OF THE INTERNAL TROUBLES IN UGANDA BEING SETTLED ONE COULD EXPECT A HALT TO THE INVASION. NYERERE SAID THAT AT PRESENT AMIN APPEARED COMMITTED TO CAUSING MORE TROUBLE.

6. NYERERE MADE NO REQUEST FOR SPECIFIC ASSISTANCE, THOUGH HE SAID HE WOULD WELCOME ANY INFORMATION WE MIGHT HAVE ABOUT THE SITUATION IN UGANDA (BOTH SPAIN AND I DREW ATTENTION TO OUR LACK OF DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION). ASKED IF IN ORGANISING HIS FORCES HE WAS FACING ANY PARTICULAR PROBLEMS, HE SAID THAT THEY HAD THE USUAL PROBLEM OF TRANSPORT. HE ALSO MENTIONED THEIR NEED OF ANTI-AIRCRAFT WEAPONS (IT WAS CLEAR THAT HE WAS NERVOUS OF FURTHER AIR RAIDS). WITH REGARD TO DIPLOMATIC ACTION, NYERERE SAID THAT THEY HAD REPORTED THE SITUATION TO THE OAU BUT HAD NOT YET



DECIDED WHETHER TO TAKE IT TO THE UN.

.. SPAIN AND I UNDERTOOK TO REPORT AT ONCE TO OUR GOVERNMENTS, STRESSING THAT I WAS SPEAKING WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS, I SAID THAT I BELIEVED THAT MY GOVERNMENT WOULD BE READY TO CONSIDER SYMPATHETICALLY ANY REQUESTS THE TANZANIANS MIGHT MAKE FOR ASSISTANCE TO DEAL WITH AN INVASION OF THEIR TERRITORY.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING LUANDA.

MOON

NNNN

FLASH

---

Flag 1

FLASH

DHF G 184/31  
 LTX983/31  
 ZZ FCO  
 ZZ WASHINGTON  
 OO TRIPOLI  
 OO NAIROBI  
 OO BONN  
 OO PARIS  
 OO UKMIS NEW YORK  
 PP LUSAKA  
 PP MAPUTO  
 PP GABORONE  
 PP PRETORIA  
 CR 350  
 DESKBY 311600Z TRIPOLI NAIROBI

CYPHER CAT A  
 FM DAR ES SALAAM 311500Z  
 CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 311600Z TRIPOLI, NAIROBI

TO FLASH FCO TELNO 745 OF 31 OCTOBER 1978  
 RFI FLASH WASHINGTON

IMMEDIATE TRIPOLI, NAIROBI, BONN, PARIS, UKMIS NEW YORK,  
 PRIORITY LUSAKA, MAPUTO, GABORONE, PRETORIA  
 SAVING LUANDA

MY I.P.T.: TANZANIA/UGANDA BORDER:

1. THE PRESIDENT WAS OUTWARDLY AS CALM AND RELAXED AS EVER,  
 BUT I BELIEVE DEEPLY DISTURBED.

ADVANCE COPY

FILED

48

PS

PS/MR JUDS

PS/MR Rowland

PS/PUS

MR GIMMAY

MR REID

Wbf EAD

Wbf NEWS

Wbf CENS

Wbf CENS-EMC

AFS STIFF

CAB OFFICER

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 081330Z/081500Z

FM DAR ES SALAAM 081202Z NOV 78

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 796 OF 8 NOVEMBER ..

AND TO IMMEDIATE MODUK, WASHINGTON, OTTAWA.

MY I.P.T. TANZANIA/UGANDA : SUPPLIES FOR TANZANIA.

1. FOLLOWING IS LIST OF REQUESTED EQUIPMENT.

BEGINS:-

1. COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT:

A) PTR 349B (PLESSEY) SQUAD RADIOS	300 UNITS
B) BATTERY CHARGER FOR PTR 349B	30 "
C) ONE PAIR RECHARGEABLE BATTERIES FOR ABOVE	600 "
D) TRA 921 (RACAL)	200 "
ONE PAIR RECHARGEABLE BATTERIES FOR TRA 921	400 UNITS
BATTERY CHARGERS FOR TRA 921	30 "
RF 301 A (HARRIS CORP US) POWER 100 WATTS	120 "
AMPLIFIERS: POWER 1 KILOWATT	10 "
E) FIELD SWITCHBOARD (10 LINE)	100 "
" TELEPHONES	1200 "
" CABLE DIO	400 KM

2. VEHICLES

FFR LAND ROVERS	36
-----------------	----

3. RIVER CROSSING EQUIPMENT

A) ASSAULT BOATS (ALUMINIUM OR INFLATABLE WITH OUTBOARD MOTORS - 12 MAN CAPACITY)	100 UNITS
B) FLOATING BRIDGE (50 TON BEARING CAPACITY)	2 SETS
C) MEDIUM GIRDER BRIDGE (ALREADY ON ORDER IN UK)	2 SETS
D) LIFE JACKETS	500 UNITS

CONFIDENTIAL

/ E) OUTBOARD

CONFIDENTIAL

- E) OUTBOARD MOTORS BETWEEN 40-60 HP (JOHNSON  
ENGINES OR EQUIVALENT) 50 UNITS
- F) ARMoured VEHICLE LANDING BRIDGE: HEAVY DUTY,  
SPAN 22.8 METRES 2 UNITS

4. MINE DETECTING/REMOVING EQUIPMENT

- A) BABY VIPERS (OR EQUIVALENT) 300 UNITS
- B) GIANT VIPERS (OR EQUIVALENT) 300 UNITS
- C) MOBILE MINE DETECTORS 10 UNITS

5. ARMS

- A) ANTI-AIRCRAFT MISSILE (RE-USABLE)  
"BLOWPIPE" (OR EQUIVALENT) 144 UNITS
- B) MISSILES FOR THE ABOVE 5000 UNITS
- C) ANTI-TANK MISSILE (HAND-PORTABLE) 72 UNITS

ENDS.

MOON

FILES

EAD  
CONS D  
CONS EM UNIT  
IPD  
EID (E)  
ES & SD  
OID  
WED  
NENAD  
OADS  
FINANCE D  
NEWS D  
N AM D

DEFENCE D  
PUSD  
CCD  
PS  
PS/MR JUDD  
PS/MR ROWLANDS  
PS/PUS  
SIR A DUFF  
MR GRAHAM  
MR WILLSON  
MR REID  
MR HIBBERT

COPIES TO  
MR PETER DOT  
CRE5 DOT  
CIP DEPT OF ENERGY  
DIO CABINET OFFICE  
ASSESSMENTS STAFF, CABINET OFFICE  
TREASURY  
ODM

/COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST/

- 2 -

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

GR 340

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 081330Z

FM DAR ES SALAAM 081215Z NOV 78

5TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 797 OF 8 NOVEMBER

AND TO IMMEDIATE MODUK, WASHINGTON, OTTAWA

PRIORITY TO NAIROBI.

MY 2 I.P.T.S : TANZANIA/UGANDA : SUPPLIES FOR TANZANIA

1. I DO NOT NEED TO ELABORATE ON THE POLITICAL ADVANTAGES OF DOING WHAT WE CAN TO HELP. IT IS CLEAR THAT THE RAPID REPEAT RAPID SUPPLY OF EVEN A FEW ITEMS WOULD BE ENORMOUSLY APPRECIATED.
2. THE TANZANIANS ARE LOOKING TO US AND THE CANADIANS TO CO-ORDINATE OUR ASSISTANCE EACH SUPPLYING WHATEVER WE CAN DO MOST EASILY AND QUICKLY.
3. SOKOINE DID NOT ADD ANY INFORMATION ABOUT THE STATE OF HOSTILITIES. WHEN I ASKED IF HE THOUGHT THAT, GIVEN THE INTERNATIONAL CONDEMNATION OF HIS ACTION, PRESIDENT AMIN MIGHT WITHDRAW VOLUNTARILY, HE SAID THAT HE "FEARED" THAT THIS MIGHT BE POSSIBLE, (THUS DEPRIVING THEM OF THE OPPORTUNITY TO INFLECT A MILITARY DEFEAT). HE COMMENTED THAT IF THE UGANDAN FORCES DID WITHDRAW THEY WOULD NONETHELESS PLANT MINES.
4. THE DEPTHS OF TANZANIAN CONCERN ABOUT POSSIBLE ASSISTANCE TO AMIN WERE SHOWN BY SOME OF THE QUESTIONS SOKOINE PUT TO ME. DID WE KNOW THAT ON THE NIGHT OF 31 OCTOBER A LIBYAN C130 AIRCRAFT HAD LANDED BRINGING LIBYAN PILOTS? DID WE THINK IT TRUE THAT SITHOLE HAD SENT HIS 'ARMY' INTO UGANDA JUST BEFORE THE INVASION? WAS LONRHO INVOLVED?
5. ON OIL SOKOINE SAID THAT THEY HAD BEEN TRYING TO SEND A MAN TO NAIROBI TO DISCUSS WITH THE KENYANS BUT HAD NOT YET SUCCEEDED. WHEN I MENTIONED THIS TO THE CANADIAN HIGH COMMISSIONER, HE CONFIRMED WHAT NYERERE HAD SAID TO HIM AS REPORTED IN PARA 5 OF MY TELNO 793, NAMELY THAT HE (NYERERE) HAD RAISED THE MATTER WITH MOI, BUT THAT NYERERE HAD NOT GONE FURTHER THAN AN EXPRESSION OF HOPE THAT THE KENYANS WOULD COOPERATE.

CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

6. MR BERGBUSCH ALSO TOLD ME THAT WHEN HE SAW THE PRESIDENT THIS MORNING 8 NOVEMBER, NYERERE MENTIONED THAT HE HAD TOLD THE RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR THAT SINCE THE RUSSIANS, BY THEIR SUPPLIES TO AMIN, HAD GIVEN THE UGANDANS SUPERIORITY IN TANKS AND AIRCRAFT THEY SHOULD NOW DO SOMETHING FOR TANZANIA. THE RUSSION RESPONSE HAD BEEN NON-COMMITTAL.

NOON

## FILES

EAD  
CONS D  
CONS EM UNIT  
IPD  
EID (E)  
ES & SD  
OID  
WED  
NENAD  
OADS  
FINANCE D  
NEWS D  
N AM D

DEFENCE D  
PUSD  
CCD  
PS  
PS/MR JUDD  
PS/MR ROWLANDS  
PS/PUS  
SIR A DUFF  
MR GRAHAM  
MR WILLSON  
MR REID  
MR HIBBERT

## COPIES TO

CRE5 DOT  
CIP DEPT OF ENERGY  
DIO CABINET OFFICE  
ASSESSMENTS STAFF CABINET OFFICE  
TREASURY  
ODM

/COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST/

# CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

33



SECRET

MO 11/10/23

CABINET OFFICE
A 3801.....
- 6 NOV 1978
FILING INSTRUCTIONS
FILE No. 443/1.....

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1  
Telephone 01-922 218 2111/3

3rd November 1978

Dear Stephen,

UGANDA ATTACK ON TANZANIA

Thank you for your letter of 3rd November drawing our attention to Dar-es-Salaam telegram No 757, and seeking Mr Mulley's views on Dr Owen's suggestion that, as a gesture of sympathy and support for President Nyerere, we might offer to fly out by RAF Hercules aircraft four of the Scorpion tanks which the Tanzanians have ordered, and which are due to be shipped from Hull next week.

Our officials are still studying this but their initial enquiries suggest certain practical difficulties:

- (a) The Scorpions will not be ready for shipment until the middle of next week;
- (b) The ammunition, which - as you acknowledged in your letter - was due to go in the second load towards the end of November - has not yet cleared the necessary process of inspection and could not, therefore, be ready for shipment for a further two weeks at least;
- (c) The Tanzanians are probably not ready to receive the Scorpions, in that they have not yet - we understand - the trained crews to man them.

It seems to us, therefore, that it would be premature to instruct the High Commissioner in Dar-es-Salaam to float this suggestion to the Tanzanians over this weekend.


MOD officials are continuing to study Dr Owen's suggestion, and I hope to be in a position to give you more considered advice before close of play next Monday.

/ It ...

Stephen Wall Esq  
Foreign & Commonwealth Office

SECRET

SECRET



SECRET

2.

It follows from the above that Mr Mulley has not yet had an opportunity to consider in detail the merits of Dr Owen's suggestion. I should tell you, however, that at this stage he is not particularly attracted to it.

I am copying this letter to Brian Cartledge (No 10), Kingsley Jones (Treasury) and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

*Yours sincerely*

*R T Jackling*

(R T JACKLING)

SECRET



CONFIDENTIAL

FLB (30) 30



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

3 November 1978

CASSETT OFFICE  
3756...  
- 5 - 1978  
FILING INSTRUCTIONS  
FILE NO. 493/1

Jan 1 at 8:00 AM  
4/11  
✓  
Shirmore

Dear Roger,

Ugandan Attack on Tanzania

FOLIO  
29

Thank you for your letter of 1 November in reply to my letter to Bryan Cartledge of 31 October. Dr Owen has seen your letter, together with Kingsley Jones' letter of 1 November conveying the views of the Chancellor of the Exchequer.

You will have seen from Dar-es-Salaam telno 757 (copy enclosed) that President Nyerere's principal concern is that we stop the supply of oil to Uganda. Our High Commissioner has explained to him the problems posed by this request.

Dr Owen thinks that we ought to show President Nyerere that we support him in the face of Ugandan oppression and are prepared to do what we can to help. Our inability to stop the oil flow makes this more important still. Dr Owen recognises the difficulties about providing arms for Tanzania and no request has been forthcoming. However, President Nyerere has mentioned to our High Commissioner that he faces difficulties because of the strength of President Amin's tank force. As you know, the Tanzanian Government have on order 36 Scorpion tanks, for which their people have received training. The first four of the Scorpions are, I understand, due to be shipped from Hull next week, with ammunition due to follow a month later. Dr Owen would like to be able to tell President Nyerere that we would be prepared to fly the four Scorpions (plus ammunition) to Tanzania as soon as possible. This could make a practical contribution to his defence forces and would show our concern to help him. We would not, however, be taking on any new commitment - merely speeding up supply of an existing order.

Transporting the Scorpions and ammunition would presumably require the use of 2 or 3 RAF Hercules aircraft. Dr Owen hopes that Mr Mulley could agree that these aircraft should be made available and that the Government should bear the additional cost over and above the shipping costs already paid for by the

/Tanzanians

R Jackling Esq

Private Secretary to the Secretary of  
State for Defence

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL



Tanzanians. Dr Owen believes that this additional expense should be seen as part of our general defence sales effort and that the cost should, therefore, be borne on the MOD vote.

Dr Owen would be grateful to know Mr Mulley's views as soon as possible since he would hope to be able to instruct our High Commissioner to speak to President Nyerere this weekend.

I am copying this letter to Bryan Cartledge (No 10), Kingsley Jones (HM Treasury) and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

*Jan ever,*  
*Stephen*

J S Wall  
Private Secretary

CONFIDENTIAL

0665

CONFIDENTIAL

DEBAY FCO 021700Z

FM LAR ES SALAAM 021610Z NOV 78

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 757<sup>A</sup> OF 2 NOVEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, NAIROBI, UKHIS NEW YORK,

INFO PRIORITY PARIS, BONN, LUSAKA, NAPUTO, GABORONE, PRETORIA,  
TRIPOLI, MODUK, KHARTOUM

INFO SAVING LUANDA

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 436

TANZANIA/UGANDA HOSTILITIES:

1. I WAS SUMMONED BY PRESIDENT NYERERE AT 3.15 PM LOCAL TIME TODAY (OVERTAKING MY TELNO 756 TO YOU). HIS PURPOSE WAS TO ASK US TO CUT OFF OIL TO UGANDA.

2. NYERERE BEGAN BY REFERRING TO AMIN'S AMBITIONS IN 1971/72 AS RECOUNTED TO THE SCANDINAVIAN AMBASSADORS (SEE MY TELNO 752). AMIN HAD NOW AGAIN MADE CLEAR HIS INTENTION TO ANNEX TANZANIAN TERRITORY AS FAR AS THE KAGERA RIVER. THE TANZANIANS HAD GOT "TO GET RID OF HIM" (MEANING TO GET HIS TROOPS OUT OF TANZANIAN TERRITORY). THEIR MEANS WERE LIMITED, BUT THEY WOULD "STRETCH" THEM AND HE BELIEVED THEY COULD SUCCEED. NYERERE SAID HE DID NOT THINK THAT AMIN WAS GETTING OUTSIDE HELP, THOUGH HE WAS NOT SURE. "SOME ARABS MIGHT STILL BE GIVING HIM MONEY". AMIN'S ECONOMY AND ARMY WERE IN A BAD STATE AND NYERERE THOUGHT HE COULD DEAL WITH HIM.

3. NYERERE THEN WENT ON TO SAY THAT HE HAD MENTIONED OIL AT OUR PREVIOUS MEETING. HE NOW WANTED TO "UPGRADE" WHAT HE HAD SAID THEN. IF OIL CONTINUED TO FLOW, IT MADE THE TANZANIAN TASK FAR MORE DIFFICULT. HE THEREFORE WISHED "TO EXPRESS HIS DEEP CONCERN TO THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT OVER THE SUPPLY OF OIL".

4. I UNDERTOOK TO PASS THIS ON. I SAID THAT WE FULLY UNDERSTOOD HIS CONCERN. OUR OWN INFORMATION WAS THAT, AS THINGS WERE, AMIN MIGHT ONLY HAVE ENOUGH FUEL RESERVES FOR A WEEK OR TWO. I THEN WENT ON AS IN FINAL TWO SENTENCES OF PARA.2 OF YOUR TUR. I ALSO TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO PASS ON THE OTHER INFORMATION IN THAT PARA, AND TO REAFFIRM OUR POSITION ON TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY IN AFRICA ON THE LINES OF THE STATEMENT BY THE FCO SPOKESMAN (RETRACT 60701). NYERERE DID NOT PRESS ME FURTHER ON THE OIL QUESTION.

2. A SHOCKING AND WORRYING SPECTACLE THAT HE HAD TO SAY WAS THE LACK OF ANY PRECISE INFORMATION ABOUT THE SITUATION, E.G. ON THE SIZE OF THE INVADING FORCE AND JUST WHERE IT HAD GOT TO. NOR HAD HE MUCH TO SAY ABOUT THE DISPOSITIONS THE TANZANIANS WERE MAKING TO DEAL WITH THE SITUATION. THIS MAY HAVE BEEN DELIBERATE FOR SECURITY REASONS, BUT I SUSPECT IT WAS MORE THAT THEY ARE IN CONSIDERABLE CONFUSION. I THINK THIS PROBABLY ALSO EXPLAINS THE ABSENCE ON THIS OCCASION OF ANY SPECIFIC REQUEST FOR HELP. THEY JUST DO NOT KNOW WHAT THEY NEED.

3. IF THE SITUATION CONTINUES TO DETERIORATE WE MAY WELL RECEIVE SPECIFIC REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE VERY SOON, POSSIBLY FOR RAPID DELIVERY OF URGENTLY NEEDED DEFENSE SUPPLIES. IF WE WERE ABLE TO TAKE THE INITIATIVE IN OFFERING HELP, THIS COULD PAY POLITICAL DIVIDENDS. AT THE LEAST, IT WAS CLEAR THAT THEY WOULD GREATLY APPRECIATE ANY INTELLIGENCE WE CAN LET THEM HAVE ABOUT UGANDAN DISPOSITIONS AND INTENTIONS. FROM WHAT HE SAID A MAIN CONCERN IN THE PRESIDENT'S MIND IS THE DANGER OF AIR ATTACK AND REINFORCEMENT OF THE UGANDAN AIRFORCE BY THE ARRIVAL OF LIBYAN PILOTS. CAN WE PROVIDE ANY INFORMATION ON LIBYA'S ATTITUDE?

4. TOWARDS THE END OF THE MEETING PRESIDENT NYERERE REFERRED SEVERAL TIMES TO THE NEED TO GET RID OF AMIN. HE ALSO ASKED SPAIN WHETHER THE US TRADE EMBARGO AGAINST UGANDA COVERED THE SUPPLY OF OIL. SPAIN THOUGHT IT DID.

5. YOU WILL NO DOUBT BE COORDINATING A RESPONSE WITH WASHINGTON. AS SEEN FROM HERE, SINCE NYERERE SUMMONED SPAIN AND MYSELF TOGETHER THERE WOULD SEEM TO BE ADVANTAGE IN CONTINUING TO HANDLE THIS ON OUR SIDE AS A JOINT BRITISH/US EXERCISE.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING LUANDA

MOON

NNNN

FLASH

*Derision 25mm.  
2 day.  
L40/70 B/100 -*

File No. ....

Department PRIVATE OFFICE

Drafted by J S WALL  
(Block Capitals)

Tel. Extn. 4641

OUTWARD

TELEGRAM

Security Classification  
SECRETPrecedence  
FLASH

DESKBY .....

FOR  
COMMS. DEPT.  
USEDespatched (Date) .....  
(Time) .....Z

POSTBY .....Z

## PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin) ..... Z (G.M.T.)

(Security Class.) SECRET

(Restrictive Prefix) .....

(Caveat/  
Privacy marking) .....

(Codeword) .....

(Deskby) ..... Z

TO FLASH DAR ES SALAAM  
(precedence) (post)

Tel. No. .... of .....

AND TO (precedence/post) IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

AND SAVING TO .....

REPEATED TO (for info) IMMEDIATE NAIROBI TRIPOLI BONN PARIS UKMIS NEW YOR

PRIORITY LUSAKA MAPUTO GABORONE PRETORIA

SAVING TO (for info) LUANDA

## Distribution: -

PS  
PS/Mr Rowlands  
PS/PUS  
EAD  
Defence  
Planning  
News

## Copies to: -

No. 10  
MOD  
Treasury

## [TEXT]

YOUR TELNOS 744 AND 745: TANZANIA/UGANDA HOSTILITIES

1. I agree that there is much to be said for our coming forward now with an indication that we are willing to help. The details of what we might produce can be worked out later. I judge this to be an important psychological moment in our relations with Nyerere and should like to give a swift demonstration of our readiness to help.

2. You should therefore take the earliest opportunity of speaking to Nyerere. You should say that you have now consulted me and that I have authorised you to reiterate on my behalf the response which you gave to Nyerere on a personal basis <sup>7.4.76</sup> this afternoon (para 7 of first TUR). You could go on to say that I fully

SECRET

recognise and respect the views which Nyerere has made clear to us on various occasions about foreign military involvement in African disputes. I should however like Nyerere to know that we fully share his concern at the latest developments on his border with Uganda and all the reports of a Ugandan invasion. If there are any areas in which Nyerere considers we might be able to help, for example over essential defence supplies, we are very ready to see what we can do. You could go on to say that if it would help we could send someone out to assess needs at very short notice. (<sup>Secretly</sup> ~~Secretly~~ for your own information we might be able to supply some light anti-aircraft guns although recent supply to Zambia has meant running down our stocks drastically. Another area we are exploring is the provision of light anti-tank weapons. As it happens the DMAO (General Fursdon) could stop off in Dar on 3 November en route for Lusaka).

4. Taking up the other points Nyerere made to you, you should explain that we have no first-hand information about the internal situation <sup>in Uganda</sup> as we no longer maintain a mission there. However, the picture we have put together corresponds closely to that Nyerere outlined to you. We also understand that Amin has asked the Libyans to make up his own shortage of pilots. As Nyerere will know, Amin's airforce consists of some 13 Mig 17 and 19 Mig 21 fighters. His only bombers are converted DC3s. We doubt if many of his aircraft are air-worthy. He also faces a serious problem over fuel reserves and may only have enough for a week or two. The position

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

here has been aggravated by the suspension of the US oil companies' supply last week. You may say that British oil companies are not making up the difference and their current supply from Kenya is at a reduced level.

4. For Tripoli. Grateful for anything you can provide on likely Libyan reaction to request for pilots.

5. For Washington. Please tell Americans urgently of action we are taking with Nyerere. I hope they will agree that we should keep closely in touch. If they are able to make an offer of a similar kind over defence equipment, I hope we could co-ordinate. It would also help us if we could share in any US airlift. You should report urgently to me what Americans may have in mind.

6. If Tanzanians do ask for assistance we shall have to consider terms. I should be grateful for your views on this. It may be that we should offer Tanzania terms no less good than those we are giving to Zambia in the current defence equipment exercise, i.e. an outright gift. Much will depend on the scale of any Tanzanian bid. Another possibility would be a loan of equipment supplied.

26  
2 Encl



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

30 October 1978

CABINET OFFICE
3540.....
31 OCT 1978
INSTRUCTIONS
REF No. 493/1

cc Sir Clive Rose  
M. Wharmore

10/31X

Dear Bryan

Uganda/Tanzania Relations

/ The Prime Minister has asked for an urgent report on recent developments between Uganda and Tanzania. I attach a note prepared by our East African Department.

The Prime Minister may wish to know that a CIG assessment of the current situation in Uganda will issue later this week. It will cover, in addition to the allegations of unrest in the Ugandan armed forces, the current problems of the Ugandan economy and the implications of the suspension of oil supplies by three US oil companies.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to the Private Secretaries to members of DOP, the Secretary of State for Trade and Sir John Hunt.

Jan. eva,  
Stephe

J S Wall  
Private Secretary

Bryan Cartledge Esq  
10 Downing Street



SECRET

UGANDA/TANZANIA RELATIONS

1. During the past two weeks there has been a series of allegations emanating from Uganda that a Tanzanian invasion force had crossed the Ugandan border in south west Uganda near the towns of Mbarara and Masaka. In the last few days there have been unsubstantiated reports of mutiny among some Ugandan Army Units and an attempted coup.
2. On 12 October President Amin claimed a Tanzanian battalion had advanced 12 miles into Uganda using machine guns, anti-tank artillery, mortars and other sophisticated weapons. The allegation was dismissed as "absolute nonsense" by President Nyerere, and the British High Commission in Dar es Salaam reported that neither they nor the Americans there had seen or heard anything which might cast doubt on the Tanzanian denial. On 23 October Uganda radio announced that all Tanzanian soldiers had been withdrawn.
3. Allegations of a renewed Tanzanian invasion were made on 27 October and a small Ugandan border town was said to be in the hands of a Tanzanian force advancing towards Masaka and Kampala. Residents of Masaka contacted by journalists in the region over the weekend said the situation appeared normal. In a further series of confused reports Uganda radio announced during the weekend that all Ugandan front-line units had been cut off; that a Ugandan reconnaissance battalion had broken through and was occupying Tanzanian territory in order to cut invaders off from further supplies; that Cuban-led Tanzanian fighter bombers had been intercepted heading for Entebbe airport and one Ugandan plane shot down. All these allegations have been dismissed as "nonsense" by the Tanzanian Government. Our High Commission in Dar es Salaam report that according to a UNDP officer based at Bukoba, a Tanzanian town on the west coast of Lake Victoria close to the Ugandan border, the town was bombed on 27 October by a Ugandan aircraft.

/4. Simultaneously

SECRET

FOLIO  
26/1

SECRET

- 2 -

4. Simultaneously with the latest reports of renewed fighting, rumours of an army mutiny and an attempted coup began to emerge. Reportedly, in the early hours of 8 October about 40 NCOs had surrounded the presidential lodge; some of Amin's bodyguards were killed but he and his family escaped by helicopter. Subsequently army units in the western districts of Uganda mutinied. The mutiny was said to be in support of the Vice-President of Uganda, Major General Mustapha Adrisi who, although not officially disgraced, has been in Cairo since May recovering from a road accident many believe to have been stage-managed. According to the Kenyan Daily Nation mutinies have broken out in three Ugandan army barracks and the town of Mbarara is in the hands of mutineers. Residents and the local police have however told telephoning journalists that all is normal.

5. We have no staff in Kampala and there is very little hard evidence with which to assess the truth of these confused reports and allegations. Amin however has in the past used allegations of Tanzanian or other external activities as a smoke screen to cover up internal problems, eg unrest in the army, and the reports of an attempted coup followed by a mutiny among some units could well have some substance. There is some supporting evidence from secret sources. According to one such report, a Tanzanian military official stated that the fighting in the border area resulted from engagements between units of Ugandan armed forces. Some Ugandan units, apparently in retreat, had moved over the border pursued by others with armed personnel carriers and heavy artillery. There have been reports of civilians and deserting Ugandan troops fleeing over the border.

6. There may be a connection between the reports of unrest in the army and the allegations of a Tanzanian invasion on the one hand, and indications that the Ugandan economy is in trouble. The US trade ban, which became law at the same time as the first allegation of a Tanzanian invasion, has led to US oil companies suspending supplies to Uganda. They account for 40 % of the market. We have been in touch with Shell/BP who account for 30% of the

/Ugandan

SECRET

SECRET

- 3 -

Ugandan market about the possible implications of this decision by American oil companies. (See FCO telno 563 to Nairobi enclosed)

East African Department  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
30 October 1978

SECRET

IMMEDIATE

CIPHER CAT A

FM FCO 270943Z

AND BY BAG

CONFIDENTIAL

TO IMMEDIATE NAIROBI TELNO 553 OF 27 OCTOBER  
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON INFO SAVING PARIS, BONN.

YOUR TELNOS 1877 AND 1835: US TRADE BAN AND UGANDA POL

1. OFFICIALS MET REPRESENTATIVES OF SHELL AND BP ON 26 OCTOBER IN RESPONSE TO A REQUEST FOR ADVICE FROM THE COMPANIES, TO DISCUSS ACTION THEY MIGHT TAKE FOLLOWING THE WITHDRAWAL OF US OIL COMPANIES FROM THE UGANDAN MARKET.

2. SHELL SAID THAT ALL THREE US OIL COMPANIES HAD NOW STOPPED SUPPLIES TO UGANDA AND WITHDRAWN THEIR EXPATRIATE STAFF. THE UGANDAN GOVERNMENT HAD APPROACHED THE MANAGER OF SHELL/BP UGANDA LIMITED, WHO HAD STALLED WHEN ASKED TO MAKE UP THE SHORTFALL LEFT BY THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE US COMPANIES. THE GOVERNOR OF THE BANK OF UGANDA WAS MEETING IN NAIROBI WITH THE SHELL/BP REPRESENTATIVE ON 26 OCTOBER BUT THE OUTCOME OF THIS WAS NOT YET KNOWN. THE KENYAN GOVERNMENT HAD TOLD SHELL IN NAIROBI THAT, WHILE THEIR RELATIONS WITH UGANDA WERE COOL, THEY WANTED THE OIL COMPANIES TO BE QUOTE STRICTLY CORRECT UNQUOTE IN THEIR TRADING RELATIONS WITH UGANDA.

3. SHELL THEN EXPLAINED THAT IN DECIDING THEIR REACTION TO THE UGANDAN REQUEST THEY WOULD BE GUIDED BY THE FOLLOWING CONSIDERATIONS:

(A) NOT TO BE SEEN TO FRUSTRATE US LEGISLATION, AND TO AVOID PARLIAMENTARY AND PUBLIC CRITICISM IN THE UK;

(B) TO OBSERVE THEIR CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS TO UGANDA. THEY ARE COMMITTED UNDER A 1970 AGREEMENT TO SUPPLY THE UNQUANTIFIED OIL REQUIREMENTS OF BP/SHELL UGANDA LTD. THE AGREEMENT PROVIDES FOR 2 YEAR'S NOTICE OF TERMINATION;

(C) THE SAFETY OF THEIR STAFF IN KAMPALA INCLUDING FOUR EXPATRIATE STAFF, TWO OF WHOM ARE BRITISH;

(D) THE NEED TO REMAIN ON GOOD TERMS WITH THE KENYANS.

4. ASKED TO STATE OUR POSITION, WE SAID THAT WHILE THERE HAD BEEN NO TIME TO CONSULT MINISTERS, OUR PROVISIONAL VIEW WAS

FOLIO  
26/2

THAT THERE WERE MANY UNCERTAINTIES IN THE SITUATION (EG THE ATTITUDE OF US GOVERNMENT AND OTHER EUROPEAN OIL COMPANIES) AND THE BEST COURSE AT THE MOMENT SEEMED TO BE TO PLAY FOR TIME. WE WENT ON TO WARN THAT ANY SUBSTANTIAL INFILLING OF THE US MARKET SHARE BY SHELL/BP WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY OCCASION CRITICISM IN THE UK AND COULD LEAD TO PRESSURES ON THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO FOLLOW THE US EXAMPLE AND BAN ALL TRADE WITH UGANDA. WE WOULD LIKE TO KEEP INCLOSE TOUCH WITH THE COMPANIES.

5. SHELL, WITH ASSENT FROM BP, VOLUNTEERED THAT THEIR PRESENT INTENTION WAS TO TRY TO KEEP THEIR DELIVERIES OF POL TO UGANDA AT ABOUT THE REDUCED LEVELS OF RECENT MONTHS, IF NECESSARY RELYING ON UGANDAN FAILURE TO PAY OFF DEBTS AND/OR BY REFERENCE TO INABILITY TO INCREASE TAKE-OFF FROM THE MOMBASA REFINERY. THEY HAVE PROMISED TO PROVIDE US WITH FIGURES. THEY WARNED HOWEVER THAT IT WAS POSSIBLE THAT PRESSURE FROM THE UGANDAN GOVERNMENT MIGHT INCREASE SINCE OIL STOCKS IN UGANDA WERE VERY LOW AND THAT THEY MIGHT NOT THEREFORE BE ABLE TO HOLD THIS LINE FOR VERY LONG. THEY WANTED TO KEEP IN TOUCH WITH US, AND MIGHT NEED FURTHER GUIDANCE AT SHORT NOTICE. WE COMMENTED THAT AT FIRST SIGHT THE SHELL/BP RESPONSE TO THE SITUATION SEEMED ENTIRELY APPROPRIATE, BUT THAT WE WOULD NEED TO CONSULT MINISTERS.

6. WE WILL TELEGRAPH FURTHER WHEN WE HAVE THE PROMISED DETAILED INFORMATION FROM THE COMPANIES AND HAVE HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO CONSIDER OUR POSITION MORE FULLY.

7. WITHOUT APPROACHING THE KENYANS, WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR ANY PRELIMINARY COMMENTS YOU MAY HAVE ON THE LIKELY VIEWS OF THE KENYAN GOVERNMENT ON SHELL/BP'S PROPOSED TACTICS.

8. RECORD OF CONVERSATION FOLLOWS BY BAG.

OWEN

FILES  
EAD  
ES & SD  
N.A.D  
CSAD  
TRED  
ECON D  
NEWS D

RHODESIA D  
WED  
PS/MR. ROWLANDS  
MR. GRAHAM  
MR. BUTLER  
MR. REID  
MR. THOMAS  
MR. HAYES

COPIES TO:  
CRE 5/DOT  
CIP DIVN D/ENERGY

CONFIDENTIAL



1  
2  
17/3  
Sir Rose  
Mr Fowler  
17/3

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

16 March 1978

6347

17/3  
Dear Martin,

443/1

UGANDAN AIRLINES AND STANSTED AIRPORT



Sir John Hunt sent me a minute (A06870) on 16 March about exchanges between Mr. Dell and Dr. Owen about the use of Standsted Airport by Ugandan Airlines. I am glad to have the background and agree that there is no need to put this correspondence to the Prime Minister at this stage.

Yours sincerely,  
Bryan Cardew.

M.J. Vile, Esq.,  
Cabinet Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

Ref. A06879

MR. CARTLEDGE

Ugandan Airlines: Flights to and from Stansted Airport



I understand that you have asked for advice on Mr. Dell's minute to Dr. Owen of 10th March (copied to the Prime Minister) saying that he is not ready at this stage, to agree with Dr. Owen's proposal that we should take action to stop these flights. He is seeking further clarification of the legal position.

2. I do not think that the Prime Minister should intervene at this stage. The case for action is to make a political gesture, though this needs to be weighed against the fact that the supplies might still be bought from the United Kingdom using commercial airlines, and also that it will shortly be announced that the Ugandan Government has accepted a Commission of Human Rights enquiry in Uganda. The real point is however that the Law Officers' advice is already qualified and is now being challenged further by the Department of Trade Solicitor's Department. Clearly the lawyers must first establish whether or not the flights could be stopped without risk of effective legal action by President Amin.

[Signature]

(John Hunt)

16th March, 1978


CONFIDENTIAL

Ref. A06879

MR. CARTLEDGE

---

Ugandan Airlines: Flights to and from Stansted Airport

 I understand that you have asked for advice on Mr. Dell's minute to Dr. Owen of 10th March (copied to the Prime Minister) saying that he is not ready at this stage, to agree with Dr. Owen's proposal that we should take action to stop these flights. He is seeking further clarification of the legal position.

2. I do not think that the Prime Minister should intervene at this stage. The case for action is to make a political gesture, though this needs to be weighed against the fact that the supplies might still be bought from the United Kingdom using commercial airlines, and also that it will shortly be announced that the Ugandan Government has accepted a Commission of Human Rights enquiry in Uganda. The real point is however that the Law Officers' advice is already qualified and is now being challenged further by the Department of Trade Solicitor's Department. Clearly the lawyers must first establish whether or not the flights could be stopped without risk of effective legal action by President Amin.

(John Hunt)

16th March, 1978



CONFIDENTIAL

CABINET OFFICE

A 5481.....

FILE INSTRUCTIONS

FILE NO. 493/1

File

17

c Sir C Rose

10/22/2

Secretary of State for Trade

UGANDA AIRLINES FLIGHTS TO AND FROM STANSTED AIRPORT

1. I have seen David Owen's minute to you of 20 February proposing that we should take the necessary steps to stop the Uganda Airlines flights to and from Stansted Airport. I very much agree with him, and hope that it can be done quickly.

2. I am copying this minute to the Prime Minister, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, the Home Secretary, the Secretary of State for Defence, the Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, and Sir John Hunt.

*JH*

J H

*Mr. Foster*

*See also Mr. Saunders' letter*

*Spoken to Mr. Rosling (EAT) who will keep in touch. He agrees that in turning the 10 March report of the Human Rights Enquiry will be important*

*22 February to Sir Ian Sinclair (attached below). He was not asked upon to advise at present, but*

*he should keep track of this case. (I am claiming of Dolo (SR) in view the future of these Uganda flights was discussed last year)*


CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

26 October 1977



File 14  
c Sir Rose-  
c Mr Whitmore

109 2714

Uganda: Stansted Flights

Thank you for your letter of 25 October about Ugandan flights to and from Stansted.

Dr Owen agrees that officials should meet in order to resolve the issue of permits for the Stansted flights and I understand that arrangements for a meeting have already been made.

Dr Owen was content with the proposed answer to Mr Janner's question.

I am copying this letter to the recipients of yours.

J S Wall  
Private Secretary

Miss Jeanette Darrell  
PS/S/S of Trade  
1 Victoria Street  
London SW1H 0ET

DEPARTMENT OF TRADE

1 VICTORIA STREET LONDON SW1H 0ET

Telephone 01-215 7877


CONFIDENTIAL



*File*  
*c Mr Bryars*

*From the Secretary of State*

Miss C E C Sinclair  
Private Secretary to the  
Rt Hon Frank Judd MP  
Minister of State  
Foreign & Commonwealth Office  
London SW1A 2AH



16 August 1977

*Dear Caroline,*

TRADE WITH UGANDA

A 9338



Your Minister wrote to my Secretary of State on 8 August about firms trading with the Ugandan armed forces and police. A list of such firms is to be provided by Greville Janner MP.


Mr Dell is in Latin America at present. I think he will want to consider Mr Judd's points in the light of Mr Janner's list when this is received. We shall therefore be letting you have a substantive reply after Mr Dell's return and the receipt of Mr Janner's list.

I am sending copies of this letter to Ken Stowe (10 Downing Street), John Michell (Department of Industry) and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

*Yours sincerely,*

*Mary Baker*

M M BAKER  
Private Secretary




CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

From The Minister of State



8 August 1977

*Mr Bryan*  
*Mr Mottam*

#### TRADE WITH UGANDA

David Owen, who is on holiday, recently had a long session with Greville Janner about trade with Uganda during which he raised in particular the question of supplies of sensitive equipment not subject to licence (eg Land-Rovers) to the Ugandan Armed Forces.

The Prime Minister has agreed that we should not pursue trade sanctions as such against Uganda. It is however inevitable that so long as private companies continue to trade with the Ugandan Armed Forces the Government will come under attack for not doing anything to prevent them. Greville Janner has made clear that he will give maximum publicity to any example of this type of trade of which he becomes aware. David Owen therefore believes that if we are to pursue a credible public policy of seeking to ensure that no aid or comfort reaches the Ugandan armed forces and police, we should at least take steps to make clear to companies trading with these bodies that they do so without the Government's approval. We realise that in the absence of trade sanctions as such, such a message to companies would have only moral force. But we should at least have made our position quite clear.

We very much hope that you will agree with this approach and that your Department will be able to make opportunities to put our views to the firms concerned, in particular to British Leyland. Greville Janner has undertaken to let David have

.../a

The Rt Hon Edmund Dell MP  
Secretary of State for Trade  
Department of Trade

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

a memorandum giving details, and I will forward this as soon as we receive it.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Prime Minister, the Secretary of State for Industry and Sir John Hunt.

(Frank Judd)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL



file 10  
- Sir C Rose D  
✓ Mr Bryars - D

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

A 8647...

18 July 1977

18 JUL 1977  
RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS

SUPPLIES FOR UGANDA

107.827

Thank you for sending me, with your letter of 14 July, a copy of the minutes of the meeting of Ministers on 1 July which discussed the question of supplies for Uganda.

The Prime Minister has seen the minutes of this meeting and has taken note of the position reached.

I am sending copies of this letter to Kingsley Jones (H.M. Treasury), Bob Morris (Home Office), Roger Facer (Ministry of Defence), Martyn Baker (Department of Trade), Richard Packer (Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food), John Vereker (Ministry of Overseas Development) and to Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

J. B. G. CARTLEDGE

J. S. Wall, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL



N 01977

SIR CLIVE ROSE


493/1

Supplies for Uganda

After further prompting, Mr Ewans of East African Department has now drafted a minute to the Prime Minister, reporting on the conclusions of the meeting of Ministers which was held on 1 July. This should <sup>be</sup> round before the weekend. I have not received a copy of the agreed record of the meeting but I understand that the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary accepted the Secretary of State for Trade's arguments that nothing could be done to halt the flights to Stansted by Uganda Airlines. As regards the question of the Crown Agents it was agreed that the 38 trucks which were already the property of the Ugandan Government must be shipped to Uganda. No precise instructions were to be given to the Crown Agents as regards their future purchasing policy for the Ugandan Government. This was to be left to "their good sense". In fact any orders placed by the Security departments of the Ugandan Government are to be referred to the Managing Director of the Crown Agents who will immediately consult with ODM as to how they should be handled.

C WILSON


13 July 1977



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

From the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State



## NAAFI TRADE WITH UGANDAN ARMED FORCES

David Owen's attention has been drawn to the fact that NAAFI (Kenya) is currently doing business with the Ugandan Army Shop to the tune of some £70,000 a month.

As you will know, considerable public concern has been expressed on the question of Britain's trading links with Uganda and we have recently been examining what action we might be able to take in this respect. It has been concluded that, while a general trade embargo against Uganda would not be appropriate, the Government must avoid giving the impression that we are in any way granting aid and comfort to the Ugandan Armed Forces and security apparatus. We are therefore proposing to the Crown Agents that they should voluntarily cease to supply equipment of any kind to these organisations, and the Department of Trade are examining possible means of legally terminating the Uganda Airlines' flights into Stansted.

It would appear inconsistent with this action for NAAFI to continue to supply the Ugandan Army Shop, particularly if, as I understand may be the case, HM Government have a decisive say in NAAFI's overall policy through Ministry of Defence representation on its Council. It is therefore David Owen's view that this trade, and the extent and nature of British Governmental association with it, should be urgently examined with a view to reaching an early decision that business for and on behalf of the Ugandan regime should cease. If such a decision is made, we would wish to consider the desirability of consulting the Kenyan Government before it is put into effect in view of the fact that the trade is conducted through Kenya.

J Tonlinson

John Gilbert Esq MP  
Minister of State  
Ministry of Defence  
Main Building  
Whitehall  
LONDON S W 1





CC

PS/Mr Michael Meacher (Department of Trade)

PS/Mr John Tomlinson (Ministry of Overseas Development)

→ Sir C Rose/ (Cabinet Office)

N 4805.....  
 29 JUN 1977  
 FILING INSTRUCTIONS  
 FILE No. 493/1

FOUIC  
 (7)

Ref: PQ 68678

*McIntosh*  
*Reguliz*

*fw 4/7*

M.1

Head of DS13

This non-oral question has been allocated to Minister of State for answer.

2. Would you please supply a draft answer and background notes to reach this office at the time shown on the front cover.

*mg. Dawey*

24/6/77

for APS/Minister of State  
 Ext 6290 Main Building.

M.2

D/DS13/151/7/35

APS/Minister of State

cc: PS/Secretary of State  
 MD/HDS  
 AUS(Sales Admin)  
 D Sales 2  
 FCO(EAD)  
 ODM (Investment and  
 Crown Agents Dept)

PS/HDS  
 AUS(Sales)  
 D Sales Supply  
 Hd/DS 12  
 DOT (Miss B M Eyles)  
 Cabinet Office - Mr C Wilson —

I enclose a draft reply and background note for  
 Mr Janner's non-oral question.

*E G Hill*

E G Hill  
 Hd/DS 13  
 MB0205 6855MB

29 June 77

MR GREVILLE JANNER (LABOUR) (LEICESTER WEST)

Mr Janner: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what sales of military supplies have been made to Uganda during each of the past 12 months; and whether he will now terminate such supplies.

ANSWER

(Dr John Gilbert)

No military supplies subject to individual licence have been made to Uganda during the past 12 months.

CONFIDENTIAL

BACKGROUND NOTE

1. Mr Janner has for some time shown a close interest in Ugandan affairs. He is in frequent touch with FCO concerning Mrs Bloch and associated matters and recently wrote to the Secretary of State for Trade drawing his attention to an article in the 17 June issue of Tribune concerning trade with Uganda. The paper published copies of what it claimed were the "loading manifests for the air shuttle service which operates from Stansted airport to Kampala". The draft reply prepared for Mr Meacher to send to Mr Janner is attached.

2. The history to the question of supplies is that in 1972 Ministers decided to cut off all supplies of military equipment to Uganda. The Ugandans were never formally notified, nor was the decision publicly announced. In November, 1975, as part of our policy of normalisation of relations with Uganda following Mr Callaghan's visit in July 1975, Ministers agreed to resume supplies to Uganda of:

- a. spares for military equipment already supplied from the UK to the Ugandan Armed Forces;
- b. ammunition, practice or live, for this equipment;
- c. sporting guns and ammunition.

3. A number of small arms were sent to Uganda following this decision, but the last licence for such an item was issued in March 1976. Since then, no applications for items in Group 1, Schedule 1 of the ECO, with the exception of some commercial explosives, have been issued.

CONFIDENTIAL

4. The term "military supplies" is, however, often used to refer to items which are not licensable under the ECO but which could be used by or are destined for the armed forces or the police. The Crown Agents are currently under an obligation to supply a number of Bedford trucks and land-rovers to Uganda; these items are not subject to licence unless they are specifically adapted for military use. The question of what should be done about these and future supplies of equipment by the Crown Agents is discussed in para 6 of the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's report to the PM of 22 June, copied to Minister of State under S of S circulation of 23 June.

5. The position is further complicated by the existence of two Open General Licences (OGLs) covering:

- a. specialised parts and components for use in or on aircraft, provided these are not specifically mentioned in the Schedule to the ECO; and
- b. aircraft parts (electric and electronic) which, though specifically mentioned as under control for COCOM reasons, are nevertheless not controlled to Commonwealth destinations.

Under these OGLs such items, of which there is a large, mainly civil, trade, may be exported to a specified list of countries, including members of the Commonwealth, without application to HMG. The lists printed in Tribune refer, in fact, to "aircraft parts" for the Ugandan Police Air Wing. The reply to Mr Janner has been drafted to reflect the present rather complicated licensing position.

CONFIDENTIAL

6. On 21 June, Mr Max Madden tabled several related questions to the Minister of Overseas Development (Hansard extract attached).

CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

7975

27 June 1977

c Sir C Rose D  
c Mr C Wilson - D

49311

107 27/6

Dear Ewen,

Supplies for Uganda



The Prime Minister has seen the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's minute (PM/77/64) of 22 June and the related minutes by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Home Secretary and the Secretary of State for Trade. He agrees with the course of action set out in Dr. Owen's minute and that the next step should be for the meeting proposed in paragraph 7 of that minute to take place; the Prime Minister considers, however, that a Treasury Minister should take part in this consultation.

I am sending copies of this letter to Nick Monck (HM Treasury), Bob Morris (Home Office), Roger Facer (Ministry of Defence), Martyn Baker (Department of Trade), Richard Packer (Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food), John Vereker (Ministry of Overseas Development) and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

*E.A.J. Fergusson*

E.A.J. Fergusson, Esq.  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL



PRIME MINISTER

PM/77/64

*In Reply 24/6.*

*me 23/6.*

cc. PS  
PS/Mr. Rowland  
PS/PUS  
Sir I. Sinclair  
Mr. Graham  
✓ Mr. Mansfield  
Mr. Obitson (E)  
Mr. White  
22/6/77

Supplies for Uganda

I have now seen the report (DOPO(SR)(77)2) of the official sub-committee under the chairmanship of Sir Clive Rose which has been considering supplies to Uganda. The sub-committee considered five possible courses of action against Uganda:-

- (a) a comprehensive ban on exports from the United Kingdom to Uganda;
- (b) action to prevent Uganda Airlines aircraft landing at Stansted;
- (c) a direction to the Crown Agents only to stop supplies to the Ugandan armed forces and police;
- (d) expulsion of Ugandan trading officials;
- (e) action against Ugandan imports.

2. I agree that a comprehensive ban on exports from the UK to Uganda is not practicable. We would be taking a very unwieldy sledge-hammer to crack this particular nut and there are a number of specific difficulties which are outlined in the official paper. I think that we have got as much out of the Community as we could hope for in the agreement which was  
came to in Luxembourg yesterday, whereby the EEC

7/1



CONFIDENTIAL

will lower its assistance to Uganda to a strictly controlled amount of humanitarian aid. I think this is satisfactory.

3. I also accept that (d) - expulsion of Ugandan officials - presents difficulties for Merlyn Rees. I had hoped to expel the Ugandan officials along with the members of the Ugandan Interests Section but this is clearly no longer possible, and there are disadvantages about treating them as a separate case.

4. I also agree that (e) - action against Ugandan imports - is likely to harm our interests without having a significant effect on Ugandan exports to this country.

5. I should therefore like to concentrate on action to prevent Uganda Airlines aircraft landing at Stansted and on putting a stop to supplies to the Ugandan armed forces and police by the Crown Agents. As far as the flights into Stansted are concerned, I think we need to look further into the question of claiming that Uganda Airlines are operating for "hire or reward" and that their flights therefore require permits. I recognise that there are risks involved in this course of action, but, even if we were taken to court, we should at least have succeeded in stopping the flights in the meantime. I also think that our officials should look at the possibility of disrupting the Stansted flights by eg diverting them to other airports, making difficulties about clearance of goods through Customs and Excise etc. It should not be beyond our capabilities to achieve this.



CONFIDENTIAL

meeting with the International Committee of the TUC today, I also mentioned to Jack Jones the possibility of union action against the Stansted trade. He did not think there was much prospect of achieving this, particularly as he suspected that the trade would merely go to other countries.

6. As far as the Crown Agents are concerned, I recognise that they are probably under legal obligation to supply the 38 vehicles which have been delivered to them. But I do not believe that they can continue to supply equipment to the Ugandan armed forces or police. Nor do I think that the Crown Agents should need to be directed by Ministers before coming to this conclusion themselves. They should decide that they will in future be unable to handle such orders. No announcement need be made and, if I or Judith Hart are asked questions in Parliament, we can say that we understand that the Crown Agents have taken no further orders for such equipment, without revealing that a policy decision has been taken. The Ugandan authorities are likely to try to circumvent any such restriction by ordering equipment for their military through Departments other than their own Ministry of Defence. But I believe that the Crown Agents will just have to be sensitive and sensible in their approach and, if items such as medical supplies do get through to the armed forces, no great harm will have been done.

7. If you agree...



to meet to sort out the remaining problems.

8. I am sending copies of this minute to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Home Secretary, the Secretary of State for Defence, Secretary of State for Trade, Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, Minister of State for Overseas Development and to Sir John Hur

*140*

22 June 1977

CONFIDENTIAL

4

N 01966

SIR CLIVE ROSE

cc. Mr Mottram

Supplies for Uganda  
(DOPO(SR)(77) 1

493/1

## BACKGROUND

Mr Evans of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office has given me the following additional information on Ministerial priorities. The Prime Minister is inclined to have the Stansted flights stopped and would like to take a decision on Wednesday, 22 June at the latest. We are aware of the Secretary of State's wish that the Committee should treat its work as a matter of high priority. In the circumstances the Foreign and Commonwealth Office will wish to let the Secretary of State have the results of the discussions of today's meeting on Wednesday, with a view to taking decisions very quickly thereafter.

## HANDLING

2. We hope to have a copy of Mr Lynch's report on his informal meeting of officials which was specifically called to discuss the question of the operations of the Crown Agents, but which ranged more broadly over some of the other issues raised in the note by the FCO (DOPO(SR)(77) 1). You may wish to invite Mr Lynch to report on the outcome of his meeting and then for Mr Evans to introduce the note, adding any information which may have come in subsequently. Before the meeting focuses on the specific policy issues in the FCO note, you may wish to refer to some of the general considerations which need to be borne in mind before coming to decisions. Will any actions proposed

- a. be effective in changing the Ugandan government's policies, or make that government more obdurate?
- b. make life more difficult for British subjects working in Uganda and Ugandan nationals in general?
- c. damage our economic and defence interests in the area and provoke retaliation by the Ugandan government?
- d. be acceptable to UK public opinion?
- e. engage the support of members of the Community and the Commonwealth?
- f. be consistent with our international obligations?

CONFIDENTIAL

2. You may then wish to take the following points in turn:

An embargo on trade

You will wish to invite Mr Petter (Trade) to remind the meeting of HMG's policy on trade embargoes. In general we do not favour trade embargoes except in time of war, or as a result of mandatory sanctions introduced by the United Nations. We should also bear in mind the need to be consistent in our policy towards Africa. It will be more difficult to resist demands at the United Nations for an embargo on trade with South Africa if we have recently imposed an embargo on trade with Uganda for obviously political reasons. ✓

Crown Agents operations

You will wish to invite Mr Lynch to comment. His meeting yesterday will have clarified the issues as the basis for the answers to Parliamentary Questions which his Minister will be answering this afternoon. Clearly an important point here is the reputation and reliability of the Crown Agents as a trading organisation if we attempt to restrict their activities.

Trade in tropical products

You will wish to invite Mr Ford (MAFF) to comment on the impact of an embargo on trade of Ugandan imports entering this country, specifically tea and coffee. Do our obligations, as members of the International Coffee Organisation, in any way inhibit action which we might wish to take against Ugandan imports and the movement of Ugandan trading officials? What effect would the cessation of supplies of Ugandan coffee have on the UK coffee market (price implications and employment implications for the processing industry)? How vital is Ugandan coffee to the UK? ✓

The expulsion of Ugandan trading officials

You will wish to invite Mr Petter (Trade) and Mr Chilcot (Home Office) to comment. See also my minute of today's date to Mr Vile.

Flights to Stansted

✓ You will wish to invite Mr Lellow (Trade) to comment on the implications for our obligations under the Chicago Convention of a decision to stop flights by Ugandan Airlines into Stansted Airport. On what grounds could we base a case for halting flights? Is it possible to introduce administrative difficulties which would delay the clearance of flight plans? Are there any ECGD aspects arising from our trade with Uganda which need to be taken into consideration? ✓

CONFIDENTIAL

Community Aspects

You will wish to invite Mr Arbuthnott (FCO) to comment. Do we have obligations under the Lomé Convention which would make it difficult for us to embargo trade with Uganda unilaterally?

Other points

Are there any other areas in which we could recommend to Ministers action against Ugandan interests?

Arms Sales (I assume that these have been stopped some time ago)

Aid

Presumably also stopped some time ago.


FURTHER ACTION

3. It is for consideration whether you wish to report directly to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary the conclusions of the meeting, or whether the FCO should be invited to do so.

C WILSON

21 June 1977

CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

20 June 1977

7754

493/1

Dear Stephen.

Uganda



The Prime Minister has seen the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's minute PM/77/59 of 17 June in which Dr. Owen put forward certain proposals about Ugandan representatives in this country.

other

Subject to comments from/recipients (including the Chancellor of the Exchequer, to whom a copy of Dr. Owen's minute has since been sent), the Prime Minister is content.

I am sending copies of this letter to Nick Monck (HM Treasury), Bob Morris (Home Office), Martyn Baker (Department of Trade), Richard Packer (Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food), Callum McCarthy (Department of Prices and Consumer Protection), and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

am av.

J.S. Wall, Esq.,

Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL